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RMA BYA PA BYANG CHUB BRITSON 'GRUS ON
MADHYAMAKA METHOD*

In the course of a paper 'On the Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma' published in the Proceedings of the 1981 Csoma de Kőrös Symposium, David Seyfort Ruegg has noted what appears to be a strange inconsistency in the views attributed by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721) to the twelfth-century Mādhyamika rMa bya pa Byang chub britson 'grus.¹ According to the *Annotations* by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa to Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* concerning the Madhyamaka approach to thesis and assertion outlined and refuted by Tsong kha pa is that of "rMa bya and others, followers of the earlier teacher Pa tshab (Nyi ma grags)."² They refute, to Tsong kha pa's approval any suggestion that the Mādhyamika has no doctrinal system or thesis of his own, and they also refute any suggestion that the Mādhyamika denies the existence of a valid means of knowledge (*tshad ma/pramāṇa*) suitable to prove it. Rather, they maintain that the approach of the Mādhyamika is as follows: Firstly, he refutes the existence of perception and inference as valid means of knowledge which are objectively gained (*dnogs po stobs zhugs*). That is to say, he refutes a situation where one affirms a valid means of knowledge and its referent established through the critical analysis which examines whether something ultimately exists or not. Nevertheless, the Mādhyamika proceeds to accept a mere valid means of knowledge and its referent as it is understood in the everyday worldly context (*jig rten grags pa*), where there is no critical analysis (*ma dpyad pa*) of how things are ultimately. Having done this, the Mādhyamika is able to prove, by means of correct logical reasons, the fact that entities lack (ultimate) truth, and he does this by setting-forth a probative proposition (Ruegg's trans., *bsgrub pa'i ngag*) directed at the opponent. The Mādhyamika, by whom is meant here the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, does not thus become a Svāntarika, since the Prāsaṅgika's reasoning is carried-out only by a valid means of knowledge as it is understood in an everyday worldly context, without its being subjected to critical analysis.³

Now, let us note the salient points of this account:

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(i) The Prāsaṅgika *opposes* those who maintain that the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own, no doctrinal system, or doesn't accept any valid means of knowledge.

(ii) He does not thereby become a Svātantrika because he doesn't accept any valid means of knowledge which is *dnegos po stobs zhugs*. He thus doesn't accept a valid means of knowledge which found at any level by the analysing mind.

(iii) His refutation of the oponent involves accepting a valid means of knowledge *'jig rten grags pa*, and this means accepting the valid means of knowledge as it is understood and used by the non-analytic, non-critical mind. Thus the opposition between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika on the issue of the valid means of knowledge is not one of acceptance::rejection, but rather one of affirmation because found through critical analysis::acceptance as and because understood by the world, without critical analysis.

If we turn to 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's *Grub mtha' chen mo*, however, the view attributed to rMa bya pa, this time referred to as 'Byang brtson', and others, is rather different. These Mādhyamikas have insufficient knowledge of the root-text and commentary on the Madhyamaka. They quote the famous, perhaps infamous *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29: "If I had any thesis then that fault would accrue to me. But since I don't, so I am indeed without fault." They then go on to argue that the Mādhyamika has no view which can serve as a basis for affirming a doctrinal system of his own. Thus there also doesn't exist a valid means of knowledge suitable to prove it. The Mādhyamika (Prāsaṅgika) simply refutes by the *prasaṅga* of internal contradiction all extremes of existence and nonexistence. And 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa mentions that this approach can be found in many explanations of the *Prasannapadā*, and in the *dBu ma'i stong thun*.⁴ Now, these two views ascribed ostensibly to rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa appear to be flatly contradictory. One says that he refutes those who claim to have no doctrinal system of their own, and a valid means of knowledge suitable to prove it, the other that this is actually his own opinion. Perhaps because the account in the *Grub mtha' chen mo* is more specific, referring to rMa bya pa by his personal name, Byang (chub) brtson ('grus), and mentions the works where this view purports to be found, so Professor Ruegg seems to prefer the latter account as a true portrayal of Byang chub brtson 'grus' approach, and suggests that the view found in the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* may be that of one

or other of the two further rMa bya pas mentioned by Tibetan historians as living round about the time of rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus: rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes and rMa bya pa rTsod pa'i seng ge.⁵ We know that rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus did indeed write, among other works, a commentary on the *Prasannapadā*, one on the *Madhyamakakārikā*, and an *dBu ma stong thun*.⁶ Unfortunately the only work by Byang chub brtson 'grus which survives is his commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā*, the *'Thad pa'i rgyan*. Professor Ruegg simply mentions in a footnote that Byang brtson has referred very briefly to the issue of thesis and assertion in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, and gives a reference to folio 8a. On folio 8a Byang chub brtson 'grus explains the rationale for Nāgārjuna's writing the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, and doesn't himself discuss the issues of thesis and assertion. But Byang brtson does indeed discuss these issues at some length later in his *Madhyamakakārikā* commentary. And his discussion there can leave one in no doubt whatsoever that his own view is that accurately portrayed by Tsong kha pa in the *Lam rim chen mo* as the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* in its entirety.

To explain. It is probable that rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus' discussion of the valid means of knowledge in his *'Thad pa'i rgyan* is ancillary to a discussion elsewhere in his collected works, since he explains that, with reference to the non-affirmation by the Prāsaṅgika of a valid means of knowledge which is objectively gained and known to both parties in a dispute, as is held by the Svātantrika, so the definitions, general and detailed refutations and so on of such *pramāṇas* are to be known from an *dBu ma'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa*.⁷ We know that Byang brtson wrote a commentary on Jayānanda's *Tarkamudgarakārikā* which appears to deal with these topics, and which also appears to be quoted and referred to in this context by the Eighth Karma pa, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554) in his *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta* commentary on the *Madhyamakāvātāra*. Mi bskyod rdo rje refers in particular to a *Rigs rgyan snang ba*, and so it is possible that Byang brtson's *Tarkamudgarakārikā* was in fact called the *Rigs rgyan snang ba*, subtitled the *dBu ma'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa*.⁸ Be that as it may, the discussion of *pramāṇa* in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan* occurs within a context not of the refutation of the *Pramāṇavārttika*/Svātantrika affirmation of objectively-gained *pramāṇas*, but rather in the context of the *refutation* of a Mādhyamika who might wish to hold, following *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29, that the Mādhyamika accepts no theses and has no *pramāṇas* in any sense. Some quote *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29, he observes, and following this maintain that since that Mādhyamika doesn't

have any view which can serve as a basis for affirming a doctrinal system of his own, so he also has no valid means of knowledge suitable to prove it. The (Prāsaṅgika) Mādhyamika simply refutes by the *prasaṅga* of internal contradiction all the extremes conceived by an opponent. Byang brtson leaves one in no doubt that this view is wrong. Here, in his position also, he says, since there isn't established a *dharma* which is conceived as ultimately existing, and is to be affirmed in the face of an analytical awareness, so there certainly doesn't exist a valid means of knowledge which is capable of proving *that*. But since there is a dependently-originated referent for the Mādhyamika, which is a simply conventional entity in the face of a non-analytical intellect, and since there exists a person (*gang zag*) for the Mādhyamika, and since the Mādhyamika also accepts verbalisation, so it is not the case that for the Mādhyamika there doesn't exist a view to be affirmed. If there wasn't affirmed also a simple valid means of knowledge as it is understood by the other side or in an everyday worldly context (*'jig rten nam pha rol la grags pa'i tshad ma tsam*) so our own side would be unable to prove our setting-forth of dependently-originated entities, like an illusion, without self-essence, as simply conventional appearances. Likewise, since we couldn't come to know that the two extremes of nonexistence even conventionally, and finally true existence, as held by the other side, are false, so we couldn't even begin to refute the other side. And so on.⁹

It will not have escaped your notice, perhaps, that the view *refuted* here is very close to that *attributed* to rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in his *Grub mtha' chen mo*. It is not only close but is verbally almost identical. Other Tibetan writers refuted the 'no thesis' theory without their wording being almost identical.¹⁰ The wording is, indeed, so close here, including the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* quote, that there can be little doubt that either Byang brtson and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa are both quoting from an identical third source, or 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is quoting directly, or almost directly, from Byang chub brtson 'grus. Since 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa quotes neither more nor less of this *pūrvapakṣa* than Byang brtson, and he himself says that it can be found in commentaries on the *Prasannapadā* and the *dBu ma'i stong thun*, so it seems likely that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is quoting here directly from Byang chub brtson 'grus, either from the works mentioned, from an edition with minor variants of the *'Thad pa'i rgyan* itself, or from memory.

Inevitably the question arises as to why 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa appears

to directly quote rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus here and yet attributes to him a view which Byang brtson actually refutes? Any answer is likely to be speculative and circumstantial. The most charitable suggestion is that Byang chub brtson 'grus changed his opinion on the issue. This would explain why 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa went out of his way to mention in which texts Byang brtson advocated the 'no thesis' view. However, it seems to me unlikely that Byang chub brtson 'grus would introduce a refutation of his own previous view with the expression 'Some say' (*kha cig*). Moreover I have examined two other accounts of rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus position on the *pramāṇa* issue, attributed to him by name, and in neither of these accounts is there any hint that Byang brtson may have held different views at different stages of his life. The first of these is contained in the lengthy *Theg pa chen po dbu ma rnam par nges pa'i bang mdzod Lung rigs rgya mtsho*, by gSer mdog paṅ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), and treats "the Great Mādhyamika rMa bya's exposition of the ambrosia of Pa tshab lotsawa's discourses". It seems clear to me that Śākya mchog ldan refers here to a different work by Byang chub brtson 'grus from the *'Thad pa'i rgyan*. Indeed the first part of Śākya mchog ldan's exposition of rMa bya pa shows notable stylistic and verbal similarities to the *Tarkamudgarakārikā*, and suggests that we have here a quote from, or synopsis of, part of Byang chub brtson 'grus' lost commentary to the *Tarkamudgara*.¹¹ It seems equally clear to me, for reasons which I will come to subsequently, that the doctrinal description of the problem of thesis and assertion given by Śākya mchog ldan is of rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus' views and not those of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. The account by Śākya mchog ldan includes definitions of the *pramāṇas* and of four types of *prasaṅga* which are almost identical in meaning, although not verbally the same as, definitions and explanations given in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan*.¹² And Śākya mchog ldan gives rMa bya pa's position as follows: To refute those who do not affirm even conventionally (*tha snyad du*) that which is to be proved and the act of proof we ask immediately how it can be that there is not affirmed even conventionally (*kun rdzob du*) the Middle Way, which is dependent origination, free from the extremes of existence, nonexistence, permanence and annihilation? If this doesn't exist even conventionally, and there doesn't exist a doctrinal system of his own (*rang phyogs*) set forth by the Mādhyamika, couldn't the Mādhyamika still wish to refute the doctrinal systems of others? No! Since self and other are mutually dependent, one's own doctrinal system

not existing so the doctrinal system of the other wouldn't exist. This being the case you had might as well go to sleep!¹³ And so on. From our side there doesn't exist a valid means of knowledge which is objectively gained (*dingos stobs 'ongs pa'i tshad ma*), so we are certainly not Svāntrikas. But logical operations, refutation, proof and so on are able to take place on the basis of *'jigs rten grags pa'i tshad ma*.¹⁴

Now, this account of rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson'grus' views has all the features noted in Tsong kha pa's fourth *pūrvapakṣa* except the connection of the means of valid knowledge with an absence of critical analysis. This connection is found in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan* account, and as we shall see, there are reasons for thinking that it was this connection and its implications which particularly concerned Tsong kha pa. But the important point in the present context is that there is no hint in Śākya mchog ldan's text that Byang brtson may have had different views on the issue of thesis and assertion at different stages in his career. If my speculation is correct that Byang brtson's position as portrayed by Śākya mchog ldan comes from his *Tarkamudgaratīkā*, so there would seem to be a consistency in Byang brtson's approach to this problem in two of the very texts most concerned with the issue of thesis and assertion.

The second text I have found which mentions by name rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus' views on the thesis and assertion debate is a much shorter, but for all that, an extremely valuable account in the commentary to the *Madhyamakakārikā* by Śākya mchog ldan's Sa skya contemporary, and co-pupil of Rong ston Shes bya kun rig (1367–1449), Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge (1429–1489). In fact Go ram pa mentions the views of three previous teachers and briefly describes their contribution to our debate. What is so significant about his descriptions is that they are identical almost word for word with part of the discussion in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan*. But unlike Byang brtson, Go ram pa gives the names of those who hold the various *pūrvapakṣas*. The first teacher, described as 'Pa lo', is in fact Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055–). He held that the Mādhyamika did not accept a thesis of proof which involves positive determination (*yongs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca'*), but it is not the case that the Mādhyamika doesn't have simple negating theses involving negative determination (*rnam bca'd dgag pa'i dam bca'*). By making this distinction there is no contradiction involved in asserting no thesis on the part of the Mādhyamika.¹⁵ We know independently that this was the view of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags from a discussion in Rong

ston Shes bya kun rig's commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā*. According to Rong ston, Lotsawa Nyi ma grags asserted that the meaning of *Vigrahyāvartanī* 29 was that there is no thesis of proof which involves positive determination for the Mādhyamika. But since there does exist a negating thesis involving negative determination so there is no contradiction here (at the beginning of the *Madhyamakakārikā*) in setting-forth a thesis refuting birth.¹⁶ Rong ston further discusses this view, without naming its originator, in his commentary to the *Madhyamakāvātāra*,¹⁷ and the fact that this clearly is Pa tshab's view supports 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's claim that Pa tshab is not himself to be identified with the former teacher who maintained that the Mādhyamika holds no views at all. Nevertheless, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's claim that Pa tshab asserts the necessity of the two truths at the foundational level, the two accumulations, means and intellect on the Path, and the two bodies on the level of the Result leaves open the question of whether Pa tshab might have embraced a negative semantics whereby all doctrinal assertions are nevertheless negative or concealed negatives.¹⁸ If we can follow Rong ston, however, such is not the case. To an opponent who objects against Pa tshab that in the Madhyamaka not only are there negating theses but also proving theses (such as dependent origination – one mustn't abandon that!) Rong ston replies that this doesn't affect the Lotsawa's point. Pa tshab's approach is made in the light of an understanding of the true nature of things. When one is carrying out an examination by critical analysis, so there doesn't exist the slightest *dharma* which is proved or established in a positively determined way.¹⁹ In other words, Pa tshab's theory applies only to theses concerning the Ultimate Truth. Then the Mādhyamika has only negating theses involving negative determination.

The phrasing of Rong ston Shes bya kun rig's description of Pa tshab's position appears to be his own, but Go ram pa's phrasing here, for the next *pūrvapakṣa*, and for Byang chub brtson grus' own approach is so close to that found for all three in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan* as to suggest strongly that he is actually quoting for all three *pūrvapakṣas* from the *'Thad pa'i rgyan* itself. This is supported by the fact that Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge includes nothing more and nothing less in his account of the first two *pūrvapakṣas* than that included in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan*. And his naming of the second *pūrvapakṣa* is, I think, of crucial significance. 'Byang ye' maintains that if the Mādhyamika wishes to refute the erroneous suppositions of his opponent then even the negating thesis involving negative determination is made solely

for the benefit of the opponent. For the Mādhyamika himself there doesn't exist even a simple negating thesis.²⁰ From which it follows that for the Mādhyamika himself there doesn't exist a thesis at all. Now, this 'Byang ye' is in fact rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes, here clearly distinguished from rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus, and apparently holding the view that the Mādhyamika accepts no theses whatsoever. What I wish to propose, therefore, is that the view attributed to rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa in the *Grub mtha' chen mo* is in reality the view of rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes — in other words, the true situation is exactly the reverse of the one Professor Ruegg surmised. But let us note in passing that Byang chub ye shes was certainly not the last to take this approach to the Madhyamaka. As Professor Ruegg has pointed out, Tsong kha pa refers in his *Lam rim chen mo* to certain contemporary Mādhyamikas who held this view.²¹ while mKhas grub rje, in his *sTong thun chen mo* also refers to certain 'moderns' in this context.²² Professor Ruegg has himself suggested that in particular the person referred to may be Ron ston Śākya rgyal mtshan, *alias* Rong ston Shes bya kun rig. But in his commentaries on the *Madhyamakakārikā* and the *Madhyamakāvatāra* Rong ston expounds and refutes the approach which maintains that the Mādhyamika has no thesis at all. Be that as it may, in the sixteenth century the Eighth Karma pa, Mi bskyod rdo rje, defended at length the 'no thesis' view in his *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*.²³ And in the course of his discussion Mi bskyod rdo rje mentions the names of a series of previous writers whose interpretation of the Madhyamaka he admires, considers to be at least partially correct, and whose views he considers himself to have clarified. He refers in particular to a tradition stemming from the 'Four Sons of Pa tshab Lotsawa', one of whom is, according to the *Deb ther sngon po*, rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes. In more modern times he particularly approves of Lo chen sKyabs mchog dpal bzang, Red mda' ba gZhon nu blo gros and others.²⁴ Unfortunately I have no idea who sKyabs mchog dpal bzang was, but rJe Red mda' ba is well-known, and was certainly contemporaneous with Tsong kha pa, since he was one of Tsong kha pa's most important teachers. He could also be referred to by mKhas grub rje as a 'modern'. Only three of Red mda' ba's works are available at the moment, commentaries on the *Suhrillekha*, the *Catuhśataka*, and the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and in the course of a rapid examination of the only work available to me, the *Catuhśatakaṭīkā*, I have been unable to find any clear reference to the issue. Perhaps detailed examination of the

Madhyamakāvatāra commentary may be able to settle the issue as regards Red mda' ba — or perhaps not!

Passing now to the last of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's three *pūrvapakṣas* he mentions the view of Byang chub brtson 'grus himself, taken almost word for word from Byang brtson's criticism of the two previous *pūrvapakṣas* in his *'Thad pa'i rgyan*. Ultimately, there doesn't exist any thesis of negation or proof. But simply conventionally, at this point (in the *Madhyamakakārikā*), there is a simple negating thesis involving negative determination, and there is no contradiction in maintaining that generally there exists for the Mādhyamika also theses of proof involving positive determination.²⁵ Again, no mention or hint that Byang chub brtson 'grus may have changed his views during his career, and some suggestion that for Go ram pa the *'Thad pa'i rgyan* was the main or most convenient source for Byang brtson's views on thesis and assertion *vis à vis* those of his predecessors.

Before proceeding to alternative suggestions as to why 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa may have attributed contradictory views to rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus let us just note how Byang chub brtson 'grus portrays his own position on the interpretation of *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29 in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan*. Our own view, he says, is as follows: We do not affirm even conventionally a valid means of knowledge which is objectively gained (*dnegos po stobs zhugs kyi tshad ma*). But if we didn't affirm a simple *pramāṇa* as understood in the everyday worldly context or by the other side so there could be no refutation or proof from the simple conventional point of view. But in fact this does occur for both sides, simply conventionally, on the basis of the four *pramāṇas* of perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison.²⁶ Byang brtson then proceeds to give the everyday definitions and explanations of the *pramāṇas*. And he continues by explaining that an ultimate referent (*khas blangs kyi mthar thug pa'i don*), even though it isn't really affirmed, still there is nevertheless a sense in which it can be affirmed. Moreover, if there is no critical investigation so something appears as if proved by valid means of knowledge. But if there is critical investigation, so the Mādhyamika relies on affirmations of the other side, the opponent, concerning a valid means of knowledge (in this particular context, inference) which is a non-delusory mode of apprehension for the mind which apprehends the logical marks.²⁷ He explains the four-fold method of procedure of the Prāsaṅgika. Conventionally there exists for the Mādhyamika himself proof and refutation, but these are brought about by simple *pramāṇas* as they are understood by the other side.

The Prāsāṅgika doesn't become a Svātantrika, nor does he become a Prāsāṅgika who, in a technical sense, proves theses, since he doesn't accept even conventionally a conclusion and refutations established as objectively gained.²⁸ And even though it is the case that if one examines with analytic reasoning so true existence is refuted, since they are proved by everyday perception and so on as appearing in the face of a non-analytic mind so nevertheless all the objects of the mind which takes appearance as its referent are certainly true precisely as objects of delusory conventional awareness, the characteristic of the conventional, simple conventional referents whose basis of characterisation is to be proved for a deluded mind, like an illusion and false.²⁹ In other words, the conventional realm, and of course conventional valid means of knowledge, are accepted by the Prāsāṅgika as they are understood by the world in accordance with a mind not engaging in critical analysis, although they do not truly exist when investigated by such analysis. Clearly, Byang chub brtson 'grus' description of his position in the *'Thad pa'i rgyan* fits exactly the account of his position on the thesis and assertion found in our other sources, most notably as the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* in the *Lam rim chen mo*.

I have argued that there is no evidence to think that rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus changed his opinion on the 'no thesis' debate. And I have also argued that the account of Byang chub brtson 'grus' position in the *Grub mtha' chen mo* of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is in fact the position of Byang chub ye shes, in spite of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's tracing it to works apparently written by Byang chub brtson 'grus. Let us consider now the possibility that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was simply confused between two rMa bya pas with such similar names. Now, Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge seems to have made a clear distinction between the two rMa bya pas and their different views on our problem, but there is evidence that by the time of Go ram pa some confusion had already set-in as to who the two teachers were. Śākya mchog ldan records that it was asked whether rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus, renowned as one of the Four Sons of Pa tshab, was the same as the pupil of Phya pa (Chos kyi seng ge), rMa bya rTsoḍ pa'i seng ge?³⁰ He appears to give no answer; the implication is that they are the same, supported by the fact that Byang brtson is recorded in the *Deb ther sngon po* as having also been a pupil of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), and is referred to as one of Phya pa's famous '*Seng ges*'.³¹ But the significant point is that Śākya mchog ldan also refers to Byang chub brtson 'grus as one of the Four Sons of Pa tshab. 'Gos lotsawa gZhon nu dpal, however, writing as an older contemporary

of Śākya mchog ldan, refers to the relevant 'son' of Pa tshab as being rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes.³² But even there the situation is far from clear, since 'Gos lotsawa follows his reference to Byang chub ye shes as one of the Four Sons of Pa tshab with a discussion 'in particular' of Byang chub brtson 'grus, one of the *Seng ges* of Phya pa, and then a discussion of Zhang Thang sag pa, known to Śākya mchog ldan as Zhang 'Byung gnas ye shes, another of the Four Sons of Pa tshab, which suggests at the least an uncertainty for 'Gos lotsawa too as to whether rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes was the same person as rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus. Moreover we have already seen that in the next century Mi bskyod rdo rje claimed admiration for the Four Sons of Pa tshab – I have suggested that his views on Madhyamaka thesis and assertion probably owe something to Byang chub ye shes – and yet his quotes and references in this context all seem to be to rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus.³³

Now, it seems clear on the evidence that we have before us that these two rMa bya pas were not the same person, although which was indeed the 'son' of Pa tshab I cannot say. But the substantial question in the present context is whether 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa confused the two? 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is the latest of our four annotators on the *Lam rim chen mo*, and yet he is the only one who mentions that the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* is by a rMa bya pa – as it turns out, Byang chub brtson 'grus. This fact suggests that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa wasn't following an oral tradition of exposition of this *pūrvapakṣa*, but had rather read the relevant works by Byang chub brtson 'grus. We have already seen that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa appears to actually quote Byang chub brtson 'grus in the *Grub mtha' chen mo*. That he is familiar with the works in some sense is supported by the confidence with which he attributes the view mentioned in the *Grub mtha'* to texts written by Byang brtson. But it seems scarcely credible to suppose that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was unaware of the contradiction between the two views attributed to Byang chub brtson 'grus in the *Lam rim chen mo* annotations and in the *Grub mtha' chen mo*, or, on the supposition that he had read Byang brtson's works, unaware that the *Grub mtha' chen mo* reference was almost a direct quote from one of Byang brtson's texts referring to an *opponent*. So it seems unlikely that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa considered rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes and rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus to be the very same person. He, too, makes no reference to Byang chub brtson 'grus changing his views, and his mention of the texts

where the 'no thesis' view could be found rules out the suggestion that the reference to Byang chub brtson 'grus rather than Byang chub ye shes was just a slip of the pen. The conclusion must be, therefore, that in spite of the evidence that there was indeed some confusion between Byang chub ye shes and Byang chub brtson 'grus prior to 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, still there is no evidence that simple confusion of the two would explain 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's paradoxical attribution of contradictory views to the same person. If Byang chub brtson 'grus didn't change his opinion, and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's attribution in the *Grub mtha' chen mo* isn't a mistake, then we are left with the less palatable suggestion that the erroneous attribution may have been intentional – in other words, that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa was primarily concerned to discredit Byang chub brtson 'grus by attributing such a view to him in the polemical context of the *Grub mtha' chen mo*. Jeffrey Hopkins, surely an admirer of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, refers to his "particular style of vast and thorough presentation, coupled with what at times is partisan fire", and notes in particular the way in which he sometimes hurls insults at his principal opponent, the Sa skya lama, sTag tshang lotsawa (1405–).³⁴ Now, sTag tshang lotsawa seems to have rather admired Byang chub brtson 'grus, whom, he claimed "had a solid command over the terminology (*tshig*) and the import (*don*) of the 'Great Madhyamaka' doctrines, by which the *prāsaṅgika-madhyamaka* is meant."³⁵ The same praise of Byang brtson is found in Śākya mchog ldan, long viewed as a notorious and mistaken teacher by his dGe lugs rivals. There is a tradition that Byang chub brtson 'grus was one of the teachers of Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251), although there are chronological problems involved in giving credence to this view.³⁶ I have suggested that there is reason to think that Mi bskyod rdo rje identified Byang chub brtson 'grus with one of the Four Sons of Pa tshab, whom he particularly wished to commend for their understanding of the Madhyamaka.³⁷ Their concern, according to Mi bskyod rdo rje, was simply absence of delusion, a concern obscured and even lost by the new preoccupation with dialectical subtleties, the analytic and therefore conceptual mind, found in the dGe lugs tradition.³⁸ So the polarisation between dGe lugs and non-dGe lugs Madhyamaka (only one polarisation among many) was reflected in a polarisation of disapproval versus admiration for Byang chub brtson 'grus. It is within this context of debate, and particularly sTag tshang lotsawa's reference to Byang brtson's solid command of the Madhyamaka, that we must view 'Jam dbyangs bzhad

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pa's preface to his erroneous portrayal of Byang chub brtson 'grus' position in the *Grub mtha' chen mo*, in which he asserts that Byang chub brtson 'grus in particular had insufficient knowledge of the root text and commentary on the Madhyamaka. What I wish to suggest is that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa attributed to Byang chub brtson 'grus, in the polemical context of the *Grub mtha' chen mo*, a view which is indeed found in Byang brtson's writings but which is not his own view, as a debating trick against sTag tshang lotsawa, who was an admirer of Byang chub brtson 'grus, used Byang brtson in order to claim a venerable ancestry for his approach to the Madhyamaka (as did Mi bskyod rdo rje) but who, unlike Mi bskyod rdo rje, did not wish to claim that the Mādhyamika accepts no views or *pramāṇas* in any sense or at any level.

What are we to make of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's attributing his *Grub mtha'* interpretation of Byang brtson to actual texts by Byang chub brtson 'grus? It seems likely that by the seventeenth/eighteenth centuries rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus' works had ceased to be studied except under exceptional circumstances. They may have been rare; it is unlikely that such references as those made by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa could be easily checked. Mentioning the names of texts under such circumstances, in the context of debate, is a shrewd rhetorical move, it gives additional force to one's argument, particularly when the argument involves a view which may have come as a surprise to the opponent. There is another case in dGe lugs literature where a suggestion that the Mādhyamika sets-forth both ultimate and conventional only dependent on others, and not as a doctrinal system of his own, appears to be attributed to Byang chub brtson 'grus. This is in the *Zin bris* to Tsong kha pa's *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*.³⁹ But the interesting point here is that the source of this view is not the lost works of Byang chub brtson 'grus, but is this time traced to the *Thad pa'i rgyan* itself. Now, we have seen that this simply isn't the view of the *Thad pa'i rgyan*, and such an attribution is surely only an attempt at distortion for polemical purposes, a distortion made all the easier by the probable fact that rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus' writings were rarely studied by this time.

sTag tshang lotsawa's criticisms of the dGe lugs centered on their attempt to validly establish the conventional – that is, to establish the conventional as conventionally existing through analytic reasoning. In other words he was critical of attempts by the dGe lugs to maintain that the conventional

exists, as conventional, for the *analytic* mind.⁴⁰ Clearly, there is indeed a precedent for the elaboration of a critique of Tsong kha pa by sTag tshang lotsawa on the basis of rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus *actual* treatment of thesis and assertion. For Byang brtson the *pramāṇas* are accepted as they are understood conventionally, in the world, by the non-analytic mind. The idea that the analytic mind would still be able to accept from its own side valid means of knowledge would be quite incorrect for both Byang chub brtson 'grus and sTag tshang lotsawa, since it would mean that the *pramāṇas* and their objects are found under analysis and therefore must be ultimately existent, which is absurd. From the dGe lugs point of view there appears to be a failure to distinguish here between analysis which searches for the object and fails to find it, thus demonstrating that the object lacks *ultimate* existence, and other functions of analysis in demonstrating *conventional* existence. Unlike other critics of Byang brtson, Tsong kha pa is particularly concerned to point out in his *Lam rim chen mo* the paradox in accepting everyday reality unanalysed and yet not allowing analysis itself, which is also to be included under everyday reality, any role in terms of that everyday reality. Particularly significant, I think, is his comment that this tradition, that of Byang chub brtson 'grus, appears to accept that a *svalakṣaṇa*, self-characteristic, exist conventionally.⁴¹ What is wrong with such an approach can perhaps be explained as follow: For Tsong kha pa entities, as they are presented to ordinary consciousness in everyday life, must be presented as having self-existence (*rang bzhin/svabhāva*) because otherwise we would see entities without any trace of self-existence and would thus be liberated from attachment.⁴² But if we accept conventionally that which is given to the non-analytic mind without further analysis, so we must accept conventionally self-existence. Now, apart from the fact that this is a Svātantrika view and not a Prāsaṅgika approach for Tsong kha pa, since to have self-existence is actually to be found under analysis, to really, ultimately, inherently exist, so if we accept conventionally self-existence, conventionally that self-existence should be found under analysis. Which is a strange contradiction, but Tsong kha pa's real point is that rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus is wrong on two counts: in accepting uncritically what is given to the non-analytic mind, and secondly in failing to explore the possibility, on his own premisses, and indeed the necessity, of grounding the conventional as conventional by the analytic mind. And therein lies the centre of Tsong kha pa's dispute not just with rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus, but also with sTag tshang lotsawa.

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One cannot base the distinction between the two 'truths' or two levels of reality on the opposition of analysis:non-analysis. It is within this context of debate that we have to understand 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's (intentionally?) erroneous attribution to Byang chub brtson 'grus of the view that the Mādhyamika accepts no theses and no valid means of proof.

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NOTES

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¹ See Steinkellner and Tauscher (eds.) (1983), Vol. 2, pp. 229–31.

² *Annotated Lam rim chen mo* (1972), Vol. 2, p. 480: bzhi pa sngon gyi pa tshab rje 'brangs rma bya ba sogs kyi lugs ni /

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 480–1: sngon gyi dbu ma pa 'ob dpon zla ba'i rjes su 'brang ba'i bod kyi mkhas pa kha cig gis ni gong gi de ltar dbu ma pa la rang lugs kyi phyogs *sam dam bca'* dang de dag sgrub byed kyi tshad ma med par 'dod pa'i lugs rnam legs par 'gag cing sun phyung nas mkhas pa de'i rang gi lugs (481) ni don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pas rnam par dpyad pa'i rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa'i gzhag bya dang tshad ma'i rnam gzhag khas len pa'i sgrub byed kyi dngos po stobs zhugs kyi tshad ma mngon rjes gnyis ka bkag nas tha snyad du ma dpyad pa'i 'jig rten gyi grags pa'i dbang du byas pa'i tshad ma dang gzhag bya tsam zhig khas blangs nas dbu ma pa rang gis phyr rgol la bsgrub pa'i ngag bkod pa'i sgo nas bsgrub bya bsgrub pa'i gtan tshigs sam rtags yang dag gis bsgrub bya dngos po bden par med pa'i don sgrub par byed do / de ltar sgrub par byed pa de lta bu yin na yang rang rgyud par mi 'gyur ba'i rgyu mtshan ni ma dpyad pa'i 'jig rten grags pa'i tshad ma'i sgo nas 'jog pa'i phyr ro zhes 'chad do / Material in italics are the annotations of Bra sti dge bshes Rin chen don grub (seventeenth century). Cf. *Lam rim chen mo*, folio 436b, and Ruegg, p. 229. Cf also the translation by Wayman (1978), p. 290.

⁴ *Grub mtha' chen mo*, in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1973), Vol. 14, p. 671: yang byang brtson dang gangs gnyan gangs rgya dmar sogs dbu ma rtsa 'grel la phyogs rgyugs byed pa dag na re / rtsod bzlog las / gal te ngas dam bcas 'ga' yod / des na nga la skyon de yod / nga la dam bca' med pas na / nga ni skyon med kho na yin / zhes gsungs pas dbu ma pa la rang phyogs khas blangs rgyu'i lta ba ci yang med cing / de nyid kyi sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yang med la gzhan geig tu yod med kyi mtha' thams cad nang 'gal thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa yin zhes tshig gsal bshad pa mang po dang dbu ma'i stong thun dag las bshad pa ltar ro // See also Ruegg, pp. 230–1. The Sanskrit for the verse from the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* is given by Ruegg on p. 207: yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ // My translation follows the Tibetan embedded in the *Grub mtha'*.

⁵ See Ruegg, p. 230.

⁶ Van de Kuip (1983), p. 300, note 268, and the *Deb ther sngon po*, trans. Roerich (1976), pp. 334 and 343.

⁷ *Thad pa'i rgyan*, p. 41: dang po la rang rgyud du smra ba'i dbu ma pa dag rgol phyir rgol gnyi ga la grags pa'i dngos po'i stobs kyi zhugs pa'am / 'dzin stangs mi 'khrul pa'i tshad ma nyid kyi nges pa yin no zhes zer ro / de ji ltar mi 'thad pa'i tshul ni / tshad ma'i sgra don dang / mtshan nyid dang / nges byed mi 'thad pas dngos po stobs zhugs kyi tshad ma spyir dgag pa dang / ji ltar brtags pa ltar gyi mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa dang / lung dang nyer 'jal gyi tsad ma mi 'thad pas bye brag tu dgag pa'i tshul dbu ma'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa las shes par bya'o /

⁸ *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*, p. 179: yang slob dpon chen po rma bya'i yig char / kha cig dngos stobs zhugs pa'i tshad ma yis / phyogs gnyis dgag sgrub nges pa yin ces / This is followed by the first verse of the *Tarkamudgarakārikā*: yul dngos stobs kyi zhugs pa yi / tshad mas de nyid rtogs so zhes / chos kyi grags pa'i rjes 'brangs pa'i / rtog ge pa rnam smra bar byed / And on the next page (180): yang tshad ma dang gzhal bya rang bden pa yod do zhes mdo sems dag smra ba la brten nas tshad ma'i mdo dang rnam 'grel des nas 'byung ba de bdag nyid chen po byang chub brtson 'grus kyi rgya cher rigs rgyan snang ba la sogs par dgag par mdzad yang legs par 'thad de / Note, incidentally, that on p. 195 of the *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta* Mi bskyod rdo rje quotes from *Tarkamudgara* verse 20 and introduces it with: des na bod gangs can gyi thal 'gyur ba chen po khu mdo des rtog ge tho bar / Is Mi bskyod rdo rje claiming here that Khu mdo sde actually wrote the *Tarkamudgarakārikā*?

⁹ *Thad pa'i rgyan*, pp. 41–2: yang kha cig / gal te ngas dam bcas 'ga' yod / des na nga la skyon de yod / (42) nga la dam bca' med pa na / nga ni skyon med kho na yin / ces pa'i tshul gyis dbu ma pa la rang phyogs khas blang rgyu'i lta ba ci yang med pas de sgrub byed kyi tshad a ma'ang med la / gzhan gyis brtags pa'i mtha' thams cad khas len nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa yin no zhes zer ro / 'di la'ang don dam pa brtags shing dpyad pa rigs pa'i ngor khas blang bya'i chos ma grub pas de sgrub byed kyi tshad ma med mod / ma dpyad pa'i shes ngo kun rdzob tsam du dbu ma'i don rten 'brel yin pas dang / dbu ma pa'i gang zag yod pas dang / dbu ma'i ngag sbyor bas dbu ma pa la / khas blang bya'i lta ba med par mi 'thad pa dang / 'jig rten nam pha rol la grags pa'i tshad ma tsam yang khas mi len na rang gi phyogs kun rdzob tsam du snang la rang bzhin med pa sgyu ma lta bu'i rten 'brel par 'byung ba gzhang pa mi 'grub pa dang / gzhan phyogs tha snyad du med pa dang / yang dag par yod pa'i mtha' mi bden par shes byed med pas gzhan phyogs 'gog 'dod kyi blo mi 'jug cing / etc. etc.

¹⁰ See, for example, Rong ston Shes bya kun rig's *Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba* commentary on the *Madhyamakārikā*, pp. 22–3: dbu ma smra bar rlom pa 'ga' zhiig / dbu ma pa la dam bca' med de / rang phyogs dang gzhan phyogs gnyis su phye nas rang phyogs mtha' cig tu bzhag tu med pa'i phyir / gzhan na mthar 'dzin can du 'gyur bas dbu ma'i don mi gnas so / Rong ston next quotes *Yuktiṣaṅkā* 51 in a version close to but not identical, with that by Jinamitra *et al.* (See Ruegg, p. 211, note 15), and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29. Then: rang gi dam bca' med pa na / de sgrub byed gtan tshigs kyang khas mi len pas rang rgyud kyi rtags kyang 'god par byar med do / gal te tshad ma khas len na dam bca' med par mi 'gyur par thal /

¹¹ Śākya mchog ldan's references to rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus, and this reference in particular, are noted by van der Kuijp (1983), pp. 275, note 112, and 300, note 269. See Śākya mchog ldan (1975), Vol. 15, pp. 544–5: dbu ma pa chen po rma bya'i gsung gis / pa tshab lo tsstha ba'i gsung gi bdud rtsi'i 'chad pa na 'di skad ces (545) gsungs te / bca'don thob byed nus pa mi slu ba / tshad ma'i mtshan nyid yin zhes kha cig zer / ma rtogs yul la 'dzin pa ma 'khrul bas / sgro 'dogs sel ba'i don ldog kha gig 'dod / don dam tshad mas ma rtog don gsal la / mi slu tha snyad tshad ma kha cig smra /

Cf. the series of *pūrvapaksas* at the beginning of the *Tarkamudgara*. In particular, verse 2: blo gang bca'don thob byed pa / tshad ma yin zhes kha cig smra / la la ma rtogs don gsal 'dod / gzhan dag bden ba'i don rtogs smra / Śākya mchog ldan gives Byang brtson's refutations of these preceding views in some detail; verbally and conceptually they seem to rely on the *Tarkamudgara*.

¹² For example, Śākya mchog ldan p. 547: myong bas ma rtogs don 'jal mngon sum gyis / tshad ma dag ni tshul gsum rtags las don / 'jal byed rjes dpag tshad ma yid ches kyi / tshig las don 'jal lung dang dpe las ni / 'dra ba'i don 'jal nye bar 'jal ba ste / 'jig rten grags pa'i tshad ma rnam bzhir bshad / Cf. *Thad pa'i rgyan*, pp. 43–5: de la mngon sum tshad ma ni / sngar ma rtogs pa'i don myong bas rtogs pa ste . . . rjes dpag ni / tshul gsum pa'i rtags las lkog tu gyur pa'i don rtogs pa ste / . . . (44) yid ches pa'i tshig las shin tu lkog tu gyur pa'i don rtogs pa lung gi tshad ma ste / . . . (45) mthong ba'i dpe las ma mthong ba'i don la 'dra ba'i cha 'jal pa ni nye bar 'jal ba'i tshad ma ste / For the four types of *prasaṅga* see Śākya mchog ldan, p. 547, and *Thad pa'i rgyan*, p. 44. See also Ruegg's note 71, p. 231.

¹³ Śākya mchog ldan, p. 546: tha snyad du yang bsgrub bya sgrub byed kyi rnam gzhang khas mi len pa 'gog pa na 'di skad ces / gcig tu yod med rtag dang chad pa yi / mtha' bral rten cing 'brel 'byung dbu ma'i lam / kun rdzob tsam du ji ltar khas mi len / kun rdzob tu yang dbu ma yod min na / dbu ma smra ba'i gang zag gis bzhag / rang phyogs med cing gzhan phyogs 'gog pa yi / gang zag dbu ma par ni 'dod ce na / rang gzhan ltos grub yin pas rang phyogs ni / med par gzhan phyogs yod min de yi phyir / khyod ni ji srid 'gog nas ngal bar 'gyur /

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 547: dngos stobs 'ongs pa'i tshad ma kun rdzob tu'ang / yod min pas na rang rgyud rtags med mod / 'jig rten grags pa'i tshad ma la brten nas / dgag sgrub nges shing rtags rnam thal bar brjod / The language and style of this and the preceding quote are clearly similar to the *Thad pa'i rgyan*, and stem from Byang chub brtson 'grus.

¹⁵ Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, in *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect* (1969), Vol. 12, p. 293, side 2: pa los / dam bca' med par gsungs pa ni yongs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca' med pa yin gyi / rnam bca'dag pa'i dam bca' tsam yang med pa ma yin pas / mi 'gal lo ces . . . / Cf. *Thad pa'i rgyan*, p. 48: kha cig dbu ma pa la dam bca' med ces pa yongs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca' med pa yin gyi / rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam med pa ma yin pas mi 'gal lo zhes . . . /

¹⁶ *Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba*, p. 24: lo tsstha ba nyi ma grags kyi rtsod bzlog gi don yongs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca' med pa yin la / rnam bca'dag pa'i dam bca' ni yod pas 'dir skye ba dgag pa'i dam bca' gsungs pa dang mi 'gal lo zhes gsungs ngo /

¹⁷ Cf. Rong ston's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvātāra* in Trayang and Jamyang Samten ed. (1974) *Two Controversial Mādhyamika Treatises*, p. 66: yong gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca' med pa yin gyi rnam bca'dag pa'i dam bca' khas len pas nyes pa med do snyam na / In both commentaries Rong ston ends up by distinguishing three types of *dam bca'*: a) Propositions for a purpose or from the conventional point of view – as when the Buddha speaks of 'I' and 'Mine' even though they don't exist; b) Propositions in a form accepted by all schools, such as "Form and so on are dependently arising"; and c) Propositions which are not in common with other schools. Rong ston then explains how *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29 is to be interpreted in this context. See his *Madhyamakāvātāra* commentary, pp. 73–4, and the *Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁸ See Ruegg, p. 228, and *Grub mtha' chen mo* p. 671: dge bshes shar ba'i lan tu gzhi la bden gnyis dang lam la tshogs gnyis dang thabs shes gnyis dang 'bras bu la sku gnyis dgos par legs par gsungs ba'i phyir ro /

19 *Zab mo'i de kho na nyid snang ba*, pp. 24–5: 'ga' zhig de mi 'thad de / dgag pa'i dam bca' yod par ma zad / sgrub pa'i dam bca' yang yod pa'i phyir te / rgyu las 'bras bu 'byung ba dbu ma pas kyang 'dod pa'i phyir ro / gal te de ltar mi 'dod na / rten 'brel spangs pas rgyu 'bras la skur ba 'debs pa'i nyes pa yod do / zhes brjod do / 'di ni lo tstsha ba'i dgongs pa la mi gnod de / lo tstsha bas de kho na nyid sems pa'i dbang du byas nas gsungs pa'i phyir dang / rigs pas rnam par brtags pa na yongs gcod du grub pa'i chos cung zad kyang med pa'i phyir ro /

20 Go ram pa, p. 293, side 2: byang yes rnam bca'd dgag pa'i dam bca' yang pha rol gyi log rtog dgag par 'dod nas de'i ngor byas pa yin gyi dbu ma pa rang la dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam yang med do zhes pa . . . / Cf. *'Thad pa'i rgyan* p. 48: yang kha cig rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' yang pha rol gyi log rtog dgag par 'dod nas de'i ngor byas pa yin gyi / dbu ma pa rang la dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam yang med do zhes zer ro /

21 See Ruegg, p. 216, note 30, *Lam rim chen mo* folio 435b, and Wayman p. 288.

22 Ruegg, p. 216, note 30, and *Stong thun chen mo* in Lha mkhar yongs dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan ed., *Madhyamika Text Series*, Vol. I, p. 294.

23 *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta*, p. 145: kha cig dbu ma pa la dam bca' yod zer ba ni mi 'thad de / dam bca' dang khas len dang 'dod pa rnam ni phyogs gang yang rung ba la mngon pa zhen pa dang / dngos po la rnam par rtog pa las byung ba yin na / bden pa gnyis ka yang rigs pas dpyad na rnyed pa rdul phra rab kyi cha shas brgya stong du bgos pa tsam yang med cing / 'phags pa'i mnyam gzahg la rnam par rtog pa gang yang mi mnga' bas dbu ma pas phyogs gang yang khas blangs pa med pa'i phyir / gang rung zhig khas blangs shing / mngon zhen yod na ni dbu ma par mi 'gyur gyi / phyogs su lhung ba dang mthar lhung ba nyid du 'gyur ro /

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 149–50: khyad par pa tshab lo tsā bu bzhi rjes 'brangs dang (150) bcas pa'i lugs de gags can gyi jongs 'dir physis kyi dus su sgra ji bzhin du smra ba lo chen skyabs mchog dpal bzang dang red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros sogs nyung sha(=e?)s las ma byung bar snang bas de dag gi legs bshad kyi snang ba'i cha yang 'dir gsal bar byas pa yin no / Cf. also p. 252 and my article 'A Note on Some Aspects of Mi bskyod rdo rje's Critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka', p. 126 and notes. For Red mda' ba see M. Sato, 'Die Madhyamaka-Philosophie der Sa skya pa-Schule – Red mda' ba gZon nu blo gros' in Steinkellner and Tauscher (eds.), Vol. 2, pp. 243–57. For rMa bya pa Byang chub ye shes as one of the Four Sons see Roerich, trans., p. 343.

25 Go ram pa, p. 293, side 2: byang brtson gyis / don dam par dgag sgrub kyi dam bca' gang yang med la / kun rdzob tsam du 'dir skabs su bab pa rnam bca'd dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam dang / spyir yongs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca' yang yod pa mi 'gal lo . . . / Cf. *'Thad pa'i rgyan* p. 49: kho bo cag gis kyang don dam par dgag sgrub kyi dam bca' gang yang nyas pa med la / kun rdzob tsam du 'dir skabs su bab pa rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam dang / spyir yongs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca' yang byas mod kyi / tha snyad khas ni ma blangs par nged cag 'chad par mi byed do /

26 *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, pp. 42–3: gnyis pa rang lugs gzahg pa ni / de ltar dngos po stobs zhugs kyi tshad ma kun rdzob tu'ang mi 'thad cing / pha rol'am 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma tsam la(=kha?)s ma blangs na kun rdzob tsam du dgag sgrub kyi rnam gzahg gang yang mi 'grub pas / mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa dang / lung dang / nye bar 'jal ba zhes bya ba 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma bzhis tha snyad tsam du phyogs (43) gnyis dgag sgrub kyi don rtogs par rnam par 'jog pa yin no /

27 *Ibid.*, p. 43: khas blangs kyi mthar thug pa'i don ni dngos su khas ma blangs kyang don gyis khas blang dgos su song ba dang / ma dpyad na tshad mas grub pa ltar snang yang dpyad na rtags 'dzin gyi blo 'dzin stangs mi 'khrul ba'i tshad mar pha rol gyi khas

blangs la ltos pa'o / The sense in which ultimate referents are affirmed is that from a conventional point of view they are asserted by way of superimposition (*sgro btags*) in order to dispel mistaken notions. See pp. 49–50.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 44: dngos po stobs zhugs kyi grub pa'i mtha' gcig tu nges pa dang / bzlog 'phangs pa ni kun rdzob tu yang med pas rang rgyud dang sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur du mi 'gyur bar shes par bya'o /

29 *Ibid.* p. 45: rigs pas dpyad na bden par yod pa khegs kyang ma dpyad pa'i blo ngo na snang bar 'jig rten gyi mngon sum la sogs pa nyid kyi grub pas snang bcas kyi blo'i yul thams cad brdzun pa sgyu ma lta bu dang / blo 'khrul par grub par mtshan gzhi shes bya tsam kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid tha snyad kyi shes pa 'khrul pa'i yul du bden pa dang ldan par nges pa yin no /

30 See the *DBu ma'i 'byung tshul rnam par bshad pa'i gtam yid bzhin lhun po*, in Śākya mchog ldan (1975), Vol. 4, pp. 233–4: de'i tshes pa tshab kyi bu bzahir grags pa ni / tshig don gnyis ka la mkhas pa rma bya byang chub brtson 'grus / 'di phyas pa'i slob ma rma bya rtsod pa'i seng ge dang don gcig gam zer /

31 See Ruegg p. 230, note 68, and Roerich, trans., p. 343.

32 Roerich, trans., p. 343.

33 See, for example, the preceding note 8.

34 Hopkins (1983), pp. 573ff. But to be fair, Hopkins also notes that the Tibetan writers of *Grub mtha'* literature tried to avoid as far as possible any element of bias or distortion.

35 Van de Kuijp (1983), p. 302, note 283.

36 See van der Kuijp (1983), p. 99 and p. 302, note 283. Pa tshab was apparently born in 1055. Sa skya Paṇḍita was born in 1182. It would be very difficult for Byang brtson to have been a pupil of Pa tshab and teacher of Sa skya Paṇḍita, especially as the *Deb ther sngon po* records that Byang brtson died seventeen years after Phya pa (d. 1169). (note van der Kuijp's correction of Roerich's mistranslation of this reference). Sa skya Paṇḍita would have been a very young pupil, and yet according to van der Kuijp he is supposed to have studied epistemology with rMa bya pa. However, it is possible that the *Deb ther sngon po* is still confused between Byang chub brtson 'grus and Byang chub ye shes. If the pupil of Pa tshab was Byang chub ye shes, as 'Gos lotsawa says, but 'Gos lotsawa confused this rMa bya pa with Byang chub brtson 'grus, so it is quite possible that it was Byang chub ye shes who died seventeen years after Phya pa. There would then be no problem in rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus being an early teacher of Sa skya Paṇḍita. Van der Kuijp also points out that Śākya mchog ldan often refers to Byang brtson in his major work on the Madhyamaka. See p. 300, note 269.

37 For dGe lugs critiques of Śākya mchog ldan and Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge see Sera rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *lTa ngan mun sel*. For his critique of Mi bskyod rdo rje's interpretation of the *Abhisamayālamkāra* see his *gSung lan klu grub dgongs rgyan*.

38 See here Williams (1983), especially. 126.

39 *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*, pp. 183–4: gzhan dag kun rdzob dang don dam la brtsams pa'i rnam gzahg thams cad gzhan ngor smras kyi rang lugs (184) la min no / For the *Zin bris* reference see the translation of the *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* by Thurman (1984), *The Essence of Excellent Eloquence* (In press – manuscript thesis consulted).

40 Hopkins (1983), pp. 172, 411–2, and especially 539ff. Compare this also with the criticisms by Mi bskyod rdo rje in Williams (1983).

- ⁴¹ *Lam rim chen mo*, folio 447a, *Annotations* p. 523: lugs bzhi pa dgag pa la gnyis las dang por rang bzhin gyis grub pa'i rigs pas dgag bya dpyad bzod 'gogs mi rigs pa ni / lugs 'dis ni tha snyad du rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa yod kyang de 'dra'i rang mtshan rigs pas dpyad bzod pa ni tha snyad du yang 'gog par 'dod par snang ba . . .
- ⁴² Tsong kha pa notes that he has dealt with this topic already when treating the refutation of self-essence. For a discussion of these issues in the context of the *Lam rim chen mo* and Tsong kha pa's other works see Williams (1980), 'Tsong kha pa on kun rdzob bden pa', *passim*.

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A BUDDHIST PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

There once was a man who said, "God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."
(Ronald Knox)

Dear Sir,
Your astonishment's odd
I am always about in the Quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by

Yours faithfully,

God.¹

Thus, with a pair of limericks, does Bertrand Russell aptly satirize the Irish Bishop Berkeley's immaterialist argument for the existence of God. Russell concedes, however, that aside from failing to establish the existence of God, Berkeley's immaterialist epistemology remains unrefuted.²

The primary weakness of Berkeley's extension of immaterialist epistemology into a proof for the existence of God as omnipresent perceiver is that even if one is prepared to agree that it is impossible to conceive of anything existing independently of perception, the most obvious conclusion is that an object, a tree for example, simply ceases to exist when it ceases to be perceived. Berkeley felt that it is inconceivable that "bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them",³ but this is precisely the position of the Buddhist logician Dignāga and his followers, most notably Dharmakīrti. To the Buddhist immaterialist the problem of the continued existence of a tree in an uninhabited quad would be a problem only for a naive immaterialist who had not completely banished materialist preconceptions from his thinking. According to strict immaterialism, the tree does not exist in the quad, it exists in my mind, as does the quad itself. I do not leave the quad; the quad leaves my mind. And

I do not return to the quad to find the tree still existing there; the quad and the tree return to my mind and thereby attain existence in the only meaningful sense of the term. In other words, there are no "bodies" which could be created or annihilated. Reality, according to Buddhist immaterialism, is a rapid succession of discontinuous mental reflexes which are imagined to represent external "bodies" only by the groundless speculation of mind-matter dualism or the untutored perception of common sense.

Buddhist immaterialism holds, moreover, that these discontinuous mental reflexes are strictly momentary, and that in a manner analogous to the processes depicted by quantum mechanics, they follow each other instantaneously, without any period of transition between successive moments. Because they do not reject the momentary creation and annihilation which Berkeley finds unthinkable, the Buddhist immaterialists arrive at a conclusion precisely opposite to Berkeley's with regard to the existence of God. Thus, Kamalaśīla writes:

This, the character of being instantaneous, of being split into discrete moments, pervades everything. By proving this, our fundamental thesis alone, we could have repudiated at one single stroke the God (of the theists), the eternal Matter (of the Sāṅkhyas) and all the wealth of (metaphysical) entities imagined by our opponents . . . (but that would be) perfectly useless trouble.⁴

Though Buddhism has been consistently courageous, or from other points of view, insistently renegade, in pursuing reason to a denial of God and the soul, Buddhist thinkers have been in accord with most other religious and non-religious thinkers in refusing to follow the lead of philosophy into the horrifying realm of solipsism. While different schools of Buddhism allow degrees of reality to what in common parlance is called the self, it is axiomatic in Buddhism that to whatever extent I exist, others also exist. Thus, while the Buddhists were willing to follow the implications of epistemological immaterialism further than Berkeley, and were prepared to accept the reality of momentary creation and annihilation, the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, arguably the greatest immaterialist of all time, thought it necessary to refute the charge that Buddhist immaterialism implies solipsism. He undertook this task in his famous treatise *Santānāntarasiddhi*, "The Proof of Another Stream (of momentary mental reflexes)".

Dharmakīrti's refutation of solipsism is similar to Berkeley's, but it is more closely reasoned and more urgent. The urgency in Dharmakīrti's argument arises from the situation that unlike Berkeley, Dharmakīrti was unwilling to

postulate the existence of God as omnipresent perceiver, a step which removes the issue of solipsism to the periphery of Berkeley's system. Berkeley's premature retreat from the implications of epistemological immaterialism, however, weakens his argument for the existence of God, while ironically, Dharmakīrti's persistence, contrary to his own expectations, results in a much stronger theistic argument. In order to avoid the charge of solipsism, Dharmakīrti finally finds it necessary to construe his highly sophisticated immaterialist epistemology in a manner which, if followed one step farther, implies the existence of a universal mind, which has been called God, and which is, at any rate, unacceptable to Dharmakīrti and most Buddhists. Berkeley's argument is weak because it rests on the supposed inconceivability of a momentary, evanescent universe, a prospect which is, though disturbing, nonetheless quite conceivable. The argument following upon Dharmakīrti's thought, however, is strong, for it persists with the implications of the apparently irrefutable propositions of epistemological immaterialism all the way to the point of head-on conflict with the truly unthinkable, morally despicable specter of solipsism.

Dharmakīrti begins his *Santānāntarasiddhi* by arguing that since I perceive that with regard to myself mental images of my own speech and purposive actions are invariably preceded by a movement of my mind, I can infer that the appearance of mental images of the speech and purposive actions of others must be preceded by a movement of another mind. That which I call "speech and purposive actions", whether my own or another's, is in reality only a series of momentary mental images which do not correspond or refer to any objective phenomena whatsoever. Still, however, having observed within myself an invariable concomitance between prior movement of my mind and the appearance of mental images of my own speech and purposive actions, I can infer that when mental images of speech and purposive actions appear in my mind, but are not preceded by a movement of my mind, they must be preceded by the movement of another mind. Dharmakīrti notes too that even the mind-matter dualist has to rely on a similar inference to establish the existence of other minds, since he cannot perceive directly any mind other than his own.⁵ The only difference in the immaterialist position, argues Dharmakīrti, is that the immaterialist is not foolish enough to assume that the mental images of speech, action and a body, whether one's own or another's, indicate the objective existence of such phenomena.⁶

The dualist opponent objects, however, that according to the Buddhist

version of immaterialism, causation operates only between successive mental moments within a single stream of consciousness, so that according to the Buddhist position, mental images (in one's own consciousness-stream) of another's speech and actions can be caused only by previous mental moments in one's own consciousness-stream; they cannot be caused by another's consciousness stream, and therefore cannot be taken as indicative of another mind.⁷ Dharmakīrti answers that this is a misunderstanding of his position, since he does not claim that mental images (in one's own consciousness-stream) of another's speech and actions are directly related causally to another consciousness-stream. Instead, he maintains only that there is an indirect, regulating causal relation between another consciousness-stream and the mental images of another's speech and purposive actions which occur in one's own mind.⁸ He notes further that the situation is similar when, having seen only smoke, one infers the existence of fire. It is the direct mental image of smoke which causes an indirect mental image of fire to arise. The knowledge of fire which arises in such a situation is not direct knowledge, but only a general concept of fire, a mental image which is altogether different from a direct mental image of fire.⁹ In other words, Dharmakīrti reiterates that the immaterialist is at no disadvantage *vis à vis* the mind-matter dualist with regard to being able to infer, on the basis of logical rules, more than that which occurs in direct experience. The immaterialist merely refuses to admit the unproven existence of objective referents of knowledge, whether direct or indirect. Mere mental images of speech and purposeful actions can indicate the existence of another stream of consciousness just as potently as speech and actions supposed to exist independently of one's perception of them. In either case, only indirect, inferential knowledge of another mind is possible.

Finally, Dharmakīrti argues, if, on the basis of indirect knowledge of fire, inferred from the direct experience of a mental image of smoke, one moves toward the inferred source of the smoke (or more strictly: if by movements of one's mind one produces mental images of movement toward this source) one is assured of being rewarded by a direct experience of fire (or strictly speaking: by a direct mental image of fire). Similarly, he argues, though one may never attain direct experience of another mind, one may be assured that actions undertaken on the basis of one's inference that other minds exist will be rewarded by the attainment of one's goals, in this case, interaction with another person.¹⁰ Thus, since the ultimate test of knowledge

in Dharmakīrti's system is that knowledge invariably precedes the attainment of human goals,¹¹ the existence of other minds is established.

It will be noted that in order to deny the charge of solipsism Dharmakīrti finds it necessary to admit that there is an indirect, regulating causal relationship between some of the mental images of speech and purposive action which occur in my mind and the independent activity of a stream of consciousness external to my own stream. Such mental images which are not preceded by a movement of my own mind, he says, are indirectly regulated by the movement of another mind. He is not, however, prepared to say that a mental image of fire, for example, is indirectly regulated by a fire existing externally to my stream of consciousness. The only thing external to my stream of consciousness which can affect my stream of consciousness, then, is another mind, and the only mental images which can indicate this external influence are mental images of speech and purposive action not preceded by a movement of my own mind. If this is the case, though, how is one to distinguish between speech and random noise, or between purposive and non-purposive motion?

It is only by recognizing the communicative content of speech that it can be distinguished from mere noise, and similarly, it is only by recognizing purpose that purposive actions can be recognized. In either case, communication is the essence of one's recognition of mental images of action which are the (indirect) result of another mind, for one must understand the purpose, or at least understand that there is a purpose behind these mental images of activity, and recognize also that it is not one's own purpose. Dharmakīrti recognizes this situation as follows:

It is asked how another's movements lead to the cognition of other mind. Does the consciousness here [in my mind] remain purely passive as in the case of sense perception, or does it realize the significance of (the) other's movements? In the former case, they [mental images of the other's movements] would have led to the cognition of other mind by virtue of the mere fact of their existence even if we had not recognized their relationship to it.¹²

Dharmakīrti's refutation of the charge of solipsism, then, hinges on two points. First, there is a qualitative difference between mental images of purposive and of non-purposive sounds and movements, since the former, he admits, have an indirect causal relation to something independent of and external to the mind in which they appear. Second, these mental images of purposive sounds and movements may be recognized by their communicative

significance. He argues, moreover, that the mind-matter dualist has to make exactly similar assumptions and inferences in order logically to affirm the existence of another mind. The dualist, in fact, merely complicates the issue by making the unnecessary and unwarranted assumption that the communicative mental images which indicate another mind refer to objectively existing sounds and motions. In essence, Dharmakīrti claims to have argued the mind-matter dualist to a stalemate, with the added consideration that the immaterialist, by making fewer assumptions, has played the more elegant game.¹³

The theist, however, may challenge both positions by calling into question the means of recognizing communicative significance in sounds and motions or in mental images thereof. How is one to distinguish between the significant movements of a person and, for example, the significant movements of a tree or the tide? All motion is at least potentially significant in that it may communicate something about the world which is or appears to be around one, something that is to some extent independent of one's own stream of consciousness and yet has an indirect causal relationship to it. Moreover, if one acts upon the basis of the knowledge communicated by the movements of tides and trees, etc., one will be rewarded by attaining one's goals, such as catching fish or avoiding falling trees. Thus, given that all movements and sounds are communicative if they are recognized as such, is there not need to postulate an omnipresent communicator in order for the immaterialist, or even the mind-matter dualist, to deny consistently the charge of solipsism? Otherwise both the immaterialist and the mind-matter dualist have to make the unwarranted assumption that motions and sounds of communicative significance can be associated only with things, namely people and animals, which are structurally similar to ourselves. If, on the other hand, they say that communicative significance resides wholly in the mind of the perceiver, then their arguments against the charge of solipsism fail.

As a proof for the existence of God, the foregoing obviously fails. It is, perhaps, more a critique of Dharmakīrti's refutation of the charge of solipsism. Such a critique is, however, of general philosophical importance, since Dharmakīrti's argument is the most thorough-going of the strictly logical denials of solipsism. Its failure implicates others, most notably mind-matter dualists, but also other immaterialists, in a similar dilemma. From the point of view of attempting to establish the existence of God, the most obvious shortcoming of the present argument is that it fails to establish

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the appropriate unity of the so-called "omnipresent communicator". This failure is probably insurmountable, as the problems involved in asserting a unitary intent behind the "communications" of nature would be analogous to those that teleological arguments have confronted without determinate success. Interestingly, rather than demanding a decision between solipsism and affirmation of God, it seems to carry one inexorably to a choice between solipsism and a world-view similar to that of the Jains, which asserts that every entity, down to molecules and atoms, is sentient. Empirical evidence to the contrary renders such an assertion virtually untenable in the modern philosophical forum. Thus, the rather anticlimactic conclusion of the foregoing considerations is merely that, albeit for largely novel and unexpected reasons, solipsism remains a burr under the philosophical saddle.

The foregoing is not submitted, however, primarily as a proof for the existence of God, or even as a contribution to current philosophy, though it does at least raise some new points for consideration in the latter area. The primary intent of the present submission is rather to indicate the interpenetration, in one area among many, of Eastern and Western philosophical concerns and arguments. It is, admittedly, tentative and somewhat superficial. Hopefully, though, it may serve to generate interest, among Eastern and Western philosophers more qualified for the task than myself, in the potentially mutual profit in more communication, less cultural solipsism if you will, than has yet been realized in the realm of philosophical thought.

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NOTES

¹ Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy's Ulterior Motives", in Bertrand Russell, *Unpopular Essays*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1950, p. 50.

² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³ *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Section 48. In *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., London etc., 1949, Vol. II, p. 61.

⁴ See Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Dover, New York, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 80-81, quoting *Tattvāsaṅgraha-pañjikā*, para. 350.

⁵ *Santānāntarasiddhi, sūtras* 1–4. Translated into Russian by Th. Stcherbatsky, and from Russian to English by Harish C. Gupta, in *Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky*, D. Chattopadhyaya (ed.), Indian Studies, Calcutta, 1969.

⁶ *Ibid.*, sūtra 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, sūtra 60.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sūtras 61–65.

⁹ *Ibid.*, sūtras 72–77.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, sūtras 78–82.

¹¹ *Nyāyabindu* 1.1. Translated by Th. Stcherbatsky, in *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, p. 1.

¹² *Santānāntara-siddhi, sūtra* 43.

¹³ *Ibid.*, sūtra 45.

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ENTITY AND ANTINOMY IN TIBETAN
BSDUS GRWA LOGIC
(PART II)

IV. LOGICAL ANTINOMIES OF SUBSTANTIAL
AND OPPOSITE PHENOMENA

A variety of what Bocheński (1961: 387) calls “contradictions deducible from intuitively evident axioms by means of no less correct rules” are relevant to the study of dGe lugs pa logic. It is useful to classify these antinomies into three kinds. The first kind of antinomy is a contradiction between logical analysis and obvious everyday knowledge. Zeno’s paradoxes fall into this category (see Vlastos, 1967). So do the Mādhyamika arguments for emptiness studied by the dGe lugs pa (see Hopkins, 1973). The second kind of antinomy is a contradiction which involves statements about statements. These are called “semantic antinomies” (Bocheński, 1961: 389). The Liar Paradox in its many versions is an important example of these which has provided the basis for Gödel’s theorem in modern mathematical logic (see Hofstadter, 1980). To the best of my knowledge dGe lugs pa logic does not make reference to semantic antinomies. It is my impression that they are excluded by the criteria for well formedness of syllogisms and logical propositions.

The third kind of antinomy is not a contradiction between logical analysis and ordinary knowledge and does not involve statements about statements. Rather it is a contradiction within the structure of logic itself; it shows that an intuitively acceptable logical system is inconsistent. This is called a “logical antinomy.” The preceding two kinds of antinomies have been recognized by Western intellectual tradition since the time of the ancient Greeks (Vlastos 1967, Bocheński, 1961: 130–133). Logical antinomies first came to be known to Western intellectual tradition rather recently through independent discoveries by Burali-Forte and Cantor between 1895 and 1897 (Bocheński, 1961: 387–389). Russell’s paradox is an important example of logical antinomy, which has greatly influenced the formulations of modern set theory and mathematical logic.

In this section on substantial and opposite phenomena I would like to

THE FIVE KHANDHAS: THEIR TREATMENT IN THE
NIKĀYAS AND EARLY ABHIDHAMMA

The five *khandhas* – *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa* – clearly constitute one of those primary lists of terms that form the basis of much of Buddhist teaching as presented in the Pali Canon. A major *vagga* of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* is devoted almost entirely to their treatment,¹ while they also feature repeatedly as categories of analysis in the early *abhidhamma* texts. Yet such accounts of the five *khandhas* as are found in contemporary studies of Indian Buddhism are for the most part of a summary nature, confining themselves to a brief discussion of each of the *khandhas* and the part they play in the breaking down of man into various constituent elements.² It does not seem inappropriate in such circumstances to attempt a clearer assessment of the place and understanding of the five *khandhas* in early Buddhist literature.³

Although the *khandhas* feature widely in the Pali Canon, they are found most characteristically treated in the *Majjhima-* and *Saṃyutta-nikāyas*, and certain sections of the *abhidhamma* texts. In the *Vinaya-piṭaka* and *Dighanikāya* they are mentioned really only in passing, while in the *Anguttara-nikāya* they feature only sporadically, conspicuous by their absence from the section on “fives”.⁴ When we begin to consider as a whole the body of *nikāya* material concerned with the *khandhas*, what we find is the sequence of terms *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* being treated according to a number of recurring formulae which are interwoven and applied in various contexts. Out of this there gradually emerges a more or less comprehensive account of the five *khandhas*. It is to a consideration of the principal *khandha* formulae that the greater part of this paper is devoted, while reference is also made to the early *abhidhamma* material where this is found to be of help in elucidating the general understanding of the *khandhas* in early Buddhist thought.

The sequence *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa* is largely taken as given in the *nikāyas*. We find very little in terms of formal explanation of either the sequence as a whole or of the individual terms. What there is, is confined to a few stock and somewhat terse definitions.⁵ But before turning

to the *nikāya khandha* formulae, it is perhaps as well to comment briefly on these five basic terms and also, at slightly greater length, on the subject of *khandha* and *upādānakkhandha*.

Rūpa is typically defined as the four elements earth, water, fire and wind, and *rūpa* dependent upon (*upādāya*) them. What is clear, both from the *nikāyas*' elaboration of this by reference to parts of the human body, and from the list of twenty-seven items of *rūpa* distinguished in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, is the extent to which the early Buddhist account of *rūpa* focuses on the physical world as experienced by a sentient being — the terms of reference are decidedly body-endowed-with-consciousness (*saviññānaka kāya*).⁶ In view of this, the tendency to understand and translate *rūpa* as "matter" is rather misleading.⁷ The connotations of the word "matter" in the Western philosophical tradition, its association with concepts such as inert "stuff" or "substance", are hardly appropriate either to the treatment of *rūpa* in the *nikāyas* and early *abhidhamma*, or to *rūpa*'s literal meanings of "form", "shape" or "appearance".

The translation of *vedanā* as "feeling" seems more straightforward, although the *nikāyas*' understanding of *vedanā* is not without its difficulties. It is usually defined as being pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant (*dukkha*), or not-unpleasant-not-pleasant (*adukkhamasukha*), and is said to be either bodily (*kāyika*) or mental (*cetasika*).⁸ The significance of the three kinds of *vedanā* seems to lie in their being seen as three basic reactions to experience which possess a certain potential to influence and govern an individual's subsequent responses in either skilful or unskilful ways.⁹

The stock definition of *saññā* in the *nikāyas* illustrates its function by reference to various colours. It is this, it seems, that has led translators to render *saññā* in the context of the *khandhas* as "perception". Yet, as Alex Wayman has pointed out, there are a number of passages in which the translation "perception" fails to make sense of the *nikāyas*' usage of *saññā* as a technical term. Wayman suggests that it is the word "idea" that should regularly be employed as a translation of *saññā*.¹⁰ This certainly seems to make better sense of the technical usage in connection with the *khandhas*. A *saññā* of, say, "blue" then becomes, not so much a passive awareness of the visual sensation we subsequently agree to call "blue", but rather the active noting of that sensation, and the recognising of it as "blue" — that is, more or less, the idea of "blueness". This appears to be in general how *saññā* is understood in the commentarial literature.¹¹

The *nikāyas* define *saṃkhāras* primarily in terms of will or volition (*cetanā*); they also describe them as putting together (*abhisamkharonti*) each of the *khandhas* in turn into something that is put-together (*saṃkhata*).⁵ In this way *saṃkhāras* are presented as conditioning factors conceived of as active volitional forces. *Cetanā* is, of course, understood as *kamma* on the mental level,¹² and in the early *abhidhamma* texts all those mental factors that are considered to be specifically skilful (*kusala*) or unskilful (*akusala*) fall within the domain of *saṃkhārakkhandha*.¹³ Thus it is that the composition of *saṃkhārakkhandha* leads¹⁴ the way in determining whether a particular arising of consciousness constitutes a skilful or an unskilful *kamma*. All this accords well with the *nikāyas*' singling out of *cetanā* as characteristic of the nature of *saṃkhāras*.

In many *nikāya* passages *viññāna* is apparently used generally to characterise the fact of self-awareness of self-consciousness.¹⁵ An interesting section of the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* is devoted to a discussion of the nature of the relationship between *viññāna*, *vedanā* and *saññā*.¹⁶ *Viññāna* is here characterised as discriminating (*viñānāti*) the three feelings, *vedanā* as feeling (*vedeti*) the three feelings, and *saññā* as noting (*sañjānāti*) yellow, blue, etc. The passage then goes on to say that these three states (*dhammas*) should be considered closely connected (*saṃsaṭṭha*) since "what one feels, that one notes; what one notes, that one discriminates". Thus *vedanā*, *saññā* and *viññāna* are here apparently viewed as operating together as different aspects of the process of being aware of a particular object of consciousness. *Viññāna* can perhaps best be characterised as awareness or consciousness of things in relation to each other; this seems to relate both the notion of self awareness and that of discriminating various objects.

Finally we may note how the *khandha-saṃyutta* explains *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāna* each in terms of six classes corresponding to consciousness that is related to the five senses of eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, and sixthly mind⁵ — that is, the six internal spheres of sense (*saḷāyatana*).

KHANDHA AND UPĀDĀNAKKHANDHA

Within the *nikāyas* the five terms *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāna* are variously designated both *khandhas*¹⁷ and *upādānakkhandhas*, and in addition are sometimes treated in sequence without either designation.¹⁸

A *khandha-saṃyutta* passage states that the *khandhas* are to be considered

upādānakkhandhas only when they are with *āsavas* (*sāsava*) and subject to grasping (*upādāniya*).¹⁹ In another passage that recurs several times in the *nikāyas*, the question is asked whether *upādāna* should be considered the same as the *upādānakkhandhas* or whether there is *upādāna* apart from them.²⁰ In reply it is stated that although *upādāna* is not the same as the five *upādānakkhandhas* there is no *upādāna* apart from them; *upādāna* is then defined as “whatever is will and passion (*chandarāga*) in respect of the five *upādānakkhandhas*”. Clearly the *nikāyas* understand *upādāna* as some form of attachment that falls within the general compass of the *khandhas*. The early *abhidhamma* texts clarify *upādāna*’s relationship to the *khandhas* under three principal headings: active grasping (*upādāna*), subject to grasping (*upādāniya*), and the product of grasping (*upādāṇa*). *Upādāna* as an active force is confined to *saṃkhārakkhandha*, although all five *khandhas* are potentially the objects of *upādāna* – that is, are *upādāniya*; similarly all five *khandhas* are said to be in some measure the products of *upādāna* – that is, *upādāṇa*.²¹ By following procedures which are adumbrated in the early *abhidhamma* texts, it is possible to detail further *upādāna*’s relationship to the *khandhas*. The text of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* begins by setting out the triplets and couplets of the *abhidhamma mātikā*, and then by way of explaining the categories of the first triplet goes on to detail the constitution of various arisings of consciousness (*citta*); the categories of the remaining triplets and couplets are explained only in brief. By treating the *cittas* in terms of the categories of the relevant triplets and couplets exactly when and in what measure the three terms *upādāna*, *upādāniya* and *upādāṇa* apply to the *khandhas* might be specified in detail. The early *abhidhamma* texts also state that *rūpakkhandha* is always considered to be with *āsavas* and subject to grasping, and that the only time when the four mental *khandhas* are not such – that is, in *nikāya* terminology, are not *upādānakkhandhas* – is on the occasions of the four *ariya* paths and fruits.²²

Returning to the immediate problem of how exactly early Buddhist thought conceives of *upādāna*, we find that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* by way of explanation of greed (*lobha*) lists a whole series of terms including passion (*rāga*), craving (*taṇhā*) and *upādāna*.²³ It does not appear that these terms are intended to be understood as mere equivalents either in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* or in the *nikāyas*. Within the *nikāyas* each of these terms is characteristically employed in particular contexts with more or less fixed terms of reference. Thus the *khandhas* are not designated the *lobhakkhandhas* or the *taṇhakkhandhas*,

for example. It seems to follow from this that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* intends *rāga*, *taṇhā* and *upādāna* to be understood as particular manifestations of greed in general.

The usage of the term *upādāna* in Pali seems to involve the association of the following range of ideas: “taking up, “grasping”, and hence “feeding”, and lastly “food”, “fuel” and “basis”.²⁴ Since the term *upādāna* is used in such close association with the *khandha* analysis, and since that analysis is used in the *nikāyas* especially as a way of looking at existence and experience at the level of the apparently stable individual being,²⁵ the notion of *upādāna* and the significance of its relationship to the *khandhas* can, I think, be summed up as follows. As grasping, *upādāna* is that greed which is the fuel and basis for the manifestation and coming together of the *khandhas* in order that they might constitute a given individual or being. This is, of course, exactly the truth of the arising of *dukkha* (see below). But in particular *upādāna* seems to be seen as greed of a degree and intensity that is able to support the reappearance and coming together of the *khandhas* from one existence to the next. To put it another way, if craving has attained to the degree of *upādāna*, then the reappearance of the *khandhas* in the form of an individual being inevitably follows. This tallies quite precisely with *upādāna*’s position in the sequence of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, falling as it does after *vedanā* and *taṇhā*, and before becoming (*bhava*) and birth (*jāti*). Indeed a number of *nikāya khandha* formulae link directly into the *paṭiccasamuppāda* chain at the point of *upādāna*:

For one who finds pleasure in *rūpa* . . . *vedanā* . . . *saññā* . . . *saṃkhāras* . . . *viññāna*, who welcomes them and becomes attached to them, there arises delight (*nandī*); that which is delight in respect of *rūpa* (etc.) is *upādāna*; for him dependent on *upādāna* there is becoming, dependent on becoming there is birth, dependent on birth there is old age and death – grief, sorrow, lamentation and despair come into being. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.²⁶

To sum up, the term *upādānakkhandha* signifies the general way in which the *khandhas* are bound up with *upādāna*; the simple *khandha*, universally applicable, is used in the *nikāyas* and especially the *abhidhamma* texts as a neutral term, allowing the specific aspects of, for example, *upādāna*’s relationship to the *khandhas* to be elaborated.

THE PRINCIPAL KHANDHA FORMULAE

(i) The "Totality" Formula

The totality of each *khandha* is referred to in the *nikāyas* according to the following formula: Whatever *rūpa* . . . *vedanā* . . . *saññā* . . . *saṃkhāras* . . . *viññāṇa* are past, future or present, within or without, gross or subtle, inferior or refined, are far or near.²⁷ The various terms of this formula are not explained further in the *nikāyas*, but the *Vibhaṅga*, which takes this formula as characteristic of the *suttanta* account of the *khandhas*, furnishes us with an illustration of their application to each of the *khandhas* in turn.²⁸

Leaving aside the question of the exact understanding of the nature of time in early Buddhist texts, the collective term past (*atīta*), not-come (*anāgata*), just arisen (*paccuppanna*) is straightforward.

The pair within/without (*ajjhataṃ/bahiddhā*) is explained as relative, having as its point of reference any given individual: one's own *khandhas* are within, while the *khandhas* of other beings are without. Interestingly, when this pair of terms is thus applied to *rūpakkhanda*, inanimate *rūpa* is left unaccounted for,²⁹ as is recognised by the commentarial appendix to the *Dhammasaṅgani*, which adds that it should be understood as without.³⁰ This lack of attention to inanimate *rūpa* further illustrates the way in which the analysis of *rūpa* centres around the sentient being. This orientation is, of course, relevant to the *khandha* analysis as a whole.

As far as their application to the four mental *khandhas* is concerned, the remaining pairs of terms are also explained as relative. That is to say, a particular manifestation of *vedanā*, for example, is distinguished as gross or subtle (*olārika/sukhuma*), inferior or refined (*hīna/pañīta*), far or near (*dure/santike*) in relation to another particular manifestation of *vedanā*. The principles according to which the distinctions between gross and subtle etc. are made involve the discernment of increasing degrees of excellence within the compass of the four mental *khandhas*. For example, although in general not-unpleasant-not-pleasant feeling is said to be subtle when compared to pleasant and unpleasant feeling, pleasant feeling occurring in conjunction with one of the four *ariya* paths or fruits would be subtle in relation to not-unpleasant-not-pleasant feeling occurring in conjunction with the fourth *jhāna* of the form sphere, since the former is without *āsavas* while the latter is with *āsavas*.

As for the application of these pairs of terms to *rūpakkhanda*, although the

inferior/refined pair is again treated as merely relative, the *Dhammasaṅgani* and *Vibhaṅga* can be interpreted as taking each part of the two pairs gross/subtle and far/near as referring to fixed items in the *abhidhamma* list of twenty-seven kinds of *rūpa*. Yet, as Karunadasa has pointed out, the *Vibhaṅga* should possibly be read as indicating that the far/near pair could be applied in a number of different ways, and moreover the various ancient schools of *abhidharma* are not consistent in the way they interpret the application of these terms to *rūpa*.³¹ One is left with the suspicion that in the case of *rūpakkhanda* too these terms were employed in a number of different ways to indicate the variety to be discerned in *rūpa*. Whether or not the details of the *Vibhaṅga* exposition are accepted as valid for the *nikāyas*, it seems clear that this formula is intended to indicate how each *khandha* is to be seen as a class of states, manifold in nature and displaying a considerable variety and also a certain hierarchy.

(ii) The *khandhas* and the Four Noble Truths

It has been usual for scholars to explain the *khandhas* as the analysis of the human individual into psycho-physical phenomena. Yet an expression of the matter in just such terms is not exactly characteristic of the texts. The preferred *nikāya* explanation of the *khandhas* would seem to be in terms of the first of the four noble truths — the *khandhas* are presented as one way of defining what is *dukkha*. The stock *nikāya* statement of the truths explains *dukkha* as "in short the five *upādānakkhandhas*".³² What is interesting is the way in which various terms are substituted for *dukkha*. For example, we find in the *khandha-samyutta*:

I will teach you, *bhikkhus*, *sakkāya* (the existing body), its arising, its ceasing, and the way leading to its ceasing. And what, *bhikkhus*, is *sakkāya*? The five *upādānakkhandhas* should be said.³³

The well known "burden" *sutta* is also in principle a variation on the four-truth theme. The burden (*bhāra*) is explained as the five *upādānakkhandhas* in accordance with its standing for *dukkha*, while clinging to the burden (*bhārādāna*) and laying down the burden (*bhāranikkhepana*) are explained according to the standard definitions of the second and third truths respectively. The troublesome taking up of the burden (*bhārahāra*), defined as the person (*puggala*), is inserted between the first and the second truths, while the fourth truth is omitted altogether; thus the usual pattern is departed from.³⁴

Another frequently quoted *nikāya* statement that follows the structure of the four truths substitutes world (*loka*) for *dukkha*:

In this fathom-long body endowed with sentience and mind, I declare the world, its arising, its ceasing and the way leading to its ceasing.³⁵

In addition, we find *dukkha* as the first truth defined, not in terms of the five *upādānakkhandhas*, but in terms of the six internal spheres of sense (*ajjhattika āyatana*).

Within this general context can be placed the verse attributed to the nun Vajira and referred to in the *Milindapañha*.³⁷ This states that just as the word “chariot” is applied to what is really a sum of parts, a being (*satta*) is the conventional designation (*sammuti*) for the *khandhas*; there is, in fact, just *dukkha*. A *khandha-saṃyutta* play on the word *satta* finds a hidden significance in this explanation:

“A being” (*satta*) is said; in what measure is “a being” said? Whatever is will, passion, delight and craving in respect of *rūpa* . . . *vedanā* . . . *saññā* . . . *saṃkhāras* . . . *viññāṇa* is being attached (*satta*) thereto, is being strongly attached (*visatta*) thereto; for this reason “a being” is said.³⁸

What begins to emerge, then, is a series of correspondences: *dukkha*, the five *upādānakkhandhas*, *sakkāya*, *bhāra*, *loka*, the six internal *āyatanas*, *satta*. All these expressions apparently represent different ways of characterising the given data of experience or conditioned existence, and are also seen as drawing attention to the structure and the sustaining forces behind it all. In this way the *khandhas* begin to take on something of a wider significance than is perhaps appreciated when they are seen merely as a breaking down of the human individual into constituent parts.

By way of expanding on the theme of the *khandhas* as *dukkha*, a whole series of designations is applied to them both collectively and individually. Most frequent in this respect is the standard sequence of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā* (see below). To this a fourth term, *saṃkhata* (conditioned), and also a fifth, *vadhaka* (murderous), are occasionally added.³⁹ One treatment describes each *khandha* in turn as, in addition to *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā*, *roga* (sickness), *gaṇḍa* (a boil), *salla* (a barb), *agha* (misery), *ābādha* (an affliction), *para* (other), *paloka* (unstable), *suñña* (empty).⁴⁰ The *khandhas* are also called embers (*kukkula*); they are on fire (*āditta*); they are Māra, and by grasping them one is bound to Māra.⁴¹ All this acts as vivid illustration of the danger inherent in attachment to the *khandhas*. Images of disease,

bodily affliction and burning abound in the *nikāyas*; the effect in the present context is one of alluding to and drawing together various *nikāya* passages.

Formulae which may be considered as adaptations of the four-noble-truth structure are used to take up the theme of the *khandhas* as *dhammas* that are to be fully understood (*pariññeyya*).⁴² Thus ignorance (*avijjā*) is defined as not knowing in turn *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa*, their arising, their ceasing and the way leading to their ceasing; conversely knowledge is knowing all of these.⁴³ In similar vein is the formula that runs: Thus is *rūpa* (etc.), thus is its arising (*samudaya*), thus is its passing away (*atthagama*). This is one of the most frequently occurring *nikāya khandha* formulae, and is usually found as an explanation of the expression, “he dwells contemplating the rise and fall of the five *upādānakkhandhas*” – an expression used especially in contexts where the process of the gaining of that insight that constitutes the destruction of the *āsavas* is being described.⁴⁴

The theme of the arising and passing away of the *khandhas* is interwoven in a cycle of *khandha-saṃyutta suttas* with that of their pleasure (*assāda*), their danger (*ādīnava*) and the escape from them (*nissaraṇa*); this apparently brings together all the various aspects which make for the full understanding of the nature of the *khandhas*.⁴⁵

(iii) *The anicca-dukkha-anattā Formula*

Perhaps the most well known of the *khandha* formulae is that which demonstrates *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* in turn as *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā*. In its fullest form this treatment of the *khandhas* is found in the *Vinaya-piṭaka* placed as a second utterance after the Benares discourse on the four noble truths.⁴⁶ At its core is a series of questions and answers in the following pattern:

What do you think, is *rūpa* (etc.) permanent or impermanent? Impermanent. That which is impermanent, is that suffering or happiness? Suffering. Is it right to regard that which is suffering, of a changeable nature, as “This is mine, I am this, this is my self (*attā*)”? No.

This series of questions and answers, applied to *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa*, occurs regularly throughout the *khandha-saṃyutta* and also elsewhere in the *nikāyas*.⁴⁷ Significantly, as a method of demonstrating *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā* the formula’s use is not confined to the five *khandhas*, but is also applied by the *nikāyas* to a whole series of categories.

In the *Cūḷa-Rāhulovāda-sutta* we find it applied to eye, visible forms, eye-contact and to “what is connected with *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* and arises dependent upon eye-contact”; ear, nose, tongue, body and mind are all treated in a parallel fashion.⁴⁸ The *sutta* thus understands thirty consecutive rehearsals of the formula. The *saḷāyatana-saṃyutta* also employs this formula in respect of a similar list of categories.⁴⁹ The *Rāhula-saṃyutta* treats a total of fifty-nine categories in this manner: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind; the six corresponding kinds of object; six corresponding classes each of *viññāṇa*, *samphassa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *sañcetanā* and *taṇhā*; six elements (*dhātu*), namely earth, fire, wind, water, consciousness, and space; finally the five *khandhas*.⁵⁰ Bearing in mind that the six classes of *vedanā*, *saññā*, *sañcetanā* and *viññāṇa* are also used to explain the appropriate *khandhas*, it is apparent that the *khandhas* feature widely in this exhaustive treatment apart from their appearance at its close. One is tempted to suggest that this seemingly repetitive list conveys a certain movement from the particular to the more general along the following lines. According to its *nikāya* definition, eye, visible forms and eye-consciousness together constitute eye-contact — similarly for the other senses. Dependent upon sense contact there arises subsequent *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa*. The significance of the appearance of the *khandha* sequence at the close of the *Rāhula-saṃyutta* list seems to lie in the fact that it is seen as integrating and synthesising what comes before into a whole — a whole that is still, however, *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā*.

(iv) *Attā, anattā and sakkāyadiṭṭhi*

The conclusion that the *anicca-dukkha-anattā* formula focuses upon is that each of the *khandhas* is to be seen by right wisdom as it really is: “This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my *attā*.” It is the attainment of this vision that distinguishes the *ariya sāvaka* (noble hearer) from the *assutavanta puthujjana* (ignorant ordinary man).⁵¹ A fourfold formula applied to each of the *khandhas* in turn indicates twenty ways in which the *puthujjana* falls short of this vision: he views *rūpa* (etc.) as the *attā*, the *attā* as possessing *rūpa* (etc.), *rūpa* (etc.) as in the *attā*, the *attā* as in *rūpa* (etc.).⁵² In both the *nikāyas* and the *abhidhamma* texts these twenty ways of viewing the *attā* in relation to the *khandhas* are used to explain in detail *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (the view that the body is real).⁵³ No doubt they are seen as operating at various levels in the psyche of the *puthujjana*, yet that they are seen as having a particular

relevance to notions of the *attā* associated with various meditation attainments seems likely, given the importance of such concerns in the *nikāya* context. Thus a passage that occurs several times in the *nikāyas* treats the four *jhānas* and the first three formless attainments successively, stating that whatever there is connected with *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* at those levels is to be seen as (amongst other things) *anattā*.⁵⁴ This is said to result either in the destruction of the *āsavas*, i.e. arahatship, or in the abandoning of the five lower fetters (*orambhāgiya saṃyojana*), i.e. the attainment of nonreturnership. *Sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is, of course, counted among these five lower fetters.

That the abandoning of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* does not of itself involve the complete destruction of the *āsavas* is a point taken up in a *khandha-saṃyutta* discourse⁵⁵ in which the venerable Khemaka is asked by a number of *theras* whether or not he views anything as *attā* or as belonging to the *attā* in respect of the five *upādānakkhandhas*. Khemaka replies that he does not; he is, however, not an arahat since the general notion “I am” still persists within the compass of the *khandhas*, although it does not take the form of a specific view, “I am this”. He concludes, “when the five lower fetters have been abandoned . . . there yet remains a residuum of the conceit ‘I am’, of the desire ‘I am’, of the tendency ‘I am’.”

The abandoning of the twenty modes of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is, then, a central element in the transition from *puthujjana* to *ariya sāvaka*. Any sense of individual existence that subsequently persists, is of too subtle a nature to act as the basis for a definite view which might identify the *attā* with all five *khandhas* or any one of them.

The formula of the twenty modes of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is also employed in the *nikāyas* to explain in detail the statement that, “whatever *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* view the *attā* in diverse ways, they all view the five *upādānakkhandhas* or one of them”.⁵⁶ In other words, there can be no specific views concerning the *attā* apart from the twenty ways of viewing the *attā* in relation to the five *khandhas*. Now, a number of scholars have drawn attention to the fact that the *nikāyas* fail to categorically deny the *attā* and declare only that the *khandhas* are *anattā*.⁵⁷ Yet, when this is taken in the context of the former statement, it must be added that the *nikāyas* refuse to allow the *attā* as a meaningful concept apart from the five *khandhas*, that is apart from views or notions of the *attā* that are ultimately to be abandoned. The *attā* is in this way squeezed out to the *nikāyas*’ ultimate frame of reference,

and deliberately confined to the level of speculations and views. This can be seen, up to a point, as a challenge to those *samañas* and *brāhmaṇas* who maintained views concerning the *attā* to explain the exact nature of that *attā*. Their response seems to have been to accuse the Buddha of declaring the destruction of the existing being, or to demand an answer to the question of whether or not the Tathāgata exists after death. The Tathāgata is untraceable (*ananuvejja*), the question of his existence or not after death is unexplained (*avyākata*), was the reply.⁵⁸

(v) *The Arising of dukkha: The khandhas as paṭiccasamuppanna*

Precisely because the *puthujjana* views the *khandhas* as his *attā*, and is attached to them through the workings of “will, passion, delight, craving, and that clinging and grasping which are determinations, biases and tendencies of mind”,⁵⁹ there arises for him “grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair”. The *nikāyas* thus convey a picture of a complete spectrum and network of attachment, and, as indicated above in the course of the discussion of *upādāna*, a number of *khandha* treatments link directly into the *paṭiccasamuppāda* chain. The continued manifestation of the *khandhas* is thus presented as the direct consequence of attachment in respect of the *khandhas*.

In addition to this kind of treatment, which has as its scale a lifetime or a series of lifetimes, a number of *nikāya* passages focus attention on the process of the arising of the *khandhas* in the context of a given sequence of consciousness. A section of the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* describes the case of one who knows that there is nothing in respect of *rūpa* of which he can say “I” or “mine” or “I am”.⁶⁰ If he is insulted by others, he knows, “There has arisen for me this unpleasant *vedanā* born of ear-contact; it is caused (*paṭicca*), not uncaused (*appaṭicca*).” He is thus said to see that contact (*phassa*) is *anicca*, that *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* are *anicca*. The *sutta* goes on to state that a manifestation (*pātubhāva*) in any section of consciousness (*viññāṇabhāga*) is to be considered as the result of three conditions, namely that the appropriate bodily organ — eye, ear, nose, tongue, body or mind — is intact (*aparibhinṇa*), that corresponding external objects — visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles or mental states — come within its range (*āpātha*), and finally that there is an appropriate bringing together (*samannāhāra*).⁶¹ When these conditions are fulfilled “whatever *rūpa* that thus comes into being is included (*saṃgahaṃ gacchati*) in *rūpupādānakkhandha*”; likewise for *vedanā* and *vedanupādānakkhandha*,

and so on. The *sutta* understands all this as illustrating *paṭiccasamuppāda*, and comments that what is causally arisen (*paṭiccasamuppanna*) is the five *upādānakkhandhas*.

This kind of treatment, then, considers the arising of the *khandhas* dependent on any one of the six internal sense spheres. The sequence of terms that thus emerges — (*rūpa*), *phassa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa* — parallels the initial pentad of *dhammas* that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* lists for the arising of each consciousness, namely *phassa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *cetanā*, *citta*,⁶² and invites a certain comparison. The precise nature of the time scale of the consciousness process envisaged by the *nikāya* treatment is ambiguous — perhaps intentionally so, while the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* apparently reduces the scale to its base unit: the individual arising of *citta* at any given time (*samaya*).⁶³ Yet what is common to both the *suttanta* and *abhidhamma* material here is the concern to consider how the *khandhas* or how *dhammas* stand in relationship to each other, how they are conditioned and sustained within a particular consciousness sequence, however that might be conceived.

THE KHANDHA-VIBHAṄGA

The *khandha-vibhaṅga* is the first of the eighteen chapters that make up the *Vibhaṅga*. It is divided into three sections, the first of which, dealing with the *suttanta* treatment of the *khandhas*, has already been referred to above. The second section, the *abhidhamma-bhājanīya*,⁶⁴ involves the analysis of the totality of each of the five *khandhas* in turn according to how each is, in the first place, a whole, and then how each is divisible into two kinds, three kinds, four kinds and so on. This procedure is taken as far as an elevenfold division in the case of *rūpakkhandha*, and as far as a tenfold division in the case of the other *khandhas*, although for the latter the text subsequently goes on to indicate additional ways of sevenfold, twenty-fourfold, thirtyfold and manifold division. The bulk of the section is taken up with the application of the relevant triplets and couplets from the *abhidhamma mātikā* to each of the four mental *khandhas*; this provides a whole series of ways of threefold and twofold division. By taking each applicable triplet with each applicable couplet in turn, according to all possible permutations, the *Vibhaṅga* indicates in the region of one thousand different sets of divisions for each of these four *khandhas* — the precise number varying according to the number of triplets and couplets relevant in each case.

The final section of the *khandha-vibhaṅga*, the *pañhāpucchaka*, takes the form of a series of questions and answers, again concerned with how the *khandhas* relate to the *abhidhamma* triplets and couplets, and as such forms an extension to the *abhidhamma-bhājanīya* treatment.

The emphasis in the *khandha-vibhaṅga* is once again on the complexity and manifold nature of the *khandhas*. In addition, taken in conjunction with the *Dhammasaṅgāṇi* analysis of the various individual arisings of *citta* in terms of the triplets and couplets, the *khandha-vibhaṅga* provides a comprehensive method of classification by which any given conditioned *dhamma* can be classed as *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* or *viññāṇa*, and can be precisely analysed and assessed within the whole scheme of *abhidhamma* and the Buddhist path.

KHANDHA-ĀYATANA-DHĀTU

For the *abhidhamma* texts such as the *Dhammasaṅgāṇi*, *Vibhaṅga* and *Dhātukathā* the *khandhas* form one of the primary category headings by means of which *dhammas* may be classified. Along with the twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*, the five *khandhas* constitute a triad among these *abhidhamma* headings in that they represent three different methods of classifying the totality of *dhammas* that make up conditioned existence. However, unlike the *khandhas*, the *āyatanas* and *dhātus* also take into account the unconditioned, *nibbāna*.⁶⁵ The other headings employed in the *abhidhamma* texts relate, for the most part, to the more specific aspects of Buddhist spiritual practice, for example the *indriyas*, the limbs of *jhāna* and the eightfold path, and so on.

As an indication of the importance of the *khandha-āyatana-dhātu* triad in early Buddhism, it is worth noting a phrase repeated several times in the verses of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*: He/she taught me *dhamma* — the *khandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*.⁶⁶ Yet when we turn to the four primary *nikāyas*, although the twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus* are specifically mentioned in one or two places,⁶⁷ it is significant that the *Samyutta-nikāya* fails to provide three corresponding treatments of the *khandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus* as might have been expected. What we do find in the *Samyutta-nikāya* are the *khandha-samyutta* and the *salāyatana-samyutta* — two exhaustive treatments, each running to some two hundred pages in the PTS editions and each dominating its respective *vagga*. A much slighter *dhātu-samyutta*,

found in the second *vagga* (which is dominated by the treatment of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula), in fact concerns itself with the eighteen *dhātus* only briefly at its opening, being for the most part devoted to the treatment of the various other items also sometimes termed *dhātus* in the *nikāyas*.⁶⁸ On closer examination the *salāyatana-samyutta*, for its part, does not strictly constitute a treatment of the twelve *āyatanas*, but seems rather to represent an approach which is relevant to analysis, from the point of view of *abhidhamma*, by both *āyatana* and *dhātu*.

All this suggests that the *khandha-āyatana-dhātu* triad is not standard in quite the same way for the *Samyutta-nikāya* as it is for the early *abhidhamma* texts. Whether this is best understood as reflecting a difference in the respective concerns of the *nikāya* and *abhidhamma* texts, or whether it indicates that this triad evolved as standard only after the composition of the bulk of the *nikāya* material, is a question that goes beyond and scope of the present paper. Whatever the case, as A. K. Warder has pointed out,⁶⁹ the *khandha-āyatana-dhātu* triad is common to all schools of Buddhism, and is not something confined to the Theravādin *abhidhamma*.

CONCLUSION

To explain the *khandhas* as the Buddhist analysis of man, as has been the tendency of contemporary scholars, may not be incorrect as far as it goes, yet it is to fix upon one facet of the treatment of the *khandhas* at the expense of others. Thus A. B. Keith could write, "By a division which . . . has certainly no merit, logical or psychological, the individual is divided into five aggregates or groups."⁷⁰ However, the five *khandhas*, as treated in the *nikāyas* and early *abhidhamma*, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* are presented as five aspects of an individual being's experience of the world; each *khandha* is seen as representing a complex class of phenomena that is continuously arising and falling away in response to processes of consciousness based on the six spheres of sense. They thus become the five *upādānakkhandhas*, encompassing both grasping and all that is grasped. As the *upādānakkhandhas* these five classes of states acquire a

momentum, and continue to manifest and come together at the level of individual being from one existence to the next. For any given individual there are, then, only these five *upādānakkhandhas* – they define the limits of his world, they are his world. This subjective orientation of the *khandhas* seems to arise out of the simple fact that, for the *nikāyas*, this is how the world is experienced; that is to say, it is not seen primarily as having metaphysical significance.

Accounts of experience and the phenomena of existence are complex in the early Buddhist texts; the subject is one that is tackled from different angles and perspectives. The treatment of *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* represents one perspective, the treatment of the six spheres of sense is another.⁷¹ As we have seen, in the *nikāya* formulae the two merge, complementing each other in the task of exposing the complex network of conditions that is, for the *nikāyas*, existence. In the early *abhidhamma* texts *khandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* equally become complementary methods of analysing, in detail, the nature of conditioned existence.

The approach adopted above has been to consider the treatment of the five *khandhas* in the *nikāyas* and early *abhidhamma* texts as a more or less coherent whole. This has incidentally revealed something of the underlying structure and dynamic of early Buddhist teaching – an aspect of the texts that has not, it seems, either been clearly appreciated or properly understood, and one that warrants further consideration.

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NOTES

Acknowledgement is due to L. S. Cousins for advice and criticism. Abbreviations of Pali texts are those of *A Critical Pali Dictionary, Epilegomena to Vol. I*, Copenhagen, 1948.

¹ The *Khandha-vagga* (S III): *khandha-samyutta*, S III 1–188, followed by the *Rādha-samyutta*, S III 188–200, which also treats the *khandhas* in all its *suttas*.

² E.g. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1914, pp. 39–56; A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1923, p. 85; E. Conze, *Buddhism – Its Essence and Development*, 2nd pbk ed., Oxford, 1974, p. 14; N. Smart, *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, London, 1964, pp. 42–5; T. O. Ling, *A History of Religion East and West*, London, 1968, pp. 86–7, 131. Fuller discussions seem to be lacking, although some further details may be gleaned from the following: K. Bhattacharya, *L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien*, Paris, 1973, pp. 109–10, and 'Upadhi, upādi et upādāna', *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris, 1968, pp. 81–95; Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'Khandha and Upādānakkhandha', *Pali Buddhist*

Review, Vol. I, No. 1, 1976, pp. 91–102; E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, London, 1962, passim; E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1958, passim, and *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, Vol. IV, pp. 1995–2042; A. O. Lovejoy, 'The Buddhist technical terms *upādāna* and *upādāsesa*', *JAOS*, XIX, 1897, pp. 126–36; A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, 2nd ed., Delhi, 1982, passim.

³ The principal sources are the four primary *nikāyas* (D, M, S, A) with the first three works of the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* (Dhs, Vibh, Dhātuk) taken as representative of the early *abhidhamma*.

⁴ Twenty-four M *suttas* contain some reference to the *khandhas*. They are also mentioned at Vin I 10 (=S V 420) and Vin I 12 (=S III 66), and at D II 35, 301, 305, 307; A. K. Warder, *op. cit.* p. 86, notes that Chinese versions of the (*Mahā*-) *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* omit the references to the *khandhas*; the *khandhas* are also found in various contexts in the summaries of *nikāya* teaching that constitute the *Saṅgīti*- and *Dasuttara-suttas*: D III 223, 233, 278, 286.

⁵ E.g. *khandha-samyutta* definitions, S III 59–60, 86–7.

⁶ Cf. the following passages: M I 185–90, S III 86, Dhs 134–46.

⁷ Taken for granted and left largely unquestioned in Y. Karunadasa's study, *The Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, Colombo, 1967.

⁸ M I 303.

⁹ See in general the *vedanā-samyutta*, especially S IV 209, 231; cf. also C. Gudmunsen, *Wittgenstein and Buddhism*, London, 1977, pp. 12–4.

¹⁰ A. Wayman, 'Regarding the Translation of the Buddhist Technical Terms *saññā*/*sañjñā*, *viññāṇa*/*vijñāna*', *Malalasekera Commemoration Volume*, ed. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, Colombo, 1976, pp. 324–36.

¹¹ *Vism* XIV 130; cf. Nyanapoika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, Kandy, 3rd ed. 1971, pp. 68–72.

¹² A III 415.

¹³ This is most simply expressed at Dhātuk 9 where the truth of arising and the truth of the path are said to be *saṃkhārakkhandha*; it is elaborated at Dhs 185–225, and at Vibh 63–9 where the various categories of unskillful *dhammas* are treated in terms of the *khandhas*.

¹⁴ Cf. *Vism* XIV 135.

¹⁵ Cf. S II 94–5, III 9–10, IV 195.

¹⁶ M I 292–3.

¹⁷ The primary meaning of Pali *khandha* (=Skt. *skandha*) would seem to be the trunk of a tree, and then the shoulder or back of a man or an animal. In the Pali Canon the word is also regularly used in a number of expressions in the sense of an accumulation or collection of something, e.g. *bhogakkhandha*, *puññakkhandha*, *dukkhakkhandha*, and often apparently indicating a division or grouping of some kind, cf. *silakkhandha*, *samādhikkhandha*, *paññakkhandha* (e.g. D I 206).

¹⁸ For the three types of reference: (i) e.g. M I 138, S III 66, Dhs, Vibh, Dhātuk passim; (ii) e.g. D III 233, 278, M III 16, S III 26, 83; (iii) e.g. D II 35. Also to be noted are the occurrences of the forms *rūpadhātu*, *vedanādhātu* etc. (e.g. S III 9), and on one occasion in verse of the sequence *rūpa*, *vedayita*, *saññā*, *viññāṇa*, *saṃkhata* (S I 112), cf. note 34 below.

¹⁹ S III 47.

²⁰ M I 299 – S III 100–1; cf. S III 166–7.

²¹ Four *khandhas* are not *upādāna*, *saṃkhārakkhandha* may or may not be; *rūpakkhandha*

is *upādāniya*, four *khandhas* may or may not be; all five *khandhas* may or may not be *upādinna*, Vibh 67.

²² Dhs 196, 246. The *abhidhamma* view that *rūpakkhanda* is always *sāsava*, while the other four may or may not be, seems to be paralleled in a *nikāya* passage which first considers how body (*kāya*) and mind (*citta*) are diseased (*atura*), and then how body is diseased but mind is not, S III 3–5.

²³ Dhs 189.

²⁴ See *upādāna*, PTS *Pali-English Dictionary* and *A Critical Pali Dictionary*.

²⁵ This is perhaps most simply summed up in the *nikāya* usage of such expressions as “the manifestation of the *khandhas*” and “the breaking up of the *khandhas*” in part definition of birth and death respectively, usually in the context of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula, e.g. M I 49, 50.

²⁶ S III 14; cf. M I 511, S III 94.

²⁷ E.g. M I 138–9, III 16–7, S III 47, 68.

²⁸ The *khandha-vibhaṅga*, *suttanta-bhāṇiya*, Vibh 1–12.

²⁹ Presumably because the terms *ajhattam* and *bahiddhā* are used in the *nikāyas* in the context of “all *rūpa*” (e.g. M I 138), Karunadasa suggests that the two terms are not being used relatively, as in the *abhidhamma* texts, but rather to establish the dichotomy between “matter that constitutes the body of a living being and the matter that obtains outside of it” (*op. cit.* p. 116), but clearly this dichotomy cannot apply in the cases of *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāna*.

³⁰ Dhs 241.

³¹ Karunadasa, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–9.

³² Vin I 10 = S V 420, D II 305, M I 48, S III 158.

³³ S III 159, M I 299.

³⁴ S III 25; this is to some extent explained if the *sutta* is viewed as an exposition of the accompanying verse – that statements in verse should not always conform to the patterns of *sutta* prose is not surprising.

³⁵ S I 62, A II 48.

³⁶ S V 426.

³⁷ S I 135, Mil 28.

³⁸ S III 190.

³⁹ S III 56, 114.

⁴⁰ E.g. S III 167–8.

⁴¹ See S III 177, 71, 194, 198, 74.

⁴² D III 278, S III 26, Vibh 426.

⁴³ S III 162–3.

⁴⁴ E.g. D. II 35, M III 115, S III 152.

⁴⁵ S III 13–5, 27–31, 61–5, 81–2, 160–1, 173–6. Cf. the recurring refrain found in the *Brahmajāla-sutta*: The Tathāgata is freed without grasping “having known as they really are the arising of feelings, their passing away, their pleasure, their danger and the escape from them.” D I 17–38, *passim*.

⁴⁶ Vin I 12–3 = S III 66–8.

⁴⁷ E.g. S III 56, 88, 104–5, 187–8, M I 138, 232–4, S II 125, 249.

⁴⁸ M III 277–80.

⁴⁹ S II 244–9.

⁵⁰ S III 18–9; cf. S III 16.

⁵¹ E.g. M III 188, 227, S III 3, 16, 96.

⁵³ M I 300, III 17–8, S III 102, Dhs 182.

⁵⁴ M I 436, A V 422, cf. 128.

⁵⁵ S III 125–33.

⁵⁶ S III 63.

⁵⁷ E.g. E. Conze, *op. cit.*, p. 39, and E. J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1933, p. 101, n. 2.

⁵⁸ M I 140, S III 119; cf. S III 124, where Māra searches in vain for the consciousness of a *bhikkhu* who has just attained arahatship and then died. The most extensive treatment of this aspect of the *khandhas* is found in the *avyākata-samyutta*, S IV 374–403. On this whole question cf. S. Collins, *Selfless Persons*, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 117–38.

⁵⁹ S III 13, cf. 7, 18.

⁶⁰ M I 185–6.

⁶¹ M I 190–1.

⁶² Dhs 9.

⁶³ See Nyanaponika, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–26.

⁶⁴ Vibh 12–69.

⁶⁵ Dhātuk 9.

⁶⁶ Ap 563, cf. 42; Thī 43, 69, 103; cf. Th 1255, Nidd I 45.

⁶⁷ E.g. D II 302 (six internal and external *āyatanas*), M III 62 (eighteen *dhātus*).

⁶⁸ *Salāyatana-samyutta*, S IV 1–204; *dhātu-samyutta*, S II 140–77.

⁶⁹ “The Mātikā”, introductory essay to the *Mohavicchedanī*, London, 1961, p. xx.

⁷⁰ A. B. Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁷¹ As additional ways of analysing the whole of experience, cf. *nāma-rūpa* (e.g. D I 223) and *diṭṭha, suta, muta, viññāta* (e.g. M I 3, 135).

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RICHARD P. HAYES

ON THE REINTERPRETATION OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S *SVABHĀVA*HETU

Ernst Steinkellner (1974: 118) correctly pointed out that the significance of the term "*svabhāva*" in the works of Dharmakīrti "has more or less puzzled scholars ever since the first text of Dharmakīrti was read." In that same article Steinkellner performed the long overdue service of showing the fundamental inadequacies of Stcherbatsky's predominately neo-Kantian interpretation of Dharmakīrti's system of epistemology. It has come to be my impression that the difficulty that Stcherbatsky and other modern interpreters of Dharmakīrti have experienced in reaching an understanding of key terms is but a continuation of the difficulty that Dharmakīrti's own commentators had in explicating the tortuous writings of this highly complex thinker. Since Dharmakīrti's use of the expression "*svabhāva*" provides a good example of an area in which his thinking seems to have been fluctuating during his career and therefore to have caused problems for his later commentators, I intend to focus on that one term in order to examine how it is used in various of Dharmakīrti's works.

First, I shall try to demonstrate that the word "*svabhāva*" has a uniform interpretation in all its occurrences in the logical portions of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Then I shall examine parallel passages in other of Dharmakīrti's works to show how the term "*svabhāva*" has a different interpretation from that found in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Let us begin, then, by examining two verses in the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. The first verse to be examined is *kārikā* two, which reads:

kāryam svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe
hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvo'pi bhāvamātrānurodhini

It is Dharmakīrti's contention that there are exactly two types of evidence (*hetu*) that can be used to confirm the presence of a suspected property (*sādhya*dharma) in a given locus (*pakṣa*). In the *kārikā* under discussion he defines these two types of evidence. In the

first instance an effect is said to serve as evidence of that which caused it: "kāryam . . . kāraṇe hetuḥ." But it is a well-known axiom of Buddhist metaphysics that when one speaks of objects in the roles of causes and effects, one is speaking of such ordinary phenomena as fires and clouds of smoke, which are examples of the type of objects that present themselves in naive cognition (*samvṛtisajjñāna*). The Buddhist claim is that at a more reflective and analytical — and therefore a more accurate — level of cognition, an ordinary object such as fire must be seen as merely the collocation of several properties such as existence, substantiality and firehood — properties that belong to all fires — plus various individuating properties that belong only to some but not to all fires. In the final analysis of *paramārthasatya*, properties are regarded as being superimposed by the mind upon particular objects of sensation. Thus it is strictly speaking inaccurate to speak of such properties as existence, substantiality and firehood as belonging to fire. Rather, according to the *cittamātra* nominalism of Dharmakīrti, the intellect (*citta*) superimposes these properties upon a sensation. But this nicety is an encumbrance to our understanding of the main logical point, which is that there are some "properties" that all fires have, and other "properties" that some but not all fires have.

Given this understanding of things, the question naturally arises whether each one of the set of properties that together constitute what we perceive as an object in the role of an effect serves as evidence of each one of the properties that together constitute what we perceive as an object in the role of a cause. Can, for example, the property of being made up of earth atoms, which is one of the many properties of smoke, serve in itself as evidence for the property of being a fire, which is one of the many properties of the object that we take to be the cause of smoke? The answer is clearly negative; we cannot legitimately infer the presence of the property of being a fire from the observed presence of earth atoms, for if we could, then the following would be a sound inference: "There is a fire on the mountain, because there is a pot on the mountain. Wherever there is earth, there is fire."

Nor, conversely, can the observation of the property of being smoke in itself serve as evidence for a property that belongs only to some but not to all fires. One cannot, for example, legitimately infer from the mere fact of observed smoke that the fire causing it is

fueled by dry straw. And so, in order to make it clear that only the properties that belong exclusively to the class of objects to which the effect belongs can serve as evidence for all the properties that belong to every member of the class of objects to which the cause belongs, Dharmakīrti qualifies the word "kāryam" in his definition with the phrase "*svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi*." The entire statement "*kāryam svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe hetuḥ*" now means this: "an effect is evidence for exactly the number of *svabhāvas* in the cause in virtue of which the effect is restricted to the cause."

Now before we are in a position to determine what interpretation to give to the term "*svabhāva*" in this context, we must ask in general just what those properties are in virtue of which the effect is restricted to the cause. To say that A is restricted to B is to say that A does not occur without B. And so what we are asking here is: what are the properties in a cause without which the effect could not occur? And the answer is obviously: just those properties that always (or necessarily) occur in the cause. A wisp of smoke cannot arise, for example, from objects that lack existence and combustion, and so these are necessarily properties of the cause of smoke. But a wisp of smoke can arise from an existent combustible thing that is not fueled by straw, and so being fueled by straw is an unnecessary property of the cause of smoke. Thus the simple observation that Dharmakīrti is making is that an effect confirms all and only those features of the cause without which the effect could not occur and hence without which the cause could not actually be a cause. And so it would appear that in the context of this discussion, the term "*svabhāva*" must mean something very much like the English expression "essential property," that is, a property that a thing must have in order to be the type of thing that it is. Indeed, "essential property" or "wesentliche Beschaffenheit" is the translation that Steinkellner has proposed (1974: 124, n. 24). He also mentions in a note (1974: 123, n. 20) that he believes the term "*svabhāva*" has not undergone any semantic shifts in the works that Dharmakīrti wrote after the *Pramāṇavārttika*. As mentioned above, my purpose in this paper is to present evidence that indicates to me that the term "*svabhāva*" did undergo a rather important shift in Dharmakīrti's usage. Steinkellner (1974: 129) does say that in Dharmakīrti "we have basically two kinds of *svabhāvahetuḥ*: The

pure generic property and the particular properties, where certain exclusions are referred to, which qualify these properties." It is my contention that there is but one notion of *svabhāvahetu* in *Pramānavārttika*, another in *Nyāyabindu*, and an incorrect assumption on the part of later commentators that the term has not undergone a semantic shift. Even if my contention can be proved to be false, however, I shall hope to be able to show that the state of affairs that Steinkellner describes, whereby the key term "*svabhāva*" means either the "pure generic property" or "particular properties that qualify these properties," would be a state of confusedness that in a system of logic based upon the relative extensions of class-defining properties would be intolerable. Rather than have to assume that Dharmakīrti was so hopelessly confused himself, I should prefer to assume, until it can be proved otherwise, that Dharmakīrti changed his usage of the term in such a way as to leave his later interpreters confused. This would mean only that one would have to be cautious in transporting ideas from one Dharmakīrtian text to another, but one could expect consistency within any given text.

Before going on to discuss other instances of Dharmakīrti's use of "*svabhāva*," it is important to spell out exactly what the implications are of understanding it here as an essential property. To say that an essential property of a thing is a property that the thing has necessarily and not just accidentally is to say that all instances of the thing in question will have the property in question. For example, to say that heat is an essential property of fire is to say that all fires have heat and that an object lacking heat would not in fact be a fire. And conversely, to say that the colour blue is a nonessential property of fire is to say that some fires are not blue. To state this same principle in the terminology of Dharmakīrtian logic, an essential property of an object of type *x* is any property that pervades (is a *vyāpaka* of) the class-defining property *X*, that is, the property in virtue of which the object is of type *x*. For example, an essential property of fire is any property that pervades firehood, that is, the property of being a fire. An object, then, naturally has a plurality of *svabhāvas*. It is, incidentally, in the nature of the pervasion relation that every property pervades itself. Since the property of being a fire pervades the property of being a fire, it qualifies as one of the essential properties

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of fire. In fact, it is the essential property of narrowest extension among all the essential properties of fire. It can be said in general that a *jāti*, that is, a property that determines a natural class, is the essential property of narrowest extension among all the essential properties that the objects of a given class have. Firehood, then, is the property that every fire has and that only fires have.

Now to return to the matter at hand, if we construe *svabhāva* as an essential property, we are committed to saying that the *svabhāva* is a *vyāpaka* or pervasive property. And if we say that a *svabhāva* is a *vyāpaka*, we can only say that the role played by a *svabhāva* in inference is that of the property to be confirmed, the *sādhyadharma*, and not that of the confirming property or *hetu*. And from this it would follow that the expression "*svabhāvahetu*" should be analyzed as a *saptami tatpuruṣa* compound: "*svabhāve hetur iti svabhāvahetuḥ*."

Bearing the above observation in mind, let us now examine the second line of the verse under discussion:

hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvo'pi bhāvamātrānurodhini

If we read this statement in what appears to be the most straightforward way and pay heed only to what Dharmakīrti himself says in this passage, we arrive at an interpretation something like the following: "An entity is evidence for an essential property that is causally dependent upon only [the entity's] existence (*bhāvamātrānurodhini*)."

Note that in this interpretation the *svabhāva* is the property to be confirmed, and the *bhāva* is perhaps a property that determines a subclass of the class determined by the *svabhāva*. In other words, the *svabhāva* pervades the *bhāva* and is thus the *sādhyadharma* for which the *bhāva* property is the evidence (*hetu*). And this is just what we should expect, because of our understanding of how the word "*svabhāva*" is used in the first line of this same verse and also because in this second line the word "*svabhāve*" appears in the locative case, which in the conventions of stating arguments in Sanskrit is the case used to mark the *sādhyadharma* for which a given *hetu* stands as evidence. The account I have just given, however, is rather surprisingly not the one given by Dharmakīrti's commentators.

Before looking at these commentators, however, let us look at what Dharmakīrti himself says in his own commentary to the verse under

discussion. He explains the relationship called “*tādātmya*” that underlies the fact of being an essential property in these words: “*tādātmyaḥ hy arthasya tanmātrānurodhiny eva nānyāyatte.*” I translate: “For a thing has the same nature as that alone which is causally dependent upon that thing; it does not have the same nature as that which is dependent upon something other than the thing itself.” To give an illustration of the import of this statement using the stock example, the property of being a tree (*vrkṣatva*) is an essential property of a given śīmśapā tree. That this is so is a reflection of the fact that the śīmśapā has the nature of being a tree, because the fact of being a tree is associated with the śīmśapā throughout its existence. Moreover, speaking ontologically, the existence of this particular instance of treehood depends upon no causal factors other than those that produced the particular śīmśapā at hand. The treehood of any individual śīmśapā is therefore not only temporally coextensive with the individual śīmśapā, but it also has precisely the same causal factors as the individual śīmśapā. Seen in this way, Dharmakīrti’s discussion of *tādātmya* confirms the observation that a *svabhāva* such as treehood is invariably present with the individual whose essential property it is. The *svabhāva*, therefore, is a *vyāpaka* and hence functions as a *sādhyadharma* rather than as a *hetu*.

There is yet one other important passage in Dharmakīrti to look at before we examine the interpretations of his commentators. That is the seventh verse of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter. It reads:

hetunā yaḥ samagrena kāryotpādo’numīyate
arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo’nuvarmitaḥ

The arising of an effect that is inferred through the complete cause is called a *svabhāva*, because it has no requirement of any further causal factor.

The issue here is the relatively unusual inference in which we infer an effect from a cause. Normally, of course, it is legitimate to infer from an effect to any one of the causal factors that are necessary for the effect to arise. An effect used as evidence for a necessary condition is a *kāryahetu*. But what sort of evidence are we to call it when the sufficient conditions of a given effect are used as evidence for the arising of the effect? Dharmakīrti in answering this question argues

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that if the totality of necessary causal factors is present, then that totality itself is a sufficient condition for the arising of the effect. That is, the totality of necessary conditions requires nothing further to produce its effect, and so the arising of the effect is a certainty and can therefore be inferred from the observation of that totality. It will be recalled that in the earlier discussion of the *svabhāva* it was said that a *sādhya* is a *svabhāva* if its existence depends on no other factor than the existence of the *hetu*. And so, on the grounds that the *sādhya*, namely, the arising of the effect, requires no causal factors other than the existence of the *hetu*, namely, the totality of necessary conditions, Dharmakīrti calls the arising of an effect in this case a virtual *svabhāva* (*svabhāvabhūta*). In other words, it is something that functions in every important respect like a *svabhāva* without strictly speaking being one. In the words of Dharmakīrti’s own commentary to the verse:

tatra hi kevalam samagrāt kāranāt kāryotpattisambhavo
’numīyate samagrānām kāryotpādanayogyatānumānāt.
yogyatā ca sāmagrīmātrānubandhinīti svabhāvabhūtaivānumīyate.
(Dharmakīrti, 1960 ed., p. 6)

For in that case one infers only the possibility of the arising of the effect from the complete cause, because one infers the capacity of all the causal factors to produce an effect. And this capacity belongs only to the collection as a whole, so one infers this capacity which is virtually an essential property.

What is important for our discussion here is that once again it is the virtual *svabhāva* that is in the role of the *sādhya* and must therefore pervade the evidence used to confirm it. The use of the term “*svabhāva*” here, then, is perfectly consistent with our interpretation of its use in the second *kārikā* of this chapter.

Let us now return to that discussion of *svabhāvahetu* in the second *kārikā* and see how the commentators Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin treat it. Both Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin offer the following analysis of the statement “*hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvaḥ.*” We are, say these commentators, to understand that the word “*bhāvaḥ*” in Dharmakīrti’s verse really means *svabhāva*, while the word “*svabhāve*” is to be understood as “*sādhye.*” Making the substitutions indicated by these commentators, Dharmakīrti’s statement now

reads "hetuḥ sādhye svabhāvaḥ." This is, on the face of it, a radical reinterpretation of the original *kārikā*! For in Dharmakīrti's verse the *svabhāva* is the property to be confirmed and therefore the property that pervades the confirming property. But on the interpretations of Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin, the *svabhāva* is the confirming property and therefore the property that is pervaded by the property to be confirmed.

Furthermore, it will be recalled that Dharmakīrti had specified that the fact of needing no further causal factors was the state of affairs that made a property qualify as a *svabhāva*. For Dharmakīrti, the fact of being a tree is one of the *svabhāvas* of a given *śiṃśapā* tree, because once the *śiṃśapā* exists there are no additional causal factors required to make the property of being a tree arise. But in Manorathanandin's account, the fact of being a *śiṃśapā* is a *svabhāva* that serves as evidence for the existence of the property of being a tree, and this indicated property requires no further causal factors than those needed to make the *svabhāva* itself arise. In Manorathanandin's words: "yasya sattāmātreṇa yo dharmo' vaśyam bhavati na hetvantaram apekṣate, tasmin sādhye svabhāvākhyo hetuḥ. (The so-called *svabhāva* is evidence for that property to be confirmed that necessarily occurs owing to the presence of the confirming property and requires no causal factors outside those of the confirming property itself.)" To repeat, the fact of needing no additional causal factors is for Manorathanandin and Karṇakagomin the defining attribute not of a *svabhāva* itself but rather of any property that the *svabhāva* indicates. This represents a significant departure from the most straightforward interpretation of what Dharmakīrti himself said in the *Pramānavārttika*.

The question that now confronts us is why would two interpreters as generally reliable as Manorathanandin and Karṇakagomin apparently misconstrue a passage as important as this one in which the key concept of *svabhāvahetu* is defined? On what authority did they reverse the role of the *svabhāva* from the part of a *sādhyadharmā* to that of a *sādhanaadharmā*, from that of a pervasive to that of a pervaded property? Why did they construe the compound "*svabhāvahetu*" as a karmadhāraya rather than as a locative tatpuruṣa?

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The answer to these questions is not difficult to find. These commentators followed the lead of Dharmakīrti himself, for he himself in his other epistemological works, the *Nyāyabindu* and the *Hetubindu*, offers an interpretation of *svabhāvahetu* that is quite different from the interpretations offered in the *Pramānavārttika*.

In the *Nyāyabindu*, for example, Dharmakīrti discusses the *svabhāvahetu* as follows: "*svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ. yathā vṛkṣo'yam śiṃśapātvād iti.*" As we shall see below, there are two interpretations of this statement, but it is at least clear that the *svabhāva* is something that functions as evidence for a property to be confirmed. And since the *svabhāva* is the confirming property, it must be a pervaded property, that is, a property pervaded by the property whose presence in the same individual is confirmed through it. What this means is that the word "*svabhāva*" as it is used in this passage can less satisfactorily be construed as an essential property than was the case in the *Pramānavārttika*. What a *svabhāva* is in the *Nyāyabindu* is related to what Dinnāga had called a "*bheda*." Dinnāga's *bheda* was a subclass of a larger class. Thus the term "*svabhāva*" is best understood relatively insofar as a given property is a *svabhāva* only relative to a property that pervades it. Thus, while "*svabhāva*" in the *Pramānavārttika* might be translated as "essential property," in the *Nyāyabindu* and *Hetubindu* it might better be translated as "individuating property" or "particularity." At one extreme, a *svabhāva* in these two latter texts may simply be the unique features that give an individual object its individuality, its difference from all other objects. Indeed, in the discussions of *svabhāvānupalabdhi* in the *Nyāyabindu*, the *svabhāva* is best understood simply as the identifying characteristics of a macroscopic object that, when not observed in a particular location, enable us to conclude that the object is not present in that location.

Now, as was mentioned above, there still remains a discrepancy between Dharmottara and Vinītadeva on how to construe the word "*mātra*" in the phrase that qualifies "*sādhyadharme*" in the *Nyāyabindu* discussion. Dharmottara first explains that "*mātra*" is to be construed in its restrictive sense: "*svasya ātmanah sattā. saiva kevalā svasattāmātram.*" And then he goes on to give an account very

similar to the one that Dharmakīrti himself gave of the parallel phrase in *Pramānavārttika* and that Kaṃṣakagomin and Manorathanandin followed in their commentaries on that work. Dharmottara says:

yo hetur ātmanah sattām apekṣya vidyamāno bhavati,
na tu hetusattayā vyatiriktaṃ kañcid dhetum apekṣate
sa svasattāmātrabhāvi sādhyah. tasmin sādhye yo
hetuḥ sa svabhāvah tasya sādhyasya nānyah.
(Dharmakīrti, 1955 ed., p. 106)

A property to be confirmed that arises owing to nothing but the presence of the evidence itself is a property the occurrence of which requires the existence of the evidence itself but which does not require any causal factor aside from the presence of the evidence. That which is evidence for such a property to be confirmed is a *svabhāva* of that property to be confirmed; nothing else qualifies as a *svabhāva*.

Vinītadeva, on the other hand, seems to depart from this interpretation of “*svasattāmātrabhāvini*” as indicating causal dependence and treats “*mātra*” instead as a term that indicates class containment. Explaining the stock inference using a *svabhāvahetu*, he says:

yathā vrkṣaḥ ayaṃ śiṃśapāvād iti. atra vrkṣasya
śiṃśapāmātreṇa sambandhah. tasmāt tena sādhyate.
(Dharmakīrti, 1971 ed., p. 20)

For example, “This is a tree, owing to its being a *śiṃśapā*.” In this case, tree is connected with every *śiṃśapā*. Because of that connection it is confirmed by that *śiṃśapā*.

Notice that we would be led into a falsehood if we took “*mātra*” in the sense of exclusion in this context. For then we should have “tree is connected only with *śiṃśapā*,” which would entail the false consequence that oaks and elms and so forth are not trees because they are not *śiṃśapās*. To avoid this absurdity, Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya translated the passage in question as follows:

As for example: this is a tree, because it is of the nature of *śiṃśapā*. Here the tree is related to every form of *śiṃśapā* and hence the existence of the tree is deduced from it, i.e. from the nature of being a *śiṃśapā*. (Dharmakīrti, 1979 ed., p. 133. Emphasis added.)

Despite the fact that Gangopadhyaya translates Vinītadeva’s use of “*mātra*” as “every,” he unaccountably takes “*mātra*” as “only” in his

translation of the very passage from *Nyāyabindu* to which Vinītadeva’s passage is an explanation. Gangopadhyaya translates Dharmakīrti’s sūtra thus:

Identity is the reason in relation to an inferable property which exists in its own [i.e. of the reason] existence *only*. (Dharmakīrti, 1971 ed., p. 133. Emphasis added.)

In this translation of the sūtra, Gangopadhyaya evidently stayed close to Stcherbatsky’s translation, which read:

Own existence [= identity] is a reason for a deduced property which exists in its own [the reason’s] existence *only*. (Stcherbatsky, 1930, p. 65, n. 4. Emphasis added. The so-called philosophical translation of *Nyāyabindu* 2.16 reads in Stcherbatsky’s text: “Identity is a reason for deducing a property when (the subject) alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction.” His literal translation, which I have quoted, appears in a footnote and actually reads: “Own existence (*svabhāva*) is a reason for a deduced property (*sādhyadharmā*) which exists in its own (the reason’s) existence only (read *sva-sattā-mātra-bhāvini*).”)

Stcherbatsky’s translation is misleading not only because of the unclear treatment of “*mātra*” but also because of the interpretation of “*svabhāva*” as identity. As Steinkellner (1974: 123, n. 19) has already pointed out, a *svabhāvahetu* is a property, whereas identity is a relation between properties or between classes. In addition to the objections that Steinkellner states against treating *svabhāva* as identity, it can further be pointed out that identity is not even the relevant relation between the confirming property and the property to be confirmed. Treehood is not identical to *śiṃśapā*hood, nor is the class of trees identical to the class of *śiṃśapās*. Classes are identical if, and only if, they possess exactly the same members. And properties are not identical unless their extensions are identical classes. In Dharmakīrti’s system, the only connection that the relation of identity has with the issue of *svabhāvahetu* is that in the case of a *svabhāvahetu* the locus of the *hetu* is identical with the locus of the *sādhyadharmā*. This feature differentiates it from the *kāryahetu* in which the locus of the *hetu* is an individual that is not identical to the individual that is the locus of the *sādhyadharmā*. This identity of locus for the *sādhyadharmā* and the *sādhyanadharmā* of the *svabhāvahetu* type is signalled by the fact that the two properties do not have distinct causes.

Taking all this into account, then, I would translate the above passage from the *Nyāyabindu* as follows:

Svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ.

A particularity is evidence for a property to be confirmed that is causally dependent upon only the occurrence of the particularity itself.

To summarize, then, in all of Dharmakīrti's works, the key feature of inferences making use of *svabhāvahetu*s is that the individual that is the locus of the confirming property is identical with the individual that is the locus of the property to be confirmed. This feature distinguishes *svabhāvahetu* inferences from *kāryahetu* inferences, in which the individual that is the locus of the confirming property is nonidentical with the individual that is the locus of the property to be confirmed.

From a purely logical and epistemological point of view, incidentally, the distinction between a *svabhāvahetu* and a *kāryahetu* inference is completely irrelevant. It makes no difference whatsoever in the task of inferring property A from the observation of property B whether A and B are properties of the same individual, since all that is needed in this sort of inference is a knowledge that B has been observed with A and has never been observed without A. Dinnāga's theory of the *trirūpa hetu* had said as much as it was necessary to say to determine the soundness of an inference. Not only is Dharmakīrti's added distinction between *kāryahetu* and *svabhāvahetu* unnecessary, it might even be seen as retrograde in that it reintroduces ill-defined metaphysical concepts into a logical system that had carefully been purged of such concepts.

To return to the main issue of this paper, Dharmakīrti's account of the *svabhāvahetu* throughout the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of his *Pramānavārttika* differs from his account in the *Nyāyabindu* and the *Hetubindu*. In the *Pramānavārttika* account, a *svabhāva* is any necessary property that an object belonging to a given class has, and an object of a given class therefore has a plurality of *svabhāvas*, any one of which can be confirmed to occur in any object that is the locus of a property of lesser generality than the *svabhāva* itself. But in his other works a *svabhāva* is treated by Dharmakīrti as a particularity

that serves as evidence for any property of greater generality than the *svabhāva* itself. Despite this rather important discrepancy in the treatment of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's works, commentators of the *Pramānavārttika* found a means of providing glosses for the key terms within the definition given in that work in such a way that the discrepancy was rendered apparently harmless. But in a logical system that depends on a recognition of the relative extensions of properties to decide which inferences are sound and which are not, no confusion on the matter of whether a property is pervasive of or pervaded by another property can be regarded as harmless. Therefore, modern scholars of Dharmakīrti could, by following the lead of Kaṇakagomin and Manorathanandin in their account of *svabhāvahetu*, be led rather seriously astray.¹

NOTE

¹ An earlier version of this paper was read at the Sixth World Sanskrit Conference in Philadelphia, October 14, 1984. Professors Steinkellner and Bimal K. Matilal made a number of useful suggestions that I have tried to take into account in revising the paper. Prof. Shoryu Katsura and Dr. Brendan S. Gillon also made comments on an earlier draft that have resulted in substantial improvements. Whatever flaws remain in the presentation are a function of my stubbornness rather than a result of a lack of excellent criticism from my colleagues. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment for the Humanities, which funded the research out of which this paper grew as a by-product.

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CAN THERE BE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR GENERAL TRUTH?

As the title of the paper suggests I shall be interested, in this context, in looking into the following questions: 'In which way empirical evidence (supposing that there is such kind of evidence) alone can justify the acceptance of some general truths?' and 'Whether empirical evidence has any intrinsic evidential demerit for a general truth?' It is important to note here that by 'general truth' I do not mean 'empirical generalization', rather significantly, I intend to mean 'truth which is indispensable for describing the world with a certain sense of profundity and finality.' A general truth is sometimes called a metaphysical truth. Thus 'time has a measurable magnitude' is a general truth, while 'watches measure time' is not a general truth.

The distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence is generally accepted as valid, at least in the West, and this distinction alone can be the ground of a more widely accepted distinction between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge. The distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence is more fundamental than the distinction between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge. This can be understood from the fact that the following questions are always regarded as key questions about knowledge:

- (1a) Can we actually know or truly believe some particular things on empirical evidence alone?
- (2a) Can we actually know or truly believe some general things on empirical evidence alone?
- (1b) Can we actually know or truly believe some particular things on non-empirical evidence alone?
- (2b) Can we actually know or truly believe some general things on non-empirical evidence alone?

No philosopher can remain neutral to any of these questions, and would try his best to give an affirmative or a negative answer to each

learning, and resulted in his most famous, and in some quarters, his most disturbing treatises. Though the Dga'-ldan-pa tradition clearly accepted that these visions originated from Mañjuśrī, thereby vindicating Tsong-kha-pa's, to some extent, unprecedented notions, his critics did not. Thus, his contemporary, the Sa-skya-pa scholar Rong-ston Śākya-rgyal-mtshan (1367–1449) is said to have opined that Tsong-kha-pa's vision was not that of a tutelary deity, but rather one of a "tutelary demon" (*lhag-pa'i lha-min*); see Gser-mdog Pan-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan, *Rje-btsun thams-cad mkhyen-pa Bshes-gnyen Śākya-rgyal-mi-shan-gyi rnam-thar ngo-mtshar dad-pa'i rol-mtsho*, Collected Works, Vol. 16, Thimphu, 1975, p. 342. A similar sentiment is expressed by another critic of Tsong-kha-pa, namely, the Sa-skya-pa Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams seng-ge (1429–1489) who speaks in this context of a "tutelary ghost" (*bāud yi-dam*); see his *Lta-ba'i shan-'byed theg-mchog gnad-kyi 'od-zer, Sa-skya-pa'i bka'. 'bum*, comp. Bsod-nams rgya-mtsho, Vol. 13, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1969, p. 18/3/4.

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EGOISM, ALTRUISM AND INTENTIONALISM IN BUDDHIST ETHICS

One of the interests of comparative studies is the manner in which features mistakenly assumed to be essential are often shown to be merely accidental. Similarly, one of the characteristic features of philosophy is that it often calls into question our complacent presuppositions. Thus comparative philosophy can be doubly illuminating in this way. This paper explores a topic in comparative ethics. It seems that certain familiar oppositions in Western ethical theory (as, for instance, between egoism and altruism, or intentionalism and consequentialism) do not figure in Buddhist ethics.¹ I shall discuss two such examples, arguing that the reason why this is so in these cases is the presence of certain distinctive metaphysical presuppositions. The interest of the discussion is twofold. Firstly, it shows that such oppositions are by no means essential to an ethical system. Secondly, it illustrates the way in which metaphysical and ethical theses so often interpenetrate each other. Finally, I should remark that my discussion is supposed to be a general account of these aspects of Buddhist ethics. However, I do usually have the Theravādin tradition in mind first, and then try to extend my claims, *mutatis mutandis*, to cover the Mahāyāna tradition as well.

I

The first supposed ethical opposition is that between egoism and altruism. My thesis is that this opposition does not figure in Buddhist ethics because the Buddhist account of the self defuses the whole question. In other words, I claim that the Buddhist contribution to a familiar problem in metaphysics yields an answer to a familiar problem in ethics. Let me first of all specify more clearly just what these two problems are. Thus, on the one hand, we have the ethical issue of egoism and altruism. The problem is perhaps best captured in the egoist's question, "Why should I act contrary to my own self-interest?" Adducing *moral* reasons here will not satisfy the egoist since only self-interest is going to be admitted as a rational motive for action. Hence the egoist will be willing to further others' interests only insofar

as he will thereby further his own interests. This, he insists, is the rational policy for any agent. Crucial to the strength of his position here is the presumption that the policy of the prudential egoist is self-evidently rational. That is, that we need to be given an argument for why we should sometimes rationally act contrary to our own self-interest, but no such argument is needed for the assumption that it is rational to act in our own self-interest.

The metaphysical question, on the other hand, is the problem of the nature of the self (perhaps most familiarly generated by the query, "What makes a person the same person he was yesterday despite a change in properties?"). There are basically two views on the nature of the self: the simple view and the complex view.² According to the simple view the self is a metaphysical simple: a substance, or at least a concrete particular. (Hence on this view the answer to the identity question about persons is that sameness of self guarantees sameness of persons through change of properties.) According to the complex view, however, the self is not a uniform substance that persists through time, but rather a cluster of past, present and future "selves" linked together by ties of various degrees: a process rather than a thing.

What is the Buddhist position on these two issues? With regard to the metaphysical question about the nature of the self the answer is pretty clear. Although the precise interpretation of its meaning is still controversial, the "no-self" (*anātman*) doctrine in Buddhism apparently insists upon a denial of a substantialist view of the self. Not only was the doctrine of "no-self" considered constitutive of Indian Buddhism by Hindu and Jain philosophers, but the crucial importance of the doctrine is frequently insisted upon in Buddhist texts. A good example is to be found at the beginning of the ninth chapter of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*:

Is there, indeed, no other Salvation than (within the pale of Buddhism)?

No, there is none! – Why? – Because (all other doctrines) hold to the erroneous view of the real existence of a Soul [*ātman*]. The term "Soul" is not regarded by them as a conventional term applied to what is only a flux of elements [*skandhasamāna*]. They maintain instead that the Soul is a Reality quite independent from (the elements). This idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation becomes impossible).³

This passage is significant not only because it clearly aligns the Buddhist view of the self with the complex view, but also because it insists upon the ethico-religious significance of the complex view of the self. This in turn relates the Buddhist view of the nature of the self to the problem of egoism

and altruism. For, as Steven Collins remarks in his important recent study of the "no-self" doctrine in Theravāda Buddhism,

... the rationale for action which acceptance of Buddhism furnishes provides neither for simple self-interest nor for self-denying altruism. The attitude to all 'individualities', whether past and future 'selves', past, future, or contemporary 'others' is the same – loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity . . . Buddhism conceives as part of [the qualitative notion of personal identity] a version of rational action which includes necessarily the dimension of altruism.⁴

And this is true of both Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism.

What I want to do is to try to show the logical connections between the Buddhist account of the self and the Buddhist conception of the rationality of non-egoistic action. More particularly, I want to argue that while the simple view of the self supports the egoistic presumption, the competing complex view of the self undermines the egoist's assumption that his view is self-evidently rational.

Firstly, then, the Buddhist view of the self. Clearly Buddhism opposes the simple view of the self in favour of the complex view. As already noted, the self is not held to be a uniform substance that persists through time, but a cluster of past, present and future "selves" connected to each other by ties of various degrees. The force of terming this the "no-self" view is to attempt to forestall any tendency to reify a process and make it into a thing, a substantial Self. One popular Buddhist way to expedite this is to abandon an ontology of concrete particulars in favour of an event ontology. Thus reality is analysed into a series of momentary events, each of which is causally efficient (the doctrine of *kṣanikavāda*).⁵ The self is not, then, a *thing*, but a *process*. And such a process is properly analysed as built up out of point-instants, in the way in which movement in the cinema is built out of a series of stills. Moreover, because of the infinite divisibility of time and space, this process will really be composed of an infinite series of momentary "selves" or person-slices. The self, then, is really a logical construction out of a set of point-instants or time-slices. (The technique is familiar from calculus where a process of motion is analysed as an infinite number of instants.) It might be thought that such momentary "selves" or temporal slices, being of (almost) no temporal "thickness", do not admit of identification and hence cannot be properly individuated. But this is not the case. Any temporal slice has distinct dispositional properties and causal relations unite these time-slice "selves" into distinct "streams" (*samāna*). The unreflective, however, erroneously view these streams as substantial individuals.

What is the relevance of this metaphysical account to the ethical problem of egoism and altruism? Basically that it undermines the plausibility of the egoistic principle. Now the egoistic principle admits of both strong and weak formulations. A strong version would be to the effect that it is only reasonable to act in our own self-interest and to be concerned just with what happens to ourselves in the future. A weak version would be to the effect that it is somehow especially rational to act in our own self-interest and to be primarily concerned with just what happens to ourselves in the future. An advocate of the complex view of the self can challenge the assumption that even the weak version of the egoistic principle is self-evidently rational.

Suppose we ask the egoist the question, "Which self is it whose interests it is self-evidently rational to serve?" On the simple view of the self the answer seems obvious: "Mine (i.e. the speaker's)." But on the complex view of the self the answer is by no means so simple, as Henry Sidgwick observed in the nineteenth century:

I do not see why the axiom of Prudence should not be questioned, when it conflicts with present inclination, on a ground similar to that on which Egoists refuse to admit the axiom of Rational Benevolence. If the Utilitarian has to answer the question, "Why should I sacrifice my own happiness for the greater happiness of another?" it must surely be admissible to ask the Egoist, "Why should I sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the future? Why should I concern myself about my own future feelings any more than about the feelings of other persons?" . . . Grant that the Ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, that the permanent identical "I" is not a fact but a fiction . . . ; why, then, should one part of the series of feelings into which the Ego is resolved be concerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any other series?⁶

In other words, given the truth of the Buddhist view of the person as a stream of causally connected past, present and future "selves", then what reason does my present (egoistic) self have for promoting the interests of any of my future selves? True, the Buddhist analysis of a person as a series of causally related selves stretching over time implies that my future selves will be causally linked to my present self in a way that the future selves of others will not be. However, in the first place, some of my distant future selves will be much less closely related to my present self than my immediately succeeding future selves will be. So why should I (as a prudential egoist) consider the interests of my distant future selves as meriting consideration over the interests of my immediately succeeding future selves, as indeed it seems I so often do on prudential grounds? Secondly, why should this causal

link matter anyway? Why does the fact that my future selves are part of a causal series of selves of which my present self is a member provide any reason for my present self to be concerned with other members of this series, any more than the members of any other series?

Hence it seems that a certain minimal altruism is required for prudential egoistic action; the promotion of the interests of my future selves is a minimally altruistic act (especially when such interests clash with my present desires). Can the Buddhist, however, press the egoist even further on this point? Perhaps he can. Recall that it is crucial for the egoistic presumption that self-interested action is self-evidently rational, that the egoist's position is the prudential position. The prudential egoist, then, pursues that policy which maximizes his own self-interest. Suppose, however, that we combine a prudential commitment to self-interest with the Buddhist view of the self. In the first place, there now arises an epistemic difficulty that is of importance for the egoist. For how can I at any given time distinguish *my* future selves (and hence their interests) from other future selves? Metaphysically, of course, there is a causal link that distinguishes my future selves from other selves; but epistemically most agents cannot know which selves are causally connected in the appropriate manner with their present selves. (True, on some accounts omniscient Buddhas are an exception to this general rule; but obviously this concession does not weaken the force of this epistemic consideration for most agents.) Secondly, even if I could know which future selves will be my descendant selves, I still would have no clear view of which of my descendant selves I should be concerned with, given that the preferences and interests of various of these descendant selves will frequently be in conflict. Now let us combine these two considerations with a commitment to the prudential egoistic principle that the rational policy is for me to act so as to maximize the expected interests of my descendant selves. This combination then implies not only a policy of impartiality towards the interests of all of my descendant selves, but (given the epistemic uncertainty) a prudential policy of impartiality of treatment of *all* future selves. Thus the egoist is committed on prudential grounds to a policy of consideration of others' interests which is behaviourally indistinguishable from altruism *simpliciter*, even though this policy is egoistically motivated!

Of course, the egoist may well shrink from this consequence and seek instead to retreat to a minimal altruism that only commits him to a policy of weighting the interests of other selves relative to their closeness to his

present self. This is somewhat like the common-sense attitude (prevalent at least in the West) that Broad has called "self-referential altruism".⁷ Self-referential altruism is neither purely egoistic nor purely altruistic. Rather, it admits the rationality (and even the obligatoriness) of a concern for the interests of others, but for others that have some special connection with oneself (relatives, friends, colleagues etc.). As Broad puts it:

Each person may be regarded as a centre of a number of concentric circles. The persons and the groups to whom he has the most urgent obligations may be regarded as forming the innermost circle. Then comes a circle of persons and groups to whom his obligations are moderately urgent. Finally there is the outermost circle of persons (and animals) to whom he has only the obligation of "common humanity".⁸

On this common-sense view, then, the rationality of concern for (and obligation to) other selves is a function of their "distance" from oneself (or one's present self). A self's distance from my present self is in turn, I suggest, a function of its overall similarity to my present self. (This accords well with the general Buddhist tendency to analyse dependence relations, including causal relations, as cases of similarity.) An analogy with possible world metaphysics is useful here.⁹ Suppose we conceive of other possible worlds as radiating in various directions from the actual world at a particular time. Now those worlds closest to the actual world constitute its immediate neighbours, distance from the actual world being a function of overall similarity to it. To measure X 's distance from Y in the actual world W is to measure how far X has to go in possibility space before it is indistinguishable from Y in W .

Now the prudential egoist who retreats to self-referential altruism in the face of our earlier argument has done more than merely give up an extreme version of egoism. Rather he has undermined the very foundations of prudential egoism. For if distance from my present self is the significant feature, then this has two important consequences. Firstly, this position runs counter to our normal conception of prudence, for it is surely often prudential for me to consider the interests of my distant (and dissimilar) descendant selves over the interests of my closer (and more similar) descendant selves. For example, having adopted self-referential altruism we can no longer have a *prudential* (as opposed to a *moral*) case for allowing the pleasure that smoking tobacco causes for my present and immediately succeeding selves to be outweighed by a future disvalue (a painful terminal cancer) suffered by my distant (and less similar) descendant selves. But if self-referential

altruism thus sometimes commits us to acting imprudently then the egoist, by retreating to such a position, has lost the possibility of appealing to the self-evident irrationality of sometimes acting contrary to our self-interest (i.e. imprudently).

Secondly, if we adopt the model above and hold rational concern to be a function of distance from my present self, then this obviously implies the rationality of a concern for those close to oneself who are nonetheless distinct from oneself. Other selves, then, may be "closer" to my present self than certain of my descendant or ancestral selves. Self-referential altruism thus implies the rationality of a concern with the interests of others, even to the extent of sometimes favouring the interests of other selves over the interests of future selves.

The Buddhist view of the self, then, presents the prudential egoist with a dilemma. On the one hand, a consistent prudential egoist is committed on prudential grounds to a policy of impartial consideration of the interests of all selves. That is, a policy behaviourally indistinguishable from altruism *simpliciter*, even though this policy is egoistically motivated. On the other hand, if the egoist retreats to a minimal altruism which only commits him to weighting the interests of other selves relative to their closeness to his present self, then (i) he now has to concede the rationality of non-prudential action; and (ii) he has to admit the rationality of sometimes favouring the interests of other selves over the interests of his own future selves. Either way, he is committed to the rationality of a policy that considers the interests of others as sometimes justifiably overriding his own interests.

The Buddhist tradition has always considered the "no-self" view as having enormous ethico-religious significance. A false view of the self is held to be one of the causes of bondage to suffering; a correct view of the self can liberate us from this bondage. Insofar as egoism represents a threat to the rationality of morality, and insofar as the egoistic presumption is made plausible by a particular metaphysical conception of the self, then it is clear that the Buddhist view of the self challenges the rationality of the egoistic presumption and provides for a version of rational action that necessarily includes some dimension of altruism. There may be other ways of undermining the egoistic presumption, but this use of a particular metaphysical view of the self to do so is distinctively (though not uniquely) Buddhist.

II

The second opposition I want to discuss is that between intentionalism and consequentialism. Intentionalism is the view that the moral value of an action is a function of the nature of the agent's intentions; consequentialism is the view that the moral value of an action is a function of its consequences. (In Western ethics Kant's moral philosophy, with its crucial emphasis on the deontological purity of the agent's will, is a familiar example of an intentionalist position; utilitarianism is a familiar example of a consequentialist position.) How are we to classify Buddhist ethics in this respect?

At first blush Buddhist ethics seems strongly intentionalist.¹⁰ In the first place Buddhism's distinctive contribution to the ethicization of the doctrine of *karma* was to make the crucial act a mental one, a "volition" or "intention" (Pāli *cetanā*). It is the presence of this intentional factor, rather than the external act alone, that is held to be the karmically significant force. Thus the often quoted words of the Buddha as recorded in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*:

O monks, it is volition [or intention, *cetanā*] that I call karma. Having willed. One acts through body, speech, and thought.¹¹

Secondly, in the Theravādin legalistic tradition embodied in the *Vinayaṭīkā* it is clear that the moral assessment of actions requires assessment of the condition of the agent. Unfortunately the Pāli *Vinayaṭīkā* does not explicitly discuss the principles involved here. This is because Buddhist law is traditionally casuistic.¹² Rather than enunciate general principles from which particular judgements can be derived, it prefers extensive listing of individual cases and the Buddha's judgements thereon. However, certain principles are implicit in such individual case judgements. For instance, the agent's intention to commit a forbidden act seems at least a *necessary* condition for moral responsibility. This is well brought out in relation to the precept concerning sexual restraint by the following interesting case from the *Suttavibhaṅga*:

Now at that time a certain monk was lying down, having gone into the Great Wood at Vesālī for the day-sojourn. A certain woman, sat down on him, and having taken her pleasure, stood laughing near by. The monk, waking up, spoke thus to this woman: "Have you done this?" "Yes, I have," she said. On account of this he was remorseful... "Monk, did you consent?" "I did not know, lord," he said. "Monk, there is no offence as you did not know."¹³

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However, although intentionality is thus crucial for the assignment of responsibility, Theravādin thought does allow consequences to play some role in grading the moral severity of various intentional actions. Hence we find the *Suttavibhaṅga* juxtaposing three similar cases where a monk gets meat stuck in his throat and is struck on the neck by a fellow monk.¹⁴ In the first case the striker kills the monk inadvertently. In the second case the striker intends to kill the monk and does so by striking him on the neck. In the third case the striker intends to kill the monk but fails to do so, though he strikes him. The first case is ruled to be no offence; the second to be an offence involving "defeat" (*pārājika*), i.e. expulsion from the order of monks; the third case is ruled to be a grave offence, but not one involving defeat. Thus an unsuccessful attempt at an intentional killing is to be viewed less severely than a successful intentional killing. The latter fulfils the traditional conditions for the gravest sort of violation against the precept to avoid taking life. That is:

(1) It must be a living being [that is destroyed]; (2) it must be known [by the killer] that it is a living being; (3) there must be a desire or an intention (*cetanā*) to kill that living being; (4) an endeavour must be made to kill that living being; and (5) that living being must be killed through the efforts made [by the would-be killer]. A person who commits an act of killing, fulfilling all the above conditions, may be said to be guilty of killing.¹⁵

Whether or not death actually results from an intended act of killing affects the moral gravity of the offence. In this sense Theravādin ethics (at least in the *Vinayaṭīkā*) is not *purely* intentionalist.

Further light can be thrown on this question of intentionality if we consider the case of dreams. Dream actions can create a special difficulty for a strong intentionalist in ethics. Hence Augustine, for instance, was forced to the position that consenting to (say) an act of fornication in a dream was morally blameworthy.¹⁶ Of course, intentionality alone does not generate this position. However, so far as the intentionalist component is concerned all that is required is the weak (and surely plausible) principle that it is sufficient for one's having done wrong that one consent to do something wrong. This principle coupled with two other doctrines Augustine subscribes to together yield his position on dream misdeeds. The two other relevant doctrines are: (i) that dreams are experiences; and (ii) that "ought" does not always imply "can".

Naturally both of these doctrines are disputable. Thus some recent

philosophers have denied that dreams are really experiences.¹⁷ But even if they are right the problem still remains, for then the concern we might feel for what we do in dreams should be supplanted by a concern for our propensities to construct immoral dream narratives.¹⁸ As for the second doctrine, Augustine's denial of the "ought" implies "can" principle is entailed by his anti-Pelagianism. However, scepticism about the universal applicability of the principle that "ought" implies "can" may be entirely independent of any theological position.¹⁹ Moreover, Augustine also reports that sometimes he is able to refrain from consenting to misdeeds in his dreams (as indeed some of us feel of our own dream actions).

Given the strongly intentionalist tenor of Buddhist ethics, what is the Buddhist position on dream misdeeds? One case that particularly worried Augustine is explicitly discussed in the Theravādin *Vinayapīṭaka*, i.e. the case of wet dreams. The ruling is that for monks "intentional emission of semen *except during a dream* is an offence requiring a formal meeting of the Order."²⁰ Similarly the *Prātimokṣasūtra* of the Sarvāstivādin school forbids a monk "intentionally to emit his semen, *except in a dream*."²¹ Why dream emissions are excepted in this way is not specified. But not all Buddhist schools are willing completely to exonerate dream actions. Alexandra David-Neel reports the views of the dGe lugs pa school of Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhism (as embodied in Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo*) to be rather different.²²

Continuing the traditional Buddhist stress on the value of mindfulness, Tsong kha pa considers it extremely important to keep control of oneself during sleep. Firstly, disorderly mental activity in dreams wastes potentially useful energy. Secondly, since dream actions can "manufacture evil", it is particularly needful to take measures to avoid this. Thus dream actions are apparently morally comparable with waking actions. This is, of course, the sort of view we should expect from a strongly intentionalist ethic: dream acts, though unreal from the waking standpoint, are very real as volitions or intentions and involve all the moral consequences attached to the latter. However, it is significant to note the actual rationale for this view which David-Neel attributes to Tsong kha pa and other Buddhist masters of his persuasion:

According to them, the most serious consequences of thoughts or actions are not those which are visible and external, but the modifications of a psychic order which they produce in the individual responsible for them. The will to accomplish an act, even if

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it is not afterwards consummated, creates, in him who has had the will or desire, affinities and tendencies which bring about a change in his character.²³

In other words, intentions as expressed in dream actions create dispositions to repeat similar actions, both in dreams and in waking life. Such intentions or volitions modify the character of the individual. Indeed, for Tsong kha pa (as for Freud) our real characters are most revealingly displayed in dreams, where we are no longer fettered by the constraints of social life. (There is a certain interesting parallel here with the teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā*. According to at least one tradition of *Gītā* exegesis, every action has two consequences: (i) its direct result (*phala*), the pleasure or pain following from it according to the *karma* theory; and (ii) the tendency (*samskāra*) it establishes in the agent to repeat the same type of action in the future.²⁴ While we cannot prevent the *phala* of an action from eventuating, we can eliminate the formation of the *samskāras* through the practice of the *yoga* of disinterested action.)

What is even more interesting, however, is that the rationale offered amounts to a *consequentialist* argument for avoiding dream misdeeds. They are said to modify the character and create karmic dispositions to perform such misdeeds in waking life as well as in dreams. And the performance of such deeds will in turn bind the agent yet more strongly to the sufferings of *samsāra*. Thus while Buddhist ethics is strongly intentionalist, it is also strongly consequentialist. This combination is made possible by the metaphysical presupposition of the doctrine of *karma*. It is a combination unusual in Western ethics, where this metaphysical doctrine is not commonly espoused. Kant's intentionalism, for example, has as its corollary a complete opposition between *prudential* action and *moral* action, the latter being action performed by an agent possessed of a will unsullied by any considerations of self-interest. We have already seen how the Buddhist metaphysical account of the self undermines the opposition between egoistic prudential action and altruistic action. Similarly, the metaphysical doctrine of *karma* undermines the opposition between prudential action and moral action, as well as the opposition between intentionalism and consequentialism. And this seems quite generally true of Buddhist ethics. Hence Gombrich justly remarks of the Theravādin tradition:

For Kant and his followers there is thus a fundamental opposition between prudence and true morality. To the Buddhist, however . . . this is a sheer nonsense. Buddhist

doctrine agrees with Kant that what counts is intention, not effect . . . *Karma* is nothing more or less than intention (*cetanāiva*). But by the law of *karma* every intention good or bad will eventually be rewarded or punished, so prudence and true morality must necessarily coincide.²⁵

III

To conclude then. Certain familiar oppositions in Western ethics just do not apply to Buddhist ethics. Two examples are the supposed oppositions between egoism and altruism, and between intentionalism and consequentialism. The reason for this phenomenon in these two cases is the presence of certain distinctive metaphysical presuppositions. The relevant metaphysical doctrines here are (i) a particular analysis of the nature of the self; and (ii) a commitment to the doctrine of *karma*, which in turn implies that all intentions have moral consequences. At least two lessons can be drawn from all this. The first is a simple point of the sort often derived from comparative studies: viz. that features of ethical systems most familiar to us need not be essential features of all ethical systems. The second has to do with the close relations that obtain between metaphysics and ethics.

These latter relations, however, can run both ways. On the one hand, it is reasonable to see much of Buddhist ethico-religious practice as generated by its metaphysics (and the two examples I have discussed seem to support this). Hence Whitehead's remark that Buddhism is "the most colossal example in history of applied metaphysics."²⁶ On the other hand, it is also arguable that much of Buddhist metaphysics is generated by its ethical positions. This is particularly plausible if we construe "ethics" to include not just morality, but value theory more generally.²⁷ Now it is well known that Buddhist philosophy displays a tendency to substitute epistemological questions for ontological ones when this can be done. But Buddhism is also strongly pragmatic in epistemological matters. The Buddhist logicians of the school of Dignāga, for example, define "knowledge" and "truth" in terms of successful human action. What counts as successful action is in turn determined by basic value commitments: ultimately, successful action must be that action which leads to the highest good, i.e. *nirvāṇa*.²⁸ Hence questions of Buddhist ontology, for instance, may in the end be determined by value judgements about the *usefulness* of certain conceptual schemes. In this sense Buddhist ethics (more widely conceived) might just

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as plausibly be said to generate Buddhist metaphysics as the other way around. These sorts of questions about Buddhist philosophy, however, require a separate discussion in themselves.

NOTES

¹ Perhaps still the best attempt at a succinct overview of the whole of Buddhist ethics is Anesaki (1912). Two valuable studies based on Pāli sources are Saddhatissa (1970) and Tachibana (1926). See also King (1964); Wijesekera (1971); Jayatilleke (1974), Chs. 14–15; Little and Twiss (1978), Ch. 8.

² Cf. Parfit (1973). See also Parfit (1984) which extensively explores the ethical consequences of the complex view.

³ Stcherbatsky (1970), pp. 11–12. Compare also Vallée Poussin (1926), p. 230.

⁴ Collins (1982), pp. 193–194.

⁵ The doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) was affirmed in Indian Buddhism by the Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas and the Theravādins, although they differed as to the exact duration of an event. The Madhyamaka school, however, rejected the theory.

⁶ Sidgwick (1907), pp. 418–419.

⁷ Broad (1942), p. 51.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁹ Cf. Zemach (1978), p. 157.

¹⁰ Thus Chapter 6 of Gombrich (1971) is entitled "The Ethic of Intention". However, Gombrich points out that the pure canonical views on the supremacy of intention are frequently compromised by Buddhist practice in Sri Lanka.

¹¹ *Āṅguttara Nikāya* 3: 295 as cited in Holt (1981), p. 75. The Pāli given there is: *cetanāham bhikkhava kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā*. See also King (1964), pp. 120–129.

¹² On the *Vinaya* as a system of religious law see Holt (1981) and, especially, Voyce (1982).

¹³ Horner (1938), p. 59. On pp. 59–63 a number of similar cases are cited. (I owe the reference to the first case to Little and Twiss (1978), p. 225.)

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 139–140. See also Little and Twiss (1978), pp. 223–224.

¹⁵ King (1964), p. 120.

¹⁶ On Augustine's views and the general philosophical problem they illustrate see Matthews (1981) and Mann (1983).

¹⁷ See Malcolm (1959) and the essays by Malcolm and Dennett in Dunlop (1977).

¹⁸ Cf. Mann (1983), pp. 381–384.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 379–380.

²⁰ Horner (1938), p. 196. (My emphasis.) See also p. 198.

²¹ Conze (1959), p. 74. (My emphasis.)

²² David-Neel (1939), pp. 74–78.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

²⁴ Cf. Hiriyanna (1932), pp. 129–130.

²⁵ Gombrich (1971), p. 246.

²⁶ Whitehead (1930), p. 39.

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²⁷ Cf. Moore (1903), p. 2: "I am using ['ethics'] to cover an enquiry for which, at all events, there is no other word: the general enquiry into what is good."

²⁸ Potter (1984) argues that this is quite generally true of Indian epistemology.

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THE FACT OF REASON: KANT'S *PRAJNA*-PERCEPTION
OF FREEDOM

It is customary, in formulating the analytic hypotheses of comparative study, to move from a Western system of thought to an Eastern one. The direction indicates an epistemological decision: the more familiar should be instrumental in deciphering the less familiar. For example, we may study the combinatorial thought underlying the *I Ching* through the lens of Leibniz. But what if we were to decide the opposite, to examine the supposedly more known system through analytic hypotheses formed from the less known? As to our motivation, that is simple enough. It would be interesting to view the comparative framing of things after having rescinded our usual decision.

One such recurrent theme is the comparison of Mahayana Buddhism with Kant, Kantian thought being the explicans, Buddhism, the explicandum. Thus, T. R. V. Murti claims,

The logical starting-point of their philosophy, therefore, is the transcendental illusion which consists in the transcendent or unrestricted use of the ordinary categories of thought – substance, causality, whole and part etc., beyond their legitimate field of experience.¹

Or, Stcherbatsky explains *kalpana* ('imaginative construction'), saying,

It corresponds to the part taken in Kant's system by 'productive imagination', whereas *vijnana*, or the *pratyaksa* of Dignaga, corresponds to 'reine Sinnlichkeit'.²

To align perspective along this meridian is to assume what is nearest to us culturally provides a suitable ground for what is more distant. Why make this assumption? As Heidegger points out, the proximate is the source of mystery. Could we not learn to question anew the conceptual framework through which we view what is philosophically alien? I want to take my cue in this experimental vein. I propose, by setting Kant and Buddhism side by side, to conduct some preliminary investigations on a specific problem dealing with Kant's idea of freedom.

1. PROBLEM ONE: THE 'FACT OF REASON'

In the 'Analytic' of his *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant's line of thought takes a curious turn. He is in the midst of examining the hypothesis that there are ways of action which serve as vehicles for pure reason, or *buddhi*-mind. The atmosphere of the *First Critique* has long since evaporated. There, we saw, he was exclusively concerned with pure reason's categorial strivings (the *vikalpa*) and their interplay with perception (*pratyaksa*). Now, he is exercised exclusively by the practicability of *buddhi*-mind, i.e., the question, can pure reason be practical?³ Not surprisingly, he occupies the familiar Buddhist position that action arising unobstructedly alone would express the fundamental nature of mind. Such action would not violate the *buddhi*-nature since it would be 'able to work independently of *determination* by alien causes', and therefore, as Kant is fond of saying, express the giving of a law unto oneself.⁴

Then, there is the surprise. Kant suddenly pronounces the actuality of unobstructed action. To all views, he has leaped from conditionality to certainty. 'The thing is strange enough', Kant admits, 'and has no parallel in the remainder of practical knowledge'.⁵ It is as if he converts the major premises of Aristotle's practical syllogism, without intermediary, to the conclusion, an action. Kant casts about for an explanatory property of pure reason. He gives three:

(a) Its primordial practicability: 'Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and it gives (to man) a universal law, which we call the moral law'.⁶

(b) Its self-actualizability: 'For the a priori thought of the possibility of giving universal law, which is thus merely problematic, is unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from experience or from any external will'.⁷

(c) Its factualizability: 'This Analytic proves that pure reason can be practical, i.e., that of itself and independently of everything empirical it can determine the will. This it does through a fact wherein pure reason shows itself actually to be practical'.⁸

It is factualizability that bears the brunt. Kant's struggle is clear in the different modes of expression he uses:

(1) The consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason, since one cannot ferret it out from any antecedent data of reason such as the consciousness of freedom . . . , and since it forces itself upon us a synthetic proposition a priori based on no pure or empirical intuition.⁹

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(2) The moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are a priori conscious.¹⁰

(3) In order to regard this law without any misinterpretation as given, one must note that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason.¹¹

(4) The objective reality of a pure will or of a pure practical reason (they being the same) is given in the moral law a priori, as it were by a fact, for the latter term can be applied to a determination of the will which is inevitable, even though it does not rest on any empirical principles.¹²

(5) This fact is autonomy in the principle of morality.¹³

(6) At the same time (the Analytic) shows this fact to be inextricably bound up with the consciousness of freedom of the will, and actually to be identical with it.¹⁴

Kant's perplexity regarding the 'fact of pure reason' is three-pronged. First, he is not clear whether it is identical with the moral law, or with freedom itself (quotations 5 and 6). Second, he is confused over the fact's being an epistemological element (belonging to *jnana*) or an ontological one belonging to *bhava* (quotations 1 and 3). And, third, Kant is unsure about the facticity of the *buddhi*-mind's factualizing capability. Its status is a fact *as it were* (quotations 2 and 4).

The 'fact of reason', serving as it does as the lynch-pin of the argument proving the practicability of the *buddhi*-mind is thus obscure as to content, metaphysical character, and facticity. But before we can have a crack at clarifying these problems, we need to see how, in Kant, things get worse before they get better.

2. PROBLEM TWO: INTUITION AND PRACTICABILITY

If Kant is to avoid a quietism, he must get a firmer grasp on the 'fact's' meaning. Instead of consolidating a position here, he plunges straight ahead. The Critical project is familiar: to furnish a regressive (transcendental) proof of the synthetic apriority of the *buddhi*-mind's practicability. He has already rehearsed this in the *Grundlagen*. Such a 'proof' must show that practical expression of the *buddhi*-mind is neither a mere generalization from experience (empiricism) nor a vacuous position lacking application in the real world (eternalism). In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for instance, Kant showed that causal concepts possessed a non-trivial a priori character by virtue of this relation to sensuous intuitions (i.e., the *manas*-orientation). But he has already discounted any so-called intellectual intuition:

For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.¹⁶

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Such intuiting would bypass the form-laden, categorial (*rupa*) tendencies of the mind, instead providing (as Kant denies) some direct access to the given. What Kant hits on is rather, as Lewis Beck White puts it, 'Some substitute for intuition': direct contact with the non-mediated real.¹⁷ Enter: the 'fact of reason'.

This kind of credential for the moral law, namely, that it is itself demonstrated to be the principle of the deduction of freedom as a causality of pure reason, is a sufficient substitute for any a priori justification, since theoretical reason had to assume at least the possibility of freedom in order to solve one of its own needs.¹⁸

This is as far as Kant pursues this matter. Somehow, he feels that knowing the architectonic place of the 'fact' resolves questions concerning its content, character, and facticity. He also ceases to elaborate what it means to call it counterpart to the receptivity to sensory events. Rather, like a gambler scheming to convert small debts into one single large one, he plots a reversal so grand that it will involve his entire system of thought. Claiming the concept of freedom as 'the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason, and even of speculative reason', he asserts all other transcendental (*paramita*) concepts now gain their objective reality from it, as

is proved by the fact that there really is freedom, for this idea is revealed by the normal law.¹⁹

And, like a gambler, he acts surreptitiously. We need now to look at Kant's grand conversion.

3. KANT'S CONVERSION SCHEME

All standard commentary and interpretation of Kant presumes a consistent point of view extending from the First *Critique*, through the Second, and beyond. This viewpoint demonstrates how sense perception (*pratyaksa*) places limits on valid concept-formation (*vikalpana*), ordering the phenomenal world (*samsara*) by causal sequences; yet, the origination of action on the part of the *buddhi*-mind can be independent of the world's causal matrix. It is Whitehead who first has qualms about this. He notices

for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity.²⁰

Inversion is correct only on the assumption of consistency. What if the effect of the 'fact of reason' were to retract everything implied by the 'productive imagination' (*kalpana*) – the epistemic blending of sensuous intuition and categorial striving – and to replace it with a new sort of insight, and thereby implied everything?

Kant's own knowledge of his own conversion seems minimal. He does speak of the new use to which his concepts are put, necessitating work 'to distinguish clearly the new path from the previous one and at the same time to call attention to the connection between them'²¹ He also tries to head off critics ready to attack him with claims of inconsistency.²² And, of course, there is the unclarity surrounding his deployment of such a new and formidable philosophical weapon, the 'fact'. This now is not as curious as it seems: the wholesale inversion of his thought must have been stupefying to his established reflection.

To begin to see what Kant is groping towards, let us recall his observation:

Pure practical reason now fills this vacant place with a definite law of causality in an intelligible world (causality through freedom). This is the moral law.²³

This vacant place is, moreover, one 'in the absolute sense needed by speculative reason in its use of the concept of causality'.²⁴ There, the categorial strivings of the *buddhi*-mind seized the form intrinsic to sensuous intuition (spatio-temporal ordering), imparting to the causal sequencing structure peculiar to *samsara*. Structure resulted from the collectivization of essentially subjective atoms of sense experience by means of the impressive processing program Kant outlined in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The end-product then approached objectivity only to the extent that the object known corresponded to the thing-in-itself. But since the latter is unknowable, objectivity is a desideratum inherently unattainable. It was the skepticism of this conclusion which drives Kant to rethink the relation between causality and intuition. For, in its baldest aspect, that is what the 'fact' represents: a newly uncovered relation which requires a revisionary view of causality and a mode of apprehension proper to it.²⁵

Small wonder his discovery of 'this vacant place' leaves Kant without adequate expression. For, the vacantness becomes, for him, a prism inverting his idealism. The moral law, practical reason, freedom all become terms suddenly bound up in a novel perception of causality.

Now practical reason itself, without any collusion with the speculative, provides reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, i.e., to freedom.²⁶

It is to this antinomous marriage of freedom and causality, occurring beyond the domain of categorial striving, that we must turn.

4. THE DISCOVERY OF *PRAJNA*-INSIGHT

I leave to the mechanism of natural necessity the right to ascend from conditioned to conditioned *ad infinitum*, while, on the other hand, I hold open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant, i.e., the intelligible, in order to put the unconditioned in it.²⁷

In the midst of a kind of philosophical investigation that has become routine for him – a transcendental deduction – Kant comes across a vacantness, a hiatus, in his thought. At this point, he encounters the emergent novelty whose mark will indelibly stamp his system. Though his sedimented concepts and percepts are unable to shoulder the creative burden, he nevertheless applies them in this area for beyond their scope. Not surprisingly, they fail to manifest any real explanatory power. Kant is torn between his preconceived, architectonic plans and the demands of his present discovery. In short, Kant undergoes *prajna*-insight.

Hitherto, Kant's perceptions were *manas*-oriented, under the impetus of categorial striving. The main effect of this, as Whitehead suggests, is a restrictive cause-effect framework in which sensory events trigger an interpretive mechanism whose end-product is the object as known. The frame features the subject, who, at the core of the field, constitutes the thing perceived, at the horizon.²⁸ The independent existence of both the subject pole and the object pole are held to be unknowable (antinomous, *avyakhta*), since the net of causality stretches between, but does not include, each. Now, suddenly, under the impact of *prajna*-insight, Kant's field of perception is transformed. In the vacant place, the *kalpanas* subside. With their subsidence, the field is decentered. The non-focal, pre-categorial profile ceases to be laden with causal forms, taking on a more open dimension. What had appeared invariant in perception (the subject/object, form/inchoate dichotomies) now can be varied, even reversed. The attention, freed of its *manas*-orientation, can move unobstructedly between foreground and background, core and horizon. It, no longer bound by the pathways of causality is free to oscillate between knower and known. It is in position to have

contact with the elements of reality (*dharma*) in an immediate, multi-perspectival (*nirvikalpa*) way.

The upsurge of *prajna*-insight, furthermore, extends well beyond the field of perception. There is also the noematic aspect. Guenther notes this correlation as follows:

When we perceive, we usually attend to the delimited 'forms' of objects. But these objects are perceived within a field. Attention can be directed either to the concrete, limited forms or to the field in which these forms are situated. In the *shunyata* experience, the attention is on the field rather than on its contents.²⁹

Sunyata is the ontological correlate of *prajna*-insight. Where the attention can shift back and forth between the categorially determined object and the indeterminacy in which it is embedded, *shunyata* is encountered. Here, the object '... fades into something which is quite open. This "open-dimension" is the basic meaning of *shunyata*'.³⁰ In this dimension, openness is not amorphous, entities melting to an undifferentiated conglomerate. Quite the contrary. Once stripped of their categorial distinctions, entities retain their unique particularities (*tathata*) participating in an original community no longer demarcated by the *manas*-inspired boundaries, especially, its supposition of individual self-existence (*svabhava*) by the *manas*-inspired boundaries. Without the evaluation inherent in focal perception, to perceive, as Merleau-Ponty says,

is to enter a universe of beings which display themselves ... to look at an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they present to it. But in so far as I see those things too, they remain abodes open to my gaze ... Thus every object is the mirror of all others.³¹

This non-obstructive continuum of entities, comprising the open dimension, widens with the widening focus of attention. At the horizon of the perceptual field, with the vanishing of all categorial striving, entities mutually penetrate (*pratitya samutpada*), mutually arising and mutually containing one another in the totality of entities (*dharmadhātu*).

Small wonder Kant stumbles and stutters over the 'fact of reason'. Discovering *prajna*-insight is like discovering a spy in the house of discursive reason. Stunned, he remains opaque concerning its content, its character, and its facticity. Now, having surveyed his discovery, we are in a better position to set the record straight. The character of the 'fact' is indisputably epistemic. It belongs to knowledge (*jnana*) and not being (*bhava*). Its content,

or the object of pure reason, moreover, is the open dimension, *sunyata*. Finally, its facticity, or bruteness, is guaranteed by the phenomenon of field reversal, the defocusing, decentering event coordinate to the fact's appearance.

5. FREEDOM AND CAUSALITY

Kant says that

the moral law is, in fact a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of the possibility of a supersensuous nature.³²

Since he has previously stated that the 'fact' is consciousness of this law, he thereby implies the 'fact' to be a certain awareness of causality. This is curious because he has spent time in the First *Critique* rejecting Hume's subjectivist notion of causality. The upshot is to restrict its applicability to within the categorial frame. Kant investigates another, non-*manas*-oriented concept, in the Third Antinomy, but concludes that neither proof nor disproof is possible. When he comes to the discovery of *prajna*-insight, that frame is rent asunder. What revisionary version of causality does Kant have in mind?

Through the 'fact of reason', contact with *sunyata* is achieved. In its negative aspect, such contact undercuts the substantiality of the world categorial scheme Kant posits (*nibsvabhavata*). Considered positively, it involves an encounter with *pratityasamutpada*, proclaiming the totality of entities to arise together, in dependent coorigination. For the Madhyamika, after Nagarjuna, this is frequently understood as non-origination (*anutpada*); entities do not arise at all.

Never are any existing things found to originate – from themselves, from something else, from both, or from no cause.³³

In Hua-yen Buddhism, we find these two aspects combined to signify the interpenetration and intercausation of all entities.³⁴ On the one hand, no entity, having substance, can obstruct the influence of any other (*anavarana*.) On the other, all entities support one another together in a great causal web, arising full-blown in existence. Fa-tsang describes this as follows:

This little particle of dust arises through causes. This means a dharma . . . this dust and other dharmas depend on and involve each other . . . all dust is formed through causation:

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this is matter . . . the theory of all things coming into existence through causation is unfathomable. All things are exhaustively combined as one, and all infinities are embraced to form a totality.³⁵

That is, each entity is monadic. Contained in each are the conditions for its and each other entity's arising. Each then participated internally in the manufacture of effects on the part of any other entity.

As the ten directions enter into one particle of dust, they are always near although they are far, and as the dust universally pervades all the ten directions, it is always far although it is near.³⁶

All causal propensities then are uniformly distributed across the totality. No causal change fails to involve the community as a whole. Causality is the mode of communication among member entities. All members possess equal fluency. Though the content of the communication of one is always a reflection (*pratibhasa*) of that of another, the mode of expression retains its particularity (*tathata*). The *dharmadhatu* is this matrix of intercausation.

To begin to understand Kant's revisionary version of causality, let us recall that he is anxious to identify freedom with autonomy, the giving of law by the *buddhi*-mind: 'this intrinsic legislation of pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive sense'.³⁷ While the political metaphor suggests the creation of rules *de novo*, Kant is elsewhere clear to reject this kind of license as the meaning of autonomy. Rather, the *giving* of law, like the giving of sensuous manifolds to intuition, has an epistemic reference. It refers to that peculiar 'substitute for intuition' which the 'fact of reason' comprises, i.e., *prajna*-insight. Freedom, for Kant, is the exercise of that receptive faculty through which the objective, non-*manas*-oriented order of things is given. It is exercising the means of achieving contact with the open dimension, where entities are no longer laden with the effects of categorial striving. Freedom is the rehearsal of the de-focusing, de-centering act that allows the particular entities to stand forth unobstructedly, in the community that they reciprocally constitute.

Thus, calling pure reason practicable is tantamount, for Kant, to saying that freedom, in this primordial sense, can be exercised. Its exercise, the receptivity to unobstructed *dharmas*, brings with it a vision of a community, intercausally connected, perfectly interpenetrating, and mutually communicating a changefulness passed lawfully from one to the other. Such a vision is absolutely necessitating. By the practice of *prajna*-insight,

we are conscious of a law to which all our maxims are subject as though through our will a natural order must arise.³⁸

We perceive our own place in 'a system of rational beings'.³⁹ At the same time, we perceive the causal changes uniquely pertaining to that place, as well as the causally communicated influences impinging thereto from the rest of the community. When our action proceeds in accordance with this perception, we participate in that causal matrix singularly our own. We authorize that act, though it does not originate in us alone. We may formulate, deferring to our *manas*-orientation, ourselves as cause and the act as effect. Then, falling back on an inherent categorial striving, we fail to note the difference between *vikalpana* and *sunyata*:

In the former, the objects must be the causes of the conceptions which determine the will, and in the latter, the will is the cause of the objects.⁴⁰

6. CONCLUSION

I have been experimental in my comparative approach, using the instrument of Hua-yen Buddhism to investigate Kant's 'fact or reason'. What has been demonstrated? Certainly, the hypothesis that comparative study is flexible enough to illuminate strands of our own philosophical tradition is both interesting and compelling. But for Kant, *does* the study of practicability with reference to the *buddhi*-mind end in the perception of the *dharmadhatu*? I have marshalled some evidence to support this theory, implicit throughout the Second *Critique*. At the end of the *Grundlagen*, Kant offers one further note suggesting this conception must have been a continuing influence on his later moral thinking. Referring to the idea of a purely intelligible world, he says it serves to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the splendid ideal of a universal kingdom of *ends in themselves* (rational beings), to which we can belong as members only if we are scrupulous to live in accordance with maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.⁴¹

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NOTES

- ¹ *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 1960, p. 295.
- ² *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1923, p. 19 n 2.
- ³ *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. Beck, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, p. 3; hereafter referred to as *Critique*.
- ⁴ *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, tr. Paton, London, Hutchinson University Library, 1948, p. 97; hereafter referred to as *Groundwork*.
- ⁵ *Critique*, p. 31.
- ⁶ *Idem*.
- ⁷ *Idem*.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 47.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- ¹⁵ *Groundwork*, p. 99.
- ¹⁶ *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Kemp Smith, London, MacMillan, 1950, A256-B311.
- ¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1960) p. 173.
- ¹⁸ *Critique*, p. 48. This need was to circumvent 'the abyss of skepticism' (*Critique*, p. 3), arising from the irresolvable dilemma concerning the existence of freedom, in the Third Antinomy. Even though freedom cannot be disproved, the practical implication inclines one away from a moral incentive.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ²⁰ *Process and Reality* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957).
- ²¹ *Critique*, p. 7.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ²⁵ The most striking evidence of this is the secondary place now afforded to an earlier view of freedom, conceived as acausal spontaneity. Cp. *Groundwork*, p. 100. Where acting freely no longer implies breaking out of the causal net, but rather participating in its maintenance, intuition assumes a new importance.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- ²⁸ Husserl says, 'Every experience has its horizon; every experience has its core'. *Experience and Judgment* (tr. Churchill and Ameriks, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 48.
- ²⁹ Guenther, Herbert and Trungpa, Chogyon, *The Dawn of Tantra*, Berkeley, Shambala, 1975, p. 27.
- ³⁰ *Idem*.
- ³¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, tr. Colin Smith, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 68.
- ³² *Critique*, p. 47.

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³³ 'Fundamentals of the Middle Way: Mulamadhyamika-Karikas', tr. Streng, in *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, New York, Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 183 (1: 1).

³⁴ Cp. Francis H. Cook, *Hua-yen Buddhism*, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977, p. 68.

³⁵ 'Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Flowery Splendor Scripture', tr. Wing'tsit Chan, in *A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 4-4-20.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

³⁷ *Critique*, p. 33.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴¹ *Groundwork*, p. 127. Cp. the Typic, *Critique*, p. 43. The kingdom of ends can be conceived as a membership of *buddhi*-perceptive beings who share a view of their mutually causal influence.

INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY IN TRADITIONAL INDIAN THOUGHT

The present paper is a study of traditional Indian attitudes towards individual autonomy and responsibility as it finds expression in traditional Indian thought. In this paper I will analyse a few basic concepts of traditional Indian thought, and consider how they relate to the problems of individual autonomy and responsibility.

The key concept bearing on the problems of individual autonomy, responsibility, initiative and efforts is *karma*. To put it very simply, according to the doctrine of *karma*, every act, whether good or bad, produces a certain result which the performer cannot escape. The related doctrine of *saṃsāra* lays it down that every individual is caught up in the cycle of birth and rebirth until he or she obtains the final release (*mokṣa*). One's actions in one's past lives determine the nature of one's present life, and the actions of the present life, in their turn, determine the nature of future lives. *Karma* stands for compensation for good and evil, and *saṃsāra* for rebirth appropriate to the *karmic* legacy. The doctrines of *karma* and *saṃsāra* are absent in the Vedic literature.¹ The doctrines of *karma* and *saṃsāra* seem to have gradually taken shape from the time of Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*.² The philosophical schools of *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikā*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* — all believed in the doctrines of *karma* and *saṃsāra*. The *Cārvāka* school of materialists, however, did not believe in these doctrines, but explained the origin and perpetuation of life on earth through its doctrine of 'chance', and believed in a complete annihilation after death. The *Ajīvaka* school of the *Sramaṇa* movement (the movement of the free thinkers) developed a view that was just the opposite of the 'chance' doctrine of the *Cārvāka* materialists. The *niyati* (fate) doctrine of the *Ajīvakas* was one of a complete determinism and fatalism. Other *Sramaṇa* schools like Buddhism and Jainism believed in *karma* and rebirth. The *karma* doctrine stands opposed to the 'chance' doctrine of the *Cārvāka* school on the one hand and to the *niyati* doctrine of the

THE PRAGMATIC EFFICACY OF *SADDHĀ*

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The goal of this paper is to trace the outlines of the concept of *saddhā* in early Buddhism with a view to showing how early Buddhism takes a *pragmatic* religious road rather than an *intellectualistic* one. An intellectualistic road would be, for example, like the one Anselm takes in constructing his ontological argument for the existence of God.¹

The approach taken in early Buddhism, by contrast, is pragmatic in that it involves an initial openness to test things religious for oneself by personal experience, rather than trying to construct abstract philosophical proofs for religious beliefs.

This is not to say, however, that one is encouraged in early Buddhism to have faith in the sense of 'believing on insufficient evidence'. As will become clear, 'initial faith' is not this but is a listening orientation, a willingness to hear the *dhamma*.

There are, in addition to *saddhā*, other terms such as *pema* and *aveccappasāda* which are relevant to the discussion of faith in early Buddhism. Ānanda, for example, is said to have had too much *pema* ('affection') for the Buddha.² In other contexts, *pema* has a pro-attitude use when linked with *saddhā* in its pro-attitude use, as when referring to those who have 'enough faith, in the Tathagata, enough regard',³ And, as Jayatilleke points out, the verb *pasidati* ('to have faith in, appreciate') is used to refer to the Buddha, while *pasāda* in the compound *aveccappasāda* frequently refers to Buddha, *Dhamma*, and *Saṅgha*.⁴ Nevertheless, in this paper the focus is on *saddhā*, a frequently recurring term usually translated as 'faith' or 'confidence' and sometimes even 'belief'.

Saddhā is rarely if ever given careful, detailed consideration by Pāli scholars, for they often accept the received view of early Buddhism as empiricism on which certain uses of *saddhā* may be ignored as

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anomalous data which do not fit the received view. The purpose of this paper is to discuss some uses of *saddhā*, usually rendered as 'confidence' or 'faith', and the importance of this concept for understanding knowledge and religious belief in the early Buddhist context.

I

In discussing *saddhā* the issues of the relation between confidence and learning the doctrine, between confidence and practical results, and the interpretation of *amūlikā saddhā* and *ākāravatī saddhā* are crucial.⁵

On the relation between confidence and learning the doctrine, consider, for example, the *Majjhima Nikāya* passage.⁶

When I had heard that *dhmma* I gained faith in the Tathāgata juxtaposed with another *Majjhima* passage.⁷

If faith is born, then he approaches.

Taken in isolation the first passage might mistakenly be viewed as support for the notion that *saddhā* is only consequent to hearing the doctrine. Not only is it confidence in the *Tathāgata* (rather than specifically in the doctrine) which results, but also this quotation is balanced by others, like the second one, in which *saddhā* is prior to investigation. From an epistemological perspective, therefore, *saddhā* sometimes precedes, and is not always consequent to checking the doctrine.

It is illuminating to see *saddhā* from a pragmatic perspective, in terms of whether it follows or precedes practical realization of the path. On the one hand, considering learning elephant riding and handling the goad (which are compared to becoming a Buddhist adept) it is said:⁸

Had he no faith he could not attain whatever is to be won by faith.

In this context *saddhā* is one of the five qualities (*pañca vasāni*) for making progress on the path, and is *prior* to achieving results. In the same vein a *Majjhima Nikāya* passage explains that the development of the *abhiñña* depends on *saddhā*.⁹ In another context, however, *saddhā* comes *after* getting results based on a hearing of the doctrine.

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'Be a *dīpa* (lamp, island) for yourself', the trainee is urged, and do not accept anything on report, tradition, or hearsay, but because you have known and seen it yourself.¹⁰

Saddhā is one of the five powers which, taken together, define the *Arahant* when they are fully developed. Having a proper degree of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and insight is having the necessary and sufficient conditions for becoming an *Arahant*.¹¹ But in addition to this sort of usage of *saddhā* as a faculty, for example, in the phrase 'the moral sense of faith', it also occurs in expressions like 'walking according to faith' and 'living in faith',¹²

A very different and negative usage is exemplified by the story of the wanderer, Magandīya, proud of his health, who is told by the Buddha that such pride is like being taken in by a 'confidence' man. Being proud of one's health is compared to 'confidence in the man with vision' (i.e., the trickster) who offers a greasy, grimy, coarse robe as if it were a lovely, unstained, pure, white cloth.¹³ Since the word used is *saddhā*, it is clear that having *saddhā* is not always regarded as a good thing.

Elsewhere in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, however, there is a clear contrast between: 'a good man has faith' and 'a bad man is lacking in faith'.¹⁴ *Saddhā* is here used with a pro-attitude, as in the 'five qualities' usage. There are degrees of *saddhā*, as the difference between those 'with only a little faith, with only a little regard', and those 'who have gone forth from home into homelessness without faith, who are crafty' shows.¹⁵ The latter is contrasted with the phrase, those who have 'gone forth from home into homelessness through faith in me'.¹⁶ When *saddhā* is used as a virtue, it is linked with moral habits involving certain attitudes, as in the case of 'young men of family who have faith and are of great enthusiasm, of great joyousness and who, having heard this, focus their minds on suchness'.¹⁷ That moral habit is seen as an important way of developing *saddhā* as a virtue is clear in the emphasis given to family background, 'he who comes from a family that has no faith' being at an initial, although not necessarily final, disadvantage.¹⁸ Sometimes, too, faith is used with a pro-attitude in reference to the Buddha, the doctrine, and the monastic order, and these may be mentioned singly or in combination.¹⁹

There is no evidence of a division among the uses of *saddhā* such

that confidence in the doctrine is a primary use and the other uses are of lesser importance. For example, there are non-cognitive applications, such as 'if faith is born, then he approaches' in order to hear the doctrine. Although it would be a mistake to over-emphasize a single strand of the complex concept as more important than all others, there are some passages which suggest the overriding importance of *saddhā* in the *Tathāgata*, for example:²⁰

If he has enough faith in the *Tathāgata*, enough regard, then he will have these things, that is to say the faculty of faith, the faculty of energy, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of wisdom. This, monks, is called the person who is striving after faith.

If it is correct to assume that the second occurrence of *saddhā* here, as in 'the faculty of faith', refers to doctrine, then one *consequence* of sufficient faith in the *Tathāgata* is faith in the doctrine. Taken in this way, the passage depicts the former as the source or precondition of the latter. I mention this passage, not to argue for one usage of *saddhā* as primary in general, but to offset the undue weight given to *ākāravatī saddhā* (Jayatilleke: 'rational faith').²¹

Jayatilleke calls attention to a distinction presented in the *Majjhima Nikāya* between confidence based on checking some points of the doctrine by acquiring 'knowledge and vision' (which confidence is called 'rational faith' M. N. I 320), and the 'baseless faith' (*amūlikā saddhā*) which the brahmins are said to have had toward the Vedic scriptures. Although Jayatilleke indicates that there are affective, conative, and cognitive aspects of the concept of *saddhā*, in the context of his expressed interest in the cognitive aspect in order to illuminate early Buddhist theory of knowledge, a reductionistic account in terms of propositional belief emerges according to which other *aspects* (he denies that there are different *uses*) of *saddhā* telescope into the cognitive one:²²

(659) The object of *saddhā* in the *Nikāyas* is most frequently the Buddha. The favourite phrase is 'having heard his doctrine he acquired faith in the *Tathāgata*' (*taṃ dhammam sutvā Tathāgate saddham paṭilabhati*, M. I. 179, 267, 344; M. III. 33). If *saddhā* means belief, 'acquiring faith in the Buddha' is equivalent to saying 'believing in the Buddha' and what is meant by believing in the Buddha is that one believes that what the Buddha says is true. As Wozzley points out, 'certainly we do talk of

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believing in a person but there we mean that we believe that what he says is true.²² The verb *pasidati*, 'to have faith in, appreciate' also has the person of the Buddha as the object (e.g. *Satthari pasidim*, M. I. 320) but *pasāda-* in the compound *aveccappasāda-* (v. *supra*, 655) frequently has the Buddha, his teaching (*Dhamma*) and his Order (*Saṅgha*) as the objects. 3 Here 'faith' or belief in the *Dhamma* means the statements that constitute the *Dhamma* or the teachings of the Buddha. Likewise, believing in the *Saṅgha* implies believing in the truth of the utterances of the *Saṅgha*; since these were more or less derived from the Buddha, it again ultimately implies a belief in the statements of the Buddha.

The third sentence in the quotation above, in particular, states that believing in the Buddha and believing that what the Buddha says is true are *equivalent*.²³ What Jayatilleke is doing here is giving an account of *saddhā* such that other uses are parasitical upon its cognitive use. There are two major difficulties with this attempt. First, it is mistaken to suppose (with Wozzley) that believing in a person is tantamount to believing that what he says is true. For as Basil Mitchell's 'parable of the Stranger' shows, belief in a person sometimes occurs even when it is recognized that the person says some things that are false.²⁴ Secondly, even if the supposition of 'equivalence' just mentioned were philosophically defensible as a general account of 'belief in', it would, anyway, not be factually correct to think that in early Buddhism the cognitive aspect of *saddhā* is primary or fundamental. For *saddhā* is sometimes operative *prior* to knowing the doctrine, as in 'if faith is born, then he approaches' and 'had he no faith he could not attain whatever is to be won by faith'. Thus, there are non-cognitive elements or aspects of *saddhā* which are ignored if one treats believing in the Buddha as equivalent to believing that what the Buddha says is true.

Jan Ergardt's work, *Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism*, tends to support the view that it would be mistaken to try to reduce all strands of *saddhā* to the cognitive one. He writes:²⁵

To sum up: faith in these texts is mainly an affective and conative faculty that functions in the disciple's good decisions on the way to the goal. Its cognitive aspect is secondary and derived from the *dhamma*, of which the utmost knowledge is the knowledge and experience of release and *nibbana*. Faith is not a necessary condition for the religious process but knowledge and experience are.

But what is 'religious process' here? If it includes approaching to hear the doctrine from a teacher of *dhamma*, then the last quoted

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sentence above is objectionable. For *saddhā* in the sense of an initial confidence with which to approach is, indeed, a necessary condition for the religious process on this inclusion.

Faith and knowledge are not opposed to one another in early Buddhism, as Ergardt points out. He sees that 'the consequence of this confidence in the Buddha, the dhamma and the sangha is development towards knowledge and experience of release' and notices that, in contrast to 'belief', 'faith is the more dynamic term suggesting a warm, even passionate attachment and implies the urge to some kind of action as a result'.²⁶ Ergardt rightly pinpoints 'the dynamic quality which is part of the Buddhist healthy faculty of faith', and supports the suggestion argued for herein *viz.*, that *saddhā* is viewed as pragmatically efficacious in early Buddhism.

Another reason to think that the distinction between *amūlikā saddhā* and *ākāravatī saddhā* presented by Jayatilleke as representing Hindu and Buddhist faith respectively is not as sharp as he suggested is found by examining *Majjhima Nikāya* I 478.²⁷ Here the Buddha says of the person who if 'freed by faith' that there is still 'something to be done through diligence'.²⁸ Commenting on this passage Barua observes:²⁹

In the lowest rank is placed the *Saddhānusārī* who develops the five faculties, essential to mukti, by way of blind faith in and through the love of the Buddha.

One should not be misled by this assertion into thinking that faith in early Buddhism is by itself sufficient for liberation. Both the text and Barua's comment on it shows that the *saddhānusārī* leave something to be done on the Buddhist path, unlike those who are 'freed both ways' (*ubhatobāgavimutta*) and those who are 'freed by intuitive wisdom' (*paññāvimutta*). But the person freed by faith does have *some* of his cankers (*āsavas*) destroyed, and has a firm faith in the *Tathāgata*.³⁰

Barua sees the importance of Buddhist faith for approaching the teacher, and emphasizes that 'the Buddhist faith is essentially that of a religious student'.³¹ Here faith is seen as pragmatically efficacious for progress in the *dhamma*. Another way in which *saddhā* is pragmatically efficacious in early Buddhism is seen in the life of the Buddha as interpreted by Kalupahana thus:³²

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Upon reaching Isipatana, Buddha discovered the five old-time friends continuing with their mortification of the flesh. The five ascetics recognized Siddhārtha.

"Here comes the weak-minded Siddhārtha, who gave up austerities for a life of abundance," said one of them, calling the attention of the others. "It would not be proper for us to pay any respect to a person who vacillates when faced with the rigors of spiritual exercises."

Yet, as the Buddha came closer to them, they noticed the change in his physical personality. They were mystified by the peace and serenity that was reflected on his face. They realized that it was not the same Siddhārtha that they left behind in Uruvela; he was completely transformed. Yet they could not understand his spiritual achievement. In spite of their earlier decision not to pay the Buddha any respect, they could not resist the temptation to get up from their seats when Buddha reached them. One of them took his bowl and robe; another prepared a seat; a third set water for him to wash his feet.

Part of the spiritual transformation described above is that the Buddha has confidence that he can teach *dhamma*. As depicted in the *Udāna*, the experience of enlightenment in which the Buddha understands causality involves the elimination of all doubts.³³ Hence the above-mentioned 'peace and serenity' may well have characterized the Buddha after enlightenment.

If, as I maintain, *saddhā* in early Buddhism is pragmatically efficacious, then it may be asked: in what ways is it efficacious? The foregoing account enables one to distinguish three levels of the application of *saddhā*. First, *saddhā* is pragmatically efficacious in coming to hear the doctrine. This does not necessarily involve an element of intellectual assent, but does involve a willingness to approach a teacher and listen to the *dhamma*. When *saddhā* is applied at this level it can be characterized as 'initial faith'.³⁴ Secondly, while on the path and before enlightenment, *saddhā* is one of the five qualities necessary for making progress on the path. In particular, the development of *abhiññā* requires *saddhā*. At this level *saddhā* may be rendered 'confidence', and here confidence in the Buddha, the *Dhamma*, and the *Saṅgha* would be appropriate examples. Thirdly, *saddhā* is necessary after becoming enlightened if one is to teach the doctrine effectively as did Gotama Buddha.³⁵ At this level *saddhā* may be characterized as 'realized faith', and in this sense it is incompatible with doubt (*viccikicchā*).

Thus, in view of the account just given, *saddhā* is of continuing significance for the exemplary religious life in early Buddhism from

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 This has several interesting implications
 • Alara & Uddaka - teacher in the Uddaka level, the 5 are engaging
 • See Shogren - teacher is possibly archetypal of the 5, in strongly critical doubt
 • on a basic psychological level, the 5 are engaging
 • in strongly critical doubt

beginning to end. It is not that *saddhā* is only important for the laity; nor is it irrelevant in the life of the Enlightened One himself. Indeed, as long as there is recognition of the role of religious experience in early Buddhism, without any suggestion that *saddhā* is the only important early Buddhist concept, then it would not be too much to say that *saddhā* is the alpha and the omega of the exemplary Buddhist life.

II

The nature of religious belief is a difficult and technical problem in the philosophy of religion. In this part of the paper I explore the question of whether and how philosophers of religion may learn from considering early Buddhism something of the nature of religious belief.

One of the most obvious lessons is that early Buddhism presents itself as a non-theistic religion, so that in a *descriptive* sense (of course not in all *prescriptive* senses) of the term, 'religion' is not necessarily theistic. It is not that early Buddhists were unaware of theism: they considered the view that *Issara* is Creator God and rejected it.³⁶

Faith, however, plays a significant role in early Buddhism, although not in the way it is sometimes taken in the West as insufficiently evidenced belief. At none of the three levels of the application of *saddhā* discussed in part I is *saddhā* ever tantamount to believing something on the basis of report, tradition or hearsay.³⁷

Philosophers of religion are often exercised by the question of whether religious belief requires justification or not.³⁸ One group typically claims that religious belief neither requires, nor admits of justification. (They are sometimes called fideists, although this is not a precise designation.) Another group believes, with Hume, that a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. On this view religious belief does stand in need of justification. And, unsurprisingly, it is the philosophers of religion who are supposed to provide this justification.

Accordingly some philosophers of religion in the latter group have sought support for religious belief in arguments from miracles. Well-known difficulties with this sort of argument are summarized by prominent philosophers of religion and require no repetition here.³⁹ What is significant for the present line of inquiry is that the Buddha is

depicted in the *Kevaddha Sutta* as prohibiting his monks from performing miracles in order to gain converts.⁴⁰ Hence it is clear that the *dhamma* does not stand in need of justification by miracles according to early Buddhism.

Does it stand in need of any other sort of justification? Not by way of pure reason does the Buddhist procede, as the rejection of the methods of the *takki* ('logicians') shows. Personal meditative experience is the key to *dhamma*; neither working wonders nor pure reason apply.

Thus, if one says that there is a pragmatic tendency in early Buddhism, then this statement must not be taken to imply that the Buddha would admit any and all means of promoting the doctrine. Skill-in-means, often emphasized as a pragmatic emphasis in early Buddhism, includes neither deception nor miracle-working.

Stewart Sutherland, a contemporary philosopher of religion, writes of the Damascus road experience of St. Paul something that also applies to a pragmatic interpretation of the Buddhist road:⁴¹

to understand the significance of that experience — what makes it religious — is to grasp the role which it plays in the life of the believer. The experience modifies how he sees his life, how he behaves, and so on, and in parallel fashion the way in which he sees the experience in question may alter in the light of his developing biography. The attempt to understand a particular experience in the absence of at least some access to the subsequent biography is doomed to produce a distorted picture.

According to a pragmatic criterion of *meaning* a proposition is meaningful if and only if it can make a difference. On this criterion it would, for example, be *meaningless* to say that everything in the universe doubled in size overnight since it would not make a difference to experience. The Buddhist belief that things have a causal nature would, however, be meaningful on the pragmatic principle. This is shown in the segment of a biography of the Buddha by Kalupahana quoted herein. A changed physical personality characterized by peace and serenity is the picture of the Buddha one gets just after he understands causality in the enlightenment experience.

In both the careers of Buddha and St. Paul after their most important religious experiences, a conviction which changes their lives is apparent in each case. Buddha claims an insight into things as they really are, and Paul insists that his doctrine is no mere human

invention. I do not think that religious experience *necessarily* results in a change of life. For it might be impossible to tell what would have resulted if there were no religious experience, in which case one could not attribute the change specifically to the religious experience. And having a religious experience might result in a confirmation of existing behavior patterns rather than a change in them, in cases when the patterns were already close to a religious ideal. But when religious experience *does* result in a change of life, as in conversion and enlightenment experiences, and when there are religious beliefs understood in the context of such change, on the pragmatic criterion of meaning the religious beliefs are meaningful. Saying so does not require the assumption that the changes always occur only afterwards: they might begin simultaneously with the conversion or enlightenment experience itself.

The pragmatic criterion of the meaning of religious belief is not, however, a panacea for all the problems of meaning in the philosophy of religion. It has its limits, one of the most important ones being that 'making a difference' is so dependent on context that it is not possible to say categorically that a particular religious belief is meaningless. Whether a religious belief is a 'live option' for us or not (to borrow William James' term) depends on the context of our lives.⁴² It seems that the most that the criterion can do is to indicate after the fact that a religious belief is meaningful in a context. It cannot sort out which religious beliefs are meaningful and which are meaningless once and for all.

However the pragmatic theory of meaning may hold up against criticism, the pragmatic tendency in early Buddhism stands and is well-documented by modern scholars.⁴³ I have emphasized the pragmatic tendency of early Buddhism with reference to *saddhā* as efficacious in its three applications distinguished. These correspond roughly to what Jayatilleke has called the affective, conative, and cognitive aspects of *saddhā*.⁴⁴

Does religious belief require justification? This question was posed earlier in section II by pointing to a contrast between those who deny and those who assert that it does. Now it is time to see how light from an account of *saddhā* in early Buddhism can suggest an answer to this question that may be of interest to philosophers of religion.

When *saddhā* is used with a pro-attitude, faith and knowledge are not mutually exclusive in early Buddhism. As previously noted, Ergardt's work tends to support this conclusion. If fideism holds that faith and knowledge are mutually exclusive, then it is false as a descriptive account of religious belief. But if it is taken to mean just that religious belief does not require justification, then it is correct where initial openness to hear the doctrine is concerned. In regard to the affective aspect of *saddhā*, the question of rational justification does not arise. However, where faith on the road to enlightenment is concerned, a justification on the grounds of the pragmatic efficacy of *saddhā* in developing the *abhiññā* can be given. At this level, those who insist that faith stands in need of justification are correct. They are also correct at the third level, realized faith. Here the confidence of the Buddha is rooted in his understanding of causality, and faith is based on knowledge of *paṭiccasamuppāda*.

In summary, the problem of the relation between faith and justification may turn on making finer distinctions between the levels at which faith or confidence are applied to the religious path. On the above account the question of justification for religious belief applies at the secondary and tertiary levels, but not at the primary level. It is up to philosophers of religion who are more interested in Christianity to see whether, and if so how, this kind of solution might apply in that context. In regard to Buddhism E. Frauwallner observes:⁴⁵

In the teachings of the Buddhist canons, we see again and again how the Buddha knows to work on his hearers with consummate skill and win them in favor of his doctrine. He, however, does not demonstrate the rightness of his system but he awakens the trustful confidence that the way pointed out by him is the right one.

Certainly Buddha did not set out to demonstrate *dharmā* by pure reason alone. But enough has been said here to show that Frauwallner's characterization only applies to what Jayatilleke has called the affective aspect of *saddhā*, and not to the conative and cognitive ones.

This paper raises more scholarly and philosophical questions than can be solved in its brief compass. The hope that it embodies is that interpreting across boundaries, both between Buddhism and

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Pragmatism and between Buddhology and Philosophy of Religion, will be encouraged.⁴⁶

NOTES

- ¹ Anselm *Proslogion* chs. II and III.
² See, for example, the way in which he laments the Buddha's passing away. *Dīgha Nikāya* II, 140. See also David J. and Indrani Kalupahana, *The Way of Siddhartha*, London & Boulder: Shambala, 1982, pp. 225–226.
³ *Majjhima Nikāya* I, p. 479. I. B. Horner (trans.); *Middle Length Sayings*, London: Pali Text Society, 1970, II, p. 154.
⁴ K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1963, p. 386 and p. 389.
⁵ Jayatilleke, p. 393.
⁶ MN III, p. 33; MLS III, p. 85.
⁷ MN II, p. 176; MLS II, p. 365.
⁸ MN II, p. 94; MLS II, p. 281.
⁹ *Ibid.*
¹⁰ *Dīgha Nikāya* II, p. 100.
¹¹ *Samyutta Nikāya* V, p. 204; *Kindred Sayings* V, p. 180.
¹² T. W. Rhys Davids and Wm. Stede, *Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary*. London: Pali Text Society, 1972, p. 675.
¹³ MN I, p. 509; MLS II, p. 189. The MLS translation has 'faith', but in this context I think that 'confidence' is preferable.
¹⁴ MN III, p. 23 (MLS III, p. 73); MN III, p. 21 (MLS III, 71).
¹⁵ MN I, p. 444: *pema*; MN III, p. 6 (MLS III, p. 56).
¹⁶ MN I, p. 463; MLS II, p. 135.
¹⁷ MN I, p. 465; MLS II, p. 138. Sung Bae Park has an argument concerning faith as a positive virtue that should be mentioned in this connection. The main premise of Park's argument to show that non-backsliding faith in early Buddhist tradition is impossible does not apply to the first of three senses of *saddhā* herein distinguished, and does not specify the sort of impossibility claimed (logical, empirical, or technical?). From the above quoted premise, plus one about the fallibility of will and intellect, it is inferred that backsliding faith is always possible in the gradual tradition. But this neither means nor logically implies that nonbacksliding faith is impossible in the gradual tradition, contrary to what Park asserts, and early Buddhists would have seen Gotama Buddha's life as an example of its possibility. See his *Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1983, p. 44.
¹⁸ MN II, p. 185; MLS II, pp. 372–373. See also Mrs. Rhys Davids (trans.), *Kindred Sayings*, London: Pali Text Society, 1979, p. 217: 'Faith is the seed . . .'.
¹⁹ See Jayatilleke, p. 389; cf. Rhys Davids & Stede, p. 446. There does not seem to be enough difference in the meaning of *pasāda* and *saddhā* in these passages to worry that the former sometimes occurs. They both mean faith or confidence as applied to Buddha, Doctrine, and Order. At MN I, p. 67 *pasāda* occurs in reference to the Buddha and *dhamma* while at MN I, p. 479 *saddhā* is used to refer to the Tathagata.
²⁰ MN I, p. 479; MLS II, p. 154.

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- ²¹ Jayatilleke, p. 393.
²² Jayatilleke, p. 389.
²³ The translation of *saddhā* as 'belief' here is somewhat arbitrary, and tends to predispose one to accept Jayatilleke's reductionistic account of *saddhā* as propositional belief. I have argued against this reduction in greater detail with reference to H. H. Price's distinction between 'belief "in"' and 'belief "that"' in a separate paper presented at Auburn University on Nov. 12, 1983. (See *Religious Studies* 21, pp. 381–387.)
²⁴ The Stranger's behavior as a secret agent is ambiguous (and it is possible that he may have to say what is false in the course of executing his duties). Nevertheless, the resistance forces believe in him. See Basil Mitchell (ed.), *The Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 18–20.
²⁵ Jan T. Ergardt, *Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977, p. 145.
²⁶ Ergardt, p. 145.
²⁷ Cf. Jayatilleke, p. 393.
²⁸ MLS II, p. 153 (MN I, p. 478).
²⁹ B. M. Barua, 'Faith in Buddhism' in Bimala Churn Law, *Buddhistic Studies*, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co., 1931, p. 346.
³⁰ MN I, p. 478.
³¹ Barua, p. 347.
³² Kalupahana, p. 102.
³³ *Udāna* p. 1; David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1975, p. 89.
³⁴ K. N. Upadyaya points out: 'even the initial faith commended in early Buddhism is meant to be critical'. He criticizes the expression 'blind faith' (quoted above from Barua), especially the idea expressed by N. Dutt that *aveccappasāda* ('faith based on understanding') marks a special distinct path to *nibbāna* for the laity. *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1971, pp. 255–261. My use of the term 'initial faith' is not meant to imply credulity, for when *saddhā* is used with a pro-attitude, as a Buddhist virtue, there is no implication of intellectual assent to what is dubious. Contrast: N. Dutt, 'The Place of Faith in Buddhism' in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol. 16, p. 640.
³⁵ See Kalupahana (1982), p. 102. In this connection it is also interesting to consider the *paccekabuddhas*. In contrast to the Buddha, could it be that they lack *saddhā* sufficient for teaching *dhamma*?
³⁶ *Dīgha Nikāya* I, pp. 17–18.
³⁷ Many times in the Pali Canon the Buddha is depicted as urging his disciples not to base knowledge claims on report, tradition, or hearsay.
³⁸ See, for example, Basil Mitchell, *The Justification of Religious Belief*, London: Macmillan, 1973, and D. Z. Phillips, *The Concept of Prayer*, London, 1965.
³⁹ For example, see John Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973, pp. 29–30. By contrast, William Rowe is less inclined to entirely reject the argument from miracles in his text, *Philosophy of Religion* Belmont: Wadsworth, 1978, pp. 136–137.
⁴⁰ Jayatilleke, p. 324.
⁴¹ Stewart R. Sutherland, 'St. Paul's Damascus Experience' in *Sophia*, Australia, 1975, p. 15.

⁴² William James, *The Will to Believe*, New York: Dover, 1956, pp. 2–3.

⁴³ David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy*, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976, pp. 160–161; K. N. Upadhyaya, *op. cit.*, pp. 290–293.

⁴⁴ Jayatilleke, p. 387.

⁴⁵ Erich Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1973, p. 124.

⁴⁶ An abstract of this paper occurs in *Proceedings of the International Research Conference on Interpreting Across Boundaries* (Honolulu, 1984), and in somewhat different form the paper constitutes part of a chapter in *Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1987.

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³ Unless, like Aristotle, we have an extended notion of causality which also includes *final* cause. Thomas Aquinas raises this difficulty about the notion of an *end* of an action which in some sense (intentionally) lies *before* the action. See his discussion of the purpose of human life in Vol. 16, Question 1, *Summa Theologiae*.

⁴ See pages 949–951, Vol. VIII, Collected Works of J. S. Mill, Toronto, 1974.

⁵ *Svatah-prayojana & gauṇa prayojana*, see Gadadhara's *muktivāda*.

⁶ See *Vidvanmanoranjani Tīkā* of Sadānanda's Vedāntasāra, the opening sections on *Adhikārin* and *sādhana/catustya*.

⁷ *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 459, Mithila, 1967.

⁸ *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 23–24.

⁹ *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Lewis White Beck, p. 22.

¹⁰ See *Nyāya Darśanam*, Part I, p. 459 bottom. *naivam ātyantikam duhkha-hānam. duhkha dvesānuśaktam. Dveṣah krodhah manyur ityanarthāntaram. Javalanatmako hi sa bhavati. Naivam Vairāgyam. Alam pratyayo hi sa ityapratikūlam duhkha-hānam ityarthah.*

THE BUDDHA AS PRAMĀṆABHŪTA: EPITHETS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE BUDDHIST "LOGICAL" TRADITION¹

1. INTRODUCTION

Dignāga (ca. 480–540)² begins his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, a basic text for the tradition of so-called "Buddhist Logic,"³ with a famous introductory verse:

Having bowed down to the one who has become authoritative, who desires to benefit the world, the teacher, the well-gone, the savior, I here make a single compendium of my various scattered [writings], in order to establish [the meaning of] authority.⁴

This verse might have been dismissed simply as a *pro forma* religious introduction to a work and a tradition otherwise preoccupied with what Stcherbatsky (1962: I, 2) calls "the natural and general logic of human understanding," were it not for the curious fact that, virtually from the moment of its composition, the opening of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* has been regarded as highly significant and suggestive — indeed, as the *locus classicus* of the logical tradition's description of what a *buddha* is. The Tibetan historians Bu-ston (Obermiller, 1931–32: II, 150) and Tārānātha (Chattopadhyaya, 1970: 182ff.) report that, when Dignāga had resolved to compose his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, he wrote out the first verse with chalk on a rock, whereupon the earth trembled, light blazed and thunder resounded. The verse was effaced twice by a jealous *brāhmaṇa*, who then was defeated by Dignāga in a debate on the verse's validity. The *brāhmaṇa*, in a rage, destroyed most of Dignāga's possessions, and very nearly killed the *ācārya*. Dignāga cried out in despair, and was heard by Mañjuśrī, who promised that, in the future, he would protect Dignāga, and that his work would attain glory. The story is apocryphal, but suggestive, for we do know that Dignāga considered the verse important enough that he discussed its interpretation of buddhahood in considerable detail in

his own commentary to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Subsequently, Dignāga's great successor, Dharmakīrti (ca. 530–600), devoted an entire chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* — the *Pramāṇasiddhi* — to an analysis of the verse that is, in fact, a full-fledged rational defense of Buddhist religious philosophy. Dharmakīrti, in turn, was a significant influence on the whole final period of Buddhist philosophy in India and — from the thirteenth century onward — became *the* authoritative logician for the Tibetan tradition, as well. Among his works, the Tibetans came to consider the *Pramāṇavārttika* paramount, and the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter became perhaps the most widely discussed of the book's four chapters. Hence, to this day, Dignāga's verse continues to influence Buddhist thought to a remarkable degree.

The seminal importance of Dignāga's introductory verse suggests a couple of observations about the Buddhist logical tradition that run contrary to Stcherbatsky's original insistence (1962: I, 1–2) that it is a pure "epistemological logic," and that "[i]n the intention of its promoters the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path toward Salvation." The first observation is that Buddhist logicians, no less than their supposedly more religious colleagues, *were* concerned to elucidate the nature of Buddhism's *summum bonum*, buddhahood, and we cannot arrive at a balanced picture of classical Indian Buddhology without considering what they have to say about it. The second observation is that the Buddhist logical tradition as a whole was far more "religious" in its motivation than often has been supposed. It cannot be ignored that Dharmakīrti and his successors expended considerable ink in the attempt to establish the unique superiority of the Buddha and the Buddhist world-view. This was neither their sole nor perhaps even their primary concern, but it *did* matter to them, and this suggests that at least part of the motive behind the logicians' development of refined epistemological tools was to mount the most compelling possible defense of Buddhism as a religious system.⁵ Indeed, the most sophisticated *rational* defenses of religious Buddhism ever attempted were undertaken precisely by Stcherbatsky's "epistemological logicians" — Dharmakīrti and his commentators, and such "independent" figures as Śāntarakṣita, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.⁶ Conversely, it must be added, the very

rationalism of Dharmakīrti and his successors insured that religious argument would not, overtly at least, be exempted from the sort of critical tests to which *all* truth-claims ought to be subjected. Indeed, in the words of another pioneering scholar of the logical tradition, Mookerjee (1980: xxxviii),

A religion without a philosophical backing was unthinkable. . . . Belief had to submit to the test of logic, and a faith that was not warranted by philosophic conviction, was rightly regarded as perverse dogmatism which has no right to the allegiance of a man of sound education and culture. . . . Philosophy was . . . the earnest quest of truth and life's purpose and nothing short of truth could give its votaries peace or satisfy their ardent minds.

The question, of course, must be raised whether an enterprise rooted at least partially in an apologetic agenda can be purely rational in approach, or whether it necessarily will be "polluted" by religious presuppositions.⁷ This, in turn, raises more general questions about the role of presuppositions in rationality. Without entering into the intricacies of this most important debate,⁸ I would state simply that I believe that there can be no presuppositionless rationality, and, precisely because of this, compelling rational arguments are not those that fulfill some impossible requirement for epistemological purity, but, rather, those that presuppose the *fewest* unwarrantable axioms and end up begging the *fewest* questions. By these standards, I think it can be maintained — at least at the outset — that Buddhist logicians genuinely do respect rationality, even if their agenda is a religious one.

This paper, then, will focus on the five epithets of the Buddha listed by Dignāga at the outset of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. We will concentrate especially on the most important one, *pramāṇabhūta*, "the one who has become an authority." We will briefly note the way in which this and the other epithets were interpreted by Dignāga (section 2). Next, we will analyze the way the epithets were utilized by Dharmakīrti. We will discuss Dharmakīrti's overall project and the place of religion in general and the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* in particular within that project (3.1). We will examine Dharmakīrti's Buddhology,⁹ as revealed through his discussion of *pramāṇabhūta* and the other four epithets, and compare it to the Buddhologies of some of his predecessors, contemporaries and commentators (3.2). We will analyze Dharmakīrti's religious rationality, as revealed through his

attempt to demonstrate “logically” that certain vital aspects of the world-view taught by the Buddha are true, and compare his attitude toward rationality with that of some of his predecessors, contemporaries and successors (3.3). We will conclude with some general reflections on the relationship between Buddhology and rationality in the Buddhist tradition (4).

2. DIGNĀGA'S EXPLANATION OF THE FIVE EPITHETS

Dignāga's introductory verse to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* simply lists the five epithets of the Buddha — one who has become authoritative, one who desires to benefit the world, teacher, well-gone, savior — without indicating their relative priority or importance. When, however, we turn to Dignāga's auto-commentary to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*,¹⁰ it becomes evident that *pramāṇabhūta* — the one who has become authoritative — is in fact the main Buddha-quality under discussion, and that the other four are subsidiary. It might be noted at this juncture that Dignāga is *not* the first to apply the epithet *pramāṇabhūta* to the Buddha. The epithet's first appearance seems to be in the *Lalitavistara* (Vaidya [1958] 233, lines 9–10), where one of the assembled *bodhisattvas* tells the Buddha: “We perceive this [world]. You alone, O Blessed One, have become the supreme eye, have become the measure, of the divine world.”¹¹ The passage occurs just after the Buddha has demonstrated to Māra that the earth goddess is his witness or measurer (*pramāṇa*), and this compliment is echoed by the suggestion that *he* is the standard or measurer, or perhaps even witness, of the entire world, both human and divine. The usage here clearly antedates the employment of *pramāṇa* as a technical epistemological term. It is not impossible that Dignāga was aware of the *Lalitavistara* passage, but *pramāṇa* has for him of course the far more specific connotation of epistemic authoritativeness.¹² In any case, although they are subsidiary, the Buddha's qualities of being benevolent, a teacher, well-gone and a savior serve for Dignāga as a demonstration or “proof” that he is rightly considered authoritative. The Buddha is an authority, therefore, *because* he is benevolent, a teacher, well-gone and a savior. Dignāga clarifies this assertion by noting that the Buddha is one who has achieved excellence in causes

(*hetusampat*) and excellence in results (*phalasampat*). His excellence in causes consists of excellence in intention (*āśayasampat*), i.e., his benevolence, or desire to benefit the world; and excellence of application (*prayogasampat*), i.e., his functioning as a teacher for the world. His excellence in results consists of his excellence in his own aims (*svārthasampat*), i.e., his being a well-gone one who is praiseworthy, non-returning and complete; and excellence in others' aims (*parārthasampat*), i.e., his ability to save or protect sentient beings. If we may paraphrase, the Buddha is authoritative because he desires to assist others spiritually (benevolence), and is capable of doing so because he has achieved his own spiritual aims (well-gone), and thus is in a position to *save* others by *teaching* them what he himself has realized. These qualities, concludes Dignāga, set the Buddha apart from other teachers, and establish that he, uniquely, is deserving of the supreme accolade a logician could confer, *pramāṇabhūta*.

It is evident, of course, that Dignāga's demonstration of the Buddha's authority is not really a “proof” in any strict sense of the term, since it presupposes what it seeks to establish, and presents the proof through an appeal to “facts” — a listing of the Buddha's excellences — that only a Buddhist would accept as axiomatic. In that sense, the proof fails to meet the strict standards Dignāga himself would apply to a rational argument. It is entirely possible, of course, that Dignāga did not *care* whether the Buddha's authority was demonstrable to every reasonable person (his audience, after all, was probably Buddhist), or it may be that he assumed that that authority was established through other treatises written by himself and others. Whatever the case, he does not bother to argue for it in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* auto-commentary. At the same time, he has managed to reintroduce a striking epithet for the Buddha, and if he did not care to work out all the implications of that epithet, his great successor Dharmakīrti soon enough would.

3.1. DHARMAKĪRTI'S PROJECT AND THE PRAMĀNASIDDHI CHAPTER OF THE PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA

Dharmakīrti begins the *Nyāyabindu*, perhaps his final work, with the assertion that “All successful human action is preceded by correct

cognition.”¹³ This statement, I think, has an epigrammatic terseness and profundity of implication akin to that of Aristotle’s “All men by nature desire to know.” This is not the place to explore all of the statement’s implications,¹⁴ but at least two bear mentioning.

The first implication is that there is an intimate link between knowledge and action. The quest for knowledge is motivated by the desire to accomplish some human goal (*puruṣārtha*), and, conversely, the achievement of that goal only will follow upon the acquisition of correct understanding of what is to be practiced and what avoided in its pursuit. Thus, gaining knowledge is a vital *practical* matter for humans. Given the practical importance of “correct cognition,” it becomes important, too, to comprehend what the types and parameters of knowledge are, i.e., of *pramāṇa*, for without such comprehension, one will be at a loss to ascertain what to practice and what to avoid in the pursuit of one’s goal. Dharmakīrti thus proceeds, in the *Nyāyabindu*, to lay out his epistemology, a confidently “foundationalist” enterprise in which “correct cognition” can be securely asserted because it is rooted in sources of epistemic authority — perception and inference — that actually do give us, as it is, the world in which human beings pursue goals.¹⁵

The second implication is that because *all* successful action is preceded by correct cognition, there is no realm of human activity that can be exempted from the requirement for antecedent knowledge in consonance with perception and inference. Thus, successful *religious* activity must be preceded by correct cognition, and it becomes important to subject claims to religious knowledge to the tests of perception and inference that one would apply to any other type of knowledge claim. Conversely, of course, if one is able to demonstrate that a claim to religious knowledge conforms to perception and inference, then that claim can with confidence be accepted as a “true” one. Thus, it becomes possible in principle to undertake a rational defense of a religious system. If one has shown that a religious system conforms to perception and inference, then one also has demonstrated that the system’s promulgator has understanding that conforms to perception and inference, and so is authoritative, is a *pramāṇa*.

Thus, it should not surprise us that Dharmakīrti, as both a rationalist and a convinced Buddhist, would believe it both necessary

and possible to demonstrate that what the Buddha taught is “correct cognition” where spiritual goals are concerned, and that the Buddha, thus, has “become an authority,” i.e., is *pramāṇabhūta*. Such a demonstration, in fact, is precisely what Dharmakīrti had attempted in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* (“Establishment of Authority”) chapter of his earlier, but critically important work, the *Pramāṇavārttika*.¹⁶ The *Pramāṇavārttika* as a whole apparently was intended as a commentary or, better, expansion upon the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter takes as its framework the above-mentioned introductory verses to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, in which the Buddha is described as authoritative, benevolent, the teacher, the thus-gone and the savior.

Just as had Dignāga in his auto-commentary, Dharmakīrti takes *pramāṇabhūta* as the main epithet, and seeks to demonstrate it through the other four epithets. Whereas Dignāga had contented himself with a rather straightforward assertion of the four “probative” Buddha-qualities, however, Dharmakīrti feels obliged to set out his proof of the Buddha’s authoritativeness as a formal inference. This proof is generally divided into a “forward” (*anuloma*) and a “reverse” (*pratiloma*) sequence of steps. In the forward sequence, the Buddha is proven to be authoritative because he desires to benefit the world, and treads a practicable path to his goal. Because he is compassionate and accomplished we can infer reasonably that he teaches because of his compassion, is thus-gone because of his accomplishment, and is a savior, teaching effectively for others the path he himself has trodden. In the reverse sequence, the Buddha is proven to be authoritative because he is the savior, i.e., because he teaches salvific truths. From the fact that he teaches salvific truths, we infer that he must himself be spiritually accomplished, i.e., thus-gone, and this state must be preceded by the desire to teach for the benefit of the world.¹⁷

If this were the extent of Dharmakīrti’s argument, he would not have advanced the discussion much beyond Dignāga, other than to have stated it more formally. In fact, Dharmakīrti feels compelled to explore in detail the philosophical implications of the qualities ascribed to the Buddha. In particular, he analyzes the central quality, authority, and the two qualities at the root of each of the two sequences of argument, namely, desire to benefit the world (forward

sequence) and savior (reverse sequence). Thus, Dharmakīrti does not merely assert that the Buddha is an authority; he defines authority and goes on to state generally what sort of person could or could not satisfy the definition. This, in turn, leads him into a discussion of negative and positive instantiations of authority, hence into a refutation of the existence of *īśvara* and a discussion of just what it is about the Buddha that makes him authoritative. By the same token, it is not sufficient simply to state that the Buddha is infinitely compassionate; Dharmakīrti sets out to prove that compassion *can* be developed limitlessly, an enterprise that leads him into an attempt to prove the reality of past and future lives in which compassion could be thus developed, which in turn requires a discussion of the mind-body problem that refutes materialism and establishes an interactionist dualism. Nor can the Buddha be shown to be a savior simply by a recitation of the four noble truths; these must be shown to be true, to conform with perception and inference, and this, in turn entails a refutation of non-Buddhist views of suffering and its origin and happiness and the path to it, as well as the establishment of the Buddhist version of these four.

In what follows, we will examine two facets of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*: (1) its overall Buddhalogy, as revealed through an analysis of the usage of *pramāṇabhūta* and, to a lesser extent, the other four epithets and (2) its Buddhalogy as an exercise in religious rationality, as revealed through Dharmakīrti's attempt to argue for the infinite expandability of compassion and the veracity of the the four noble truths. In each case, we will (a) analyze Dharmakīrti's position on the issue and (b) comment on how that position fits in with trends in Buddhist thought before, during and after Dharmakīrti's time.

3.2. DHARMAKĪRTI'S BUDDHALOLOGY (I): HOW THE BUDDHA IS AUTHORITATIVE

3.2.1. Dharmakīrti on Pramāṇabhūta

3.2.1.1. Pramāṇa Defined. Before Dharmakīrti can explain how and

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why the Buddha is authoritative, he must first, of course, define authority — *pramāṇa*. This he does in the first six verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, where he gives a brief but classic explanation of authority as a cognition (*jñāna*) that (a) elucidates an unknown, or not previously cognized, object (*ajñānārthaprakāśa*), (b) is unsublated (*avisamvāda*) by subsequent checking and (c) serves to effect one's goals or objects (*arthakriya*).¹⁸ In verse 7, then, Dharmakīrti sets into motion the main business of the chapter with the assertion, "In such a way is the Blessed One an authority."¹⁹ In the strictest sense of the term, of course, the Buddha is *not* an authority, because he is a person, and an authority must be a cognition. Nevertheless, he is *like* an authority strictly defined because he himself is possessed of correct cognition and is a source of correct cognition in others.²⁰ It might be objected that *all* of us possess some correct cognitions, and that most of us serve at one time or another as a source of correct cognition in others, so the Buddha is hardly exceptional in this regard. Dharmakīrti thus must specify what special kind of authority the Buddha has that causes him to be glorified as *pramāṇabhūta*. Dharmakīrti will do this by analyzing in turn the two components of the phrase, first *bhūta*, or "has become," and then *pramāṇa*, "authority."

3.2.1.2. *The Meaning of Bhūta in Pramāṇabhūta*. Dharmakīrti explains that "Has become' [an authority] is said [of the Buddha] so as to overturn [the idea] that he has *not* come to be; authoritativeness depends on accomplishment [of goals], so it is reasonably [asserted] of him."²¹ Thus, the fact that the Buddha "has become" an authority implies a number of things about him. First, he has not always been an authority, but has come to be one. Second, the fact that he has *changed* his status from being a non-authority to being an authority means that change is intrinsic to him, so it cannot be asserted of him that he has not arisen, i.e., been subject to causal processes.²² Third, because he has a causal, impermanent nature, he is capable of accomplishing goals — for it is virtually axiomatic to Dharmakīrti that only the impermanent can be causally efficient (*arthakriya*).

He then goes on to illustrate the significance of the Buddha's having "become" an authority by analyzing a counter-example, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *īśvara*, a creator God who is permanent and

independent, and who therefore, if he is an authority, must always have been one, and could not have "become" one. Dharmakīrti argues (verses 8–9) that a permanent entity cannot possibly be an authority, because the objects of authoritative cognition are impermanent and successive, and thus require a cognizing authority that is itself impermanent and successive. And, if this permanent entity is independent, it cannot cognize impermanent objects through the mediation of impermanent cognitions, for this implies dependence, quite apart from failing to explain how the permanent entity could relate to its own impermanent cognitions. After a detailed rejection of a theistic syllogism that seeks to demonstrate, via a version of the argument from design, that *īśvara* is the creator of the world (verses 10–20), Dharmakīrti resumes his analysis of the nature of *īśvara*, arguing (verses 21–28) that, without change, activity and the achievement of results are impossible; thus, as long as *īśvara* is considered to be permanent, he cannot reasonably be said to act in the world. The world's processes, in fact, are perfectly adequately explained by impermanent causal forces. *īśvara*, therefore, is both superfluous and impotent.²³

In short, the fact that *īśvara* is *abhūta*, "not become," assures that (a) if he is an authority, he must always have been one, and thus can have no experience or understanding of the sufferings and needs of sentient beings and (b) in fact, as a permanent entity, he can neither cognize nor act in the world at all, and thus is impotent to effect *anything*, either for himself or for sentient beings. By implication, then, the fact that the Buddha is *bhūta*, an entity that "has become," assures that (a) he has not always been an authoritative, enlightened being, and thus has experience and understanding of sentient beings, for he once was one himself and (b) as an impermanent entity he *can* cognize and act in the world, and thus is in a position to accomplish goals both for himself and for sentient beings. Dharmakīrti must, of course, still explain more specifically what it means for the Buddha to be an authority, and it is to that explanation that he next turns.²⁴

3.2.1.3. *The Meaning of Pramāṇa in Pramāṇabhūta.* Dharmakīrti's discussion of the nature of the Buddha's authoritativeness is set forth as a refutation of a skeptical (most likely Mīmāṃsaka) assertion (verse

29) that there exists no authority cognizing hidden matters (*parokṣārthajñāna*), because there is no method for the accomplishment (*sādhana*) of such authority, and so no one who makes the effort to find that authority. Dharmakīrti begins his reply (verse 30) by noting that because people fear to be misled by someone who falsely claims the authority to teach the ignorant, they *do* seek out someone who is truly knowledgeable about hidden matters, so that they may practice according to his teaching. With the introduction of the notion of "practicing a teaching" (*upadeśakarana*), it becomes clear that the sort of "authority" Dharmakīrti is interested in is *spiritual* authority, and the sort of "hidden matters" at issue are those relating to the great questions of bondage and liberation. Indeed, affirms Dharmakīrti (verse 31), people investigate a potential teacher to determine if his knowledge covers what their spiritual practice ought to be (*anuṣṭeyagatam*). Thus, Dharmakīrti asks rhetorically, of what use would it be for us if a teacher knew such "hidden matters" as the number of insects in the world? Dharmakīrti's explicit pragmatism and implicit mockery of omniscience reach a climax in the next verse (no. 32), where he makes his clearest statement on what the Buddha's authoritativeness does and does not entail. The authoritativeness we desire, he says, is that of someone who has knowledge of (a) *what* things (*tattva*) are to be rejected and adopted (*heyopadeya*) and (b) *how* the abandonment (*hāni*) of that which is to be rejected and the method (*upāya*) for practicing that which is to be adopted are to be effected. The authoritativeness we desire is *not* that of someone who knows everything (*sarvasya vedakaḥ*). Whether or not a teacher can see great distances, concludes Dharmakīrti (verse 33), he at least must be able to see the principle (*tattva*) of what to do and not to do on the spiritual path, and how to go about it. After all, if authority is conferred simply by virtue of an ability to see great distances, we ought to make the vultures our teachers!²⁵

3.2.2. *The Other Four Epithets*

The Buddha, thus, is seen by Dharmakīrti as an authority, authoritative in the specific sense that he has learned what to practice and what to avoid on the spiritual path, and is able to communicate this knowledge to others. His functioning thus as an authority depends, in

turn, on his having "become" an authority, i.e., on his previous experience of *saṃsāra*, which allows him to understand it; and on his impermanent nature, which ensures that, unlike *īśvara*, he is able to cognize and act within the world. It is clear that *pramāṇabhūta* is the crucial Buddha-epithet for Dharmakīrti just as it was for Dignāga: he devotes the first thirty-three verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter to elucidating what it means, and most of the rest to proving why it is reasonably asserted of the Buddha. By the same token, the other four epithets given to the Buddha by Dignāga, namely one who desires to benefit the world, teacher, thus-gone and savior, are utilized by Dharmakīrti, just as they had been by Dignāga, as a way of proving that the Buddha is *pramāṇabhūta*, and do not receive extensive individual discussion themselves. Nevertheless, in arriving at a rounded picture of Dharmakīrti's Buddhology, we cannot ignore them, and will indicate briefly the way in which Dharmakīrti interprets each.

The discussion of the Buddha's characteristic of desiring to benefit the world, his benevolence, covers over a third of the chapter (verses 34—131, 282a), but virtually all of this actually is Dharmakīrti's extended discussion of the mind-body problem. The particulars of the Buddha's benevolence are not analyzed in great detail. Indeed, the only one that receives significant attention is limitless compassion, which serves as a springboard for the analysis of the mind-body problem. Thus, Dharmakīrti's notion of the Buddha's benevolence appears to be quite general and conventional, going little beyond the repeated assertion that he does, indeed, have the pure intention to benefit the world.

As we might expect, the Buddha's characteristic of being a teacher (verses 132—138a, 281b), entails that, because of his benevolence, he applies himself to finding an antidote to suffering that he can test on himself and then communicate to others. The antidote is, generally speaking, an understanding of what is to be rejected and what adopted on the spiritual path, i.e., the four noble truths, the first two of which are to be rejected and the second two of which are to be adopted. More specifically, the antidote is the realization of no-self (*anātman*). In an extended sense, then, the realization of no-self is the true "teacher," since it is from the pure application of that understanding that one "learns" to overcome suffering, because from that under-

standing flows the elimination of all faults, afflictive attitudes (*kleśa*) and the propensities thereto.

The Buddha's characteristic of being thus-gone (verses 139b—145a, 280b—281b), his "excellence of his own aims," entails his possession of a special abandonment and a special knowledge, each of which has three qualities. His special abandonment is praiseworthy (*śasta*), because it has been preceded by the method conducive to the highest good, the realization of no-self; it is irreversible (*apunarāgama*), because one can never return from it to *saṃsāra*; and it is without remainder (*aśeṣa*), because in it all faults have been removed. His special knowledge is actual (*tattva*), because it is knowledge of reality as it is; it is firm (*sthira*), because it is uncontradicted by fact and unshaken by circumstances; and it is complete (*aśeṣa*), because in it nothing is omitted.

The discussion of the last of the Buddha's characteristics, savior (= his "excellence of others' aims"), comprises nearly half the chapter (verses 145b—146a, 146b—281a), but most of this involves an attempted proof of the salvific truths he teaches, namely the four noble truths. In any case, the fact that he is a savior means that he communicates undistortedly to others the antidotes that he has discovered and applied successfully to himself, the four noble truths and the realization of no-self; he thereby enables others to be saved from their suffering condition.

3.2.3. *Dharmakīrti and Other Buddhists on the Buddha's Nature*

The Buddha described by Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, then, is a greatly compassionate figure who, in order help release sentient beings from suffering, discovers and applies successfully to himself the method for eliminating that suffering, namely the realization of no-self. His successful application of it to himself means that he has been able to transcend entirely the causes of suffering, and his compassion assures that he will teach to others the salvific method he has discovered. Because he has been successful, he must have understood reality correctly, since successful human action is preceded by correct cognition. He is, therefore, a reliable authority for those who are intent on spiritual liberation, his authorita-

tiveness being defined by his knowledge of what to practice and what to avoid on a spiritual path, *not* by his omniscience.

What is remarkable about Dharmakīrti's Buddha, I think, is how unremarkable he really is: he is virtually a "generic Buddha," a sort of lowest common denominator of the term who recalls in the modesty of his dimensions the Buddha of the *nikāyas*, before he has gained omniscience and his various cosmic "bodies." This, then, is remarkable, for Dharmakīrti's description of the Buddha was written not in the third century B.C.E., but in the sixth century C.E., a time when elaborate speculative Buddhologies were flourishing, and omniscience long since had been granted the Buddha even by the Theravādins, let alone the Mahāyānists among whom Dharmakīrti lived and wrote. Indeed, Dharmakīrti himself has generally been assumed to be a Mahāyānist, since his theory of perception shows clear Yogācāra influences and Yogācāra, presumably, is a Mahāyāna philosophical school.²⁶ Here, then, is a Mahāyāna philosopher, writing during the tradition's golden age, who describes a Buddha that seems to be a throwback to an earlier phase of Buddhology.

What was Dharmakīrti trying to do? Was he rejecting the elaborate Buddhologies of his day in favor of a more modest concept of the Buddha? Or, was he simply describing a "generic" Buddha, which may or not have been his own vision of the Buddha, because he sought to establish a "basic" Buddhism against his non-Buddhist opponents? Or, was he actually attempting to describe the fully omniscient Buddha of the Mahāyāna, but in an oblique way? It is very difficult for us to know, because the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* is Dharmakīrti's only extended treatment of the concept of the Buddha, and he did not write his own commentary upon it, as he did in the case of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter. When we turn to the vast commentarial literature that grew up around the *Pramāṇavārttika*,²⁷ we see that it is virtually all Mahāyānist. Dharmakīrti's commentators, therefore, were generally committed to a vision of the Buddha as omniscient and possessed of the three *kāyas*, and it should not surprise us that, whatever Dharmakīrti *appeared* to be saying, his commentators were convinced that he not only accepted but actively argued for an omniscient, cosmic Buddha. This is not the place for a detailed examination of Dharmakīrti's treatment at the hands of his

commentators, but we might get a better sense of the difficulties involved in trying to ascertain his Buddhology if we trace at least in outline the way in which a number of key commentators have dealt with his attitude toward a crucial issue on which he seems to differ from "classic" Mahāyāna: omniscience.²⁸

In the course of establishing that the authoritativeness he attributes to the Buddha is simply his knowledge of what to practice and avoid on the spiritual path (*Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, verse 32), Dharmakīrti appears to ridicule the idea of omniscience. His apparent attitude also may be gleaned from *Nyāyabindu* III.96—7, where the use of "omniscient being" in a syllogism leads to the fallacy of an inconclusive reason,²⁹ and from his discussions of yogic perception (e.g., *Nyāyabindu* I.11; *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pratyakṣa* chapter, 281—287), which nowhere connotes omniscience.³⁰ When we look at the *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (PTT 5717b: 255/4/4—225/2/7) of Dharmakīrti's direct disciple Devendrabuddhi — who, according to legend, had to submit his work to his master for approval — we find omniscience once again ridiculed, not only because it does not constitute the basis of the Buddha's authority, but because arguments for the existence of such an attainment always would be subject to doubt. When we turn to the later and highly influential *Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra* of Prajñākara-gupta, however, we find that the interpretation has shifted radically. Prajñākara-gupta (PTT 5719: 23/4/8—25/5/7) sees Dharmakīrti not as denying omniscience, but, rather, as not denying it, and reads *Pramāṇasiddhi* verses 30—33 as if they sought to prove primarily that seeing great distances is not a sufficient criterion of *omniscience*, which, to be complete, must include authoritative knowledge of what to practice and avoid on the spiritual path. It is evident from other passages in his commentary (e.g., PTT 5719: 75/1/2) that Prajñākara-gupta assumes that the authority of one who knows reality as it truly is *must* be omniscient. With this in mind, we can understand how he sees *Pramāṇasiddhi* verses 30—33 as dealing primarily with criteria of omniscience.³¹

Prajñākara-gupta's commentary, which allied Dharmakīrti's concerns with those of classic Mahāyāna Buddhology, had an immense influence on subsequent interpreters, so it should not surprise us that when we arrive at Tibetan discussions of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the

Pramāṇavārttika,³² Dharmakīrti's project is seen, at least in part, as the *demonstration* of omniscience. Thus, the dGe lugs pa scholar rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen, whose *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* is one of the greatest early Tibetan *Pramāṇavārttika* commentaries, locates several passages in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter where omniscience is either proved or implied.³³ Thus, rGyal tshab rje interpolates a "proof" of omniscience into his gloss on Dharmakīrti's demonstration of the truth of cessation, arguing that a mind that has realized the four noble truths and eliminated all possible stains must know all *dharmas*, because all obstacles to knowledge have been removed, and the four noble truths are exhaustive of all phenomena (rGyal tshab rje 1974: 325–6). Similarly, he elaborates on Dharmakīrti's discussion of the "newness" of a *pramāṇa* by attempting to demonstrate that, even though everything is cognized directly and authoritatively in the first omniscience-moment after one's enlightenment, the second and subsequent omniscience-moments also are authorities (1974: 236–8). By the same token, his commentary on Dharmakīrti's explanation of the Buddha's authoritativeness, including the apparent critique of omniscience, sees the section's purpose as proving "as omniscient the one who knows by perception how all [knowables] really exist" (1974: 239), and it is clear (though not stated explicitly) that he interprets the Buddha's authoritative knowledge of what is practiced and what avoided on the spiritual path as an omniscient knowledge of all *dharmas*, for every *dharma* is either acceptable or rejectable, and without a knowledge of every such *dharma*, the Buddha could not be truly authoritative for those intent on spiritual freedom. Indeed, in glossing Dharmakīrti's assertion (verse 31) that omniscience is of no use to us, rGyal tshab rje interpolates "for the time being" (*re shig*), implying that it will be useful later, when we achieve it (1974: 250).³⁴

Are Dharmakīrti's commentators serving him badly? Are they perverting his intent by insisting that he actually sought to prove a concept that he appeared to deny? It is difficult to know. For all his mockery of omniscience, Dharmakīrti does not, in fact, anywhere explicitly deny it, and so he does leave the door ajar for those who would insist that he *must* have accepted the Buddha's omniscience, but chose not to assert it explicitly because, e.g., his purpose in writing the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, the refutation of non-Buddhists, required

that he discuss a "basic" Buddhism taught by a "basic" Buddha. This may very well have been the case, but in the absence of any positive evidence, it is an argument from silence, and when we rely strictly on what Dharmakīrti *did* have to say about the Buddha and omniscience, we can only conclude that his Buddhology was in many ways a backward look at an earlier and simpler conception of his tradition's founder.

3.3. DHARMAKĪRTI'S BUDDHALOLOGY (II): WHY THE BUDDHA IS AUTHORITATIVE

Were Dharmakīrti's analysis of the Buddha limited to his general comments on the five epithets, it would be interesting for the reasons outlined above, but hardly worthy of the detailed attention it has received from Buddhist philosophers virtually from the moment of its appearance. What truly sets Dharmakīrti's Buddhology apart from all those that preceded him is the way in which the concept of the Buddha is inseparably linked to the concept of rationality, in particular to rationality as applied to religious ideas. We have seen above (p. 336) that Dharmakīrti links the five epithets into forward and reverse order in such a way that they form two alternative syllogisms that "prove" the Buddha's authoritativeness. This is an interesting advance on Dignāga's non-inferential proof in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* auto-commentary, but requires considerable elaboration if it is to be convincing. The fact that Dharmakīrti *does* provide elaborate arguments to demonstrate why the Buddha rightly is called *pramāṇabhūta* is, I think, his most distinctive contribution to Buddhist religious philosophy. As indicated above (pp. 336–37), the two most sustained arguments he gives, together covering over three-quarters of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, are attempts to prove, respectively, that limitless compassion is possible and that the four noble truths are true. The first of these may be seen as an elaborate attempt to prove that the Buddha truly has *become* an authority, i.e., that arrival at a state of spiritual authoritativeness is possible; the second is an attempt to prove that he has become an *authority*, i.e., that what he teaches those intent on spiritual freedom is rationally defensible. This is not the place for a detailed description or evaluation of these arguments, but

we will indicate briefly the general direction taken by each, their relation to earlier, contemporaneous and later Buddhist attitudes toward religious rationality, and some of the issues that must be faced by those who *do* attempt to evaluate them.

3.3.1. *Proofs of Limitless Compassion and the Four Noble Truths*

3.3.1.1. *The Proof of Limitless Compassion.* Dharmakīrti believes that if he can demonstrate that the Buddha truly has become one who desires to benefit the world, i.e., has limitless compassion, then he will have shown that Buddhism's extraordinary claims about the mental qualities of enlightened beings, including their authoritativeness, are reasonable. To do this, he believes, he must show two things: (1) that there exist a multiplicity of lives in which compassion and other positive mental qualities could actually be developed to such an extraordinary degree, and (2) that positive mental qualities are the sort of phenomena that develop progressively, and do not require a repetition of the effort by which they are initially generated.

The proof of (1) a multiplicity of past and future lives (verses 34—119), in turn, clearly requires a demonstration that the mind is sufficiently different from the body that it can survive the body's death and be reborn into another body. To meet this requirement, Dharmakīrti launches into a detailed attempt to refute Lokāyata materialism and, at the same time, to establish an interactionist dualism as the true relation between mind and body. His basic argument against the Lokāyatas is that the body cannot be demonstrated to be either the substantial cause or an indispensable condition of the mind, and that the mind, while affecting and being affected by the body indirectly (e.g., via *kāyavijñāna*), is substantially different from it, and therefore results principally from its own previous homogeneous causes. Thus, when we examine the first mind-moment of a given life, it must have been preceded by a mind-moment, hence by a moment in a previous life. And, if we anticipate the last mind-moment of a given life, it will be succeeded by its own homogeneous result *unless* the conditions for its continuity, ignorance and craving, have been eliminated.

The proof of (2) the progressively expandable nature of mental

qualities (verses 120—131) depends to a considerable degree on the success of proof 1, for the main argument here is that mental qualities are not limited by their physical basis as are, for example, jumping ability and boiling water, which cannot increase limitlessly. Dharmakīrti maintains that mental qualities, especially when deepened by meditation, can be greatly deepened and expanded and that, given an infinite number of lives in which they can be developed, their scope is literally without limit.

By demonstrating the reality of past and future lives and the expandability of mental qualities, Dharmakīrti believes that he has established in principle the limitless compassion of the Buddha, and to the degree that other mental qualities can be developed limitlessly, too, he also has established that that extraordinary state of mental perfection and spiritual authority attributed to the Buddha can, in principle, be achieved. Hence, it is reasonable to say that the Buddha has *become* an authority.

3.3.1.2. *The Proof of the Four Noble Truths.* Dharmakīrti believes that if he can demonstrate that the Buddha has accurately described reality in his teachings, then he can be said to be truly authoritative for those intent on spiritual freedom. Thus, he sets out to prove that the four noble truths, those cornerstones of the Buddhist world-view are, in fact, true.³⁵ He takes up each truth in turn.

His defense of the truth of suffering (verses 147—179a) entails showing that suffering does not come about either causelessly or through "inappropriate" physical causes, such as the humors (*doṣa*) or elements (*bhūta*). Physical causes are rejected as an explanation of suffering primarily on the grounds that there is no exact correspondence between physical and mental states, as well as on the grounds that physical states are publicly observable, while mental states are not.

His defense of the truth of origination (verses 179b—190a) entails a rejection, again, of the idea that suffering arises causelessly, and a rejection, too, of the idea that it arises from a unique cause, such as *īśvara*. It also involves an explanation of the way in which craving (*trṣṇā*) incites rebirth, and is more *directly* responsible for it than either ignorance or *karma*.

His defense of the truth of cessation (verses 190b—205a) hinges on the fact that, in general, when an effect's cause can be identified, the elimination of that cause will entail the absence of the effect, and, furthermore, that the cause *can* be eliminated, precisely because it is an impermanent entity. Hence, because the cause of suffering, craving, has been identified, we know that it must be subject to elimination. In addition, a specific analysis of the nature of craving shows it to be rooted in self-grasping (*ātmagraha*), and thus, the antidote to self-grasping, the realization of no-self, should be able to effect the cessation of both the cause, craving, and its effect, saṃsāric suffering.

Dharmakīrti's most extensive defense is of the truth of path (verses 205b—280a), and the majority of his discussion is given over to the assertion just mentioned, i.e., that grasping or not grasping at a self is the axis on which spiritual bondage and freedom turn. He begins by asserting generally (verses 205b—220a) that the wisdom realizing no-self is a mental factor of great power: once it has been integrated, it never again will permit the arising of self-grasping or of the defilements that, demonstrably, spring from self-grasping. Dharmakīrti then goes on to refute a number of non-Buddhist soteriologies, including those of the Vaiśeṣikas, who believe that freedom results from the ability to separate that which pertains to the self, which is to be rejected, from the self itself, which is to be accepted (verses 226b—247a); Sāṃkhya, who insist on the disengagement of the pure, immutable *puruṣa* from the fluctuations of *prakṛti* (verses 247b—252a); Naiyāyika (?) theistic-ritualists, who believe that freedom results from the application of divinely-bestowed *mantras* (verses 257b—267a); and Jainas, who maintain that physical austerities will lead to the elimination of *karma*, hence of suffering (verses 273b—280a). In each case, the soteriology's failure hinges on its inability correctly to identify self-grasping as the ultimate cause of suffering, and a consequent inability to see that the only real path to freedom could be the wisdom that realizes that there is no self.

By thus demonstrating the validity of the four noble truths, Dharmakīrti believes that he has shown that what the Buddha teaches those intent on spiritual freedom is the *truth*, i.e., a set of statements that can be ascertained, by the independent application of perception and perceptually-based inferences, to correspond to actual states of

affairs. To the degree, then, that what the Buddha teaches is rationally demonstrable as the truth, we may safely say of him that he is one who has become an *authority*.

3.3.2. *Dharmakīrti and Other Buddhists on the Buddha's Rationality*

In examining Dharmakīrti's general conception of the Buddha in relation to that of his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, we saw that he seemed in some ways to resurrect an older, "simpler" Buddhology consonant with that of the *nikāyas*. This Buddhology was quite different from those of most of his Mahāyāna contemporaries, and we saw that Dharmakīrti's commentators and successors increasingly overrode his apparent rejection of an elaborate conception of the Buddha, and came to view him as arguing for precisely such a conception. When we compare Dharmakīrti's attitude toward the Buddha's rationality to that of other Buddhists, we find that the situation is virtually reversed.

For Dharmakīrti, a crucial criterion of buddhahood is its rationality, both in the sense that it must be a demonstrable attainment (*bhūta*) and that the truths propounded by the Buddha must be demonstrably true (*pramāṇa*). Certainly the "early" tradition of Buddhism believed that the Buddha had achieved *nirvāṇa*, and that what he taught was the truth, but the "proof" of these facts was to be found in personal experiential confirmation that followed on the invitation to "come and see" (*ehi passako*), i.e., practice the path, oneself. By the same token, there is in the earlier tradition a marked suspicion of attempts to argue rationally for or against religious beliefs, encapsulated by the Buddha's advice to the Kālāmas (*Āṅguttaranikāya* I, 189) not to believe him in doubtful matters because of report, tradition, hearsay, logic, inference, reasons, reflection, propriety or respect, but only because one has seen and known for oneself directly what the matter's resolution is. Rational argumentation is regarded with suspicion for a number of reasons, depending on the situation: it may be that the categories involved in the argument do not fit the case at hand (e.g., the nature of the Tathāgata after death), or are irrelevant to the practical spiritual purpose at hand (e.g., the parable of the man shot by the arrow), or are conducive to arrogance, despair and a general

instability of mind (as is argued frequently in the *Suttanipāta*). At the same time, it must be noted that this rejection of disputation seems on occasion a bit disingenuous, for the Buddha, starting with the very first *sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya*, frequently rejects the philosophical positions of his contemporaries and seeks to establish his own. It may primarily be on the basis of "experience," but a certain degree of rationality and inference cannot be avoided.³⁶ Nevertheless, it can safely be said that Dharmakīrti's exaltation of rationality and insistence that it is a crucial characteristic of the Buddha differs to a considerable degree from the attitude expressed earlier in the tradition.

Though Dharmakīrti's position may have been a departure from that of his distant predecessors, it was very much appropriate to his times, for his was an age in Indian philosophy when the development of generally agreed-upon rules of argumentation (*tarka*) and formal inference (*anumāna*), led to the confident belief that all disputed issues could be subjected to clear analysis and resolution — one simply had to apply the proper authority in the proper way. All matters, from those of everyday life to the sublimest reaches of religion, could be, and had to be, rationally demonstrable. Thus, the promulgator of the spiritual system that really "worked" for those intent on freedom would be the person who set forth the system that turned out to conform to rationality, for any spiritual system that did not conform to rationality, i.e., to the way things demonstrably were, could *not* work for sentient beings, for it would fail the "reality test." Rational analysis alone was not — even for Dharmakīrti — a sufficient condition for liberation, since only direct non-conceptual realization could effect such a state, but any religious system that claimed to lead to liberation had to be able to withstand rational analysis, and such analysis could be a vital part of one's progress along the path. The Buddha, thus, necessarily was considered a paradigm of rationality.

The rigor and subtlety of Dharmakīrti's thought made a profound impression on most important Buddhist philosophers after him. Indeed, his confidence about rationality is a hallmark of his commentators and successors, who continued the project he had begun, both in terms of epistemological analysis and the discussion of intersystemic religious and philosophical differences. Some commentators and successors (e.g., Dharmottara) concerned themselves primarily with

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epistemological issues, while others, such as Śāntarakṣita, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, accepted the inseparability of epistemological and religious matters, and thus continued Dharmakīrti's arguments by debating with *their* contemporary opponents on such issues as *īśvara*, the existence or non-existence of the self, and omniscience. We find, too, that the Tibetan tradition, after an initial reluctance (among the Sa skya pas) to tie epistemology to religion, came to see them as intimately related, and, to one degree or another, came to regard Dharmakīrti's ultimate aim as the justification of the Buddhist path, since securely established epistemological foundations would be the basis of certainty regarding "correct cognitions" that, invariably, would issue in "successful human action," including the successful traversal of a Buddhist path on which rationality was itself an important spiritual tool.

3.3.3. *On Assessing Dharmakīrti's Arguments*

Dharmakīrti and his successors have been, to a greater or lesser degree, confident that the epithet *pramānabhūta* is attributed to the Buddha reasonably, i.e., that it *can* be rationally demonstrated that such a condition is attainable and that the Buddha, because he spoke the truth, was its supreme exemplar. This is not the proper setting for an examination of these claims. We might however, help to frame any future attempts at such an examination by indicating briefly a number of levels on which the arguments' validity must be addressed.

The first level is that of the arguments themselves. Here, we must ask whether Dharmakīrti does, in fact, frame his inferences correctly, such that he (a) provides non-fallacious reasons and appropriate examples, (b) avoids such disputational faults as question-begging, circularity and infinite regresses, and (c) observes the unstated axioms of Indian philosophy regarding causality, existence and non-existence. Thus, on the most general level, we might ask, do the proofs of limitless compassion and the four noble truths in any way presuppose each other? More specifically, does the proof of mind-body dualism presuppose that mind and body must be substantially different because one is observable and one is not? Or, does the proof of the liberating power of a direct realization of no-self presuppose the salvific potency of yogic states? Furthermore, we would have to assess the arguments

in terms of their representation of the opponents' positions. Are they fairly stated, or are they simply straw men set up as easy targets? If they are straw men, how would a real opponent, with a subtler position, respond?

Even if we were to feel certain that Dharmakīrti has begged no questions and represented his opponents fairly, there is a second, deeper level on which the arguments must be assessed, that of the unstated assumptions that he, as a Buddhist, brings to the discussion. Dharmakīrti will assume, for instance, that the world is best understood impersonally, as constellations of mental and physical *dharma*s. These *dharma*s are, in turn, most logically explicated in terms of momentariness, i.e., of a succession of durationless events (*kṣaṇa*) that are linked by no enduring substance (*āīman*), yet are "dependently originated" and related by various specifiable causes, conditions and effects. These assumptions are idiosyncratically Buddhist, and would not likely be shared by many of Dharmakīrti's Indian opponents, let alone by a Christian or some other real outsider. One has to ask whether these unstated assumptions do not themselves pose real philosophical problems. For instance, is causality explicable in terms of momentariness? Can a self be avoided? Must events be either absolutely momentary or absolutely eternal? Even if the assumptions turn out to be coherent, are they not actually rooted in *a priori* convictions about the world, e.g., its impersonality or personality, that are themselves beyond argument? In that case, may not other systems be just as coherent as the Buddhist, assuming that they unfold logically from *their a priori* convictions?

This leads into a third, most general level on which the arguments must be examined, and that is the level on which we ask whether the confidence in rationality displayed by Dharmakīrti and his successors is, in fact, at all justified. Is it possible that our epistemological foundations are not as secure as the Buddhist logical tradition would have us believe? Is epistemological "certainty" and "objectivity" really possible in the light of what we — and not a few ancient Indians — have understood about the degree to which "objective knowledge" is shaped by desires, attitudes, conceptual schemes and linguistic structures? Can we finally say anything more about "reality" than this: "interpretation echoes interpretation; there is only interpretation"?

This certainly is the conclusion reached by some thinkers in disciplines as varied as philosophy, anthropology, literary criticism, history, and even science, and it is a view that must be addressed seriously before any rational enterprise can be undertaken.³⁷

As a result of this line of analysis, I would contend that if Dharmakīrti's arguments are to be thoroughly assessed, we must first establish the possibility of rationality, that is, of some standards of epistemological certainty, then ascertain whether the unstated assumptions that each of us brings to our arguments are defensible and at least partially compatible, and finally assure ourselves that the arguments themselves are sound. If the arguments survive all of these tests, then, and only then, do I think we could safely accept them and declare that the Buddha is, indeed, rightly and uniquely described as the *pramāṇabhūta*.

4. CONCLUSION

There is little to add by way of conclusion to what we have already stated. Let us simply recapitulate the vision of the Buddha that holds sway in the Buddhist logical tradition. He is a Buddha who may or may not be omniscient, may or may not possess a multitude of "bodies," may or may not display an unimaginable array of powers. What he is, most certainly and centrally, is a truth-teller, especially when it comes to the great questions of bondage and spiritual freedom. The truth, of course, ultimately must be experienced directly by each person, but if it is the truth, it also will be susceptible of rational demonstration through the application of authoritative perception and inference. If it cannot thus be demonstrated, it cannot be ascertained to be "the way things are," and if we act on the basis of information that is mistaken about the way things are, we are doomed to fail in our projects. If, on the other hand, we analyze correctly the way things are, we will succeed in our projects. When it comes to spiritual projects, it is the Buddha who has seen and described the way things are, who has told the truth. When we have satisfied ourselves rationally, and ultimately through experience, that things indeed are as he said they are, then we will have seen the truth, and the truth will have made us free.

NOTES

¹ This paper originally was delivered at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Boston, Massachusetts, December, 1987. I would like to thank Drs. John E. Thiel and Richard P. Hayes for their helpful suggestions on the paper's style and content.

² Here, and in the case of Dharmakīrti, I am accepting the dates suggested by Lindtner (1980). The dates he proposes for the two seminal logicians are considerably earlier than those suggested by Frauwallner (1961), but I find his reasoning sound.

³ The term "Buddhist Logic" was coined by Stcherbatsky (1962), and bears the unfortunate weight of some of his assumptions about parallels between Buddhist and Western thought. A more proper designation of the philosophical tradition beginning with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and stretching down through such figures as Prajñākaragupta, Śāntarakṣita, Dharmottara, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, might, as suggested by Warder (1971: 190), be the "Pramāṇa School," since the elucidation and delineation of epistemic authority was a central concern for all of these figures. Nevertheless, I will refer here to the "logical tradition," without thereby endorsing all of Stcherbatsky's notions about that tradition.

⁴ *pramāṇabhūṭaya jagaddhītaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine / pramāṇasiddhyai syamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasrītād ihaikataḥ //* Though the Sanskrit of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as a whole has been lost — it is available in Tibetan translation (Peking edition, no. 5700) — the Sanskrit of this verse has been preserved by Vibhūticandra in his notes to Manorathanandin's *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, ed. Sankrityayana (1938) 108. Cf. also Nagatomi (1959), Hattori (1968) 23f. and 74ff., and Steinkellner (1972) 7ff. It should be noted that I have translated *tāyin* by "savior" rather than the more usual "protector." I realize that "savior" carries Christian connotations that we might wish to avoid in discussing the Buddha, but I feel that "protector" fails to carry the force of the original, and so opt, tentatively, for "savior."

⁵ The first to make this point really forcefully, I think, was Steinkellner (1982).

⁶ For Śāntarakṣita, see Jha (1937–39); for Jñānaśrīmitra, see Thakur (1959); and for Ratnakīrti, see Thakur (1975).

⁷ This seems to be the stance taken by Hayes (1984), who distinguishes between Buddhist logicians who were "champions of reason" and those who were "champions of dogma." Hayes does not believe that any figure is entirely one or the other (Dignāga is more rational, Śāntarakṣita more dogmatic, and Dharmakīrti somewhere in between), but I would take a step back and question the very viability of the distinction, which seems to ignore the inevitability of "dogma" (i.e., presuppositions) in the formation of any argument, and, at the same time, underestimates the degree to which philosophers with religious interests may succeed in minimizing unwarrantable presuppositions. These points notwithstanding, Hayes' is a lucid and important contribution to our understanding of the larger framework of the Buddhist logical tradition, a worthy extension of Steinkellner's seminal article (1982).

⁸ For a basic source on the debate, see Hollis and Lukes (1982).

⁹ David Snellgrove (1987: 32ff.) has suggested "Buddhology" as a term for the process of theorizing about buddhahood, and I will use it here, alerting the reader that it should not be confused with "Buddhology," a term that nowadays usually refers to the academic discipline of Buddhist Studies.

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¹⁰ The auto-commentary is preserved *in toto* in Tibetan, and partially in Sanskrit, where the section under consideration is found embedded in Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (Sankrityayana 1953: 3). Nagatomi has transcribed and translated the appropriate passages in his 1959: 264–6.

¹¹ *vayam atra pratyakṣaḥ. api tu bhagavaṃstvameva sadevakasya lokasya paramasākṣibhūta pramāṇabhūtaśceti.*

¹² Richard P. Hayes has suggested (1987: 7–8) that Dignāga may have derived the term *pramāṇabhūta* from the tradition of Sanskrit linguistics (*vaiyākaraṇa*), where it is used, by Patañjali and others, as an epithet for the tradition's founding *ācārya*, Pāṇini.

¹³ *Nyāyabindu* I.1: *saṃyaginānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir*. See Śāstri (1954: 1) for the original. For a translation with Dharmottara's commentary, see Stcherbatsky (1962), II, 1–11. For a translation with Vinitadeva's commentary, see Gangopadhyaya (1971) 79–86. The issue also is raised in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*; see Lindtner (1986: 151) for a discussion and many useful references.

¹⁴ For a thoughtful recent exploration of some of the statement's implications, see Phillips (1987) 238ff.

¹⁵ On the other hand, the world as it is understood by those who have achieved the ultimate *spiritual* goal is *not* given via all the *pramāṇas*, but, rather, only in yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*). This might, of course, raise the question whether religious knowledge arising from *pramāṇas* that do not give us the world as a yogi sees it, e.g., as "mind-only," can truly be efficacious spiritually, since that cognition is in some sense mistaken. This, in turn, could lead to a discussion of the broader issue of the way in which Buddhists have attempted to balance an epistemological foundationalism with their tradition's tendency to "deconstruct" our ordinary understanding of the world. I hope to address this issue in some detail in a later paper.

¹⁶ Modern editions of the *Pramāṇavārttika* include those of Saṅkrtyāyana (1937) Shastri (1968) and Miyasaka (1972). My numbering of verses will follow Miyasaka's. All three editors have taken the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter as the first, reasoning that, since the *Pramāṇavārttika* is supposed to be a "commentary" on the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, the chapter that comments on the beginning of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* must be the first. This position is upheld by Stcherbatsky (1962: I, 38–9) and Nagatomi (1959: 263, note 1). The Tibetan tradition, on the other hand, regards the *Pramāṇasiddhi* as the second chapter, and that on *Svārthānumāna* as the first, for (a) it is the only chapter on which Dharmakīrti wrote on auto-commentary and (b) it is necessary to establish at the outset the syllogistic structures that will be applied throughout the rest of the work, and it is the *Svārthānumāna* chapter that does this. The latter position is upheld by Frauwallner (1954) and Inami and Tillemans (1986). The chapter has been translated *in toto* by Nagatomi (1957: unpublished), and partially (the second half) by Vetter (1984).

¹⁷ The question of precisely which verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter are covered by the forward and reverse sequences of argument has been debated. Nagatomi (1959: 266) holds that the forward sequence covers the entire chapter up to verse 282 (Miyasaka 280), and the reverse sequence is expounded only in verses 282–285a. Inami and Tillemans (1986), on the other hand, present a Tibetan arrangement of the chapter, that of dGe 'dun grub pa (1391–1474), in which the reverse sequence begins at verse 146b, with the discussion of the four noble truths. The point at issue, thus, is whether the long demonstration of the truth of the four noble truths is the last

argument in the forward sequence or the first in the reverse. I am inclined to side with the Tibetans, because it seems reasonable to think that Dharmakīrti feels most compelled to prove in detail the *first* epithet in a given sequence, and that the other three may then easily be inferred from the first. It might be noted parenthetically that dGe 'dun grub pa's arrangement probably is based upon that of his older contemporary, rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen, whose *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* will form the basis for some of our discussion later in the paper. For rGyal tshab rje's arrangement, see Jackson (1983: 499–537).

¹⁸ This definition has been discussed in many places. For an interesting recent analysis, see Katsura (1984), who translates the relevant verses (219–220) and analyzes them (220–224).

¹⁹ *tadvat pramāṇam bhagavān* (7a).

²⁰ Indeed, Inami and Tillemans (1986: 127–128) cite a Tibetan text that maintains that, although authority is in the most precise sense a cognition, it can be admitted by metaphoric extension that words (e.g., Buddhist scriptures) and persons (e.g., the Buddha) also can be authorities.

²¹ *abhūtanivṛttaye / bhūtoktiḥ sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇatā //* (7a–b).

²² The Tibetan *ma skyes pa* (rather than the expected *ma gyur pa*) for *abhūta* underlines the idea that the notion to be overturned is that the Buddha is not subject to causation.

²³ The section on *īśvara* has been completely translated and analyzed by Jackson (1986), and has been partially translated by Vattanky (1984: 34–35).

²⁴ Needless to say, this entire discussion of the implications of the Buddha's authority being *bhūta* also would rule out the possibility that the Buddha is somehow "pramāṇa incarnate" in the same way that Jesus is the *logos* become flesh, for the *logos* incarnated by Jesus is an eternal, immutable principle (perhaps something like a Vaiśeṣika *padārtha*) that, from Dharmakīrti's point of view, could *not* be incarnated as long as it was regarded as eternal and immutable.

²⁵ The section in question has been translated by Jaini (1974: 86–87) and Jackson (1988). Although appearing just this year, the latter article was written in 1981, having spent an inordinately long time in press. I stand by the paper's general conclusions, but I would alter a number of the translations found in it, including that of the present section.

²⁶ For a good recent discussion of Dharmakīrti's affiliation, see Hayes (1985).

²⁷ See Stecherbatsky (1962: I, 39–47) and van der Kuijp (1983) for a discussion of the Indo-Tibetan tradition of *Pramāṇavārttika*-commentary.

²⁸ For a detailed treatment of Dharmakīrti's concept of omniscience and its interpretation by his commentators, see Jackson (1988).

²⁹ See Stecherbatsky (1962: II, 206–8).

³⁰ Even in the later Mahāyāna tradition, in fact, *yogipratyakṣa*, seems *not* generally to require omniscience, for it is a faculty predicated of any *ārya*, whereas omniscience — which *does* presuppose *yogipratyakṣa* — is predicated only of a *buddha*. On the other hand, omniscience does enter into the discussions of *yogipratyakṣa* among later Mahāyānists, whereas Dharmakīrti ignores it in his discussion entirely.

³¹ The acceptance of omniscience extended not only to Dharmakīrti's Indian commentators, but to his successors, as well. Śāntarakṣita, for example, devotes most of chapter XXVI of the *Tatvasaṃgraha* to arguments for omniscience (contrary to

what is implied by Jaini [1974: 87], who seems to have taken the *purvapakṣa*, which he cites, as Śāntarakṣita's position), and Ratnakīrti upholds the concept in his *Sarvajñāsiddhi* (Thakur 1975: devanagari 1–31).

³² For a discussion of the increasing Tibetan interest in the *Pramāṇāsiddhi* chapter, which was tied, it seems, to an attempt to wed the *pramāṇa* tradition to current soteriological concerns, see Steinkellner (1983) and van der Kuijp (1987).

³³ This entire chapter has been translated by Jackson (1983, II: unpublished); a revised version will appear next year as *Why Buddhism Is True: Dharmakīrti and rGyal tshab rje on Knowledge, Rebirth, No-Self and Enlightenment* (London: Wisdom Publications).

³⁴ There are a number of other passages in the *Pramāṇāsiddhi* chapter that could be taken as implying omniscience, though rGyal tshab rje does not thus draw out their implications: the demonstration of the possibility of developing limitless compassion (verses 120–131), which explicitly is extended to other positive mental qualities, such as wisdom, and could be taken to apply to knowledge, as well; the discussion of the natural luminosity of the mind (verses 208b–209a), which may be taken to imply that the mind is naturally obstacle-free, hence omniscient; and the assertion (verse 280b) that one of the three special characteristics of the thus-gone's knowledge is its completeness, the fact that, literally, in it nothing is lacking (*aśeṣa*).

³⁵ This is the section of the *Pramāṇavārttika* translated by Vetter (1984).

³⁶ Indeed, Dharmakīrti contends (PV 284–285) that the Buddha, while never explicitly formulating a theory of inference, assumed and applied such a theory, e.g., in his assertion that something that has the nature of arising must as a consequence have the nature of ceasing.

³⁷ For influential recent expositions of this position, see Rorty (1979), Tracy (1987), and Feysabend (1975).

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DONALD S. LOPEZ, JR.

DO ŚRĀVAKAS UNDERSTAND EMPTINESS?

The Mādhyamika school of Indian Buddhism is traditionally regarded as having two branches, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, based on the manner in which reasoning is employed to establish the nature of reality. The Svātantrikas, notably Bhāvaviveka (c. 500–570), insisted on the use of the autonomous syllogism (*svatantra-prayoga*) against the opponent whereas the Prāsaṅgikas, in the persons of Buddhapālita (flourished c. 500) and Candrakīrti (c. 600–660),¹ employed consequences (*prasaṅga*). Although Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita for his use of consequences and Candrakīrti in turn defended Buddhapālita and attacked Bhāvaviveka for his use of autonomous syllogisms, it does not seem that the Indian masters of either school referred to themselves or each other as Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. These designations do not appear as the names of schools until the eleventh century, and not in India but in Tibet. It is only with the second propagation (*phyi dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet that the division of Mādhyamika that is considered standard today gained prevalence. It was during this period that Pa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags (died 1158) collaborated with the Kaśmīri *paṇḍita* Jayānanda in the translation of the major works of Candrakīrti from Sanskrit into Tibetan, including the *Prasannapadā*, the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, and the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*. On the basis of their study of these translations, especially the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā*, it seems that Tibetan scholars coined the terms *rang rgyud pa* (*svātantrika*) to refer to Bhāvaviveka and his followers and *thal 'gyur pa* (*prāsaṅgika*) to refer to Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, and their followers.²

Although the form of logical statement to be employed in proofs of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) provides the basis for the etymologies of the two branches of Mādhyamika and carries broad implications for their respective conceptions of the nature of reality,³ it is by no means the only significant issue upon which the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas part company. This paper will consider a constellation of issues

revolving around the question of whether *śrāvakas*, followers of the Hīnayāna, understand emptiness. These issues include the meaning of selflessness (*anātman*), the nature of the afflictive obstructions (*kleśāvaraṇa*), the root of cyclic existence (*saṃsāra*), and the distinguishing features of the Mahāyāna. The *dramatis personae* and the plot are the same as that found in the controversy over the use of syllogisms and consequences: Bhāvaviveka attacks Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti comes to Buddhapālita's defense, rejecting Bhāvaviveka's argument. The controversy is played out in Buddhapālita's *Buddhapālitaṃmūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Tarkajālā*, and Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* and *Madhyamakāvātāra*.

BUDDHAPĀLITA

Nāgārjuna's *Prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter *MMK*) says at VII.34:

Production, abiding, and disintegration
Are said to be like
A dream, an illusion,
And a city of Gandharvas.⁴

In commenting on this stanza, Buddhapālita writes:

In this way, the *Bhagavan* set forth the categories of an illusion, an echo, a reflection, a mirage, a dream, a ball of foam, a water bubble, and a banana tree as examples of the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*). There is nothing whatsoever that is real or non-mistaken in these. It is said that these are elaborations (*prapañca*), that these are falsities. In the statement, "All phenomena are selfless," selfless means entitylessness (*niḥsvabhāva*) because the term "self" is a word for entityness (*svabhāva*).⁵

Buddhapālita's position is that the Buddha used instances of worldly deceptions such as illusions, mirages, and dreams in order to indicate the deceptive nature of all phenomena, that they do not exist as they appear. These false appearances are elaborations or hypostatizations of mistaken conceptions (*vikalpa*).

Buddhapālita also implies that whenever the Buddha uses similes such as those employed by Nāgārjuna in VII:34, he is referring to the selflessness of phenomena (*dharmanairātmya*); Buddhapālita makes no

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qualification, as Bhāvaviveka will, as to whether the simile appears in a Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna *sūtra*.

Finally, Buddhapālita makes the important gloss, later reiterated by Candrakīrti, of *ātman* as *svabhāva*. The implications of this become clear when Bhāvaviveka's position is presented.

BHĀVAVIVEKA

In his commentary on the same stanza (*MMK* VII:34), Bhāvaviveka writes:

I and mine do not inherently exist, but they are perceived in that way. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions (*kleśāvaraṇa*), the *Bhagavan* taught in the *śrāvakayāna*:

The Seer of Reality said that
Form is like a ball of foam,
Feeling is like a bubble,
Discrimination is like a mirage,
Compositional factors are like a banana tree,
Consciousness is like an illusion.⁶

In the Mahāyāna, conditioned phenomena are just without inherent existence, although they are perceived in that way and appear in that way. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstructions to omniscience (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) it is said [in the *Vajracchedikā*]:

Conditioned phenomena are to be viewed like
Stars, cataracts, butter lamps,
Illusions, dew, bubbles,
Dreams, lightning, and clouds.

Therefore, this is not something to be feared; the intelligent, having analyzed, should be forbearant.⁷

That is, the Buddha indicated the deceptive nature of the aggregates in order that followers of the Hīnayāna might overcome the misconception that the I and mine are real. This misconception serves as the root cause of the afflictive obstructions such as desire, anger, pride, and doubt. The realization that the self does not exist serves as an antidote to these afflictions and upon their destruction, liberation from birth and death is achieved. The Buddha teaches Bodhisattvas that all phenomena are selfless, empty of ultimate existence. By understanding

this Bodhisattvas are able to overcome both the afflictive obstructions, which prevent liberation from rebirth, and the obstructions of omniscience, which prevent the attainment of Buddhahood.

It is Bhāvaviveka's view that statements in Hīnayāna sūtras that compare the aggregates to deceptive phenomena are intended to overcome the false conception of I and mine, the chief of the afflictive obstructions; a *śrāvaka* or *pratyekabuddha* needs only to abandon the conception of a self of persons (*pudgalātmagraha*) to be liberated from cyclic existence (*samsāra*).

The Bodhisattva however, must overcome both the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience in order for him to achieve his goal of Buddhahood. He must, therefore, abandon not only the conception of a self of persons but the conception of a self of phenomena (*dharmātmagraha*) as well. For the benefit of Bodhisattvas, the Buddha taught the selflessness of phenomena (*dharmānairātmya*) in the Mahāyāna sūtras in passages such as that cited from the *Vajracchedikā*.

Bhāvaviveka contends, then, that the two passages quoted teach different things although they are ostensibly very similar, with both using the images of bubbles and a mirage. In the first passage, the five aggregates are being described, in the second conditioned phenomena. Since the five aggregates and conditioned phenomena are coextensive categories,⁸ the tenor of the two passages is the same. In both cases they are being likened to instances of worldly deception. Hence, at face value there is nothing that indicates that the passage from the Hīnayāna sūtra teaches strictly the selflessness of persons whereas the passage from the Māhāyāna sūtra teaches the selflessness of phenomena. For Bhāvaviveka, the essential distinction is not to be found in what the passages say but in to whom they were spoken. This shall be explained below.

Bhāvaviveka goes on to quote Buddhapālita's commentary to *MMK* VII.34:

Another [i.e., Buddhapālita] says, "The *Bhagavan* set forth the categories of illusions, echoes, reflections, mirages, dreams, balls of foam, water bubbles, and banana trees as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever

real or non-mistaken in them. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, 'All phenomena are selfless,' selfless means entitylessness because the term 'self' is a word for entityness."⁹

Bhāvaviveka responds:

Regarding that, one who is not the other [i.e., myself Bhāvaviveka] says that here [in the passage, "Form is like a ball of foam . . ."], since the appearance as self is a mistaken reality and since the term "self" is a word for self, and since a self that is a separate entity does not exist in those [aggregates], and they themselves are not a self just as they are not *Īvara*, that [Hīnayāna] source cannot indicate that phenomena are selfless because of having the meaning of the term "selflessness of persons", which is to be specifically realized in the *śrāvakayāna*. If it could mean [the selflessness of phenomena], it would have been pointless [for the Buddha] to have taken up another vehicle [namely, the Mahāyāna].¹⁰

Bhāvaviveka argues that all references to selflessness in the Hīnayāna sūtras mean the selflessness of persons because, "the term 'self' is a word for self" of persons and does not mean entitylessness, as Buddhapālita claims. Passages that occur in the Hīnayāna sūtras, such as "Form is like a ball of foam . . ." cannot denote the selflessness of phenomena because *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* do not understand the selflessness of phenomena; the specific object of their realization is the selflessness of persons and therefore all allusions to selflessness in their sūtras must mean only that. The Buddha intended for followers of the Hīnayāna to understand the selflessness of persons and the followers of the Mahāyāna to understand the selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, nowhere in the Hīnayāna canon did he teach the selflessness of phenomena. If he had, "it would have been pointless to have taken up another vehicle." That is, if the object of the Bodhisattva's wisdom, the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena, were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, then the complete antidote for the removal of both obstructions would be available in the Hīnayāna *piṭaka* and the Buddha's teaching of the Mahāyāna would perforce be redundant. What sets the Mahāyāna sūtras apart for Bhāvaviveka is their teaching of the selflessness of phenomena.

Bhāvaviveka reiterates his assertion that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand one type of selflessness while

Bodhisattvas understand another, more subtle type in his commentary to *MMK* XVIII.4–5, which says:

When the thought of the internal
And external as I and mine
Ceases, attachment stops and
Through the extinguishment of that, birth ceases.
When actions and afflictions cease, there is liberation.
Actions and afflictions are from conceptions.
Those [arise] from elaborations.
Elaborations are stopped by emptiness.¹¹

In the *Prajñāpradīpa* Bhāvaviveka contends that the first stanza describes the process of achieving the liberation of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*; through the realization of the selflessness of persons the afflictive obstructions are removed, resulting in the extinguishment of birth and the attainment of liberation. He argues that the second stanza describes the process of abandoning both obstructions whereby the Bodhisattva achieves Buddhahood. In response to a hypothetical Hīnayāna objection that it is unnecessary to realize the selflessness of phenomena since actions and afflictions cease through understanding the selflessness of persons, Bhāvaviveka replies that emptiness, the selflessness of phenomena, must be realized in order to destroy the afflictions and their latencies (*vāsanā*) completely.

Objection: By only seeing the selflessness of persons the actions that arise from the conception of the beautiful and pleasant and the afflictions are completely pacified. Therefore, to see the selflessness of phenomena would be purposeless.

Answer: That is not correct because we wish to pull out from the roots all of the afflictions and their predispositions and this cannot occur without seeing the selflessness of phenomena. The self-arisen wisdom is the antidote to the unafflicted ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*), which is abandoned by a non-mistaken realization whose object is all phenomena. [Hence,] it is not purposeless to see the selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, emptiness, which is the character of the complete pacification of all conceptual elaborations (*prapañca*) in that way, is liberation.¹²

Bhāvaviveka's position, then, is that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* only realize the selflessness of persons and hence do not fully destroy the nets of the afflictions. Their partial understanding is, nevertheless, sufficient to put an end to birth and suffering. Bodhisattvas realize the more subtle selflessness of phenomena, thereby destroying the

elaborations of ultimate existence, which are the root cause of the afflictions, including the conception of a self of persons.

Bhāvaviveka delineates the two obstructions (*āvaraṇa*) most fully in the fourth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*, entitled "Introduction to the Reality of *Śrāvakas*" (*śrāvakatattvaviniscaya*). In commenting on *Madhyamakahr̥daya* IV.28, he writes:

The path taught in the *śrāvakayāna* is not a cause of perfect, complete enlightenment (*samyaksambodhi*) because, since it lacks meditation [on emptiness], it is incapable of abandoning the obstructions to omniscience, as is the path taught in the *pratyekabuddhayāna*.¹³

He explains that there are two types of afflictive obstructions, the binding (*bandhana*) and the latent (*vāsanā*). The obstructions to omniscience only have a nature of binding. He goes on to say:

With respect to this, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* merely abandon the binding afflictions, not the latent afflictions [nor] the obstructions to omniscience, which do not have a twofold nature. Therefore, it cannot be said that Arhats achieve nirvana because they [still] have obstructions [to be abandoned], like Stream Enterers (*śrotapanna*) and so forth. Thus, this proves the statement that even *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* become Buddhas upon purifying the stains of the predispositions and completing the collections of enlightenment (*bodhisambhara*).¹⁴

In addition to there being two kinds of afflictive obstructions, there are also two kinds of ignorance, the afflicted ignorance (*kliṣṭāvidyā*) and the non-afflicted ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*), with the former including such things as pride, obscurations, and attachment regarding the self. Non-afflicted ignorance is of the nature of the latencies. As in the case of the two types of afflictive obstructions, only the first type of ignorance is abandoned via the Hīnayāna path:

Regarding that, *śrāvaka* superiors (*ārya*) entirely and thoroughly abandon the afflictive ignorance because they understand the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*). The non-afflicted [ignorance] does not obstruct [their] liberation, so that although [that type of ignorance] continues to exist, it is said that they gain knowledge of extinguishment (*kṣaya*) and non-production (*anutpāda*).¹⁵

Thus, for Bhāvaviveka, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* abandon the binding afflictive obstructions and the afflicted ignorance but do not abandon the latent afflictions of the non-afflicted ignorance, nor do they abandon the obstructions to omniscience. It cannot even be said,

therefore, that Arhats have abandoned the afflictive obstructions; they have only abandoned one type of afflictive obstruction, that which binds them in the cycle of rebirth. It is only through meditating on emptiness and thereby destroying the misconception that is the root of desire that one is able to destroy the latent afflictions. Because *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* only understand the selflessness of persons and do not understand emptiness, they are incapable of destroying the latent afflictions.

The *Bhagavan* is one who has thoroughly abandoned the stains of the afflictions together with their latencies through becoming accustomed to the view of emptiness over a long period of time. Therefore, this [Mahāyāna] is shown to be special due to [possessing] a method for abandoning the obstructions to omniscience.¹⁶

It is thus clear that, according to Bhāvaviveka, it is impossible to abandon the latent afflictions, the non-afflictive ignorance, or the obstructions to omniscience without understanding emptiness, and the exposition of emptiness is a special feature of the Mahāyāna.

Abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience does not occur without special meditation [on emptiness]. Even the *Bhagavan* did not annihilate the obstructions to omniscience by means of this [Hīnayāna] path; he abandoned them by means of another, special meditation. If this path had the capacity to abandon the obstructions to omniscience, then even *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* would have annihilated the two obstructions and abandoned the intervening latencies. This is not the case. Therefore, the obstructions to omniscience are abandoned thoroughly only by the special cultivation of the path taught in the Mahāyāna.¹⁷

This statement provides further support for Bhāvaviveka's contention that the doctrine of emptiness is not set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras. He argues that if the Hīnayāna path possessed a method for abandoning the obstructions to omniscience, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* would have abandoned them. Because they have not, Bhāvaviveka concludes that the only way to abandon the obstructions to omniscience is by engaging in "a special meditation," meditation on emptiness, which is explicated exclusively in the Mahāyāna. Furthermore, the Hīnayāna path is incapable of abandoning even the afflictive obstructions in their entirety; it only abandons the binding afflictions but leaves intact the latencies of the afflictive obstructions. This contention leads Bhāvaviveka to a radical deprecation of the Hīnayāna

path when he claims that, "It cannot be said that Arhats achieve nirvana because they [still] have obstructions [to be abandoned]." Later, however, he seems to contradict himself when he says that although *śrāvakas* do not abandon the non-afflictive ignorance, they nevertheless achieve liberation, "they achieve knowledge of extinguishment and non-production." In one place he says that *śrāvakas* do not achieve liberation and in another place he says that they do. It is necessary to attempt to determine whether he is referring to two different liberations, two distinct enlightenments.

Knowledge of extinguishment (*kṣayajñāna*) and knowledge of non-production (*anutpādayñāna*) are the ninth and tenth of the ten knowledges,¹⁸ which are described at length in the seventh chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*. Vasubandhu says at VI.67a: "The knowledges of extinguishment and non-production are enlightenment."¹⁹

With the attainment of these two knowledges ignorance is abandoned completely; with the knowledge of extinguishment comes the knowledge that the task is completed and with knowledge of non-production comes the knowledge that there is nothing more to accomplish.²⁰ With the attainment of the knowledge of extinguishment one becomes an Arhat (*Kośa*, VI.44–45a) and with the attainment of the knowledge of non-production, one becomes an immovable (*akopya*) Arhat (*Kośa*, VI.50a). At *Kośa*, VII.7, Vasubandhu describes the knowledge of extinguishment as the certainty with regard to the truths that the sufferings have been identified, the origins have been abandoned, etc. He identifies the knowledge of non-production as the certainty that there is nothing further to be identified, abandoned, etc. In the autocommentary, he cites the *Mūlaśāstra*:

What is the knowledge of extinguishment? When one knows, "I have identified suffering perfectly, I have abandoned origin, I have now actualized cessation, I have cultivated the path," the resulting understanding, the vision, the knowledge, the intelligence, the enlightenment, the wisdom, the illumination is called the knowledge of extinguishment.

What is the knowledge of non-production? When one knows, "I have identified suffering completely and there is nothing more to identify, . . . there is no other path to cultivate," the knowledge is called the knowledge of non-production.²¹

Thus, for Vasubandhu these two bring knowledge that the afflictions

(*kleśa*), the contaminants (*āsrava*), and the insidiosities (*anusaya*) have been extinguished and will not be produced in the future.

Bhāvaviveka presents his position on the two knowledges at *Madhyamakahr̥daya* IV.27:

Furthermore, the knowledge of non-production and extinguishment
Is not, in reality, the ultimate object
Because it is conceptual and is as if erroneous.
How could they think that that is reality?²²

In the autocommentary, Bhāvaviveka says:

The opponents assert that the knowledge of the non-production of the aggregates and the knowledge of the extinguishment of the afflictions that occur at the completion of the sixteen mental moments called the forbearance of doctrinal knowledge (*dharmajñānaksānti*) regarding suffering, doctrinal knowledge regarding suffering, the forbearance of subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñānaksānti*) regarding suffering, subsequent knowledge regarding suffering and, in the same way, the forbearance and knowledge of the doctrinal [knowledge] and subsequent knowledge for origins, cessations, and paths were indicated by the *Bhagavan* [when] he said, "The knowledges of extinguishment and non-production is enlightenment."²³ Because we do not agree with this, we refute it and say, "These are ultimately inaccurate. For what reason? Because they are conceptual, like mistaken consciousness." This indicates that since the knowledges of extinguishment and non-production are similar to mistaken consciousnesses and because they observe the unreal, they are [not] complete understandings and are [not] endowed with knowledge.²⁴

It is at this point that Bhāvaviveka argues that the *śrāvakayāna* and *pratyekabuddhayāna* are not a cause of highest enlightenment because they lack the realization that eliminates the obstructions to omniscience. The Arhat is thus not truly liberated because he still has obstructions. The *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* abandon only the binding afflictive obstructions; the latent afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience remain. Furthermore, although they have destroyed the afflicted ignorance (*kliṣṭāvidyā*), which includes pride, desire, and so forth, they have not abandoned the unafflicted ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*), which has the nature of instinct (*vāsanā*).²⁵

It is Bhāvaviveka's view, then, that Arhats are beset by three faults which Buddhas have abandoned: the latent afflictive obstructions or latencies of the afflictions (*kleśāvāsanā*), the obstructions to omniscience (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), and the unafflicted ignorance (*kliṣṭāvidyā*).

Lamotte has studied the development of the idea of the latencies of

the afflictions in Indian Buddhist thought.²⁶ It is in the Hīnayāna sects that the idea of the latencies of the afflictions (or impregnations of the passions, as Lamotte renders the term) first develops, apparently as a means of accounting for the strange behavior of some of the Buddha's most illustrious disciples. For example, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, the most advanced of the disciples in the use of magical powers, would begin to skip and jump about whenever he heard music; Nanda would stare at the women in the audience before preaching the dharma; Gavampati would spit out his food and then eat it.²⁷ Such behavior was understandably difficult to account for in those who had destroyed the afflictions. It was explained that these Arhats still had the latencies of the afflictions, predispositions to certain types of physical and verbal activity deriving from former births. Hence, Mahāmaudgalyāyana's "simian aṭavism" at the sound of music was due to the fact that he had been a monkey in previous lives. Nanda's ostensibly lustful stares were the residue of a past fondness for women and Gavampati's disgusting mealtime habit was the imprint of five hundred lifetimes as a cow.²⁸ Lamotte cites the *Mahāvibhāṣa* for a technical explanation:

In every Śrāvaka who has already committed himself to a given passion, there is created by that passion a special potential, cause of a distortion in bodily and vocal behaviour: [this potential dwells] in the mind and is called impregnation. The impregnation is a special thought, [morally] undefined.²⁹

Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sects held that the Buddha alone was free from such impregnations, due to his collection of merit over countless aeons.³⁰ The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* explains that the Bodhisattva abandons the afflictions over the first seven grounds (*bhūmi*) and the latencies of the afflictions over grounds eight, nine, and ten.³¹

Thus, it would seem that Bhāvaviveka's hypothetical Hīnayāna opponent would agree with him that the Arhat has not destroyed the latencies of the afflictions while the Buddha has. However, the Hīnayānist would argue that those latencies could be removed by traversing the Bodhisattva path as described by the Hīnayāna and would not require embarkation on the bogus Mahāyāna path. The same could be said of the unafflicted ignorance.

The unafflicted ignorance is said to involve an ignorance of the

profound and subtle qualities of a Buddha; an ignorance of the very distant in place, as when Maudgalyāyana did not know that his mother had been reborn in the Mārīcī world; an ignorance of the distant in time, as when Śāriputra did not know that a certain householder possessed the roots of virtue necessary for liberation and thus did not allow him to join the order; and an ignorance due to the limitless divisions of the aspects of cause of effect, that is, not knowing the specific details of the realms, places of transmigration, circumstances of a lifetime, and so forth. Only a Buddha, for example, is said to know the karmic causes of the various colors in the feathers of a peacock's tail.³² It would be the position of the Vaibhāṣikas, for example, that such ignorance is present in Arhats and absent in the Buddha and can be removed by the Bodhisattva path as set forth in the Hīnayāna canon.³³ However, Bhāvaviveka seems to have a different, more subtle, unafflicted ignorance in mind. He cites the *Sūryabuddhakṛtanirdeśasūtra*:

This ignorance has two aspects:
The mundane and the surpassing.
The mundane creates discrimination;
The surpassing extends far.

When a disciple abides in the cessations,
His mind becomes fixed,
He is without appropriation [of the aggregates],
He does not enter into birth.

Abiding free from cessation,
He is obscured by the surpassing ignorance.
His consciousness lacks appropriation
And he says he is liberated.

How can this obscuration be liberation?
In fact, it is complete obscuration.
His consciousness is completely concealed
In the depths of the source of phenomena.

Although he does not take rebirth,
This is not the final awakening.
If it becomes the *dharmakāya* of a Buddha,
It is called nirvana.

This *dharmakāya* of the Buddha
Is nirvana.
It is fully known only by a Buddha.
Therefore, abide in [their] blessings.³⁴

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This passage is cited by Bhāvaviveka as support for his position that *śrāvakas* abandon fully and utterly the afflictive ignorance through their understanding of the selflessness of persons. Although the unafflicted ignorance persists, it does not obstruct their liberation, and it can thus be said that they achieve knowledge of extinguishment and non-production.³⁵ Because Bhāvaviveka implies that it is necessary to meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in order to destroy the unafflicted ignorance, it is unclear how that ignorance differs from the obstructions to omniscience.

It would seem that his position can be summarized as follows:

1. Arhats abandon the binding afflictions and the afflicted ignorance.
2. Arhats do not abandon the latent afflictions, which are removed through the Bodhisattva's collection of merit.
3. Arhats do not abandon the obstructions to omniscience or the unafflicted ignorance, which can only be abandoned through meditation on emptiness as set forth in the Mahāyāna canon.

Thus, when Bhāvaviveka says in one place that *śrāvakas* do not achieve liberation and elsewhere says that they do, he is clearly referring to two distinct enlightenments. When he says that an Arhat does not achieve nirvana, he means that an Arhat does not achieve the perfect, complete enlightenment (*samyaksambodhi*) of a Buddha until he abandons the obstructions to omniscience, and this is accomplished only when the Arhat enters the Mahāyāna and completes the Bodhisattva path. When he says that *śrāvakas* achieve liberation, he means that they achieve the dual knowledge of extinguishment and non-production that is acquired at the completion of the sixteen moments of knowledge (*jñāna*) and forbearance (*kṣānti*) with respect to the four truths,³⁶ at which point the *śrāvaka* realizes that the afflictions have been extinguished and the aggregates will not be produced again in another lifetime. This indeed must be considered liberation in that the cycle of rebirth has been halted. But Bhāvaviveka disputes the Hīnayāna contention that the knowledge of extinguishment and non-production is enlightenment because such knowledge is accompanied by conception. He goes on to say that the knowledges of extinguishment and non-production are mistaken consciousnesses and observe the unreal (*viparīta*), presumably because they do not observe emptiness.³⁷

Bhāvaviveka grudgingly concedes that freedom from rebirth is attainable via the Hīnayāna path while at the same time denigrating the attainment of the Arhat, whose enlightenment is far inferior to that of a Buddha. The Arhat, he says, is like a stream enterer when compared to a Buddha because he still has many obstacles to overcome. It is only when the Arhat enters the Mahāyāna path that true enlightenment comes within his grasp. So long as the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* remain satisfied with the provisional wisdom taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras, they can only seek the inferior attainment of mere freedom from rebirth and the binding afflictions. So long as they view the knowledge of impermanence, of production, and of cessation taught in their sūtras as supreme, they will remain bound by the webs of misconception because, for Bhāvaviveka, these knowledges are ultimately mistaken. The knowledge gained from the Hīnayāna sūtras is sufficient to destroy the binding afflictions but is not knowledge of the real. He says in the third chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*:

In the *śrāvakayāna*, the *Bhagavan* thoroughly explained to *śrāvakas*, in order that they might abandon the afflictive obstructions:

O, products are impermanent
Having the nature of production and disintegration.
Being produced they cease.
They are peacefully blissful.³⁸

Why? As it is said [in sūtra]:

The various worlds are not desire;
Attachment to the imaginary is the desire of beings.
For the steady [of mind] who abide like the various worlds
[Desires] are tamed accordingly.

In the Mahāyāna, [the Buddha taught] no arising, no phenomena, no production, no cessation, no composition, and no objects of knowledge in duality. If [that is the case], how can the afflictions arise? Thus, [the Buddha] explained [this] fully to the compassionate [Bodhisattvas] so that they might abandon the afflictions together with their latencies as well as the stains of the obstructions to omniscience.³⁹

It is clear, then, that Bhāvaviveka sees a fundamental difference between the nature of reality described in the Hīnayāna sūtras and the nature of reality described by the Buddha in the Mahāyāna sūtras. In the Hīnayāna, the Buddha talked about impermanence, production,

and disintegration, the transitory nature of phenomena. In the Mahāyāna, he talked about the emptiness of ultimate existence. The understanding of the former is not the understanding of the latter; they are two very different realizations. For Bhāvaviveka, only one is ultimately true, only one is knowledge of reality. The other is provisional, mistaken, and ultimately false. The realization of impermanence and of the selflessness of persons gained in the Hīnayāna has the capacity to tame and destroy the desire that binds beings in birth and death. Still, it is mistaken in the final analysis, it is "ultimately inaccurate," as Bhāvaviveka says. How, then, is it possible for a mistake, an untruth, to lead to freedom?

Bhāvaviveka answers this question in an intriguing manner through examining what is meant by the terms "true" and "false." At *Madhyamakahr̥daya* IV.30 he says:

In fact, there is no path in the Mahāyāna
For the realization of Buddhahood
Because it would have conceptions and signs,
As do worldly paths.⁴⁰

Here, using the apophatic language so beloved by the Mādhyamikas, Bhāvaviveka denies the ultimate existence of the path to Buddhahood because, in reality, the Mahāyāna path is empty of ultimate existence as are all other paths and all other phenomena in the universe. In reality, there is only emptiness, the negation of ultimate existence. His commentary says:

The path is not a cause of enlightenment because it possesses conceptions and signs, such as [the statement], "This world and the world beyond exist." It is like the path of performing actions that cause beings [to be reborn] in the realm of gods and humans [which is not a cause of enlightenment].⁴¹

Bhāvaviveka's point is that the special cause of Buddhahood is the non-conceptual, non-dual realization of the signless reality, emptiness; the details of the Mahāyāna path cannot, in themselves, serve as the cause of Buddhahood, just as ethical action alone can lead only to a favorable rebirth and never to the enlightenment of a Buddha.

It is important to note that Bhāvaviveka here expressed what might be termed a qualified apophasis concerning the path. When he says

that there is no path in the verse above, he is making a specific statement about what does and does not effect enlightenment. To introduce that verse he says, "Furthermore, in this Mahāyāna system, the *Bhagavan* teaches the cultivation and clear realization of the path conventionally, not ultimately."⁴² Hence, the path exists conventionally.

As a Mādhyamika, Bhāvaviveka would hold that the attainment of Buddhahood via the Mahāyāna path does not ultimately exist because the Mahāyāna path and Buddhahood and its attainment are all empty of ultimate existence. As a Mādhyamika, he would also uphold the compatibility of emptiness and dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*); the emptiness of a particular phenomenon does not cancel its conventional efficacy. Thus, that the Mahāyāna path does not ultimately exist is not a problem for Bhāvaviveka. It is a problem, however, for his hypothetical Hīnayāna opponent who sees the Mādhyamika view as nihilistic and who cannot conceive of an existence empty of ultimate existence. In the *Tarkajvālā*, such an opponent raises the following qualm:

If it is the case that the cultivation of the path is for the purpose of destroying the afflictions, then what destroys the afflictions when [the path] itself is not true? By thinking that the stump of a tree is a human, one does not get rid of doubt.⁴³

That is, an unreal path cannot destroy the afflictions. It is incorrect to hold that the afflictions can be overcome by cultivating a path that is not truly established. Something which is false can have no positive effect, says the opponent; nothing is gained by mistaking a tree stump in the distance for a human.

Bhāvaviveka, of course, does not agree because he does not equate non-true existence with non-existence; something can be empty of true existence, and in that sense be untrue, and still perform a positive function. But what of the opponent's example? Can anything ever be gained by a visual error? Bhāvaviveka, ever undaunted, provides a counterexample:

Just as someone is frightened
Through confusing a rope for a snake,
[So] knowing that [it] is a coiled vine
Is known to be a cure [for that fear].⁴⁴

In his commentary, he explains:

Due to being mistaken, someone initially [thinks] that a rope is a snake, not knowing that it is a rope. [Telling] that [person], "This is a coiled vine, it is neither a rope nor a snake," [creates] the apprehension of an unreal [in the sense of non-existent] coiled vine whereby the mistaking of [a rope] for a snake is cured. In the same way, adherence to wrong views and wrong thoughts arises through being initially mistaken about forms and so forth. By knowing that one is mistaken about these, a view is created that is a cure, such as the correct view (*samyak-dṛṣṭi*). [But] one should know that both of these [views, the wrong and the correct] are wrong due to being conceptions of true existence. The unseen is reality because there is nothing other than the nature which is non-true existence.⁴⁵

To illustrate his point, he cites a passage from the *Tathāgatakośasūtra*:

Kāśyapa, it is thus. Some beings are tormented by the unfounded suspicion [that they have taken] poison, and they beat their breasts and wail, saying, "I have eaten poison! I have eaten poison!" One skilled in the ways of medicine pretends to remove the unreal poison [by giving them a purgative⁴⁶] thereby overcoming the belief [caused] by their suspicion of poison. As a consequence, they are relieved of their torment. What do you think, Kāśyapa? If the doctor had not pretended to remove the false weak poison, would those beings have lived?

No, *Bhagavan*. Just as they were supposedly tormented by an unreal poison, so [that torment] was removed by another unreal poison.

The *Bhagavan* said, "In the same way, Kāśyapa, do I teach the doctrine in an unreal manner to childish common beings who are beset by the afflictions."

Does the *Bhagavan* not speak the truth? How could the Tathāgata not speak the truth?

The *Bhagavan* said, "Kāśyapa, what do you think? Are you liberated by truth or untruth?"

I am liberated by untruth, not by the truth. *Bhagavan*, desire, hatred, and obscuration are said to be untrue. If desire were true, *Bhagavan*, one could not remove oneself from desire through [meditation on] ugliness. If hatred were real, *Bhagavan*, one could not remove oneself from hatred through [meditation on] love. If obscuration were real, *Bhagavan*, one could not remove oneself from obscuration through [meditation on] dependent arising. *Bhagavan*, it is because desire and hatred and ignorance are unreal that one can separate oneself from them by meditation on ugliness, love, and dependent arising. *Bhagavan*, since all afflictions are unreal, they are thoroughly abandoned by a realization that is unreal. *Bhagavan*, because both the afflictions and that by which they are abandoned are unreal and untrue, unreal knowledge removes one from unreal afflictions.⁴⁷

Bhāvaviveka begins with the classic example of mistaking a coiled rope for a snake. He adds a further twist, however, by arguing that one can dispel the fear of the mistaken person by telling him that it is not a snake but a coiled vine. (He does not suggest the motivation for

such prevarication.) This demonstrates that a mistake can be corrected (in the sense that the fear of the snake is dispelled) by an untruth. In the same way, wrong philosophical views, such as that forms are permanent, can be eradicated by learning correct views concerning impermanence. However, ultimately both wrong views and correct views are false because they are involved with the elaborations of true existence, “both of these are wrong due to being conceptions of true existence (*dngos por 'dzin pa*).” Emptiness, “the unseen,” is reality “because there is nothing other than the nature of non-true existence (*dngos po med pa*).”

Thus, to the Hīnayāna opponent who objects that the path must be truly existent in order to be effective, Bhāvaviveka responds with an example of an effective lie, providing an instance of a worldly untruth to show that what is not truly existent can nonetheless be efficacious. He takes the discussion to another level, however, by going on to say that wrong views and correct views are ultimately false because they are based in the conception of true existence, that the only reality is emptiness, the very absence of true existence.

The play on “true” and “false”, “real” and “unreal” continues in the example provided from sūtra, an example in which the motivation for the telling of a lie (or at least the withholding of the truth) is provided. The Buddha tells the story of a group of people who mistakenly believe they have been poisoned and are duly distressed. A skilled physician, knowing that his assurance that they have not been poisoned would be insufficient to allay their fears, administers something that they believe to be an antidote, thereby “curing” them. Comparing himself to that physician, the Buddha says, “In the same way, Kāśyapa, do I teach the doctrine in an unreal manner to childish common beings who are beset by the afflictions.” That is, the Buddha teaches that which is not “true” to the more benighted of his followers.

To this point, Bhāvaviveka’s example of the coiled vine and the example from sūtra are roughly parallel, showing the efficacy of untruth to dispel fear. The exegeses of the two examples are somewhat different. Bhāvaviveka explains that even though the correct view is not ultimately true, it can counteract wrong views. Kāśyapa focuses at first not on the truth or falsity of the antidote but on that of the malady, noting that it is because desire, hatred, and ignorance are

untrue, that is, not truly existent, that they are susceptible to meditation on ugliness, love, and dependent arising. But he goes on to imply that this susceptibility is not because the unreal is overcome by the real but rather because the unreal is susceptible to the unreal: “*Bhagavan*, because both the afflictions and that by which they are abandoned are unreal and untrue, unreal knowledge separates one from unreal afflictions.” There is no explicit identification made here, as there is by Bhāvaviveka, of this lack of truth with reality. However, when Kāśyapa says, “I am liberated by untruth, not by truth,” he seems to imply that it is because phenomena are empty that liberation is possible, that if things were reified into some true existence, transformation would be impossible.

It is certainly fair to ask at this juncture what this discussion has to do with the question of whether *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. Bhāvaviveka is here attempting to prove the Mādhyamika point (made also by Nāgārjuna at *MMK*, XXIV, 14–24) that the viability of phenomena is possible within emptiness, that things need not be truly existent (indeed must not be) in order to be effective. Because Bhāvaviveka’s *śrāvaka* opponent raises this qualm, it is clear at least that that *śrāvaka* does not understand emptiness. But what of the rest?

Bhāvaviveka’s example of telling a frightened person that a coiled rope is a coiled vine is ascribed great significance by Tibetan doxographers of the dGe-lugs-pa order in their discussion of the question of whether, according to Svātantrika, *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. As will be seen in the next section, Candrakīrti criticizes an opponent for asserting on the one hand that the conception of true existence is the root cause of suffering and rebirth and asserting on the other that liberation from suffering and rebirth is possible without abandoning that conception. Bhāvaviveka does indeed appear to be caught in that contradiction. In an attempt to answer for him, Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (1648–1721) in his *Great Exposition of Tenets* (*Grub mtha' chen mo*) and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan (1797–?) in his *Annotations* (*mChan 'grel*) to the *Great Exposition of Tenets* argue that it was Bhāvaviveka’s position that although emptiness is the final mode of being and true nature of reality and that the conception of true existence is the root cause of suffering, it is not necessary to understand emptiness in order to be liberated from rebirth, just as it is

not necessary to know that what looks like a snake is actually a coiled rope; it is sufficient to think that it is a coiled vine for one's fears to be assuaged. In the same way, although emptiness, the selflessness of phenomena, is reality, it is sufficient to understand the selflessness of persons in order to gain the lesser liberation of the Arhat.⁴⁸ Whether it can be concluded that this is Bhāvaviveka's position will be considered when Candrakīrti's refutations are dealt with.

An examination of Bhāvaviveka's statements in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Tarkajvālā* indicates that he rejected the view that the doctrine of emptiness appeared anywhere in the Hīnayāna sūtras, and that he held that the doctrine of emptiness was at least a, if not the, distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna canon, that followers of the Hīnayāna realize only the selflessness of persons and not that of phenomena, thereby becoming Arhats and abandoning the binding afflictive obstructions but not the latent afflictions, the unafflicted ignorance, or the obstructions to omniscience, which can only be abandoned through meditation on emptiness.

CANDRAKĪRTI

Bhāvaviveka's contention that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras rests on three major points of disagreement with Buddhapālita: the meaning of self and selflessness, the nature of the two obstructions, and implicitly, the distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna. Candrakīrti attacks Bhāvaviveka's position on each of these points.

He says in his commentary to Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*:

Regarding this, "self" is the entity of things that does not depend on another (*aparapratibaddha*), [it is] inherent existence. The non-existence of that is selflessness. Through the division into phenomena (*dharma*) and persons (*pudgala*) it is understood as twofold, the selflessness of phenomena (*dharmanairātmya*) and the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*).

Candrakīrti makes two essential points here. First, he follows Buddhapālita's gloss of *ātman* as *svabhāva*; self does not refer to a falsely attributed quality of the person. Rather, it is the inherent existence, the intrinsic nature, the own-being falsely ascribed to all phenomena, including persons. It is an entity of independence and

autonomy, an inner principle of objects that relies on nothing else for its existence. Secondly, Candrakīrti asserts that selflessness, the absence of this inherent existence, can be seen as twofold, as the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, a division based not on two qualities but on two qualificands. A person's lack of being an independent, inherently existing entity is the selflessness of persons. That same absence of inherent existence in a phenomenon other than the person is the selflessness of phenomena. For Candrakīrti, there is no difference in subtlety between the two selflessnesses. They are distinguished from the point of view of the bases that are selfless, that is, persons and phenomena. They are not distinguished from the point of view of that of which they are empty; the object of negation (*pratiśedhya*), inherent existence, is the same.

Candrakīrti's position stands in sharp contrast to that of Bhāvaviveka, who holds that the selflessness of phenomena is more subtle than the selflessness of persons. The two selflessnesses are not only distinguished in terms of what is selfless, as they are for Candrakīrti, but are also differentiated from the point of view of how they are selfless; the word "self" in the terms "selflessness of persons" and "selflessness of phenomena" has two distinct referents. When it is said that the person is selfless, it means that the aggregates are not a permanent, single, independent agent either individually or collectively, nor does such an entity exist apart from the aggregates. For Bhāvaviveka, the self is only imputedly existent (*prajñapti-sat*) as the mental consciousness.⁴⁹ When it is said that phenomena are selfless, it means that they lack ultimate existence (*paramārtha-sat*); they are incapable of withstanding analysis by a reasoning consciousness investigating their final mode of being.⁵⁰

As Bhāvaviveka explains in his commentary to *MMK* XVIII.4–5, the selflessness of persons is the object of the wisdom of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* whereas the more subtle selflessness of phenomena is the object of the wisdom of Bodhisattvas. In his own commentary to *MMK* XVIII.4–5, Candrakīrti says:

Therefore, in dependence on emptiness, which has the character of the complete pacification of all elaborations, one separates from elaborations and through separating from elaborations, thought is reversed. By overcoming thought, the afflictions are reversed and by overcoming the afflictions, birth is reversed. Therefore,

since only emptiness has the character of the overcoming of all elaborations, it is called nirvana. As [Āryadeva's] *Catuhśataka* says:

Here, in brief, the Tathāgatas
Speak of only these two:
The doctrine is non-harming;
Emptiness is nirvana.

The master Bhāvaviveka does not understand that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have realization of emptiness as it is explained.⁵¹

Candrakīrti then paraphrases Bhāvaviveka's position that *śrāvakas* understand that there is no self of persons whereas the object of a Bodhisattva's non-conceptual wisdom is the view of the non-production of all products (*ajātasarvasaṃskāra*), that is, the selflessness of phenomena.⁵²

To support his position that followers of the Hīnayāna realize emptiness, Candrakīrti cites the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*:

Subhūti, one who wishes to attain the enlightenment of a *śrāvaka* should learn this perfection of wisdom. Subhūti, one who wishes to attain the enlightenment of a *pratyekabuddha* should learn this perfection of wisdom. Subhūti, one who wishes to attain unsurpassed, perfect, complete enlightenment should learn this perfection of wisdom.⁵³

This is the extent of Candrakīrti's consideration in the *Prasannapadā* of the question of whether *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. He notes that he has already demonstrated that Bhāvaviveka does not follow Nāgārjuna on this point and refers the reader to the eighth verse of the first chapter of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.⁵⁴ Let us turn there.

Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* is divided into twelve chapters, the first ten devoted to delineations of the ten Bodhisattva grounds (*bhūmi*), the eleventh describing the qualities of the ten grounds, and the twelfth describing the qualities of Buddhahood. Candrakīrti's discussion of the object of the Hīnayāna wisdom and his attendant critique of Bhāvaviveka occur in two places in the text. In the first chapter, employing scripture, he presents quotations from sūtra and from the works of Nāgārjuna to show that *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. In the sixth chapter, employing reasoning, he argues that it is logically untenable to hold that liberation is possible without knowing emptiness.

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At *Madhyamakāvatāra*, I.8, referring to Bodhisattvas on the first ground, Candrakīrti writes:

Even those who abide in the first aspiration to full enlightenment
Subdue those born from the speech of Muṇḍra
As well as *pratyekabuddhas* through the increase of their merit.
On the Gone Afar he surpasses them in awareness.⁵⁵

Bodhisattvas on the first ground have greater merit than *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*. It is not until the seventh ground, however, the Gone Afar (*dūramgama*), that Bodhisattvas surpass those of the Hīnayāna with their wisdom. Candrakīrti cites the *Daśabhūmika* for support:

Similarly, Children of the Conqueror, as soon as he creates the aspiration [to enlightenment], a Bodhisattva outshines *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* by the greatness of his special thought but not by the power of his analytical awareness. A Bodhisattva abiding on the seventh Bodhisattva ground greatly surpasses all the activities of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* through abiding in the great knowledge of his own sphere.⁵⁶

Candrakīrti argues that it can be determined clearly from this passage that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have the knowledge that all phenomena lack inherent existence. If they did not understand the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena, then Bodhisattvas on the first ground, who do have such understanding, would surpass them in intelligence on the first ground, not on the seventh as is indicated by the sūtra. If *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* observed forms as having their own entity, they would be mistaken and thus would not realize the selflessness of the person because they would misperceive the aggregates as self.⁵⁷ He goes on to cite an extended passage from Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* (stanzas I.35–37 and IV.57–66) to establish the relationship between the misconception of the aggregates and the misconception of the self. For example, *Ratnāvalī*, I.35 says:

As long as there is a conception of the aggregates,
There is a conception of the "I";
When there is a conception of the "I" there is action;
From action there is birth.⁵⁸

The second long citation from the *Ratnāvalī* contains the stanza (IV.63):

Because they lack entityness in that way,
Attachment to finding pleasure and
Attachment to separating from pain are abandoned.
Therefore, those who see in this way are liberated.⁵⁹

Candrakīrti argues that these extended passages from Nāgārjuna prove that it was his position that followers of the Hīnayāna understand emptiness because in his description of phenomena, such as the aggregates and physical elements (*mahābhūta*), as lacking inherent existence and how liberation is achieved through understanding that, there is no mention of Bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas are referred to only in the last stanza cited (*Ratnāvalī*, IV.66):

Bodhisattvas, who also see in this way,
Wish definitely for enlightenment.
But they continue in existence until enlightenment
Through their compassion.⁶⁰

Candrakīrti attempts to demonstrate two points in the foregoing discussion. The first is that there is ample evidence in sūtra and in the statements of Nāgārjuna to indicate that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand the emptiness of inherent existence. His second point is that it is clear from the statements of Nāgārjuna that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* must realize emptiness, the lack of inherent existence of persons and phenomena, in order to be liberated from rebirth. Contrary to Bhāvaviveka's view, it is impossible to realize that the person is selfless without realizing that phenomena are selfless because, as Nāgārjuna says, as long as the aggregates are misconceived, so long is there the misconception of the "I". Hence, knowledge of the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena is essential for liberation from suffering. If *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* did not have such knowledge they would be like non-Buddhists who do not destroy the afflictions. The necessity of knowledge of emptiness for liberation is considered further by Candrakīrti in the sixth chapter.

Candrakīrti disputes two other positions of Bhāvaviveka in the first chapter of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the first being Bhāvaviveka's

contention that emptiness is not set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras. Like Buddhapālita, he cites the "Form is like a ball of foam" stanza as evidence of the doctrine of the selflessness of phenomena in the *śrāvakaśāstra*. He then cites two statements from Nāgārjuna, the first of which (*Ratnāvalī*, IV. 86) states that the teaching of non-production in the Mahāyāna and the teaching of extinguishment in the Hīnayāna refer to the same thing. In the second statement (*MMK*, XV.7), Nāgārjuna notes that the extremes of existence, non-existence, and both existence and non-existence are rejected by the Buddha in *Kātyāyanāvavāda*, a Hīnayāna sūtra.⁶¹

Finally, Candrakīrti disputes Bhāvaviveka's contention that if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, it would have been pointless for the Buddha to have taught the Mahāyāna.

It can be understood that the system of those who think that if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the *śrāvakaśāstra*, then the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be pointless contradicts reasoning and scripture. The Mahāyāna teaching does not set forth simply the selflessness of phenomena. Why? [It sets forth] the grounds (*bhūmi*), perfections (*pāramitā*), prayers (*prañidhāna*), great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), and so forth of Bodhisattvas as well as the dedications (*pariṇāma*), the two collections (*sambhara*), and the inconceivable reality (*acintyadharmatā*). As the *Ratnāvalī* [IV.90, IV.93] says:

The prayers, deeds, and dedications
Of Bodhisattvas were not explained
In the *śrāvakaśāstra*.
How could one become a Bodhisattva [by that path]?

The topics concerning the Bodhisattvas' deeds
Are not discussed in the sūtras;
They are discussed in the Mahāyāna.
Therefore, the wise should accept it [as the word of the Buddha].⁶²

In order that the selflessness of phenomena be clarified, it is fitting that it be taught in the Mahāyāna because [the Buddha] wished to speak about the teaching at length; in the *śrāvakaśāstra* the selflessness of phenomena is limited merely to a brief characterization. As the master [Nāgārjuna] said [in the *Lokāṭīastava*, 27]:

You said that there is no liberation
Without understanding the signless.
Therefore, you taught it fully
In the Mahāyāna.⁶³

Here, Candrakīrti counters Bhāvaviveka's contention about the pointlessness of the Mahāyāna on two fronts. First, he makes the rather obvious point that there are many topics set forth in the Mahāyāna sūtras that are not found in the Hīnayāna canon. Thus, the selflessness of phenomena is not the unique feature of the Mahāyāna, even if it were not taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras. Furthermore, in the passage from the *Ratnāvalī*, Nāgārjuna is attempting to prove that the Mahāyāna is indeed the word of the Buddha by listing those things essential for Buddhahood that are not to be found in the Hīnayāna sūtras. Notable by its absence is the selflessness of phenomena, which Nāgārjuna should have included were it unique to the Mahāyāna.⁶⁴

Candrakīrti's second point is that the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena in the Mahāyāna is not redundant because the selflessness of phenomena is delineated at great length in the Mahāyāna sūtras whereas it is discussed only briefly in the Hīnayāna.

Hence, it is abundantly clear that Candrakīrti asserts that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras and that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* must understand that selflessness in order to abandon the afflictive emotions and be liberated from rebirth. He says in his commentary to Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, "The abandonment of the afflictive emotions does not occur for those who wish to abandon the afflictive emotions but who apprehend the inherent existence of forms and so forth."⁶⁵ However, his statement in commenting on the stanza from the *Lokātīstava*, to the effect that the selflessness of phenomena is discussed only briefly in the Hīnayāna while it is set forth extensively in the Mahāyāna, suggests that Candrakīrti wishes to maintain the supremacy of the Mahāyāna even here, but with perhaps more deftness than Bhāvaviveka displayed. Despite his insistence that followers of the Hīnayāna must and do understand emptiness, Candrakīrti qualifies the nature of that understanding rather significantly later in the *Madhyamakāvātāra*. This is evident in his commentary to VI.179ab, which says:

For the liberation of transmigrators, this selflessness
Was taught in two aspects, with the divisions of persons and phenomena.

Candrakīrti comments:

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This selflessness was set forth briefly in two aspects: the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons. Why was selflessness set forth in two aspects? As is explained, "For the liberation of transmigrators." The *Bhagavan* set forth these two aspects of selflessness for the sake of the liberation of transmigrators. Regarding that, the selflessness of persons was set forth so that *pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* would be liberated. Both [selflessnesses] were set forth so that Bodhisattvas would be liberated through attaining omniscience (*sarvākārājñāna*). *Śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* also see the mere conditionality (*idampratīyayatva*) of dependent arising. However, they do not meditate on the selflessness of phenomena fully. It is shown that they have complete meditation on the selflessness of persons.⁶⁶

Not only, then, is the selflessness of phenomena delineated in a partial way in the Hīnayāna sūtras, Candrakīrti also asserts that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* engage in meditation on the selflessness of phenomena in a partial manner. He concedes that they understand the "mere conditionality of dependent arising," which here can be taken to mean the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena, but their contemplation of that emptiness is not as complete as that of Bodhisattvas. Candrakīrti here is able to maintain the superiority of the Mahāyāna while preserving his point that *śrāvakas* understand the selflessness of phenomena. He does so by qualifying the nature of that understanding.⁶⁷

Candrakīrti's position rests on his fundamental conviction that the conception of inherent existence is the root cause of the afflictions and that it is therefore impossible to abandon any of the afflictions, much less achieve liberation, without realizing the emptiness of inherent existence. In the sixth chapter of the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, he disputes the contention that liberation is achieved merely through understanding that the self is not permanent. He says at VI.131:

[According to] you, yogis perceiving selflessness
Do not realize the reality of forms and so forth.
[Therefore,] due to seeing forms [as inherently existent]
and relating to them [as such]
Desire and so forth are produced because
their nature has not been understood.⁶⁸

This stanza seems to be addressed to those who do not acknowledge emptiness as the final nature of reality. Candrakīrti also attacks those, like Bhāvaviveka, who maintain that emptiness is the ultimate truth

but who claim that liberation is possible without emptiness being understood. He says at VI.140—1:

[You assert] that when selflessness is understood
One abandons the permanent self, [but] it is not held
To be the basis of the conception of self.
Hence it is fantastic to propound
That through knowing the lack of [a permanent]
self, the view of self [i.e., inherent existence] is eradicated.

That while looking for a snake that lives
in a hole in the wall of your house,
Your qualms can be dispelled and the fear
of the snake abandoned
By [someone's saying], "There is no elephant here,"
Is, alas, laughable to others.⁶⁹

The dGe-lugs-pa scholar Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan draws a connection between saying that there is no elephant in the wall and saying that a coiled rope is not a snake, but a coiled vine. He says in his *Annotations (mChan 'grel)*:

The Prāsaṅgikas say that it is not correct that by meditating on the selflessness of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency (*gang zag rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi bdag med*) one abandons the afflictions and their seeds, because that [selflessness] is not the final mode of being of phenomena. To hold that transmigrators cycle in mundane existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena but that they can overcome cyclic existence not through meditating on the referent object of that [conception of a self of phenomena] but rather through meditating on the selflessness of a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency is senseless. This would be like saying that there is no elephant in the house in order to dispel the mistaken fear that there is a snake in the house.

The Svātantrikas assert that it is true that transmigrators cycle in mundane existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena and that the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of being of phenomena. However, one does not have to meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in order to be liberated from cyclic existence because although a vine is not the mode of being of a rope, by saying, "This is a coiled vine," one can dispel the fear of one who thinks that a coiled rope is a snake. In the same way, although the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of being of phenomena, it is not contradictory that one can temporarily [that is, until entering the Mahāyāna] abandon cyclic existence and its causes.⁷⁰

Bhāvaviveka provided the example of the coiled vine to demonstrate that the desired effect can be achieved by that which is not literally true. It will be recalled that he made that point to demonstrate

to a Hīnayāna opponent that the Māhayāna path need not be ultimately existent to lead to the state of Buddhahood. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan recognizes Bhāvaviveka's point but sees a second significance in the metaphor, interpreting it as also illustrating Bhāvaviveka's position that one can be liberated from rebirth without understanding emptiness. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan's juxtaposition of Bhāvaviveka's vine and Candrakīrti's elephant may not be historically accurate; we do not know whether Candrakīrti had Bhāvaviveka in mind as the opponent in this context. However, he has pointed up a major fissure between the two Mādhyamika masters. It seems that for Bhāvaviveka, despite his protestations, there is not such a great difference between the selflessness of persons understood by śrāvakas and the selflessness of phenomena understood by Bodhisattvas. The śrāvakas only make a small mistake, like confusing a rope for a vine, when they contemplate the nature of reality, and that mistake is not significant enough to prevent them from putting an end to the afflictions. For Candrakīrti, the error is of a different order; one cannot dispel the fear of there being a snake in the house by telling someone that there are no elephants in the parlor. The conception of a permanent self that the Hīnayāna schools refute is gross and obvious, like an elephant. It is unrelated to the more subtle and sinister serpent of the conception of inherent existence. Removing the elephant does not destroy the snake. Thus, Candrakīrti argues that understanding the coarse selflessness that is taught by the Hīnayāna schools will not bestow liberation. All who seek freedom from rebirth must destroy the conception of inherent existence. The śrāvakas and *pratyekabuddhas* abandon the afflictions through their understanding of the two selflessnesses. However, they cannot abandon the latent afflictions (*kleśavāsanā*), which are only destroyed by Bodhisattvas.⁷¹

CONCLUSIONS

The present study has attempted to articulate a central issue of Mahāyāna soteriology through an examination of the writings of two Mādhyamika masters, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti. The purpose here has been to demonstrate a further criterion for the retrospective designation of their respective philosophies with the terms

“Svātantrika” and “Prāsaṅgika.” An exhaustive study of the nature of the Hīnayāna wisdom according to the Mādhyamika school would entail an analysis of the writings of many other masters, especially those who produced what has been called the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika synthesis. To attempt to determine the position of Maitreya-nātha, for example, on this issue would entail an analysis of the famous “Five Treatises” (the *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga*, the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, the *Uttaratantra*, and the *Abhisamayālamkāra*) as well as the myriad commentaries on these works. It is possible to speculate briefly here on what the position of Nāgārjuna may have been on this issue and then go on to discuss the implications and possible motivations of the views of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti.

When attempting to determine the position of Nāgārjuna, there is always the vexing question of deciding which of the many other works ascribed to him are indeed the products of the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra*. Here, in order to provide a wide range of statements on the subject, I will accept the thirteen texts that Lindtner considers authentic.⁷²

During the later propagation (*phyir tar*) of the Buddhist doctrine in Tibet (c. 11th century), Tibetan scholars called Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva “Mādhyamikas of the model texts” (*gzhung phyi mo'i dbu ma pa*) because their writings are ambiguous on a number of points upon which later Mādhyamikas, whom the Tibetans called “partisan Mādhyamikas” (*phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa*), parted company.⁷³ It should be noted that in subsequent centuries, Tibetan scholars went to great length to demonstrate that Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva were not as ambivalent on these issues as earlier scholars had believed and that Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, in fact, represented the Prāsaṅgika view in their writings. When this could not be determined from their writings, it was argued that despite what the words may say, their “thought” (*dgongs pa*) was Prāsaṅgika.

On the question of whether *śrāvakas* must understand emptiness in order to be liberated from rebirth, Candrakīrti has already provided a prodigious number of citations from Nāgārjuna, drawn primarily from the *Ratnāvalī*. Other passages not cited by Candrakīrti but which

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support his position that all who wish to achieve liberation must know emptiness include *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 72:

Those who do not know emptiness
Are not bases of liberation.
The obscured wander in the six realms
In the prison of *saṃsāra*.⁷⁴

MMK, XXIV.10 says:

Without relying on conventions
The ultimate cannot be taught.
Without understanding the ultimate
Nirvana is not attained.⁷⁵

There is also the statement at *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (4):

One is not liberated by existence;
One is not liberated by non-existence;
Great beings are liberated
Through the thorough understanding of existence and non-existence.⁷⁶

The term “great being” (*mahātman*) may be seen as referring to Bodhisattvas, who are often referred to with the epithet *mahāsattva*. But Candrakīrti says in his commentary that the *mahātman* is one who abides in the wisdom of the unobservable (*anupalabdhatā*), thereby greatly surpassing childish beings; *mahātman* is a term for *ārya*.⁷⁷ It is thus applicable to *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and Bodhisattvas. In the *Acintyastava*, Nāgārjuna says that the Buddha, out of his compassion, taught the selflessness of phenomena to “the intelligent” (*viditam*).⁷⁸ It is not clear from the context whether this refers explicitly to Bodhisattvas.

Another statement from Nāgārjuna, and in many ways the most interesting, comes from the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 11–13. Here, Nāgārjuna says that the Buddhas spoke of the five aggregates to *śrāvakas*, but continually taught Bodhisattvas that form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a bubble, etc.⁷⁹ This passage can be read in two ways. Bhāvaviveka may find some initial support here in Nāgārjuna’s contention that the Buddha described the aggregates for *śrāvakas* but

declared the unreality of those aggregates to Bodhisattvas. Hence, the doctrine of the selflessness of phenomena, in this case the aggregates, was not intended for, nor taught to, followers of the Hīnayāna. However, as has already been discussed, the exposition of the unreality of the aggregates cited by Nāgārjuna derives from a Hīnayāna sūtra, the *Samyutta-nikāya*. This supports Candrakīrti's position that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the *śrāvakaṭīka*. In the end, Nāgārjuna's statement seems to provide further evidence for Candrakīrti's case, showing that the Buddha taught the selflessness of phenomena using language that he had employed in teaching *śrāvakas*. It appears to be an instance of the Buddha making a brief reference to the selflessness of phenomena in the Hīnayāna canon, as alluded to by Candrakīrti. Nāgārjuna's statement that the Buddha set forth the aggregates to *śrāvakas* is explained by Tsong-kha-pa to mean that he taught the reality of the aggregates not to all *śrāvakas* but to those temporarily unable to understand emptiness.⁸⁰ Nāgārjuna himself says that the Buddha did not teach the doctrine of emptiness to everyone. This point is made explicitly at *Ratnāvalī* IV.94–96 and at I.79, which says:

This profundity that brings liberation
And is beyond vice and virtue
Has not been tasted by those who fear the baseless:
The others, the *tīrthikas*, and even by us [Buddhists].⁸¹

It seems reasonable to conclude that from the evidence available to us, Candrakīrti seems to represent the position of Nāgārjuna when he says that the doctrine of emptiness is set forth in the Hīnayāna canon and that *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. Candrakīrti provides several citations from Nāgārjuna to support his claim and his interpretation of them is neither forced, far-fetched, or manipulative. There are other supporting statements from Nāgārjuna that Candrakīrti does not cite. Furthermore, Bhāvaviveka, who displays no reluctance to cite Nāgārjuna for support on other points of doctrine, provides no quotations from the master here.

What may have motivated Bhāvaviveka to argue so stridently that emptiness is not set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras? Bhāvaviveka clearly indulges in a hermeneutics of control when he claims that a statement

in a Hīnayāna sūtra that says that feelings are like bubbles teaches the selflessness of persons to *śrāvakas* while a statement from a Mahāyāna sūtra that says that the conditioned is like bubbles teaches the selflessness of phenomena to Bodhisattvas. Bhāvaviveka lived in a period of sometimes bitter polemics among the various Buddhist schools: between the Hīnayāna schools and the Mahāyāna schools with the Hīnayāna denying the veracity of the Mahāyāna sūtras as the word of the Buddha (*buddhavacana*) and labelling the Mādhyamikas nihilists, and between Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. Bhāvaviveka seems to have conceived of himself as the defender of the Mādhyamika against such challengers, whom he attacked with zeal. Hence, he reacted bitterly to Hīnayāna charges of bogus scriptures and nihilistic views. In the *Tarkajvālā* he deals with his opponents in turn, setting out to demonstrate how the Mahāyāna is in all ways the superior vehicle, Mādhyamika in all ways the superior view. Thus, what distinguishes the Mahāyāna from the lesser vehicle is not merely its path or the nature of its enlightenment, not merely its method (*upāya*) but also its wisdom (*prajñā*). His statement that if the selflessness of phenomena were set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras, the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be purposeless is clearly hyperbolic; it is obvious from the first three chapters of the *Tarkajvālā* that Bhāvaviveka did not believe the doctrine of emptiness to be the only contribution of the Mahāyāna sūtras to Buddhist thought.

In order to uphold the supremacy of the Mahāyāna, Bhāvaviveka forced himself into the philosophical difficulty of, in effect, positing two causes of *saṃsāra*. The binding afflictions are caused, at least immediately, by the conception of a self of persons. Understanding the selflessness of persons is, therefore, sufficient to put an end to birth and suffering and serves as the object of the *śrāvakas*, wisdom. Bodhisattvas realize the more subtle selflessness of phenomena, thereby destroying the elaborations of ultimate existence, which are the root causes of the afflictions, including the conception of a self of persons.

Bhāvaviveka distinguishes disciples of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by the object of their wisdom. Although the difference in motivation is clearly important, with Hīnayānists seeking mere liberation for themselves and Bodhisattvas seeking Buddhahood for the welfare of

others, motivation alone does not distinguish the two vehicles for Bhāvaviveka; he seems to imply that if the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena were available to *śrāvakas*, they would be capable of achieving Buddhahood. In order to defend the efficacy and purpose of the Mahāyāna scriptures, Bhāvaviveka is therefore willing to disregard or explain away any and all references to the selflessness of phenomena that appear in the Hīnayāna sūtras. It is instructive to note that in the fifth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* he similarly rejects all statements that appear to teach mind-only.

Candrakīrti is less polemical in approach, he is philosophically more consistent, and he is, at least ostensibly, more accommodating to the Hīnayāna. For him, the conception of self, of both persons and phenomena, is the chief obstruction to liberation. Thus, everyone who achieves liberation must realize the subtle selflessness of persons and phenomena, whether that liberation is sought with the Hīnayāna motivation or the Mahāyāna motivation. There is no difference between the objects of the wisdom of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* on the one hand and Bodhisattvas on the other. All who are liberated understand emptiness. Therefore, emptiness must be taught in both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sūtras. Candrakīrti is able to maintain the superiority of the Bodhisattva, however, by explaining that the Bodhisattva's meditation on the selflessness of phenomena is complete. Candrakīrti's position, then, is internally consistent: the conception of inherent existence is the root cause of suffering and its antidote is the wisdom of emptiness. This implies that there can be Mādhyamikas who are also *śrāvakas*, a point made by Tsong-kha-pa. Those Hīnayānist who have understood the selflessness of persons and phenomena are Mādhyamikas because they have abandoned the two extremes of permanence and annihilation.⁸² Indeed, according to Candrakīrti, all of the great Arhats of the past must have been Mādhyamikas! He thus accommodates the followers of the Hīnayāna in his system but with a magnanimity tempered by a certain exclusiveness. Bhāvaviveka is willing to allow the *śrāvakas* the liberation from suffering that is the result of the paths delineated by the Hīnayāna sects. Candrakīrti holds that without understanding the profound emptiness, which is taught only briefly in the Hīnayāna sūtras, liberation is impossible.

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NOTES

¹ The dates of these figures are taken from D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Towards a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School," in L. A. Hercus, et al., ed., *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Canberra, Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 505–530.

² The Tibetan origin of the designations Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is attested to by Tsong-kha-pa in his *Lhag mthong chen mo*, "During the latter propagation [of the dharma] in the Snowy Range [Tibet], scholars created the designations Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika. I do not think that they are fabrications because they accord with the *Prasannapādā*." See *rJe tsong kha pa'i gsung dbu ma'i lta ba'i skor*, Vol. 1 (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press), 1975, p. 16. Among the followers of Bhāvaviveka the Tibetan doxographers 'Jam-dbyang-bzhad-pa and lCang-skya-rol-pa'i-rdo-rje list Avalokitavratā, Jñānagarbha, Śāntaraksita, and Kamalaśīla. Other well-known Prāsaṅgikas are Śāntideva and Atiśa.

³ This question has been dealt with extensively by others. For two recent considerations of the implications of the debate over the use of syllogisms and consequences see David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, pp. 64–66, 76–80) and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publication, 1983), pp. 441–530.

⁴ The Sanskrit is: *yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaram yathā | tathoitpādastathā sthānam tathā bhāṅga udāhram||* See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Commentaire Prasannapādā de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), p. 177. This edition will be referred to in subsequent notes as *Prasannapādā*.

⁵ P 5254, Vol. 95 91.3.6–4.1. In their translation of Mādhyamika texts from Sanskrit, Tibetan translators rendered the term *śvabhāva* in two ways, as *rang bzhin* and as *ngo bo nyid*. The former I translate as "inherent existence" and the latter as "entityness". The formation of the latter neologism is influenced in part by Heidegger's discussion of "the thingness of a thing" in his essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art", where he writes:

"This block of granite, for example, is a mere thing. It is hard, heavy, extended, bulky, shapeless, rough, colored, partly dull, partly shiny. We can take note of all these features in the stone. Thus we acknowledge its characteristics. But still, the traits signify something proper to the stone itself. They are its properties. The thing has them. The thing? What are we thinking of when we now have the thing in mind? Obviously a thing is not merely an aggregate of traits, nor an accumulation of properties by which that aggregate arises. A thing, as everyone thinks he knows, is that around which the properties have assembled. We speak in this connection of the core of things. The Greeks are supposed to have called it *to hupokeimenon*. For them, this core of the thing was something always already there. The characteristics, however, are called *ta sumbebekota*, that which has always turned up already along with the given core and occurs along with it." See Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 22–3.

⁶ With the slight modification of referring to the Buddha as the "Seer of Reality" (*de nyid gzigs pa*) rather than as the "Sun-friend" (*ādityabandhu*), this is a quotation that indeed appears in the *śrāvakayāna*, namely in the *Samyutta-nikāya III*. See *Samyutta*

Nikāya III, edited by M. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, 1960), pp. 141–2. An English translation by F. L. Woodward is available in *The Book of Kindred Sayings III*, Pali Text Society 13 (London: Luzac and Company, 1954), pp. 120–1. The Sanskrit, as quoted by Candrakīrti is: *phenapindopamam rūpam vedanā budbudopamā maricisadrśi samjñā saṃskārāḥ kadalīnibhāḥ māyopamam ca vijñānam uktamādityabandhunā*|| See *Prasannapadā*, p. 41. The verse is also quoted in the *Bodhicittavivarana* (12–13), traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna, an attribution accepted by some (e.g. Lindtner) and disputed by others (e.g. Ruegg).

⁷ P 5253, Vol. 95, 187.4.4–8.

⁸ Vasubandhu says at *Abhidharmakośa*, I.7a, “Conditioned phenomena are the five aggregates, beginning with form.” (*te punaḥ saṃskṛtā dharmā rūpādīskandha-pañcakam*). See P. Pradhan, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu* (Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), p. 4.

⁹ P 5253, Vol. 95, 187.4.8–5.3.

¹⁰ P 5253, Vol. 95, 187.5.3–6.

¹¹ The Sanskrit is: *mametyahamīti kṣīṇe bahirdhādhyātmaeva ca | nirudhyata upādānam tatksayājjanmanaḥ kṣayah || karmakleśakṣayānmokṣa karmakleśā vikalpataḥ | te prapañcātprapañcastu śūnyatāyām nirudhyate*|| See *Prasannapadā*, pp. 349–50.

¹² P 5253, Vol. 95, 224.2.5–4.8. Avalokitavrata’s subcommentary occurs at P 5259, Vol. 97, 199.3.3ff.

¹³ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.4.2–3.

¹⁴ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.4.5–7.

¹⁵ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.4–6.

¹⁶ P 5256, Vol. 96, 66.1.7–8.

¹⁷ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.3.2–5.

¹⁸ The first eight are knowledge of conventionalities (*samvṛtijñāna*), doctrinal knowledge (*dharmajñāna*), subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñāna*), knowledge of suffering (*duḥkhajñāna*), knowledge of origin (*samudayajñāna*), knowledge of cessation (*nirodhajñāna*), knowledge of path (*mārgajñāna*), and knowledge of other minds (*paracittajñāna*).

¹⁹ The Sanskrit is: *anutpādakṣayajñāne bodhiḥ*. See P. Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu* (Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), p. 382.

Translating from Hsuan-tsang’s Chinese translation, Louis de la Vallée Poussin renders the line, “Le *ksayajñāna* avec l’*anutpādajñāna*, c’est la Bodhi” and reconstructs the Sanskrit as *ksayanutpādayor jñānam bodhi*. Hsuan-tsang’s version reverses the order of the two knowledges but reflects the sequence of the ten knowledges found elsewhere in the *Kośa* where *ksayajñāna* is the ninth and *anutpādajñāna* is the tenth. See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, trans., *L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Tome IV (Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1971), p. 282.

²⁰ Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, p. 383.

²¹ See Pradhan, ed., p. 394.

²² The Sanskrit is: *nānutpādakṣayajñāne yathārthe paramārthataḥ | bhrāntivāt savikalpavāt taibodhaḥ kasya taitvataḥ*||. The Sanskrit is provided from V. V. Gokhale and Robert A. F. Thurman’s unpublished edition of the Sanskrit of the fourth chapter of the *Madhyamakahrdaya*, which also includes an edition of the Tibetan of the fourth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* and an English translation of the chapter. Although the

translations from the fourth chapters of the *Madhyamakahrdaya* and the *Tarkajvālā* provided in this article are my own, I have consulted the translation of Gokhale and Thurman from time to time. I am grateful to Professor Thurman for providing me with a copy of the manuscript. It is scheduled to be published by Tokyo University Press in *The Madhyamakahrdaya of Bhāvaviveka*, edited by J. Takasaki.

²³ Cited also by Vasubandhu at *Abhidharmakośa* VI.67a.

²⁴ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.3.5–4.2. 72.4.2 mistakenly reads, “phyin ci log la dmigs pa’i phyir yongs su shes pa gang zhig rig pa dang ldan pa yin zhes bstan to.” It should read *min* or *ma yin*.

²⁵ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.4.2–8.

²⁶ See Étienne Lamotte, “Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism,” in L. Cousins, A. Kunst, K. R. Norman, ed., *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1974), pp. 91–104.

²⁷ Lamotte, pp. 92–3.

²⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁹ Lamotte, p. 94.

³⁰ Lamotte, pp. 94–8.

³¹ Lamotte, p. 100.

³² This explication of the four types of unafflicted ignorance is provided by the first Dalai Lama in his commentary to the expression of worship at the opening of the *Abhidharmakośa*. See dGe-dun-grub, *mDsod tik thar lam gsal byed* (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), pp. 5–6.

³³ See lCang-skya-rol-pa’i rdo rje, *Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po’i mdzes rgyan* (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970), p. 95.

³⁴ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.1–4.

³⁵ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.4–6.

³⁶ This is discussed at length in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* commenting on VI.25ff.

³⁷ P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.3.6–4.2.

³⁸ The Sanskrit as quoted by Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā* (p. 39) is: *anityāśca te saṃskārā utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ | utpadya hi nirudhyante teṣāṃ vyūpaśamah sukhaḥ*||.

³⁹ P 5256, Vol. 96, 27.1.8–27.2.4. This is the autocommentary to *Madhyamakahrdaya*, III.24.

⁴⁰ The Sanskrit is: *na tattvato mahāyāne mārgo sambuddhabodhaye | savikalpani-mi [tta]rvāt saksāl laukikamārgavat*||. The Tibetan translation at P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.1–2 reads: *yang dag tu na theg chen gyi | lam gyis sangs rgyas jang chub dag | sgrub min rtoḡ bcas mtshan bcas min | jig rten pa yi lam bzhin no*||, which can be translated as:

In fact, the enlightenments of Buddhas
Are not achieved by the Mahāyāna path;
It does not have conceptions and signs,
As do worldly paths.

Even if the *min* at the end of the third line is a scribal error for *yin*, as is suggested by the commentary, the two versions are sufficiently different to suggest that the translators of the text from the Sanskrit (the illustrious Atiśa and Tshul-khrims-rgyal-ba) may have worked from another edition than that provided by Gokhale and Thurman.

- ⁴¹ P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.2—3.
⁴² P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.8—73.1.1.
⁴³ P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.3—5.
⁴⁴ This is *Madhyamakahrdaya*, IV.32. The Sanskrit is: *rajvām sarpa iti bhrānter yathā trastasya kasyacit | latākularajujñānam pratipakṣo 'pi jāyate* ||. For the Tibetan, see P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.5—6.
⁴⁵ P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.6—2.1.
⁴⁶ This gloss is provided by Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan in his *Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor* (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Saying Press, 1964), *dbu ma* 33b2.
⁴⁷ P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.2.1—3.4.
⁴⁸ 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya msho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong* (Musoorie, India: Dalama, 1962), ca 68a3—7 and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *dbu* 33a5—b2.
⁴⁹ *Tarkajvālā*, P 5256, Vol. 96, 34.4.5—6.
⁵⁰ P 5256, Vol. 96, 27.3.1—5.7. See also 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, ca, 71b3—4.
⁵¹ *Prasannapadā*, p. 351.
⁵² *Prasannapadā*, pp. 351—2.
⁵³ *Prasannapadā*, p. 353.
⁵⁴ *Prasannapadā*, pp. 352—53.
⁵⁵ Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., *Madhyamakāvātāra par Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), pp. 17, 19. This edition will be referred to in subsequent references as *Madhyamakāvātāra*.
⁵⁶ *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 18.
⁵⁷ *Madhyamakāvātāra*, pp. 19—20.
⁵⁸ Cited at *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 20. The Sanskrit is: *skandhagrāho yāvadasti tāvadevāhamityapi | ahaṃkāre sati punaḥ karma janma tataḥ punaḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Madhyamakāśāstra of Nāgārjuna* (Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1960), p. 298.
⁵⁹ Cited at *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 21. The Sanskrit is: *sukhe samyogatrṣṇaivam naiḥsvābhāvīyātprahīyate | duḥkhe viyogatrṣṇā ca paśyatam muktirityataḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., p. 308.
⁶⁰ Cited at *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 21. The Sanskrit is: *bodhisattvo 'pi drṣtvaivam sambodhau niyato mataḥ | kevalam tvasya kāruṇyādā bodherbhavasamītatīḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., p. 308.
⁶¹ *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 22.
⁶² Cited at *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 23. The Sanskrit is: *na bodhisattvaprañidhirna caryāpariṇāmanā | utkāḥ śrāvakayāne 'smādbodhisattvaḥ kutastataḥ || bodhicaryāpratīṣṭhārtham na sūtre bhāṣitam vacaḥ | bhāṣitam ca mahāyāne grāhyamarumādīvacakṣanaiḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., p. 310.
⁶³ The Sanskrit of the stanza from the *Lokāitastava* is: *animittam anāgamya mokṣo nāsti tvam uktaḥ | atas tvayā mahāyāne tat sākalyena deśitam* || For Sanskrit and Tibetan editions of the text as well as an English translation, see Christian Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982), pp. 128—139. The entire passage translated is found at *Madhyamakāvātāra*, pp. 22—3.
⁶⁴ This point is made by Tsong-kha-pa in his commentary to the *Madhyamakāvātāra*. See his *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Saying Press, 1973),

- pp. 65—67. Tsong-kha-pa also takes up the question of whether *śrāvakas* understand emptiness in his *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), pp. 152—55. Tsong-kha-pa's commentary on the first five chapters of the *Madhyamakāvātāra* has been translated by Jeffrey Hopkins in *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (Valois, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1980), pp. 93—230. Tsong-kha-pa's *Legs bshad snying po* has been translated by Robert A. F. Thurman in *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the "Essence of True Eloquence"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
⁶⁵ P 5265, Vol. 98, 182.4.3.
⁶⁶ *Madhyamakāvātāra*, pp. 301—2.
⁶⁷ Tsong-kha-pa provides an explanation of what it means for *śrāvakas* to have a complete understanding of the selflessness of phenomena while not meditating on that selflessness completely at *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, pp. 67—8.
⁶⁸ *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 253.
⁶⁹ *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 264.
⁷⁰ Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *dbu*, 33a3—8.
⁷¹ *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 393. Candrakīrti does not explicitly equate the latent afflictions with the obstructions to omniscience as 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa suggests. The latent afflictions that Candrakīrti discusses here seem quite close to those described by Lamotte. Candrakīrti even mentions the Arhat, formerly a monkey, who jumps about in trees.
⁷² See Lindtner, p. 11. The most controversial among his list is probably the *Bodhicittavivarāṇa*, which Ruegg (*The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, pp. 104—5) ascribes to Nāgārjuna II.
⁷³ ICang-skya-rol-pa'i rdo-rje, p. 285.
⁷⁴ See Lindtner, p. 206. Also cited by Tsong-kha-pa, *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, pp. 62—3. Whether ascribable to Nāgārjuna or not, the same point is made in the *Dharmadhātustava* (1) which says:

Obeisance to the *dharmadhātu*
 That abides definitely in all beings;
 When it is not thoroughly known
 One revolves in the three existences.

See P 2010, Vol. 46, 31.3.7—8. For a study of this text, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Le Dharmadhātustava de Nāgārjuna," *Études Tibétaines dédiées à la Mémoire de Marcelle Lalou* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1971), pp. 448—471.

⁷⁵ The Sanskrit is: *vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate | paramārthamanāgamya nirvānam nādhigamyate* ||. See *Prasannapadā*, p. 494.

⁷⁶ See Lindtner, p. 102.

⁷⁷ P 5265, Vol. 98, 173.1.1—3.

⁷⁸ See Lindtner, p. 140.

⁷⁹ See Lindtner, p. 188.

⁸⁰ *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, p. 62.

⁸¹ Tsong-kha-pa identifies the "us" as Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas and says that it does not refer to all followers of the Hīnayāna. See his *rTsa shes tik chen / dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), p. 323.

⁸² Tsong-kha-pa, *rTsa shes tik chen*, p. 323.

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THE PRASAṄGIKAS' VIEWS ON LOGIC:
TIBETAN DGE LUGS PA EXEGESIS ON
THE QUESTION OF SVATANTRAS¹

One of the most important and most complex topics in the Mādhyamika curriculum of the great monastic universities of Tibet dealt with the Prasāṅgika critique of the *svatantra* form of reasoning, a type of syllogism which the Prasāṅgika school considered to be incompatible with the tenets of the Mādhyamika but which was adhered to by another branch of that same school that eventually came to be called by that very name, the Svatantrikas. Following the Indian exegesis based on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (III, 2),² the Tibetan analysis focuses the discussion on the nature of the subjects of syllogisms and of the *pramāṇas*, the valid forms of knowledge, that perceived them. Specifically it had to do with whether the subjects of the syllogisms used by Mādhyamika appeared in the same way to the Mādhyamika proponents of the syllogisms as they did to those realists to whom the syllogisms were directed (*chos can mthun snang*). The remarks that follow are based on the Tibetan dGe lugs pa exegesis on this subject, in many ways the most extensive and detailed treatment of these questions in the corpus of Buddhist literature.

We will come back to the specific question of the *svatantra* presently but first it is worth mentioning that the issue has tremendous implications to a consideration of the Mādhyamika's views on ontology, epistemology and logic. Before proceeding to our main subject, therefore, it is appropriate to turn our attention to the context in which this discussion takes place. In the *sTong thun chen mo* of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang we find that the subject is introduced by first considering whether or not the Prasāṅgikas have any philosophical positions of their own. mKhas grub rje presents the position of an opponent as follows:

The Prasāṅgika Mādhyamika have no position of their own, no beliefs and nothing at all that they accept. Were they to have such beliefs then they would also have to accept such things as the syllogisms (*gtan tshigs*) which prove the beliefs of their own system, logical examples and so forth. Were *that* so, they would essentially become Svatantrikas.³

The opponent here is claiming that the Prasaṅgikas hold no philosophical positions⁴ and that if they did they would essentially become Svatantrikas because they would have to rely on the use of syllogistic reasoning to establish these positions, the implication being that in the Mādhyamika school only Svatantrikas use syllogisms.⁵ The opponent here is operating under the faulty assumption that all syllogisms are *svatantras*. He then reasons as follows: if all syllogisms are *svatantras* and Prasaṅgikas reject the latter, they must also reject the former, in other words they must also reject syllogistic reasoning and logic *in general*. Syllogisms are the instruments that prove or establish the tenets of any system. If Prasaṅgikas repudiate syllogistic reasoning they could have no beliefs of their own since they could have no tools with which to establish these beliefs. Hence, concludes the opponent, the Prasaṅgikas have no system of tenets, no beliefs. The opponent further claims that whatever logical constructs a Prasaṅgika may employ and whatever views they may seem to set forth:

... are carried out for the sake of confronting others, without it being a reflection of the Prasaṅgika's own system.⁶

Given the dGe lugs pa penchant for logical methodology, an outcome of the fact that much of their work is directed at creating a synthesis of the traditions of the Mādhyamikas and Prasaṅgikas, it is scarcely surprising that mKhas grub rje finds this viewpoint anathema to his enterprise. What is most interesting, however, is that he considers the source of the error to lie in erroneous ontological presuppositions, in the fact that the opponent advocates the infamous *yod min med min gyi lta ba*, an interpretation of the Mādhyamika in which emptiness is considered a middle ground between existence and non-existence. Of course for mKhas grub rje, who is a staunch advocate of the principle of the excluded middle, there is no middle ground between existence and non-existence. If the existence of something is repudiated it is a tacit affirmation of its non-existence and vice versa. For mKhas grub rje the idea that things are neither existent nor non-existent is at best nonsensical and at worst nihilistic. He says in this regard:

Those who make such claims (that the Prasaṅgikas repudiate reasoning and have no

tenets of their own) have, as I have mentioned before, misapprehended the extent of what is to be refuted. Hence they think that the reasoning of the Prasaṅgika Mādhyamikas is refuting all phenomena. Once they have refuted everything, seeing that all of their arguments can be used to refute what they themselves believe, they discard the notion that all of those absurdities urged on others are applicable to themselves. But when such absurdities *are* urged on them, being totally unaware of how to avert such arguments (when turned against them), their one last hope is to say "We accept nothing."⁷

What mKhas grub rje is saying is that the logical skepticism of this opponent (his view that the Prasaṅgikas accept nothing and repudiate syllogistic logic) is a corollary of his ontological nihilism (his view that the Prasaṅgika critique is a critique of the existence of all phenomena). Put in another way, mKhas grub rje is saying that this brand of logical skepticism is the last refuge of the ontological nihilist, who, realizing that his own faulty arguments will soon be turned against him, attempts to immunize himself from logical fault by declaring himself to have no position, appending the disclaimer that any logic he *has* used was employed only in confrontation with his challenger and not because he himself ascribed to the validity of reasoning (syllogistic or otherwise).

What I find fascinating about mKhas grub rje's analysis (and I ought to mention that this is a theme that we find repeated throughout the *sTong thun chen mo*) is his connection of ontological, logical, epistemological and soteriological forms of skepticism or nihilism. For mKhas grub rje the *yod min med min* view, which he characterizes as "refuting all phenomena", i.e., as ontological nihilism, the view that the Prasaṅgikas repudiate syllogistic reasoning — a form of logical skepticism, the view that they repudiate the notion of *pramāṇa* — a form of epistemological skepticism, and the view that in meditation the mind is to be emptied of all thought, the infamous Hva shan view and a form of soteriological nihilism,⁸ according to mKhas grub rje, are just different sides of the same coin (or more appropriately the same four-sided pyramid). Each of these positions he sees as not only being tied to each other historically but as being corollaries of each other in the logical sphere as well. All of this by way of contextualization; let us return to our main topic, the discussion of the *svatantra*.

We saw that mKhas grub rje's first opponent held the position that all syllogisms were *svatantric* in nature and that since Prasaṅgikas

Bones: The Conception of a Relic in the Inscriptions of Nāgārjunikoṇḍa", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 108 (1988) 527–37.

⁸² J. Marshall, *Taxila. An Illustrated Account of Archaeological Excavations carried out at Taxila under the Orders of the Government of India between the Years 1913 and 1934* (Cambridge: 1951) Vol. I, 275.

⁸³ Marshall, *Taxila*, Vol. I, 315, 316, 317, 318, etc.

⁸⁴ Marshall, *Taxila*, Vol. I, 365.

⁸⁵ J. Ph. Vogel, "Excavations at Kasiā", *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1906–07* (Calcutta: 1909) 44–67, esp. 48–49.

⁸⁶ Marshall et al., *The Bagh Caves in the Gwalior State*, 27–28.

⁸⁷ M. K. Dhavalikar, *Late Hinayana Caves of Western India* (Poona: 1984) 79; 3.

Dhavalikar uses here and elsewhere "Hīnayāna" to refer to 'early' caves and "Mahāyāna" to refer to the 'later' caves. I have avoided these sectarian usages in the belief that their accuracy has yet to be fully demonstrated.

⁸⁸ M. K. Dhavalikar, "Evolution of the Buddhist Rock-cut Shrines of Western India", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay* 45/46 (1970/71) 50–61, esp. 53; see also M. K. Dhavalikar, "The Beginnings of Mahayana Architecture at Ajanta", in *Madhu. Recent Researches in Indian Archeology and Art History*. Shri M. N. Deshpande *Festschrift*, ed. M. S. Nagaraja Rao (Delhi: 1981) 131–38.

⁸⁹ A. Ghosh, ed., *Indian Archaeology 1954–55 – A Review* (New Delhi: 1955) 24–26, esp. fig. 6.

⁹⁰ D. Mitra, *Ratnagiri* (1958–61) (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, 80) (New Delhi: 1981) Vol. I, 152 ff; esp. fig. 8. It should, perhaps, be noted that the central cell in the back wall of cave II at Bagh houses a *stūpa*, not an image. This, however, may only represent a formal, not a conceptual difference in the articulation of the sense of the Buddha's presence — see n. 81 above. The question needs, at the least, further study.

⁹¹ Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Śayanāsanavastu and the Adhikaraṇavastu*, 10.20 ff.

⁹² That constructional activity at Buddhist monastic sites was under the supervision of specifically designated monks is clear from both literary and inscriptional sources; see M. Njammasch, "Der *navakammika* und seine Stellung in der Hierarchie der buddhistischen Klöster", *Altorientalische Forschungen* 1 (1974) 279–93; for the construction of the *gandhakuṭi* at Śrāvastī in Pāli sources see B. Fausbøll, *The Jataka* (London: 1877) Vol. I, 92.21 (*so majjhe dasabalassa gandhakuṭim kāresi*).

⁹³ J. H. Marshall, "Excavations at Sahēth-Mahēth" *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1910–11* (Calcutta: 1914) 11–12, and pl. VIa; see also D. R. Sahnī, "A Buddhist Image Inscription from Śrāvastī", *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1908–09* (Calcutta: 1912) 133–38.

⁹⁴ Marshall, "Excavations at Sahēth-Mahēth", 12, and pl. VIb.

⁹⁵ Marshall et al., *The Monuments of Sāncī*, Vol. I, 47–49.

⁹⁶ Marshall & Konow, "Excavations at Sārnāth, 1908", 68, etc.

⁹⁷ A. Ghosh, ed., *Indian Archaeology 1962–63 – A Review* (New Delhi: 1965) 97, 107; cf. M. C. Joshi, "Studies in Early Indian Art in Uttar Pradesh and Neighbouring Areas: Summary and Suggestions", in *Archaeology and History. Essays in Memory of Shri A. Ghosh*, ed. B. M. Pande and B. D. Chattopadhyaya (Delhi: 1987) Vol. II, 495–506, esp. 501 and pl. 134.

⁹⁸ Marshall et al., *The Monuments of Sāncī*, 47.

⁹⁹ The above remarks should not be taken to imply that all "images" found in *stūpas* are to be interpreted in this way. There are some instances where other ideas — although not unrelated — appear to be intended. See, for example, the carefully arranged set of images found in the core of the main *stūpa* at Devnimori (R. N. Mehta & S. N. Chowdhary, *Excavation at Devnimori (A Report of the Excavation conducted from 1960 to 1963)* (Baroda: 1966) 49ff.).

¹⁰⁰ See as a sampling for the aspects which have most concerned us here: A. B. Keith, "The Personality of an Idol", *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, 3rd series, 7 (1925) 255–57; J. N. Banerjea, *The Development of Hindu Iconography* (Calcutta: 1956) esp. 36–107 G.-D. Sontheimer, "Religious Endowments in India: The Juristic Personality of Hindu Deities", *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* 67 (1965) 44–100; J. D. M. Derrett, "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments", in *South Asian Politics and Religion*, ed. D. E. Smith (Princeton: 1966) 311–36; H. von Stietencron, "Orthodox Attitudes Towards Temple Service and Image Worship in Ancient India", *Central Asiatic Journal* 21 (1971) 126–38; D. L. Eck, *Darśan. Seeing the Divine Image in India* 2nd, rev. ed. (Chambersburg: 1985).

¹⁰¹ J. Takakusu, trans., *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* 176–77.

¹⁰² J. May, "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste", *Asiatische Studien/Études asiatiques* 25 (1971) 256–323, esp. 298.

repudiate the latter they must also repudiate syllogistic reasoning and logic in general. Another opponent is characterized as follows:

Even Prasaṅgikas accept *svatantra* syllogistic reasoning (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*) because they accept tri-modal syllogistic reasoning (*tshul gsum pa'i rtags*) which proves a specific quality (*khyad par kyi chos*) of a certain subject (*chos can*) that is established by the *pramāṇas* of both the proponent (of the syllogism) and the opponent (to whom it is posited).⁹

This second opponent shares one presupposition with the first, namely that all syllogisms are *svatantra* forms of syllogisms, but realizing that it would be absurd to deny the Prasaṅgikas' use of logic, he maintains instead that since Prasaṅgikas accept syllogistic reasoning they must also accept *svatantras*.

Both views, of course, are, in the opinion of the dGe lugs pa exegetes, faulty, the source of their fault lying in their common presupposition that all syllogisms are *svatantric* in nature. mKhas grub rje's belief is that Prasaṅgikas accept tri-modal syllogistic reasoning (*tshul gsum pa'i rtags*) but not of the *svatantra* variety. What then characterizes a syllogism as being a *svatantra*? mKhas grub rje states:

... when positing a *svatantra* position or logical reason it is not enough that both the proponent and the opponent establish, by means of a *pramāṇa*, the subject of the inquiry (*shes 'dod chos can*) which is the basis upon which a predicate is posited. Instead, it is absolutely necessary that (the subject) be established compatibly (*mithun snang du*).¹⁰

But what does it mean to be "established compatibly"? To put it simply it means this. Prasaṅgikas have a different notion of entities than do Realists. When they posit a syllogism to a Realist they understand that the subject of the syllogism (and indeed all of its parts, including the tri-modal relations) are not subjects that exist inherently. Despite this fact Prasaṅgikas believe that entities appear to the consciousness of every sentient being (*pramāṇas* or otherwise) to exist as if they *were* real and independent. Hence they realize that the *pramāṇa* which perceives the subject of a syllogism is erroneous (*'khrul pa*). This is of course not the case with the Realists, for whom:

... all *pramāṇas* are believed to be valid in regard to subjects that exist by virtue of their own characteristic. In their system all *pramāṇas* are forms of consciousness that are non-erroneous in regard to their objects; it is believed that if the subject of a syllogism is established by a *pramāṇa*, then that very subject must be an object which is found (*rnyed don*) by the *pramāṇa*.¹¹

Therefore, according to mKhas grub rje, a *svatantra* is a syllogism in which the subject is "established compatibly" in the system of both the proponent and opponent where both parties consider it to be the object perceived by a *pramāṇa* that is non-erroneous in regard to the ontological status of the object. In other words, it is a syllogism in which both parties consider the subject to be a real independent entity that is verified as such by a non-erroneous *pramāṇa*. Since this is inconsistent with the Prasaṅgika view that (a) no such entity exists and that (b) any consciousness to which an entity appears in this way must be erroneous, *svatantra* forms of syllogistic reasoning are unacceptable to this school.

This does not mean, however, that Prasaṅgikas repudiate syllogistic reasoning in general. Instead they employ a form of syllogism known as "inference based on what is renowned to another" (*gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag*)¹² which mKhas grub rje defines as:

... a syllogistic reason in which the subject, though not perceived by *pramāṇa* in a way that is compatible to both the proponent and opponent, is nonetheless perceived by a *pramāṇa* in the system of the proponent and by a *pramāṇa* in the system of the opponent and which is posited (by the proponent) while "feigning the acceptance" (*'khris nas*) of what the opponent believes in his/her system as regards the perception of the subject by a *pramāṇa*.¹³

That is to say that in an "inference based on what is renowned to another" the Prasaṅgika proponent will feign acceptance of the opponent's notion of the nature of the subject and of the *pramāṇa* which perceives it, all the time realizing that his/her own notion is completely different, i.e., incompatible, with the opponent's. But despite the incompatibility of the way in which the subject exists and in the way in which the *pramāṇa* which perceives it functions, an "inference based on what is renowned to another" is nonetheless a valid tri-modal syllogism. In this way, mKhas grub rje demonstrates that not all syllogistic reasoning is *svatantric* in nature, that there does in fact exist a form of such reasoning that is compatible with Prasaṅgika Mādhyamika tenets and therefore that the latter do not repudiate logic in general.

Whether or not mKhas grub rje's analysis is truly representative of the Indian Mādhyamika tradition to which he claims to be heir is a question that this paper does not seek to answer. What is far more interesting to me is *the fact that* mKhas grub rje (and his teacher

Tsong kha pa) interpret the repudiation of the *svatantra* as they do. Throughout, they view their efforts as an attempt to set straight the score concerning the Prasaṅgika's views on logic, which, as we have seen, is part of a more general campaign, that of upholding the validity of rationality (the possibility of valid knowledge), language (its ability to describe reality) and logical principles (such as that of the excluded middle). Whether or not the dGe lugs pas succeed in their endeavor is also a question that has yet to be answered. That it is a stance to be reckoned with in any treatment of the Mādhyamikas' views on logic is an indisputable fact.

NOTES

¹ An earlier version of their paper was presented at a panel entitled 'Nāgārjuna and His Successors: Perspectives on "Middleism"' at the 15th annual conference on South Asia at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Thanks must go to Professor Roger Jackson of Fairfield University, the discussant, and especially to Professor Geshe Sopa of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the organizer of the panel, who made the opportunity for a very lively exchange of ideas possible.

² Peking edition of the *bsTan 'gyur* [Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitika Research Institute, 1957] (hereafter cited as P), *dBu ma tsa*, folio 4a; this is of course commented on by Buddhapālita, *ibid.* folio 197b, by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā*, L. de la Vallée Poussin edition [Bibliotheca Buddhica IV], pp. 34 passim. sDe dge edition [Tokyo: Faculty of Letters of the University of Tokyo, 1978] *dBu ma 'a*, folio 11a. The general discussion of the issue in the *Prasannapadā* however begins earlier (Sanskrit p. 29, Tibetan folio 9a) with a discussion of the compatibility of the subject of a syllogism based on the renowned example of the "impermanence of sound". There is however another extensive discussion on the meaning of *svatantra* reasoning in the *Prasannapadā* in its extensive commentary to the first verse of the *Kārikās* (Sanskrit p. 14, Tibetan folio 5b). This is the renowned passage in which Candrakīrti refutes Bhāvaviveka's attack of Buddhapālita's methodology. It is commented upon extensively in the *sTong thun chen mo* of mKhas grub rje (see note 3) on pp. 340–358.

³ mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang, *sTong thun chen mo* in *Mādhyamika Text Series* Vol. 1, [New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin, 1972], p. 294 (all page numbers refer to the Arabic enumeration of the folios of the text).

⁴ Nor are such opponents a thing of the past. This is, for example, the stance taken by Mervyn Sprung in his 'Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna: The Origins and Issue of Skepticism' [*Revelation in Indian Thought*, edited by H. Coward and K. Sivaraman (California: Dharma, 1977):

Buddhi, the ratiocinative faculty, is as subject to the kleśas as character and motives (*saṃskāras*) are. The Mādhyamikas' attack on all theories, all ways of looking at things, all perspectives, as the key to removing the kleśas, follows from this. (p. 165)

And also:

... Mādhyamika sets out, as is well known, to undermine not only all philosophies and all ideologies but every last category and concept constituting the everyday world on which the philosophies and ideologies are founded. (p. 165)

Nor is Mr. Sprung alone; for a detailed discussion of this view in the Western academic literature see 'Dzong kha pa and Modern Interpreters II: Negating Too Much', Chapter Five of E. S. Napper's *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* [University of Virginia: Ph.D. Dissertation, 1985], pp. 159–193. See also my *A Buddhist Philosophy of Language and Its Culmination in Tibetan Mādhyamika Thought* [University of Wisconsin: Ph.D. Dissertation, 1987].

⁵ This also seems to be the view of D. S. Ruegg in his 'The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuskoti and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism' [*Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1977), pp. 8–9] and also throughout his 'On Thesis and Assertion in the Mādhyamika/dBu ma' [in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, editors, *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Philosophy* (Vienna: Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, 1983)] (see especially pp. 224–225 and 234–236).

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 295.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

⁸ To what extent these views were, individually or collectively, held by historical personages is an extremely difficult question to answer and one which is, in any case, beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to D. S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Mādhyamika School of Philosophy in India* [Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1981] and to the 'Introduction' of R. A. F. Thurman's *Essence of True Eloquence* [Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984]. See also Paul Williams' 'rMa bya pa byang chub brtson'grus on Madhyamaka Method' [*Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 (1985), pp. 205–225].

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 313.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 316–317. He then goes on to state that not only must the subject of the syllogism be established in this way but that indeed so must all of the other parts of the syllogism including the tri-modal criteria.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 317–318.

¹² *Paraprasiddha* or *Parasiddha (anumāna)* — see, for example, the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin [Bibliotheca Buddhica IV], pp. 34–35 and 272.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 318.

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THE CONCEPT OF CONTRADICTION IN INDIAN LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

I

The concept of contradiction in Indian philosophy raises some interesting logical and epistemological problems, which, though not left unnoticed by Indian philosophers, have not received adequate emphasis from modern interpreters. The English term 'contradiction', in the wider sense of incompatibility, finds its approximate Sanskrit equivalent in *virodha*.¹ The term *virodha*, however, as it is understood by Udayana in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, carries the sense of absolute opposition, which involves the operation of the Law of Excluded Middle. This sense of *virodha* is brought out by Udayana in the following well-known verse:

parasparavirodhe hi na prakārantarasthitih /
naikatāpi viruddhānām uktimātravirodhataḥ //
(Nk 3/8)

[In the case of mutual contradiction there is no third alternative. There is also no identity of the contradictories, for the contradiction is apparent on the very face of assertions.]

The two contradictories 'A is B' and 'A is not-B' present such a contradiction. Without factually ascertaining which one is true and which false we can at once logically intuit that one is true and the other false and that both cannot be true or both false, because B and not-B together exhaust the whole universe of discourse leaving no third alternative.² To sense this contradiction we need not even go for the concrete value of B. The same thing is apparent if we even give a value of B, say 'cow', wherewith we get the two propositions, 'A is cow' and 'A is not-cow'. There is no doubt that the question of truth or falsity ultimately bears a factual reference. Yet our immediate frame of reference does not necessarily include any ascertainment as to which one of the propositions corresponds to fact and which does not.

WAS THE BUDDHA A BUDDHA?

Tilman Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramānavārtika*. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Prāmaṇasiddhi-Kapitel. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 12, Wien 1984. Price: ÖS 230, —. To be ordered from Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Maria Theresien-Strasse 3/4/26, A-1090 Wien, Austria.

The four noble truths may be considered not only as the starting point of Buddhist philosophy, but also as a conceptual framework within which almost all Buddhist philosophical theories may be subsumed. The truth of suffering may include all theories answering the question what the world is in general and living beings (especially humans) in particular. The truth of the arising of suffering may include the theories of causality. The truth of the cessation of suffering may include theories of the absolute, that is, of Nirvana, of Buddhahood, of *tathatā*, etc. And the fourth truth may include theories of practice, especially ethics and theories of meditation. These are, roughly speaking, the traditional themes dealt with by Buddhist philosophers. However, it is less than obvious whether, and if so how, the Buddhist *pramāṇa*-school, which deals mainly with epistemological and logical problems, is to be related to this conceptual framework; all the more so as Dignāga, the founder of the school, as well as all the other logicians who came after him, did not recognize scripture or authoritative verbal communication (*āgama, śabda*) as an independent means of knowledge.


In a short but most edifying case-history Professor Steinkellner pointed out that the majority of modern scholars who dealt with the

spiritual place of epistemology and logic in the Buddhist tradition may be classified under two categories: Those, like Conze, who stressed the practical and religious ideas of Buddhism, and considered the epistemological tradition as a deplorable distortion and corruption of the basic Buddhist values; and those, like Stcherbatsky, who considered the epistemological tradition as the greatest achievement of Indian philosophy, but who equally considered it as un-Buddhistic in its spirit¹. "The assumption common to all these approaches", concludes Steinkellner "is that the epistemological tradition presents an essential deviation from the spirit of Buddhism. And the methodical fault common to all these approaches is that none of them raises the question of the tradition's self-understanding."²

However, Steinkellner notes one important exception to these approaches, namely, that of Professor Vetter, who gave a "fully acceptable" explanation of this relationship in his *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*.³ Surprisingly enough, Vetter's explanation has been ignored by the vast majority of scholars, and it is indeed disconcerting to observe that a book by a well-known and respected scholar, which was published in the well-known and easily available series of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, remains largely unknown; especially as Vetter's book is, to the best of my knowledge, the one and only monograph on Dharmakīrti in any European language. Partly it is no doubt due to the fact that it was not written in English, and it might serve as an alarming indicator that German is becoming something of an esoteric language⁴. Partly it is also due to the extremely condensed style of the book which makes its reading an arduous task. Whatever the case may be, I sincerely hope that the book under discussion here will not share the fate of its predecessor, and will draw the attention it deserves as a major contribution towards the understanding of Dharmakīrti's Buddhism.

The relation between the *pramāṇa* theory and Buddhist spirituality was laconically stated by Dignāga in the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and in the *Vṛtti* thereon. It consists of five epithets of the Buddha which stand in causal relation to each other. These are usually represented in the following scheme:⁵

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It should be noted, however, that this scheme, albeit correct, is incomplete; for it fails to account for the relation among the four last epithets (*jagaddhitaṣṭitā* etc.), as well as the relation between perfection in cause and perfection in effect. (Are they cause and effect of each other, or of a third and even fourth party?) Dharmakīrti, who raised the question, claimed that each of the four is a necessary condition for the next one (i.e., *jagaddhitaṣṭitā* → *śāstrīva* → *sugatatva* → *tāyitva*), and this enables him to infer the epithets from each other in the following order: Because the Buddha is a protector (as is evident from his revealing of the four noble truths), he is *sugata* (the root *gam* is interpreted as "to know", and together with the three meanings of *su-* it means that the Buddha's knowledge is true, lasting and complete); because he is *sugata* (i.e., because he has far more knowledge than what is necessary for a simple *arhat*), he is a teacher; because he is a teacher (i.e., because he exerts himself for the sake of others), he is full of compassion, that is, seeking the benefit of all living beings. And because of all four taken together the Buddha is a means of valid cognition or authority.⁶ Note, however, that this inference does not account for the complexity of relations among the four terms; as far as the Buddha's motivation is concerned, Dharmakīrti construes them in a different order: Because the Buddha is full of compassion he wants to become a protector, and the best way to become a protector is to

become a teacher, but in order to become a teacher one has first to experience the way and its result (i.e., to become *sugata*).

None of these interpretations seems particularly faithful to Dignāga. Unfortunately, however, we do not have any other commentatorial tradition except Dharmakīrti's, and, therefore, in order to understand Dignāga we should better look at his predecessors rather than his successors, for at least one could determine the direction from which his thought developed. One important passage which seems to bear directly on our subject matter here is found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣā* on 7.34, where Vasubandhu explains the similarities and dissimilarities among the different Buddhas. The similarities consist in the accumulation of all merit and knowledge, in having the *dharmakāya* and in being helpful to all living beings. These three are called perfection in cause, perfection in effect and perfection in means (*hetu-, phala-, upakārasampat*)⁷. Dignāga seems to have had this passage in mind while composing his *maṅgalaśloka*, although he uses the terms in a different sense and one to one relationship of the sub-divisions is difficult, not to say impossible, to establish. In any case the epithet *pramāṇabhūta* could correspond to perfection in means which is explained by Vasubandhu as perfection in liberating from the three bad destinies and from the suffering of *saṃsāra*, or, alternatively, in putting people in the three *yānas* (i.e., *śrāvakayāna* etc.) and in good destinies. As far as the term *pramāṇabhūta* itself is concerned, it could have been borrowed from the *Mahābhāṣya* where Pāṇini is thus called⁸. This could hint at Dignāga's aspiration to grant his epistemology the status of the highly respected science of *Vyākaraṇa*, and further perhaps to establish an epistemology which would be acceptable to, and used by different philosophical schools, just as is the case with grammar. But I shall leave the matter at that because Vetter's book is not about Dignāga, but about Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga, which is, as usual, something completely different.

The book consists of a most interesting, daring and intriguing introduction (pp. 13–35) and a translation of verses 131cd–285 of the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter⁹. Vetter's view of Dharmakīrti's view of the Buddha's career may be summarized as follows. There was a person who practiced compassion for a long time during many lives. None of the other perfections (*pāramitā*) known from Mahāyāna texts

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is mentioned by Dharmakīrti, and, therefore, he considered that compassion alone is necessary for becoming a Buddha. The best way to help someone in the long run is to become his teacher. A good teacher has first to experience for himself what he teaches, and that is why the Buddha undertakes the necessary steps towards liberation, although he is not interested in liberating himself but only in liberating others. The Buddha already knew from tradition (*āgama*) and argumentation (*yukti*) that suffering has a cause, that this cause is not eternal, and that it is absent where the apprehension of Self, desire, etc., are absent; he also knew that their opposite (i.e., the apprehension of Selflessness etc.) had to be practiced in order to destroy them. However, he had to employ different methods in order to find out the best way for his purpose. He practiced many different methods for a long time, understood their advantages and shortcomings, and realized that the only definitive way to realize his aim is the apprehension of Selflessness (*nairātmyadarśana*). From this interpretation of the first three predicates Vetter reaches the conclusion that Dharmakīrti's Buddhism is unique of its kind (p. 19):

Bei der Erörterung des Prädikats 'das Heil der Welt suchend' war zu sehen, dass Dharmakīrti beim historischen Buddha keinen Mahāyāna-Weg zum Ziel der Buddhaschaft vor Augen hat und ebensowenig ein Bodhisattva-Ideal, dem möglichst viele zu folgen hätten. Auch diejenige Richtung des Hinayāna, welche das Erscheinen des historischen Buddha als die Manifestation einer höheren Macht interpretiert — der sogenannte Lokottaravāda —, war auszuschliessen. Dharmakīrti ist auch nicht ohne weiteres der breiten Hinayāna-Tradition zuzurechnen, zu der auch der Pāli-Kanon gehört. Entgegen diesem breiten Strom behauptet Dharmakīrti nämlich, dass der Buddha für sich selbst keine Erlösung suchte; er suchte die Erlösung nur, weil er in dieser wichtigen Sache gut Bescheid wissen musste, um anderen helfen zu können. Entgegen vielen Texten dieser breiten Tradition war der Inhalt seiner Lehre auch nicht das Ergebnis einer einmaligen Erleuchtung (*bodhi*). Nebenbei sei bemerkt, dass der bei uns gebräuchliche Name Buddha (der Erleuchtete oder Erwachte) von Dharmakīrti nie verwendet wird. Die wichtigsten Elemente der Lehre waren dem Buddha von der Überlieferung angeboten und von seinem Nachdenken gebilligt oder verbessert worden . . .

It seems to me, however, that Vetter's interpretation is improbable, for in the final analysis it would leave no room for the Buddha to innovate anything, not even to improve a previously existing way to liberation. According to Dharmakīrti the practice of apprehension of Selflessness is not only the best way to Nirvana, it is also the only way. And if it is

accepted by tradition that certain persons reached liberation before the Buddha, it follows that they also reached it by practicing the very same method. This, however, implies that they also knew and understood its presuppositions, such as the five *skandhas* being suffering, etc. The only thing left for the Buddha to do was to give his approval to a way with the discovery of which he had nothing to do. In other words, not only are the four noble truths not originally discovered by the Buddha, they were not even rediscovered by him. Though it is not explicitly stated, I think Vetter will actually accept this conclusion in some form or another, as he says (p. 18): "Der Buddha wusste zwar durch *Āgama* und Argumentation (*yukti*), dass das Leid eine Ursache hat, und dass diese Ursache keine ewige Natur hat (132c–133b, vgl. 179) . . . und was die Ursache ist (132c–134, vgl. 183–185) . . . er wusste damit auch, dass die Gegensätze zu diesen Fehlern zu üben seien." Such a belittling of the Buddha seems odd, but before pronouncing any judgement on it one should, of course, ask what Vetter adduces as evidence for it. As far as I can see, his evidence amounts to one single word — *Āgama* — in v. 132: *yuktyāgamābhyām vimṛśan duḥkhaḥetum parikṣate* / "Reflecting with [the help of] reason and tradition he examines the cause of suffering." Vetter, however, translates as follows: "Forschend mit Hilfe von Argumentation und Überlieferung stellt er die Ursache des Leides fest." Of course, there is some difference whether one examines something with the help of tradition or whether one determines something with the help of tradition. And obviously the role of tradition is strengthened under the latter alternative. However, the rendering of *parikṣate* with "stellt fest" is very strange; as far as my reading experience goes, I never saw it used that way, and none of the dictionaries available to me (I checked the *MW*, *PW*, *Apte* and *Renou*) glosses the word in this meaning. I do not doubt for a minute that Vetter knows what the verb usually means, and, therefore, I fail to understand why — if he wanted to convince us that Dharmakīrti uses the verb in this highly unusual meaning — he did not adduce some evidence for it, or add a few words of explanation¹⁰. Failing that, one could suspect that Vetter twists the text to support his theory.

But even if we assume, at least for the sake of argument, that Vetter is correct in his translation, this would still not be enough for his far-

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reaching conclusions. For Dharmakīrti does not say that the four noble truths are a part of the tradition referred to in the verse; as a matter of fact he does not say anything about the content of this tradition. Moreover, I must admit that I do not know what Vetter means by tradition (or rather the tradition, since he uses the definite article). Does it mean that the four noble truths were common knowledge, at least among certain groups of renouncers? If so, how is this compatible with the epithet *pramāṇabhūta*? For one of Dharmakīrti's criteria for being a *pramāṇa* is to reveal something which was not previously known (*ajñātārthaprakāśa*).^{10a} Or should we assume that we deal with a secret tradition which was made public by the Buddha? Should we connect this tradition with the ancient belief, found already in the Pāli canon, that there were other Buddhas before the historical Buddha? Is it possible that the term "tradition" refers to non-Buddhist tradition? Could it refer to the theories of the teachers of the Buddha, or to other theories (such as the *śāśvatavāda* and the *ucchedavāda* or all the other theories which appear in the *Brahmajālasutta*) which were rejected by the Buddha as too extreme, dangerous, or inappropriate? Couldn't it be that Dharmakīrti used *yuktyāgama* as a ready-made expression without taking into account all its implications? Finally, is it not possible (or even likely) that the subject of this verse is not the Buddha? Dharmakīrti's laconicism does seem to leave room for more than one interpretation.

Furthermore, there is another problem which immediately arises in this context: One of the things which distinguish a Buddha from a simple Arhat is that a Buddha reaches enlightenment by himself: For all Buddhas are said to have gained their knowledge without having received instruction (cf. for instance *AKBh* on 7.34 p. 415.23: *jñānasampat punaś caturvidhā — anupadiṣṭajñānam . . .*; de la Vallée Poussin:¹¹ "Perfection de savoir: 1. savoir non enseigné . . ."; cf. also Yaśomitra ad loc.¹²: *anupadiṣṭajñānam iti svayamabhisambodhanārthena* — "Untaught knowledge [is used] in the meaning of becoming enlightened by oneself"). Thus Vetter's interpretation of *Āgama* is incompatible with one of the most important characteristics of a Buddha. Vetter may have been aware of this problem when he says that according to Dharmakīrti the Buddha's teaching is not the result of a single enlightenment, and that Dharmakīrti does not use

the word Buddha. If I understand him correctly, what he actually claims is that the Buddha was not a Buddha and the four noble truths (give or take a few minor improvements) are not originally his own. (All this in the name of Dharmakīrti, of course.) This is a very strong and interesting claim indeed, but, unfortunately, I do not see that Vetter has any conclusive evidence for it. As for the fact that the word Buddha never occurs in the *Pramāṇavārttika*¹³, this, of course, does not prove anything.

Although it is not explicitly stated, it is clear from the context that Vetter draws his conclusion from v. 136:

*bahuśo bahudhopāyam kālena bahunā'sya ca/
gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām//*

"Ihm, der intensiv (*bahuśo*) und über eine lange Zeit hin (*kālena bahunā*) auf vielerlei Weise (*bahudhā*) ein Mittel übt [um die aus Überlieferung und Nachdenken gewonnene Einsicht zu verwirklichen und dann diese und die zu ihrer Verwirklichung einsetzbaren Mittel anderen zu lehren], gelangen diesbezüglich [d.h. bezüglich der verschiedenen Mittel] die Vor- und Nachteile zu [voller] Klarheit."

However, Vetter's interpretation is certainly not the only possible one. While commenting on this verse, Prajñākaragupta explicitly mentions the Buddha's enlightenment, for he considers that the verse refers to the time after the Buddha's enlightenment, or more precisely, when the enlightenment unfolds or blossoms (*prabodhavikāsa*). (The biographies of the Buddha usually mention four, or sometimes seven¹⁴, weeks.) Although the Buddha is free from suffering, he further practices different means and perfects his qualities as a teacher; e.g., he exerts himself to eliminate his imperfections of speech etc. Or, alternatively, although his suffering is destroyed, the Buddha is not yet omniscient¹⁵. Nothing in this implies or suggests that the content of the Buddha's teachings is not the result of a unique enlightenment.

Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, on the other hand, do not mention the enlightenment at all, because they consider that the practice during long time refers to the time when the Buddha was not yet a Buddha, i.e., when he was still a Bodhisattva. Nothing in their

interpretation implies anything unusual in their understanding of the future Buddha's enlightenment.

The interpretation of v. 136 bears directly on the problem of *āgama* in 132cd. For, if I understand them correctly, according to Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin the Buddha used *āgama* only in his previous lives when he was a Bodhisattva. This is probably the simplest solution to the problem. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (ed. D. Shastri. Varanasi 1968) p. 51.12–15: *etaṃ duḥkhaḥetaṃ tadvipakṣaṃ cāgamād upaśrutyānumanān niścīyā [niścīyā or a lacuna?] bahuśo 'nekaśo bahudhopāyam anekaparakāram kālena ca bahunā'sya bodhisattvasyābhyasyato bhāvayatas tatra duḥkhaḥetau tadvipakṣe ca guṇadoṣā yathāyogaṃ prakāśatām gacchanti*. "Having heard the cause of suffering and its opposite from tradition [and] having determined [these two] by inference, the advantages and shortcomings in respect to the cause of suffering and its opposite as it fits (i.e., in reversed order) become clear to the Bodhisattva who is practicing, [i.e.] meditating, manifoldly (intensively?) in many different ways and for a long time on the means [to destroy suffering through its cause], which has many different forms"¹⁶. This seems a perfectly sound solution. In any case, one cannot simply ignore it the way Vetter does.¹⁷

It is only according to Prajñākaragupta's understanding of Dharmakīrti that the role of *āgama* becomes problematic; and he proposes two different interpretations. According to the first, *āgama* makes known objects which are beyond the scope of perception and inference¹⁸. According to the second, — and this is the one on which Vetter bases his interpretation (cf. p. 40, n. 1) — the examination of suffering etc., is done in a threefold succession of tradition, inference and meditation (*āgama, yukti* and *bhāvanā*¹⁹).

The issue is quite complicated, and many questions have to be raised and answered before a definitive solution can be accepted. Vetter has certainly given some thought to the subject, but unfortunately he does not share his deliberations with his readers. Failing that, one may assume that he was led astray by Prajñākaragupta.

The problem of the originality of the Buddha has arisen long before Dharmakīrti, and he must have been aware of its traditional solution. Had he anything original, not to say revolutionary, to say on the

subject, I would expect him to state it explicitly, as he does in many other cases, and not to hide it behind such remote implications. It seems to me, therefore, that Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's interpretation does better justice to Dharmakīrti's original intention, for if it is accepted, the problem of *āgama* does not even arise in the context of v. 132cd. As far as I can see there is nothing in Dharmakīrti's words to indicate the innovations which Vetter reads in them, and inasmuch as the Buddha is considered as a person, and not as an abstract principle, Dharmakīrti probably followed the traditional Buddhist doctrine, as it appears for instance in the *Milindapañha*²⁰, namely, that there were many Buddhas, and they all have exactly the same teaching, but each of them discovers the way by himself.

The *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter is anything but a systematic treatise, and Vetter has accomplished a veritable *tour de force* in reconstructing a whole system out of it. By the very nature of things he had to rely on odd bits and pieces scattered here and there; sometimes not even directly there, but only hinted at or alluded to by the employment of certain terms, by omission of what could be expected, etc. The reconstruction is indeed fascinating in certain aspects, but from the very nature of things highly speculative, and I feel that Vetter, in spite of his experience and intimate knowledge of Dharmakīrti, ought to have been more cautious. For instance, how much can one read into a simple "etc."? Discussing the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths Dharmakīrti mentions the first four by name and then adds "etc." (cf. v. 270). Vetter observes that the remaining twelve are not convincing and are merely a by-product of the first well-functioning four, which is a legitimate opinion for any modern scholar, but to say that Dharmakīrti's "etc." corresponds *exactly* to this appreciation, is a bit far-fetched. Cf. p. 26—7:

Die nicht als solche genannten 12 falschen und 12 wahren Aspekte von den insgesamt 16 sind wenig überzeugend und wohl eher Ausfluss der bei der ersten edlen Wahrheit gut funktionierenden Reihe von vier Aspekten; Dharmakīrtis blosses "usw." entspricht genau dieser Einschätzung.²¹

One of the most provocative parts in Vetter's interpretation of the

pramāṇasiddhi-chapter concerns the epistemological presuppositions of the way to Nirvana. Contrary to the usual affiliation of Dharmakīrti to the Yogācāra school, or more precisely to the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school, Vetter claims that for the last stages of the way to Nirvana Dharmakīrti assumed a realistic theory of knowledge (p. 32):

Auch ist hier — im Gegensatz zu Höhepunkten der Theorie in den Wahrnehmungskapiteln von Pramāṇavārttika und Pramāṇaviniścaya — nichts von einem Einfluss des Idealismus späterer Yogācāra-Texte zu merken. Das passt gut zu der Beobachtung, dass Dharmakīrti — anders als sein Kommentator Prajñākaragupta (siehe Anm. 1 zu 139) — dem Erblicken der Irrealität der Gegebenheiten keinen Platz im Erlösungsweg einräumt. An diesem Höhepunkt der Praxis scheint sogar eine realistische Erkenntnistheorie nötig zu sein. Denn das ist doch wohl der Hintergrund der vor dieser Lehre vom leuchtenden Geist stehenden Behauptung, dass es eine Eigenschaft des Erkennens sei, das Objekt so zu erfassen, wie es ist. Diese Behauptung kann man wegen der dabeistehenden Umschreibung, dass das Objekt mittels eines wirklich bestehenden Wesens die Erkenntnis hervorrufe, kaum in einem anderen als in einem realistischen Sinne verstehen.

Again, how does Vetter substantiate his assumption? As far as I can see his evidence is very meager. His main argument is that the cognition whose basis is transformed, and which apprehends the object correctly with no conceptualization, arises from the capacity of the thing (*vastubalotpatti* or similar expressions). But Dharmakīrti does not say that the thing has to be a material object; at any rate Vetter produces no evidence to that effect. On the other hand such expressions as *vastubalotpatti* can easily fit in an idealistic epistemology where they would refer to the apprehension of the mind by itself, that is, a moment of cognition arises from the previous moment of cognition, carries the latter's form and apprehends this form as its object. It seems, therefore, that in this case, just as in many other cases, Dharmakīrti is consciously using terms which are ambiguous enough to allow both realistic and idealistic interpretation. And, of course, it is the idealistic interpretation which reflects a higher level of truth.

Vetter wants to support his argument by the fact that Dharmakīrti does not mention the apprehension of the unreality of the elements (*dharmanairātmya*) as a necessary condition for liberation. This could have been at most an argument from omission, but in fact one does not even expect Dharmakīrti to include the unreality of the elements

as a part of the way; on the contrary, it would have been very surprising if he were to include it, because — unlike in Yogācāra properly speaking — in Sautrāntika-Yogācāra, or what should better be called Yogācāra with certain Sautrāntika presuppositions, as we know it for instance from the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*, the mental elements are the final absolute reality. In other words, there is no relativisation of the mental elements into a higher level of reality usually called *tathatā*. This is in fact one of the most important criteria to distinguish the two schools. There is no place for the unreality of elements in Sautrāntika-Yogācāra, and, therefore, there is no reason to assume that Dharmakīrti deviates from it towards a realistic theory just because he does not mention it. (As for the term *dharmanairātmya*, when it appears in Sautrāntika-Yogācāra texts, it has a completely different meaning, namely, that cognitions lack the manifold nature of apprehending, apprehended, etc., but they do not lack the real unexpressible nature which is apprehended by the Buddhas.²²) Furthermore, Vetter admits that the *pratyakṣa*-chapter in the *Pramāṇavārttika* does contain clear influence of later (i.e., idealistic) Yogācāra texts, but he does not attempt to reconcile the two chapters. Are we to understand that Dharmakīrti changed his mind in the time between writing the two chapters? Or that he was a crypto-realist?

To conclude, it seems to me that Dharmakīrti's religious ideas are not so much original as they are reductionist. This is probably due to the logician's mind which looks everywhere for the necessary and sufficient conditions, and has a distaste for encumbering a subject matter with unnecessary or superfluous factors. This tendency can be observed on several occasions, which have been duly noted by Vetter, though I am not sure whether he would agree with me in drawing from them a general conclusion, and in calling Dharmakīrti a reductionist. Thus, we have the reduction of the perfections to compassion; the reduction of all faults (*doṣa*) to one single cause, namely, *satkāyadrṣṭi*, and its equation with *avidyā* (cf. p. 22); the reduction of desires to one main desire responsible for suffering, namely, the desire for existence (instead of the traditional three: *bhavatrṣṇā*, *kāmatrṣṇā* and *vibhavatrṣṇā*); the reduction of the eightfold path to one main member, namely, *samyagdrṣṭi* (which changes its meaning accordingly, cf. p. 26); the consideration of all spiritual exercises except *nairātmya*-

darśana as meaningless (cf. p. 27), etc. I think Dharmakīrti's touch is best seen in these things. In theory of knowledge he reduced inferential relations into two (*tādātmya*, *tadutpatti*), and the objects of valid cognition into one (*svalakṣaṇa*), and one can feel that it is the same mind which now works in a religious field, trying to put some order into the world — making it metaphysically somewhat poorer, but as simple and coherent as possible. However, a note of caution should be added, for in developing these theses Vetter relies very heavily, almost exclusively, on an argument *ex silentio*.

Now, as far as the translation is concerned, let me start by emphasizing that it is very good, and that it is a real help for the reader who tries to wrestle with Dharmakīrti's Sanskrit. However, I must admit that it is not as good as I expected. I believe that every translation — even by the best of scholars — and especially of such a difficult text as the *Pramāṇasiddhi*, should be meticulously checked by at least another pair of eyes before it goes into print. This has apparently not been done in this case, and accordingly the translation contains some simple mistakes, which are probably due to momentary lack of concentration, and which could have been easily avoided. For instance, *hetu* (cause) in v. 139 is translated as "suffering" ("Leid"). I presume Vetter wanted to translate "cause [of suffering]," and that it somehow slipped his mind. This trivial mistake is indeed unfortunate, because Vetter drags it on for the next three verses as well, considering the giving up of suffering as the subject of the discussion where, however, one would simply expect the explanation of the particle *su-* (well) in the predicate *sugata* (well-gone). Such cases, however, are rare. The problematic part of the translation lies not in the literal rendering of words but in their interpretation which is added in brackets, and which is sometimes three and four times as long as the translation itself. For instance v. 222:

*prahāṇir icchādveṣāder guṇadoṣāmbandhinah/
tayoḥ adrṣṭer viṣaye na tu bāhyeṣu yaḥ kramah//*

(Note that Vetter reads *adrṣṭer* against all Sanskrit editions which read *adrṣṭir*; from the Tibetan translation one would expect an instrumental.)

Verlangen, Hass usw. werden, [da] sie sich an Vorzüge und Nachteile [eines Objekts] heften, aufgegeben durch das Nichtsehen von [Vorzügen und Nachteilen] beim Objekt. Die Methode [um von der letztlich auf das Selbst gerichteten begehrenden Liebe als solcher und nicht bloss von dieser oder jener auf ein bestimmtes Objekt gerichteten Manifestation dieser Liebe frei zu kommen] ist aber nicht [dieselbe wie bei den] auf äussere [Objekte gerichteten Emotionen; man kann sie nämlich nicht dadurch aufgeben, dass man die nachteiligen Folgen, die aus ihr selbst hervorgehen, betrachtet].

Vetter's interpretation is highly improbable, for it is clear from the context that Dharmakīrti is replying in this verse to an opponent who claims that one does not have to give up the notion of Self, but only desire; for the Self is free from all faults, it is only desire which is faulty (cf. v. 221ab: *snehaḥ sadoṣa iti cet tataḥ kiṃ tasya (scil. ātmano) varjanam/*). Against this opponent Dharmakīrti argues that one cannot give up a faulty desire in the manner one gives up a faulty object. One can give up a faulty object by seeing its faults, but in order to give up desire one has to see not the faults of the desire itself, but the faults of the object towards which the desire is directed. Therefore, as long as no faults are seen in the Self, the desire towards it cannot stop. In other words, what Dharmakīrti has in mind is not, as Vetter claims, a distinction between two kinds of desire, the one, desire as such, which in the final analysis is directed towards the Self, the other, a manifestation of the former, directed towards an external object. The distinction he made is simply between desire and external object. This is also how Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin understood Dharmakīrti, and I fail to understand why Vetter did not follow them. Furthermore, Dharmakīrti himself elucidates his argument in the next half-verse in a manner which hardly leaves any room for misunderstanding: *na hi snehaguṇāt snehaḥ kiṃ tv arthaguṇadarśanāt/* "For desire does not [arise] from the qualities of desire, but from seeing the qualities of an object."

The weakest point of the translation is due, I think, to Vetter's unusual relationship to Dharmakīrti's commentators. Dharmakīrti was, no doubt, a great philosopher, but, as Collingwood once said of Kant, the stylist in him was not equal to the philosopher, and the way he expresses himself could sometimes make you wish he said what he meant in a simpler and clearer manner. Tradition tells us that he knew he would not be understood already by his contemporaries and recognized the need even for a simple word to word explanation of

the *Pramāṇavārttika* — how much more so for his philosophical ideas, but for that purpose even his own disciples were not good enough for him²³. Whether the sad stories about Devendrabuddhi are true or not — they certainly have a ring of truth to them — it is clear that we cannot understand Dharmakīrti without some help by the commentators. This does not mean, of course, that we have to accept everything they say, but as a methodological rule I think they should be given the benefit of the doubt and considered innocent until proven guilty by using sound criteria. That holds especially for Devendrabuddhi's commentary which is supposed to have been approved by Dharmakīrti himself. And even if this is just a legend, at least this commentary has the advantage of being the oldest, and of not being written by an original and relatively independent philosopher like Prajñākaragupta. Of course, if one has some sound reasons, whether philosophical, philological, contextual or whatever, to disagree with a commentator, one should do so by all means. But if all three, Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, agree on an interpretation of a certain verse, and Vetter proposes a completely different one, I would certainly expect him to state his reasons why he thinks they are all wrong, and explain in what manner his interpretation deviates from the traditional one; and the least he could do is to warn the reader about it. I checked the *Pramāṇavārttikāṅkara* and *-vṛtti* (which almost always agree with each other²⁴), and occasionally Devendrabuddhi's *Vṛtti* (or *Pañjikā*); and it is clear that Vetter deviates from them in dozens of cases.

As a rule the traditional interpretation is simpler than Vetter's, often more convincing, and I cannot help feeling that Vetter complicated things unnecessarily. Sometimes the difference between Vetter and the commentators is so great, you can hardly believe they were reading the same text. For instance v. 168cd—169ab, directed against the Cārvākas:

*bhūtānām prāṇitābhede 'py ayaṃ bhedo yadāśrayaḥ/
tan nirhrāsātiśayavat tadbhāvāt tāni hāpayet//*

[Im allgemeinen führt ihr das Belebte auf eine Besonderheit in der Zusammensetzung der Elemente zurück.] Wenn nun trotz des unterschiedslosen Belebteins (*prāṇitā-abhede 'py*, Tib. *srog chags khyad med kyaṅ*) der [den Körper formenden] Elemente dieser Unterschied [in Begierde usw. da ist, dann muss] die [Sache], worauf

sich [dieser Unterschied] stützt, [ebenfalls] ein Weniger oder Mehr besitzen [und kann nicht identisch sein mit der besonderen Zusammensetzung der Elemente, die eurer Meinung nach für das Belebte sein sorgt]. Da es diese [Sache — das durch Hegung stärker oder schwächer seiende Residuum von Begierde usw. —] gibt, soll man die [Elemente und ihre Zusammensetzung als eine doch nicht befriedigende Erklärung] aufgeben.

There are several problematic things here, but let us concentrate on the last three words (*tadbhāvāt tāni hāpayet*). Devendrabuddhi comments (Derge ed. 73b 6–7): *gañ las ñams par 'gyur že na / de yod pa las te* (= **tadbhāvāt*) / 'dod chags la sogs pa dañ ldan pa ñid las so (= **rāgādīmatvāt*) / de ltar na 'ga' žig skye bžin pa ñid ni / sdug bñial dañ bde ba la sogs pa med pa dañ ldan pa dañ / 'dod chags dañ bral ba dañ / že sdañ dañ / phrag dog dañ ser sna dañ bral ba skye bar 'gyur ro // Prajñākaragupta does not comment on these words directly and the text is partly corrupted, but nevertheless it is clear that he understands them in a similar manner (129.5–6): *yataḥ kāraṇād bhūtātīśayātvād* (read with the Tibetan translation²⁵: *-atīśayād*) *bhedas tathā* (*tasya* ?) *nirhrāsātīśayam antare* (read with the Tib. trans.: *-atīśayasambhave*) *'tyantāpacayo 'pīti vitarāgaḥ syāt*. Manorathanandin also follows Devendrabuddhi (p. 61.13): *tadbhāvād rāgādīmatvāt tāni bhūtāni hāpayed bhraṃśayed iti nīrāgo 'pi kaścīt sattvaḥ syāt*. According to all three commentaries one should translate as follows: "Although there is no difference of vitality in the elements [which constitute a living being] (i.e., one living being is not more alive or less alive than another), there is this difference [in desires] (i.e., some living beings have stronger, some weaker desires); its basis (i.e., cause), which is characterized by increase and decrease, could make the [elements] loose that [property of possessing desire, etc.; thus, there could be a living being without desire]."

We have two completely different interpretations of the same verse; which one is to be preferred? I cannot evaluate Vetter's interpretation, because he does not say what led him to it, nor why he thinks that Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin are so completely off the mark. I do see, though, that the traditional interpretation has the advantage of accounting better for the use of the causative (*hāpayet*).

Vetter seems to be aware, at least to some extent, of this problem

as he says in the preface (p. 7) that "Man hat das grösste Recht, von mir zu erwarten, dass ich auch in jedem Punkt Rechenschaft ablege über die Meinung der frühen Kommentatoren Devendrabuddhi (7.Jh.?) und Prajñākaragupta (8. Jh.). Nur für Prajñākaragupta kann ich diese Erwartung zum Teil erfüllen." This statement, however, could be misleading by its modesty, for it could give the false impression that Vetter uses only partly Prajñākaragupta's commentary, and not at all Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's commentaries. A quick glance at the notes, however, reveals that Vetter does use all three commentaries (Manorathanandin is referred to several times; Devendrabuddhi seems to be used only occasionally and he is mentioned, I believe, only once in p. 156). Moreover, when one compares the translation with the commentaries, one sees clearly that Vetter relies on them quite heavily; sometimes he even brings *utsūtras* into the brackets. (Personally I would prefer *utsūtras* to be in footnotes — for which there is plenty of unused space in the book — and not as an integral part of the translation, for sometimes they do distort Dharmakīrti's arguments.) One has to conclude, therefore, that in those cases where Vetter deviates from the commentators he is conscious of that (at least in respect to Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin), and for this reason it is unexplainable to me why he proceeded the way he did. The trouble is that Vetter hardly ever tells you whether he follows one of the commentaries or whether he goes his own way, and when he deviates from the commentaries, he often proposes interpretations which are far from being self-evident, but with very few exceptions he never explains how he arrived at them.

In spite of its shortcomings, and those mentioned above are not meant to be exhaustive but only a few of the most conspicuous ones, Vetter's book is undoubtedly an important contribution towards the understanding of Dharmakīrti's Buddhism. A perfect translation and interpretation of Dharmakīrti is not likely to be achieved by a single scholar in a single stroke, and Vetter's study is certainly not, nor was it meant to be, the last word on the subject. However, it does form a solid starting point, and as such it is a considerable achievement. Therefore, one can only be grateful to Professor Vetter for a book which is interesting, stimulating and which will occupy, I am sure, a central position in future Dharmakīrti-studies.

NOTES

- ¹ Cf. E. Steinkellner, "The spiritual place of the epistemological tradition in Buddhism," *Nanto Bukkyu* 49, 1982, pp. 1–18. To the second category Steinkellner adds modern Indian scholars like Sukumar Dutt, who share Stcherbatsky's positive approach, but unlike the latter who made a case for the compatibility of Buddhist "atheism" with Marxism-Leninism, are motivated by nationalistic ideology, discovering in the epistemological tradition the dawn of a Western-like rational secularism within the monastic culture.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ³ Wien 1964.
- ⁴ Cf. Conze, *The Memoirs of a Modern Gnostic*, Part I, Sherborne 1979, p. 12: "... and one of the greatest benefits of my return to England has been that I have been able to do my Buddhist work in English and not in German, a language scarcely worth writing in any longer on scholarly matters concerning the East."
- ⁵ Cf. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, Cambridge 1968, n. 1.2 (p. 74).
- ⁶ I cannot enter here the *anuloma-pratiloma* controversy in all the details which it implies. The conflicting positions of Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin have been clearly explained by M. Inami and T. J. F. Tillemans in "Another Look at the Framework of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Pramāṇavārttika", *WZKS* 30, 1986, pp. 123–142. I believe they are methodologically right to prefer Devendrabuddhi's interpretation, according to which the *pratiloma* starts in v. 146, to Manorathanandin's who situates the break in v. 280. (The difference is not as big as it may seem; it depends on the answer to the question whether the section on the four noble truths is the last part of the *anuloma* or the first part of the *pratiloma*.) It seems to me, however, that in this particular case exception should be made, for Manorathanandin's division of the text is more elegant, and further, it is more natural to interpret v. 146b (*tāyo vā cauḥsatyaparakāśanam*) as an alternative to v. 145a (*tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktiḥ*), rather than as a beginning of the *pratiloma*-part. As for Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, in order to accept the claim that it is quite possible that he situated the break in v. 146 and not in v. 280 (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 125–126, n. 7), one has to have some reason why he should refer to this break while commenting on the latter and not on the former.
- ⁷ Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, ed. P. Pradhan, 2nd ed., Patna 1975, p. 415.14f: *tribhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ sāmyam sarvabuddhānām. sarvapuṇyājñānasambhārasamud-āgamato dharmakāyapariniṣpattito 'rthacaryayā ca lokasya . . . etām eva ca trividhām sampadam manusikurvāṇena viduṣā śakyam buddhānām bhagavatām antike tīra-premagauravam cotpādayitum* (perhaps: *-premagauravam cot-*) *yaduta hetu-sampadam phalasampadam upakārasampadam ca*.
- ⁸ Cf. *The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, ed. Kielhorn, repr. Osnabrück 1970, vol. I, p. 39.10: *pramāṇabhūta ācāryaḥ . . .* (as opposed to *pramāṇikaraṇa* *ibid.*, p. 39.4). I owe this reference to Professor A. Wezler.
- ⁹ Throughout this paper I follow Vetter's numbering of the verses; the numbering in other editions differs slightly, but the correspondence is easily made: Vetter's 131cd–132ab = Miyasaka's 132, *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* 133 and *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* 134.
- ¹⁰ Nor could this be a slip of pen, for Vetter uses "feststellen" consistently throughout the translation.
- ^{10a} Cf. *PVV*, p. 9.15–16: *tadvad bhagavān pramāṇam; yathābhīhitasya satyacatuṣṭa-yasyāvisamvādanāt. tasyaiva parair ajñātasya prakāśanāc ca*.
- ¹¹ Cf. *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. Paris/Louvain 1923–31, vol. 6, p. 82.

- ¹² *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṣārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*, ed. D. Śāstri. Varanasi 1981, vol. II, p. 1097.19.
- ¹³ Cf. Y. Miyasaka, "An Index to the Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā," *Acta Indologica* III, 1974, pp. 1–157.
- ¹⁴ Cf. E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, repr. Louvain 1967, p. 18. More specifically, Prajñākaragupta may have had the first week in mind; cf. next note and *Lalita Vistara*, ed. S. Lefmann, Halle a. S. 1902 (repr. Tokyo 1977) vol. I, p. 351.15f.: *prathame saptaḥe bhikṣavas tathāgatas tasminn eva bodhimaṇḍe niṣaṇṇo 'sīhāt . . . samanantaraprāpte khalu punar bhikṣavo bodhisattvena sarvajñatve . . .*
- ¹⁵ Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (ed. R. Sankrityayana, Patna 1953) p. 110.20–23: *tao vāgaigun'yādikam api nivartayitum prayatate . . . atha vā yadi nāma duḥkhaprahāṇam tathāpi na sarvajñatvam bhavati . . .*
- ¹⁶ Cf. also Devendrabuddhi's *Vṛtti*, Derge ed. No. 4217, fol. 56b7f.: *ji srid du ma lus par thugs su chud pa med pa de srid du ston pa nīd phun sum tshogs pa rdzogs pa dan ldan pa ma yin pa de tar na skyes bu chen po dag gis dus riñ por goms par mādad pa 'bras bu med pa ma yin no . . . grol bar bzed pa (= *mukūtikāma) 'dis kyuñ bdag med pa mthoñ ba dus riñ por rnam pa du mar goms par byed pa yin no*. Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin probably understood the practicing of means as one of the Bodhisattva's perfections, namely, the *upāyakaūśalya* (cf. H. Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*. London 1932, p. 248ff.). This interpretation is quite possible for Dharmakīrti as well.
- ¹⁷ As a matter of fact, Vetter does refer the reader to the above quoted passage (cf. p. 40, n. 1), but the reference is done in such a way that the reader is misled to assume that Manorathanandin supports Vetter's interpretation.
- ¹⁸ Cf. *PVA*, p. 109.1: *anumānāgocare cāgamah, atīndriyapratyāyanahetuḥ*.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 109.1–6. Cf. also G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*. Part II, The First Bhāvanākrama of Kamalāsīla. Serie Orientale Roma IX, 2. Roma 1958.
- ²⁰ Cf. *Milindapañhapāli*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 13, Varanasi 1979, pp. 156–157. (Rhys Davids' transl., vol. II, p. 13f.).
- ²¹ Cf. also p. 27: "Evident ist jedoch, dass das Gegenteil der sechzehn falschen Aspekte geübt werden soll, eigentlich nur der vier ersten falschen Aspekte . . ." (my emphasis).
- ²² Cf. *Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, ed. S. Lévi, Paris 1925, p. 6 (on 10d): *yo bālair dharmanām svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādīḥ parikalpitas tena kalpitenaṁmanā teṣāṁ nairātmyam na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānām viṣaya iti*.
- ²³ Cf. Frauwallner, "Devendrabuddhi," *WZKS* 4, 1960, pp. 119–123 (reprint in *Kleine Schriften*, ed. by G. Oberhammer and E. Steinkellner, Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 842–846).
- ²⁴ In fact these two commentaries help us understand one another. Manorathanandin helps us to see how Prajñākaragupta's general comments can be read into Dharmakīrti's verses, whereas Prajñākaragupta's deliberations provide the rational behind Manorathanandin's short glosses. I did not read enough of Devendrabuddhi's *Vṛtti* in order to be able to generalize about it, but from the few cases I checked there seems to be a strong unity among all three commentaries.
- ²⁵ *TTP*, vol. 132, Te 142b8.

or that earlier Jain works are free from hostile remarks about Buddhism. Śīlānka, for example, in his commentary to the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* (Lālā Sundarlāl Jain Āgamagrān-thamālā, vol. I, re-edited Muni Jambuvijayaji, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978) widely attacks the Buddhists, as indeed the *sūtra* itself seems to do. Śīlānka belongs to the late 9th century, and thus predates our text by several hundred years. In addition there is evidence that the Buddhists could equally vilify their Jain opponents. The *Divyāvadāna* records a story of Jyotiṣka, who murders his pregnant wife, an act applauded by the Jains who have heard it predicted that the child she is carrying will be a great Buddhist (*Divyāvadāna*, edited by P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, vol. 20, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1959, *avadāna* no. 19, pp. 162–180). The same *avadāna* appears in Kṣemendra's *Avadānakalpalatā*, dated 1052, and there is no indication that the hostility has increased to match what we find exhibited by the Jains against the Buddhists in the *prabandhas* studied in the present paper. (Kṣemendra, *Avadānakalpalatā*, edited P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, vol. 22, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1959, *avadāna* no. 9, pp. 78–85). In fact a cursory reading of the Buddhist narrative material leaves the investigator with the impression that the Buddhists were preoccupied less with threats from outside and more with internal dissension. Thus a favourite theme of the *avadānas* is the relationship between the Buddha and Devadatta over a series of lives, while Mahāyāna *sūtra* literature concerns itself more with the hostility from and towards non-Mahāyāna Buddhists than with other religions.

³¹ Edited Bhabatosh Bhattacharya, Bibliotheca Indica, work no. 274, Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1953. Valāllasena's extreme hostility to non-Brahmanical sects is clear in his opening account of the texts he has used to write his *Dānasāgara*; anything remotely connected with the heretical faiths he has omitted from consideration. A discussion of Sena anti-Buddhist policy and anti-Buddhist sentiment in Bengal may be found in Upendranāth Bhaṭṭācārya, *Baṅglār Baul o Bauler Gān*, Calcutta: Orient Book Company, 1957, pp. 245 ff. Bhattacharya cites the *Dānasāgara* amongst other evidence.

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VASUBANDHU'S 'REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF SELFHOOD' (*ĀTMAVĀDAPRATISEDHA*)

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION

The *Abhidharmakośa* (*Kośa*) is generally believed to have been written in India during the later part of the fifth century A.D. Vasubandhu himself wrote a commentary on this work, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*Bhāṣya*). The *Kośa* and *Bhāṣya* were discovered in Tibet in 1935 by Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana, who had attempted earlier to reconstruct them from Tibetan and Chinese translations and Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārḥābhidharmakośavyākhyā* (*Vyākhyā*), which to this date is still the only other Indian Buddhist commentary on the *Kośa* known to survive in Sanskrit. The manuscripts found by Sāmkṛtyāyana were first fully edited by Prahlād Prahlān, and published, along with the *Vyākhyā*, at Patna, India, in 1967 by the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute. Dwarkadas Shastri also made a critical edition of the text which was published in four volumes at Varanasi, India, in 1970–1973, along with the *Vyākhyā*, as part of the *Bauddha Bharati Series*.

The chapter translated below, which lacks an autocommentary, Vasubandhu himself entitles 'Refutation of the Theory of Selfhood' (*Ātmavādapratishedha*). Yaśomitra's title for the chapter, "A Resolution of Questions About Persons" (*Pudgalavinīśchayaḥ*), I have used as a subtitle. It was written in prose as an appendix to the verses that constitute the first eight chapters. The translation presented here is based on Dr. Shastri's edition, which I have checked against the revision of Dr. Pradhan's edition made by Aruna Halder and published in 1975 by the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute. To my knowledge, it will be the first into a modern Western language from an unreconstructed Sanskrit text. From the *Vyākhyā* and the Tibetan translations T. Stcherbatsky composed an English translation, entitled "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" (first published by the *Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de Russie*, 1919, pp. 823–854, 937–958 and reprinted in 1976 by the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi). The

French translation, by L. De la Vallee Poussin, which is in the last volume of his monumental *L'Abhidharmakośa De Vasubandhu* (Paris, 1923—1931), was made primarily from Yaśomitra's commentary and the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang. In preparing my own translation I have consulted Yaśomitra's commentary, the Tibetan translation of Jinamitra, and, with the help of Mr. Michael Olson, the Chinese translations of Hsüan-tsang and Paramârtha, as well as the Chinese commentaries of P'u-kuang, Fa-pao, Yuan-hui, and K'uei-tao. The Sanskrit commentaries on the *Kośa* by Sthiramati, Puṇyavardhana, Śamathadeva, Dignâga, and Vinitedeva are now lost, but exist in Tibetan translation. Among these only Dignâga's commentary includes a discussion of the appendix, but it is merely a summary of its arguments.

Vasubandhu's abbreviated style of composition, tailored to the use of scholarly monks steeped in Buddhist dogma and privy to oral traditions of commentary, makes his treatise rather difficult to understand and translate at times. This difficulty is surely one of the reasons this very important work of Buddhist philosophy has not received the attention it deserves. In the translation that follows, I have often placed in parentheses words, phrases, or sentences which I believe will help the reader to grasp unexpressed parts of theses and arguments presented in the text. The additions most often are made on the basis of information supplied by Yaśomitra's commentary, though I also rely on the commentaries of P'u-kuang, Fa-pao, K'uei-tao, and Yuan-hui when their views seem reasonable; but at times I simply supply what the context of argument and our general knowledge of Buddhism seem to require. So the reader can better distinguish what Vasubandhu actually says from what I add in the hope of making it clearer, I have translated the text so that it can be read either with or without these additions. To make grammatical sense of the unembellished translation the reader need only disregard punctuations required for the readability of the expanded translation. I welcome any suggestions readers of this journal may care to make concerning improvements in the translation. Sanskrit-English and English-Sanskrit glossaries for the translation can be obtained by contacting the translator at the Philosophy Department of the University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, 52242, USA.

Because the argument of the appendix is often presented in question-answer form Stcherbatsky and Poussin chose to translate it as a philosophical dialogue. But this falsely represents the appendix to the Western reader as if it were meant to be a philosophical dialogue of the sort written by Plato, Berkeley, or Hume. In fact it is a treatise which often, but not always, develops its subject within a relatively terse question-answer format. For literary reasons I have not followed the Tibetan and Chinese practices of simply replicating this format. I have tried to retain the confrontational spirit of the writing, but without reproducing its frequent and distracting use of short questions and answers. I have, in addition, supplied section headings, numbered according to related issues raised in the text, as an aid to reference and to comprehension of the twists and turns of Vasubandhu's argumentation.

Those who seek information about the scriptural sources of quotations in the text and about philological matters may consult the extensive footnotes to Poussin's translation. The footnotes to my translation are confined primarily to explanations of translations and additions, sources consulted for the additions, and clarifications of the meanings of theses and arguments. The footnotes of Stcherbatsky which deal with questions of meaning are still of some interest, but my footnotes are meant in fact to supercede them. My philosophical commentary on Vasubandhu's treatise will appear, along with the translation and an extensive introduction, in a book Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. has agreed to publish later as part of the series, "New Perspectives in Philosophical Scholarship: Texts and Issues."

I am making my translation of Vasubandhu's treatise available now, well before its inclusion in the above-mentioned book, because of the keen and wide-spread interest contemporary Western philosophers are showing in what Derek Parfit calls reductionist theories of persons,¹ the most famous examples of which are presented by David Hume and by Parfit himself. Vasubandhu's work includes a clear statement and extensive defense of a reductionist theory and a number of important criticisms of non-reductionist theories, both of which are significantly different from those found in the works of Hume and Parfit. Western philosophers, I believe, will therefore welcome as soon as possible a chance to study and evaluate Vasubandhu's treatise with

the help of a translation expressly composed to facilitate its philosophical study and evaluation. In what follows of this introduction to the translation I shall provide what I believe to be the proper categorial framework for this study and evaluation.

The reductionist theory of persons, as Parfit presents it, includes theses about both the existence of persons and their identity over time. The theses are (i) that a person's existence is reducible to the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and (ii) that a person's identity over time is reducible to a set of impersonal facts about a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events. Such facts are impersonal, Parfit explains, if they can be described without presupposing the identity of a person, without explicitly claiming that the experiences in a person's life are had by the person, and without explicitly claiming that a person exists.² According to Parfit, reductionists claim that persons exist, but need not explicitly claim that they exist, since in their view a complete description of reality can be given without claiming that persons exist.

What is common to every non-reductionist theory, as characterized by Parfit, is simply the denial of the above two theses. But its most prevalent form, one against which both Hume and Parfit himself argue, is the substance theory, according to which (i) a person is a separately existing entity, an entity whose existence is distinct from that of a brain and body, and from that of the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and (ii) personal identity is a non-reducible fact about this entity. Versions of the view presented by the Tīrthikas are challenged by Vasubandhu, whose arguments against them may be most profitably compared to those of Parfit and Hume against the Cartesian view.

There is a minimalist version of the non-reductionist theory, not discussed at all by Hume or at any length by Parfit, but subjected to an extensive analysis by Vasubandhu. This is the view that (i) the existence of a person cannot be reduced to that of a brain and a body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and the fact of personal identity cannot be reduced to a set of impersonal facts, yet (ii) a person cannot be said to be a separately

existing entity and the fact of personal identity cannot be said to be a non-reducible fact about such an entity. Persons, on this view, are ontologically inexplicable in the sense that they cannot be said to be in nature other than or the same as a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events.

That part of the minimalist theory that concerns personal identity Parfit calls the further fact view and summarily dismisses it because it offers no explanation of the fact of personal identity.³ Once seen in the perspective provided by the minimalist theory as a whole, however, we can see that Parfit's criticism misses the mark, since the view criticized is put forward on the basis of arguments which purport to show that the existence of persons and their identities over time *cannot* be explained. To give an adequate appraisal of the further fact view one must, as Vasubandhu does, engage the minimalist's arguments for the inexplicability of both the existence of persons and their identity over time. Vasubandhu in effect rejects the further fact view of personal identity as part of his extensive critique of the arguments given for the minimalist version of the non-reductionist theory of persons presented by the Vātsīputriyas, an early school of Buddhist philosophers.

I have included Vasubandhu and Hume among those who hold reductionist theories of persons, even though they do not explicitly say that the existence of persons and their identity over time are reducible to those of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events, and so I must explain why I believe that it is proper to classify their theories of persons in this way. First of all, we should notice that Parfit does not commit himself to a complete metaphysical analysis of the brain and body, or of the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events to which he refers in his characterizations of theories of persons. (He himself states that physicalist, idealist, and dualistic versions are possible.⁴) His characterizations of views about the existence of a person, therefore, lend themselves to a variety of specific metaphysical analyses. They lend themselves, in particular, both to Vasubandhu's view that a person is just the five *skandha*'s or aggregates into which he analyzes the person's body and mind, and to Hume's view that a

person is just a bundle of perceptions into which he believes the person's body and mind can be analyzed. Thus Parfit's characterizations of views about the existence of a person can provide a framework in which the views of Parfit, Vasubandhu and Hume concerning the existence of a person may be compared and criticized.

Parfit's characterizations of views on personal identity can also be applied to views held by Hume and Vasubandhu and some of their opponents. For Hume and the Cartesians the application is relatively straightforward, even if complicated by Hume's famous second thoughts about his account of personal identity in *A Treatise of Human Nature*.⁵ But because Vasubandhu and the Tirthikas do not explicitly disagree about personal identity it might be doubted that Parfit's characterizations apply to views held by them. That they do in fact apply, however, is strongly suggested by Vasubandhu's claim, against the Tirthikas' view that persons are permanent (*nitya*), that they are only the continua of the impermanent phenomena (*anitya-dharma-s*) he calls the aggregates. The notions of a permanent entity and of a continuum of impermanent phenomena, I believe, may be construed, for purposes of comparative study and evaluation, as metaphysical analyses of the notion of identity over time. A continuum of impermanent phenomena, without in any obvious way violating the meaning intended by Vasubandhu and his opponents, may be defined as a continuant that retains its identity over time by virtue of being reducible to a series of self-natured events tied together by the laws of causality, and a permanent entity may be defined as a continuant that retains its identity over time by virtue of being an unchanging self-natured entity not reducible to such a series. These may be understood, respectively, as metaphysical accounts of what many Western philosophers, including Hume, have called loose or imperfect and strict or perfect identity over time, and, in their application to persons, accounts of what Parfit takes to be personal identity as a fact reducible to a set of impersonal facts and personal identity as a fact about a separately existing entity. Thus Vasubandhu's view that persons are continua of the impermanent aggregates may be counted as a reductionist view of personal identity and the Tirthikas' view that persons are permanent may be counted as a non-reductionist view.

NOTES

¹ See his *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 199–217.

² *Ibid.*, p. 210.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 239–240.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁵ See *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 633–636.

78–79), as well as in Candrakīrti's observations in his *Madhyamakāvātāra* (vi. 42, 85 and 95f). But the hermeneutical theory based on the three criterial conditions mentioned above was only fully elaborated later.

⁵ See for example H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale*, i (Paris, 1959), especially p. 373ff, 382–3, 392 Note 3, and also ii/2 (Paris, 1964), p. 182ff (on the problem of the *integumentum* and *involucrum*, and *exegesis per integumentum*). See also recently M. Harl, *Origène: Philocalie 1–20* (Paris, 1983), pp. 47 (on the 'spirit' of a text as opposed to its literal meaning, the *lexis* (λέξις) or *historia* (ἱστορία), 122 (on *huponoia* (ὑπόνοια) as the hidden sense of a text).

PRINCIPLED ATHEISM IN THE BUDDHIST SCHOLASTIC TRADITION

0. INTRODUCTION

In their systematic presentations of religious philosophy, the Indian Buddhists consistently defended the position that belief in an eternal creator god who superintends his creation and looks after the concerns of his creatures is a distraction from the central task of the religious life. This was clearly the position taken in the early Pāli literature and in the Theravāda philosophy based on that literature, but even in the later Mahāyāna writings such as the Lotus Sūtra and the Lankāvātāra Sūtra, in which buddhahood is portrayed not as a feature of the isolated career of Siddhārtha Gautama but rather as a constant feature of the entire cosmos at all times, great care is taken to try to distinguish the concept of the cosmic Buddha-nature in the forms of Dharmakāya or Tathāgatagarbha from the concept of a creator god. The Buddhists were, for whatever reasons, eager to avoid falling into a theistic position. The motivation behind the present paper has been to discover what those reasons were.

Section 1 will outline how the issue of God's existence is treated in the early Buddhist literature, especially in the Suttapiṭaka, where systematic Buddhist philosophy begins. Section 2 will review the treatment of the question of divine creation as an issue in the systematic philosophy of such thinkers as Vasubandhu (400–480), Dharmakīrti (600–660), Śāntarakṣita (725–788) and Kamalaśīla (740–795). And section 3 will show how the arguments for atheism are isomorphic with the arguments for a variety of other positions to which the Buddhist philosophers were committed.

1.0. BUDDHIST ĀGAMAS ON THE QUESTION OF GOD

In the Nikāya literature, the question of the existence of God is treated primarily from either an epistemological point of view or a

moral point of view. As a problem of epistemology, the question of God's existence amounts to a discussion of whether or not a religious seeker can be certain that there is a greatest good and that therefore his efforts to realize a greatest good will not be a pointless struggle towards an unrealistic goal. And as a problem in morality, the question amounts to a discussion of whether man himself is ultimately responsible for all the displeasure that he feels or whether there exists a superior being who inflicts displeasure upon man whether he deserves it or not.

An instance of the epistemological treatment of the question of the highest good occurs in the Tevijja Sutta, the thirteenth sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya. In this sutta there is an account of a dispute between two young brahmins, Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja, over the issue of which religious practices lead most directly to union with Brahmā. Brahmā is typically treated in the Nikāya literature as an object of brahmanical devotion who is believed by his devotees to be the master over whom no other being has mastery (abhibhū anabhibhūto), who sees everything (aññad-atthu-daso), the mighty one (vasavattī), who is lord, maker, designer, chief, creator, master and father of all beings that have been and of all beings that shall be (issaro kattā nimāttā seṭṭho sañjitā vasī pitā bhūtabhavyānam).¹ Moreover, companionship with Brahmā (Brahma-sahavyatā) is believed to be the state of salvation, and so whatever set of practices leads most directly to companionship with Brahmā may be considered the most direct path to salvation (añjasāyano niyyāniko).² But the brahmin students Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja have heard from their respective teachers differing accounts on which practices lead to the goal that they both desire. And so they decide to approach Gotama the Buddha to see whether he can decide which party is right in this very important dispute.

On being told the nature of the dispute between Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja, Gotama Buddha begins by asking the disputants a few questions of his own, and the answers to the questions show that the young brahmins believe that there are many alternative paths that lead to Brahmā, but the dispute is really over which path is most direct. On learning this much, Gotama Buddha then pursues the supposition that there are paths that lead men to meet Brahmā face to face. What, asks the Buddha, entitles us to believe that anyone meets Brahmā face to

face? Prompted by Gotama's questions, the young brahmins concede that no living brahmin teacher claims ever to have seen Brahmā face to face, nor has any living brahmin teacher's teacher, nor has any teacher in the lineage of teachers for the past seven generations. Moreover, not even the Ṛṣis, the ancient seers who made the Vedas available to man and whose words the brahmin priests learn and chant and transmit down through the generations, claim to have seen Brahmā face to face. What we have then, is the astonishing state of affairs in which the followers of the brahmanical religious tradition are striving towards a goal for the existence of which no one has any evidence. Their religious goal, says the Buddha, is laughable (hassaka), vain (rittaka) and empty (tucchaka).³

It is not only fellowship with God that is dismissed in this way. Very nearly the same treatment is given to a Jaina disciple and his teacher in the Cūḷa-Sakuladāyī-sutta and the Vekhanassa-sutta respectively, suttas seventy-nine and eighty in the Majjhima Nikāya. Here the Jainas are depicted as seeking after a "highest lustre," a lustre superior to which and more excellent than which there is nothing. On hearing of this unsurpassed lustre, the Buddha's response is exactly the same as his reaction to the idea of comradeship with the mighty lord and creator of all beings: he challenges the devotees to point to that to which they are devoted. When they cannot do so, Gotama spins out an analogy to illustrate to the devotees the nature of their search. They are, he says, like a young man who goes about saying "I love and cherish the loveliest woman in the land," but who cannot say whether she is of high birth or low, of pale complexion or dark, a city-dweller or a villager, and does not even know what her name is. In short, the poor fool does not know, directly or indirectly, the identity of the woman with whom he claims to be in love. We are entitled to wonder, then, whether he is really in love at all.

The Buddha's reaction to those who seek to meet the creator or who seek the unsurpassed lustre is not to deny that such things exist. Rather, it is to take the epistemologically cautious stand that even though the loveliest woman in the world may exist, one might very well see the person who uniquely answers to the description of the world's loveliest woman and yet not realize *that* she is the person who answers to that description. Furthermore, it is not clear how one could

ever be certain that a given woman were the loveliest in the world, unless he could see every woman in the world and know that he had seen every woman. Similarly, it is not clear how a religious seeker could be sure that he had correctly identified the greatest lustre or the master over whom no other being has mastery. And, as we see in the Brahmajāla Sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya, the case can be made that people often misinterpret religious experiences and draw false conclusions from them, which should make one suspicious of even the very claims of direct experience of such things as unsurpassed masters. Until his identification of the supreme being is specific and certain, the religious seeker may be said to be pursuing such an ill-defined and nebulous goal that it becomes difficult to determine whether a given set of practices leads toward or away from the desired goal. In contrast, the goal of nirvāna towards which Gotama's disciples strive is sufficiently definite — the elimination of selfish desire and hostility — that a disciple can have a very clear idea of whether he has or has not reached it and whether he is or is not making progress toward it. It is a goal to be realized in this life, not in some future existence, says Gotama, and he makes no promises to anyone other than that nirvāna can be achieved by anyone who strives diligently to attain it. The definiteness of the goal of Buddhist striving is what makes that goal more worthy of pursuit than the goals of the Brāhmaṇas and the Jainas — this seems to be the message so tirelessly repeated in the Nikāyas. And so the Buddha Gotama is portrayed not as an atheist who claims to be able to prove God's nonexistence, but rather as a skeptic with respect to other teachers' claims to be able to lead their disciples to the highest good.

The above described reactions of the Buddha to the claims of other religious teachers are simply instances of his well-known aversion to speculative views concerning matters that are beyond man's ken. Speculation about such matters as whether the universe is beginningless or had a definite point at which it came into being was regarded as a distraction from pursuits closer at hand, and time spent thinking about such things was regarded as wasted time that could more profitably be spent on gradually ridding oneself of those counter-productive attitudes and beliefs that, when acted upon, bring further distress rather than the desired relief from the inconveniences of the

human condition. That the attitude of the Buddha as portrayed in the Nikāyas is more anti-speculative than specifically atheistic is illustrated by a refrain that is frequently repeated in the Brahmajāla Sutta. Here Gotama the Buddha differentiates himself from other teachers on the grounds that he, unlike them, does not propound doctrines concerning the nature of the self after death. Furthermore, unlike other teachers, the Buddha realizes that "these dogmatic tenets thus taken up and thus embraced will lead to such and such consequences and will lead to such and such a destiny."⁴ What the reader of this sutta is left to conclude is that if the consequences of embracing certain tenets about the existence of the self were healthy, then Gotama would certainly recommend that his followers embrace them; but, since he in fact repeatedly warns people to avoid embracing certain tenets, there must be something about them that he regards as unhealthy or counter-productive.

Some insight into why it is that Gotama regarded the belief in God as unhealthy, as an obstacle to spiritual progress, can be gained by looking at the Devadaha-sutta, the one hundred first discourse in the Majjhima Nikāya.⁵ Here we find an enumeration of the types of reasons that people often give for why they experience pleasure and pain. Among the five reasons, one is that pleasure and pain are created by God (issara). This view is not refuted in the sutta in question, which is a polemical dialogue against the Jainas. All that is said is that *if* God creates pleasure and pain, then the Jainas are made by an evil creator who inflicts much suffering on them through their programme of austerities; the Buddha, on the other hand, feels only pleasant feelings in his dispassionate state, and so, if pleasure be created by God, then the Buddha's creator must be a kind one. The other theories, incidentally, as to why men experience pleasure and pain are that such experiences are (1) the result of actions done in the past, (2) the result of fate, (3) innate to certain species of beings, and (4) the outcome of efforts undertaken in the present life. A Buddhist monk, says this sutta, realizes that the source of all displeasure is self-centred craving (taṇhā), while the source of pleasure is nonattachment and dispassion. And so, while the reader is left to conclude that it is attachment rather than God, actions in past lives, fate, type of birth or efforts in this life that is responsible for our experiences of sorrow, no

systematic argument is given in an attempt to disprove the existence of God.

Nor do we encounter actual arguments against the existence of a creator god in later Theravāda works such as Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*. Here it is explained that the Buddha's teaching that craving is the root cause of all distress is offered as a corrective to such false theories as that the world with all its woes is the creation of a god (*issara*), or that it is an evolution of primordial matter (*padhāna*) as in the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy, or that it is a product of time or fate or that it is an accidental by-product of material elements.⁶ But how and why these theories are false is not explained.

2.0. VASUBANDHU'S DISCUSSION OF DIVINE CREATION

Like Buddhaghosa, the dogmatist Vasubandhu refers to alternative accounts of how the world and its attendant suffering began, and he too refers to the views that it began through divine creation, through an evolution of primordial matter, or on account of time, fate or pure chance. Unlike Buddhaghosa, however, Vasubandhu supplies arguments designed to show why these various theories are inadequate. Concerning the theory of divine creation of the world, Vasubandhu focuses his attention on three issues. First, he explores the question of how a single, undivided God, existing at all times, can create a complex universe the parts of which arise in temporal sequence. Second, he examines God's psychological motivation in creating the world. And third, he looks into the relationship between God as principal creator and auxiliary causal factors that go into making up the world. Vasubandhu treats these issues in about one page of Sanskrit prose. Later Buddhist philosophers wrote more extensively on each of these three issues than did Vasubandhu, but for the most part they did not explore other issues beyond these three. Let us look at the issues one by one, seeing first how Vasubandhu treated each one and then how later philosophers expanded on his treatment.

2.1. GOD'S UNITY

The position that Vasubandhu and most other Buddhist scholastics

accepted is that the world is caused by a virtually infinite number of causes, namely, the intentional actions of the countless sentient beings who have lived through all beginningless time. The belief that there is a single entity responsible for the rich diversity of experiences is fundamentally wrong-headed. "The world," says Vasubandhu, "does not have a single cause. Although they generate their own actions in birth after birth, the poor wretches of unripened wisdom, who experience the consequences of their own actions, wrongly contrive a supreme God."⁷ And so it should be noted at the outset that Vasubandhu's arguments are designed to demonstrate the untenability of *any* theory whereby the world's diversity is traced to a single source. In particular, Vasubandhu points out that all his arguments for the necessary plurality of causes does as much damage to the Sāṃkhya theory of primordial matter (*pradhāna*, or *prakṛti*) as to the theory of divine creation.⁸

Given that understanding of Vasubandhu's own position, let us see how he criticized the positions that were contradictory to it. He begins by saying:

If the world had a single cause, whether that single cause be God or something else, the entire universe would have to arise all at once. But what we observe is that beings occur one after another. Now that fact could be a function of God's intending for each individual thing that it arise at a given time and disappear later. But in that case, since there are numerous intentions, it would turn out that the cause of the world is manifold. Moreover, that plurality of intentions would be simultaneous, for the reason that God, which is their source, putatively has no internal divisions.⁹

As will be discussed more fully below in section 3, this argument, or various modifications of it, was one to which Buddhist academics repeatedly resorted, not only in their arguments against theism but also in their arguments against any hypothetical entity that was supposed to retain its singularity while possessing a plurality of parts or characteristics. By the time of Vasubandhu a real thing (*dravyasat vastu*) is defined as any ultimate simple, that is, anything that cannot be reduced either physically or conceptually into smaller components.¹⁰ Consistent with that understanding of what it means for something to be a real thing, Vasubandhu argues that if it is claimed that God is real and therefore simple, then it cannot consistently be said that he also have a plurality of separate intentions, one for each

object in the universe. But if God's uniformity is taken seriously, then he must have only one intention that is applicable to everything at once. And if that single intention is "Let it be," then everything must be at once. A simple God can create, it would seem, only a perfectly static universe. But the universe that we experience is not static.

Vasubandhu anticipates one objection to the above line of reasoning: "Now one might argue that even if God's intentions occur all at once, the [created] universe need not do so, since it is created in accordance with divine will."¹¹ God's mind could have exactly the same set of intentions at each moment in history, and in that case it could not be said that he undergoes change. His unchanging set of intentions could be: "Let A be at t_a , B at t_b , C at t_c . . . X at t_x ." Each event in history could then occur in the sequence that we observe and still the sequence could occur according to a constant set of volitions. Vasubandhu rejects this possibility, saying: "That is not so, because there is nothing that distinguishes those [intentions at one time] from [those that occur] later."¹² The point appears to be that if God's set of volitions is constantly in the form "Let all the events of history occur in a prescribed order," the problem still remains that in order for the intentions to be realized by being translated into action, some change must occur in something; some potentiality must be converted into an actuality. That change that must occur cannot occur in God himself, for he is changeless. It must, then, occur outside God. But if that which converts God's intentions into actions is something outside God, then we should say that it, rather than God, is the creator of the universe.

This question of how potentiality becomes actuality is taken up somewhat more fully in Dharmakīrti's arguments adduced to demonstrate the nonexistence of God. The first observation that Dharmakīrti makes is that a permanent, unchanging entity such as God would have to have exactly the same nature before the creation of the world as after; there would be no difference whatsoever between God as creator and God as a being that is not yet a creator.¹³ To be a cause of something is to undergo some change, as when a seed and the earth in which it is planted undergo changes in nature as they evolve into a shoot.¹⁴ But if God suffers no changes in nature, then he surely cannot be regarded as the cause of anything.¹⁵ Even if

there is no apparent change in nature within the cause itself, there must be some change in at least the cause's circumstances. For example, it must move from one place to another, or it must come into contact with an object with which it was not previously in contact. A weapon, for example, can be recognized as the cause of a wound in the body only if the body is not wounded before contact with the weapon, then contacts the weapon, and immediately upon such contact develops a wound. But if God is supposed to be omnipresent and therefore always in contact with everything, it cannot then be the case that God comes into contact with a thing with which he was not previously in contact, and so it is impossible that a change in some object be due solely to that object's change in relationship with God.¹⁶

Central to Dharmakīrti's argument is the claim that no action is possible without change, and so no unchanging thing can perform the action of creating the universe. In this connection he anticipates a possible counterexample that might be cited to disprove this central claim. A sense object such as a patch of colour apparently undergoes no change at all when it is perceived, and yet it is acknowledged as a cause of sight, as can be shown by pointing out that sight occurs when a patch of colour is present and fails to occur when no visible object is present. Is it not possible, therefore, that God can be an unchanging cause of the universe in the same way that a patch of colour is an unchanging cause of vision?¹⁷ Dharmakīrti replies to this hypothetical counterargument by stating the principle that nothing can become an actuality without first being a potential. A visible object could never actually be seen unless it had the potential to be seen, and so a sense object must have an intrinsic potential to be sensed, and this potential must be in some way triggered into actuality. Similarly, if God is a creator of the universe, it must be admitted that he has a potential to create that exists prior to his actually creating anything. But if this is so, we must ask how that potential becomes realized. A visible object's potential to be seen, for example, is triggered into actuality by factors extrinsic to the visible object itself; there must be such factors as light, a sentient being with a functioning eye and an attentive mind and so forth, or else the potentially visible object cannot actually be seen. But is there a similar set of factors extrinsic to God that are required to trigger his potential to create? If so, then God is at least not a

sufficient condition for creation of the universe — whether or not he is a necessary condition is a separate question, to which we shall return in section 2.3 below. But if there are no factors extrinsic to God that are required to trigger his potential to create, then the conversion of God's potentiality into actuality must be seen as an action that he himself performs. But if God performs an action, then he must undergo change and thus cannot be permanent.

Dharmakīrti could also have pointed out in this context that serious problems result from saying that a thing has an intrinsic potential to act. For following the parallel to an argument made in another context, we can see that if we claim that a certain object has an intrinsic potential to act, then we are forced to conclude that the object realizes that potential in every moment of its existence.¹⁸ For otherwise we have no means of explaining why that which is a mere potential at one moment becomes an actuality in the next. Just as an object that has an intrinsic potential to perish must perish in every moment of its existence (and must, therefore, exist for only one moment), so also God, if he has a wholly intrinsic potential to create, must create in every moment of his existence. But this means that there is never a time when God exists and the created universe does not. If God is beginningless, then so is the universe. And if the universe is beginningless, there is no creation after all and therefore no need to answer the question of who brought the creation about.

Post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist academics, such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, provided a natural corollary to Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti's conclusions that a changeless being cannot perform the action of creation. Not only can a changeless being not create the world of sequential events, says Śāntarakṣita, but he cannot even know about the world of change. Even if there were a simple, beginningless and endless being endowed with the faculty of intelligence, such a being could not know the events of the transitory world, for if such a being knew each event separately as it occurred, then he would have a plurality of cognitive acts and would lose his unity. But if he knew all events at once, then he would not know the essential characteristic of events, which is that they occur in sequence. Knowing all events in history at once would be like hearing every note in a melody played at once rather than in sequence. Just as the essence of a melody lies in

the sequentiality of the notes rather than in the mere presence of the notes, the essence of history lies in the sequentiality of events. And so, concluded Śāntarakṣita, if God is indeed simple and eternally changeless, he cannot participate in or know about history, and so those of us who are caught in history can derive no benefit from God's existence at all.

As can be seen from the above discussions, Vasubandhu's claim that a complex world cannot have a simple and thus eternal cause was a very powerful and rich claim indeed, which thinkers were still exploring and expanding upon for several centuries.

2.2. GOD'S MOTIVATIONS

A second question that Vasubandhu raises about the theory of divine creation focuses on the issue of why a self-sufficient and supposedly perfect being would either need or wish to create anything at all. Vasubandhu asks:

For what purpose would God expend so much effort in creating the world? Perhaps for pleasure? Well, if God cannot make an effort without pleasure, then he has no control over that, and thus he has no control over anything else either!¹⁹

Even more alarming than the possibility that God's creation of the universe was a mere indulgence in hedonism is the possibility that it was an act of cruelty, as evidenced by God's apparent willingness to allow his creatures to err and to suffer for their errors:

And if God allows his creatures to be afflicted in hells by many guardians and takes pleasure in that, then we should prostrate ourselves before such a God as that! For the verse composed about him is very apt that goes:

Because he torments, because he is severe,
because he is cruel and full of might,
because he devours flesh, blood and marrow
they call him the Dreadful (Rudra).²⁰

In contrast to the argument concerning the impossibility of the creator's unity, which became the principal Buddhist argument against the existence of God, this issue of the creator's motivations was not stressed by Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla. In his Nyāyamañjarī, however, the Hindu theistic philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

devotes a section to arguments adduced by atheists before providing his own arguments in favour of God's existence. Among the arguments that Jayanta cites against God's existence is a version of Vasubandhu's question concerning motivations:

Did the Lord of creation undertake the creation of the universe just as it is after he had pondered upon a purpose? If the undertaking were purposeless, then he would be like a madman, in that his actions would not be preceded by reflection.²¹

But, Jayanta reports his atheist opponent as saying, God is putatively endowed with every possible joy and is free of passionate desire, and so it is difficult to see what he would think he had to gain by creating a universe without which he is already quite content. The standard answer that the theist gives to this question is that God created the world out of compassion. But, says Jayanta's adversary, for whom are we to believe that God has compassion? Compassion is a response to beings who are in pain. But surely there can have been no beings in pain before the creation of the universe; indeed, it was precisely because of the creation that previously contented souls began to feel pain and anguish. Moreover, since God is supposedly omnipotent, he might have created a universe in which sentient beings felt only joy and happiness instead of this sorry world in which what little pleasure there is is fleeting and serves only to taunt us in our misery. Perhaps we can conclude only that the creation was a joke (*krīḍā*) that God played to amuse himself. But, Jayanta has the atheist say, if the creation was a joke, it is one the humour of which is too subtle for the sentient beings to appreciate: "Neither is the Magnanimous One's joke appropriate, which causes dread in all his creatures, nor is this great effort to play it."²²

As effective as this investigation into divine psychology might be in casting doubt upon the purity of the creator's motivation in making the world such as ours, this line of attack was not as commonly used by Buddhist academics as the more fundamentally persuasive arguments based on metaphysical considerations such as the problem of God's unity and permanence. There is no need, then, for us to dwell any longer upon the teleological issue.

2.3. GOD AS ONE CAUSAL FACTOR AMONG OTHERS

We have already seen how Vasubandhu, who was followed in this by Dharmakīrti, argued that God cannot be regarded as a sufficient condition of creation, that is, as a wholly self-sufficient creator with an innate self-actualizing potential to enact the creation of the world. But the possibility still remains open that God might be one of several necessary conditions in the origin of the universe. Historically, in fact, this view of creation, whereby God is a sentient, noncorporeal agent whose volition puts coeternal atoms into motion to make up macroscopic corporeal forms and puts eternal souls into these created physical bodies, is the one adopted by most Indian theists, who generally condemned the theory of *creatio ex nihilo* as absurd. In dealing with the possibility that God requires factors outside himself in order to create the universe, Vasubandhu first considers the possibility that the creator's dependence upon other things is due to his being himself an effect of other causes. If anyone were to hold such a view, then he would have to answer what it was that caused the creator's causes and so on *ad infinitum*. In fact, says Vasubandhu, this theory amounts to admitting that the universe is beginningless, which is the view accepted by Buddhists; but if one accepts that the universe is beginningless, there is of course no need to posit a creator at all.²³

The possibility that God's dependence upon other things is in the nature of his being the effect of those other things is not to be taken very seriously, since no one actually advocates such a view, and Vasubandhu's refutation of it must be seen as a result of a good philosopher's penchant for thoroughness. Far more serious, however, is the claim that the world made up of insentient matter requires some conscious force to put it into motion. The principal argument of the theistic philosophers in India, in fact, was that since all complex products require sentient makers and since the universe is a complex product, the universe must have a sentient maker.

The above argument was one that the Buddhist academics tended not to reject; the medieval Indian Buddhists, in other words, did not advocate a position anything like the view accepted by most modern thinkers to the effect that the universe is for the most part uninhabited and that sentient life is a development that has come about relatively

recently in the history of an inconceivably vast expanse of lifeless matter. On the contrary, Buddhist mythology and systematic philosophy generally endorsed the view that the vast universe is everywhere populated by sentient beings and that the shape the universe takes is an accommodation to the force of the constant fruition of the multitudes of deeds performed by those sentient beings throughout the history of a beginningless universe. The medieval Buddhist view, in other words, is no more attuned to modern scientific views than is the theistic view of creation that the Buddhist academics sought to refute. What in particular Vasubandhu rejected in the theistic theory that the universe is sustained and influenced by noncorporeal sentience was the alleged *unity* of that sentience. If the material universe obeys the dictates of only one sentient force, namely God, then human beings and other sentient beings must be ultimately powerless, and their role in making all the manufactured items of ordinary life must ultimately be denied. As Vasubandhu puts the matter:

He who accepts that there is but one cause of the universe must deny the obvious human effort in other matters. And he who fancies God as a creator along with [other] causal factors would merely be proclaiming his devotion, for we do not observe the operation of anything other than [the other] causal factors when something arises from them.²⁴

Dharmakīrti did not develop this argument in his discussion of the theory of divine creation, but Śāntaraksita expanded Vasubandhu's argument considerably. First, Śāntaraksita recapitulates the theist's claim as follows: "Others regard God as the cause of all things that are produced. No insentient being, they say, produces its effects by itself."²⁵ But, he argues later, granting that an insentient universe cannot put itself into motion does not force us to conclude that there is but *one* sentient being who motivates insentient nature. On the contrary, in everything that we observe in the world around us we see that a multiplicity of effects is preceded by a multiplicity of creators. It takes many ants to make an anthill, and many men to construct a city and all the things in it; potters make pots, weavers make cloth, carpenters build houses and so forth, but we never observe that behind all these many manufacturers of things there is but a single sentient being at work with a single will.²⁶ If there were but a single purposive will driving all apparently independent sentient beings, there would be no

conflicts among beings, but this is hardly what we in fact observe. And so, concludes Śāntaraksita, "We have no dispute with what is claimed in general, namely, that [products] are preceded by something intelligent, for diversity is born of deliberate action. In the argument for [products] being preceded by a single, eternal intelligence, the conclusion is frivolous and [the evidence is] inconclusive, because it is observed that palaces and so forth are built by many people."²⁷

Closely related to the general issue of whether God is one factor among many in building and sustaining the universe is the contention held by some theists that God's function is an essentially administrative one in that he keeps an account of all the deeds of his creatures and dispenses retribution in accordance with merit. The crucial question to be asked in this connection, say the Buddhists, is whether or not God actually tampers in any way with anyone's stock of merit and demerit. If not, then it must be admitted that God is essentially doing nothing more than being aware of the natural process of the ripening of past deeds that would presumably take place whether or not he were conscious of it. God would then be much like us, a powerless bystander witnessing a series of virtually inevitable events. Positing such a god has no explanatory value, and paying respects to such an impotent figure would provide little comfort to the worshipper. And so, if God's administrative talents are to command our respect, it would appear to be more promising to assume that God can and does play a decisive role in the maturation of the seeds of past deeds into present realities. And to say that God plays a decisive role amounts to saying that he accomplishes something that the natural fruition process itself would not accomplish. But what can God accomplish that could not be accomplished by a natural process of individual karmic seeds maturing into new realities? The most likely answer to this question is that God must somehow be able to alter the karmic configurations of sentient beings, to give beings rewards and punishments that they do not rightly deserve on the basis of the moral momentum of their own actions. But if God has this power to give those beings under his care gratuitous benefits, then we are entitled to ask why he does not consistently exercise this power so that all beings might always be happy. That he does not do so would appear to indicate either God's insensitivity to our pain or his cruel willingness

to see us undergo suffering that he could easily prevent. And so, the Buddhists conclude, whether God is unable to help us, unwilling to help us or unaware that we need help, he is of little value to man. We are better off conducting our affairs on our own powers and acting as if there is no divine power to help us in the task at hand, which is to transform our characters in such a way that we do only meritorious actions that naturally ripen into happy experiences in the present and future.

3.0. THE PROBLEM OF UNITY IN GOD, INDIVIDUALS AND UNIVERSALS

Of the issues concerning the existence of God that have been outlined above, the one that received the greatest attention from the Indian Buddhist academic tradition was that of the possibility of God's unity, simplicity and permanence.²⁸ In fact, this principal argument for the nonexistence of God may be seen as a special application of a form of argument that occurs repeatedly in Buddhist metaphysical treatises, it being but another instance of the general Buddhist preoccupation with the problem of unity in diversity. Generally speaking, the Buddhist philosophers denied the existence of anything that was supposed to retain its unity while occurring in or being related to a plurality of things, as this verse from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* acknowledges:

Personal identity, continuum, groups, causal conditions, atoms, primordial matter, and God the creator are regarded as mere ideas.²⁹

Why each of these items is regarded as a purely conceptual fiction is that each is construed as a unity that is composed of a plurality of components. To give an exhaustive account of all occurrences of the Buddhist treatment of the one-many problem would be to tell nearly the whole story of Indian Buddhist philosophy, which is a bit like a symphony played on a one-stringed violin. Rather than attempting that monumental task here, let me simply outline four issues that at first glance might seem unrelated but which all turn out to be versions of the fundamental Buddhist claim that no whole exists over and above the existence of individual parts. Following this, I shall indicate briefly

how this same fundamental claim was behind the Buddhist rejection of real universals and real relations.

3.1. WHOLES AND PARTS

Among the first Buddhist philosophical writings to become familiar to a relatively wide audience within the English-reading world was the celebrated *Questions of King Milinda*. In this text the monk Nāgasena is depicted as explaining to King Milinda that the personal identity that most people naively believe they possess is in fact no more than a mere designation, a convenient fiction. To demonstrate this principle, Nāgasena argues that the person is, like a chariot, really analyzable into discrete components, any one of which may be altered or replaced or deleted without impairing the supposed integrity of the collection of those parts.³⁰ Just as a chariot's wheel can be replaced without altering the chariot's "identity" — that is, without making it a different chariot — a person's body can undergo changes, and some habits can be replaced by others, and knowledge can be gained or lost, and all these changes can occur without changing the person's "identity." But when we inquire into where this so-called identity resides, we find that it cannot reside in its totality in any one component part, nor can it reside in the set of parts taken as a whole. For if, let us say, the entire identity of the chariot were to reside in, for example, the left wheel, then the chassis and the axle and the right wheel would not be parts of the chariot at all, for the chariot would be just the left wheel. And if the left wheel should break and be replaced, we should have to say that the entire chariot was broken and replaced by an entirely different chariot. On the other hand, if we assume that the identity of the chariot resides in the collection of parts taken as a whole, then, since the whole changes any time any part changes, to replace any part would be to change the identity of the whole; to replace a single screw in the chariot would be to create a wholly different chariot. But it goes against our intuitions of the chariot's identity to say either that the chassis is not part of the chariot or that the change of a tiny part creates an entirely different chariot. This intuition of identity, then, is no more than an intuition. It resides

purely in the mind of the beholder and has no counterpart in the world outside the mind. What we take to be a person is in fact devoid of personal identity. Further arguments along this line are developed in Vasubandhu (pp. 461–479) and throughout the Buddhist academic tradition.

In Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika under Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.31–33 there is a discussion concerning whether or not it is justifiable to infer, when one sees the part of a tree that one is facing, that the tree has a backside as well. Uddyotakara represents the Buddhists as being unable to regard such an inference as justifiable. In order to use an observation of A to serve as a sign of B, say the Buddhists, one must have seen A and B together at some point and one must never have seen A without B. But it is impossible to see the face and back of a three-dimensional object simultaneously, and so one can never legitimately conclude that there is a backside to a tree or any other large object that one is facing. The Naiyāyika is spared from having to hold such a patently silly view, thinks Uddyotakara, because he believes it possible to see not only the parts of the tree but the tree itself as a whole object. To see the front of a tree is to see a tree, and to see a tree is to know immediately that it must have a backside as well, since having sides facing all directions is part of what it is to be a tree. But the Buddhists, says Uddyotakara, continue to dispute this Naiyāyika claim by availing themselves of the following line of argument. We cannot say that the tree-as-a-whole resides entirely in any one part, such as a single leaf, for if that part were destroyed we should then have to say that the whole tree was destroyed. On the other hand, we cannot say that the tree-as-a-whole exists only partially in the single leaf, since that would entail admitting that the tree-as-a-whole is partite, which runs counter to our intuition that a whole is a unit rather than a mere assemblage of smaller units. And so, say the Buddhists, the tree-as-a-unit resides only in our mind and is not something that can be seen or in any way sensed as a datum of the world external to awareness.

In Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti under kārikā 5.50, Dinnāga argues that proper names (*yadr̥cchāśabda*), usually regarded as words that apply only to given individuals, are in fact a type of class noun, since what we ordinarily think of as individuals are in fact complex objects. And

so, just as the word "cow" applies to a plurality of objects that the intellect gathers together and treats as a unit called a class, a proper name like "Devadatta" applies to a plurality of traits that the intellect collects and treats as a unit called a person. But persons and classes are both convenient fictions for the supposed unity of which there is no justification in the facts of the world external to consciousness.

In the examples given so far, objects that are usually regarded naively as units have turned out on closer reflection to be complexes that because of their complexity in fact lack unity. Atoms, on the other hand, are defined as absolute simples in that they are divisions of matter than which nothing could be smaller. But the only unity than which nothing could be smaller must be without any dimension at all and so must not be a unit of matter at all, since unlike all other matter the atom cannot occupy space and be resistant to other units of matter occupying the same space. The same arguments are applied in some Buddhist works to the smallest possible unit of time, the moment (*kṣaṇa*).

Individuality, then, is merely an idea (*cittamātra*), say the Buddhist academics, for reason shows that things that are given in experience as existing, such phenomena as persons and chariots, have no real individuality, while things that theoretically have true individuality, such things as atoms and moments, cannot really exist.

3.2. UNIVERSALS AND RELATIONS

At Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.1–4, Dinnāga argues that the intellect's act of gathering a plurality of individuals together under a single concept is done without any basis in a real unity binding the objects together in the world external to consciousness. There are, in other words, no real universals that retain their unity while residing in a plurality of individuals. At Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.17 Dinnāga argues that if there were such a thing as a universal like cowness, then either it would have to reside in its entirety in a single individual cow or it would have to reside partially in each individual cow. In the former case there would then be only one cow, which is not what we in fact observe. In the latter case the universal cowhood would have internal divisions and so would not be a unity, which runs counter to the usual

definition of a universal. Therefore universals do not reside in objects in any way at all, says Diñnāga; rather, they are superimposed by the mind upon the objects of experience.

Using an argument that is parallel to the argument against the existence of real universals, Diñnāga concludes that there are also no relations in the real world. For a relation is supposed to be a unity that binds a plurality of relata together. But if the relation is a real object in the world, then it must reside either wholly in a single relatum or partially in each, neither of which consequences is possible. Similarly, resemblance cannot be a real feature of objects in the world, for resemblance is a kind of relation. Resemblance, like any other relation and like universals, is something that the intellect superimposes upon the objects of experience rather than something that is a discovered feature of objects that they have outside our experience of them.

4.0. CONCLUSION

The doctrine that there is no permanent creator who superintends creation and takes care of his creatures accords quite well with each of the principles known as the four noble truths of Buddhism. The first truth, that distress is universal, is traditionally expounded in terms of the impermanence of all features of experience and in terms of the absence of genuine unity or personal identity in the multitude of physical and mental factors that constitute what we experience as a single person. As we saw above, the principal Buddhist arguments against the existence of God focus on the impossibility of permanence and unity in the causal structure of the universe. The second noble truth, that distress is the outcome of one's own unrealistic aspirations, is traditionally seen as ruling out the erroneous view that distress is something inflicted upon creatures by a cosmic superintendent or by other circumstances completely beyond their control. The third noble truth, that distress can be eliminated by divesting oneself of all unrealistic aspirations, rules out the view that sentient beings, as powerless victims of a divine will, have no alternative to a life of constant frustration. And the fourth noble truth, that the best means of removing unrealistic desires is to follow a methodical course of

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self-discipline, counters the view that the road to happiness lies in obedience to divine will or in trying to manipulate the sentiments of a cosmic intelligence through prayer or ritual.

Atheism, then, is a doctrine of fundamental importance within Buddhist religious philosophy rather than a mere accretion acquired through historical accident. As such it was a doctrine for which the Buddhist apologists during the academic period were strongly motivated to find good arguments. Although a variety of arguments were used, the most frequently used and the most powerful was a special application of the general Buddhist commitment to the principle that there can be no real unity binding together any plurality of things and that all notions of unity in plurality are therefore superimposed gratuitously upon experience by the experiencing mind. From this same principle the Buddhist scholastics in India also derived their commitment to nominalism or conceptualism in the realm of linguistic philosophy and to the theory of radical momentariness in the realm of metaphysics.

NOTES

¹ Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 18.

² Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 235.

³ Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 240.

⁴ "Tayidam, bhikkave, Tathāgato pajānāti: 'Ime ditthitthānā evaṃ-gahitā evaṃ-parāmatthā evaṃ-gatikā bhavissanti evaṃ-abhisamparāyā ti.'" Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 30.

⁵ Chalmers (1898), pp. 214–228.

⁶ "samudayañānam issarapadhānakālasabhāvādīhi loko pavattati ti akāraṇe kāraṇābhīmānapavattam hetumhi vipattipattim." (Knowledge of the origin [of distress] puts an end to misconception with respect to causes, which concerns the belief that something is a cause when it is not, such as that the world arises owing to God, primordial matter, time or the inherent properties [of the material elements].) Buddhaghosa, p. 1156.

⁷ "tasmān na lokasyaikarṇi kāraṇam asti. svāny evaiśām karmāṇi tasyāṇi tasyāṇi jātau janayanti. akṛtabuddhayaṃ tu varākāḥ svaṇi svaṇi vipākaphalaṃ cānubhavanta īśvaram aparāṇi mithyā parikalpayanti." Vasubandhu, p. 102, under Abhidharmakośa 2.64.

⁸ "evaṃ pradhāne'pi yathāyogaṃ vācyam." Vasubandhu, p. 102.

⁹ "yadi hy ekam eva kāraṇam īśvaraḥ syād anyad vā yugapat sarveṇa jagatā bhavitavyaṃ syāt. dr̥ṣyate ca bhāvānāṃ kramasāmbhavaḥ. sa tarhi cchandavaśād īśvarasya syād ayam idānim utpadyatām nirudhyatām ayam pascād iti. cchandabhedāt tarhi siddham anekarṇi kāraṇam syāt. sa cāpi cchandabhedo yugapat syāt taddhetor īśvarasyābhinnatvāt." Vasubandhu, pp. 101–102.

¹⁰ yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat/
ghatārthavat samvrtisat paramārthasad anyathā//AK 6.4//
Vasubandhu, p. 334.

¹¹ “yaugapadye’piśvaracchandānām jagato na yaugapadyam. yathācchandam
utpādanād iti cet.” Vasubandhu, p. 102.

¹² “na. teṣām paścād viśeṣābhāvāt.” Vasubandhu, p. 102.

¹³ yathā tat kāraṇam vastu tathaiva tad akāraṇam/
yadā tat kāraṇam kena mataṁ neṣṭam akāraṇam//PV 1.23//

(That thing [which like God is permanent] is exactly the same way when it is not a
cause as when it is a cause. When it is a cause, by what is it so recognized? Why is it
not believed [to remain] a noncause?) Dharmakīrti, p. 16.

¹⁴ svabhāvapariṇāmena hetur aṅkurajanmani/
bhūmyādis tasya saṁskāre tadviśeṣasya darśanāt//PV 1.27//

(Soil and so forth, owing to a transformation of nature, is a cause of a seedling’s
arising, since the seedling’s attributes [such as growth] are observed in the soil’s
constitution.) Dharmakīrti, p. 17.

¹⁵ svabhāvabhedena vinā vyāpāro’pi na yujyate/
nityasyāvvyatirekatvāt sāmārthyaṁ ca duranvayam//PV 1.25//

(No activity is possible without a change in nature. Since a permanent thing is
unchanging, its capacity to act is hard to believe.) Dharmakīrti, p. 17.

¹⁶ śāstrausaḍhābhisaṁbandhāc caitrasya vranarohane/
asaṁbaddhasya kiṁ sthānoḥ kāraṇatvaṁ na kalpyate//PV 1.24//

(Owing to his contact with a weapon or with medicines, Caitra gets wounded or
healed. But a permanent thing that is disassociated [from activity] is not considered to
be a cause.) Dharmakīrti, pp. 16–17.

¹⁷ yathā viśeṣeṇa vinā viśayendriyasamhātih/
buddher hetus tathedaṁ cet . . .//PV 1.28//

(But could this [creation of the world by God] be similar to a sense-faculty’s
contacting a sense-object, which without changing [serves as] a cause of awareness?)
Dharmakīrti, p. 17.

¹⁸ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (pp. 453 f.) reports a Buddhist argument for momentariness based
on the principle that if a thing has an intrinsic, self-realizing potential, then that
potential must be constantly actualized, for otherwise there is no accounting for how
the potential becomes actualized just when it does and no sooner or later.

¹⁹ “kaś ca tāvad īśvarasyeyatā sargaprayāsenārthaḥ. yadi prītiḥ tām tarhi
nāntareṇopāyaṁ śaktaḥ karttum iti na tasyām īśvaraḥ syāt tathaiva cānyasmin.”
Vasubandhu, p. 102.

²⁰ “yadi ceśvaraḥ narakādiṣu prajāṁ bahubhiś cetibhir upasṛṣṭam sṛṣṭvā tena prīyate
namo’stu tasmai tādrśāyeśvarāya. sugītaś cāyaṁ tam ārabhya śloko bhavati.

yan nirdahati yat tīkṣṇo yad ugro yat pratāpavān/
māṁsaṇitamajjādo yat tato rudra ucyate//

Vasubandhu, p. 102.

²¹ “kiṁ kimapi prayojanam anusaṁdhāya jagatsarge pravarttate prajāpatir evam eva
vā. niṣprayojanāyaṁ pravṛttāv apreksāpūrvakāritvād unmattatulyo’sau bhavet.” Jayanta
Bhaṭṭa, p. 192.

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²² na ca krīḍāpi niḥśeṣajanatātaṅkakāriṇī/
āyāsabahulā ceyam kartum yuktā mahātmanah//
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, p. 192.

²³ “kāraṇāntarabhedāpekṣane vā neśvara eva kāraṇam syāt. teṣām api ca kramotpattau
kāraṇāntarabhedāpekṣanād anavasthāpasaṅgah syād ity anantarabhedāyāḥ kāraṇa-
paramparāyā anāditvābhyupagamād ayam īśvarakāraṇādhimuktaḥ śākyapūrvīyam eva
nyāyaṁ nātivṛttaḥ syāt.” (On the other hand, if God is dependent on a variety of
other causal factors to create the world, then he is not in fact the cause of the world.
And if other causal factors arise one after another, then there would be an infinite
regress, since each would require a variety of anterior causes. And so he who believes
that God is the creator does not really reject the Buddhist position, since he too
believes that the sequence of causal conditions, in which one comes immediately after
the other, is beginningless.) Vasubandhu, p. 102.

²⁴ “ekaṁ khalv api jagataḥ kāraṇam pariḥṅhnatānyeṣām arthānām pratyakṣaḥ
puruṣakāro nihnutaḥ syāt. sahāpi ca kāraṇaiḥ kārakam īśvaraṁ kalpayatā kevalo
bhaktibādaḥ syāt. kāraṇebhyo’nyasya tadutpattau vyāpārādarśanāt.” Vasubandhu, p.
102.

²⁵ sarvotpattimatām īśam anye hetuṁ pracakṣate/
nācetanam svakāryāṇi kila prārabhate svayam//TS 46//
Śāntaraksita, p. 51.

²⁶ kintu nityaikasarvajñanīyabuddhisamāśrayaḥ/
sādhyavaikalyato’vyāpter na siddhiṁ upagacchati//TS 72//
tathā hi saudhasopānagapurāttālakādāyāḥ/
anekānīyavijñānapūrvakatvena niścītāḥ//TS 73//

(But [the world’s] dependence upon that which is eternal, one, and of unchanging,
omniscient mind is a conclusion that does not admit of proof. Because [the property
that the theist cites as evidence for that conclusion, namely, the fact that the world is
a complex product] is not pervaded [by the property of depending upon that which is
eternal, etc.], for the property that is in need of proof does not extend [to all created
things]. For example, such things as houses, staircases, gateways and towers are known
to be preceded by many beings with changing mental states.) Śāntaraksita, p. 63.

²⁷ buddhimatpūrvakatvaṁ ca sāmānyena yad īṣyate/
tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyam hi karmajam//TS 80//
nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhane sādhyasūnyatā/
vyabhicāras ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣanāt//TS 81//
Śāntaraksita, p. 65.

²⁸ Another issue that came to be frequently discussed by the academics after
Dīnāga’s time was that of God as a revealer of truths to which mankind would
without revelation have no access. As this issue has been treated in Hayes (1984), I
have not discussed it any further in the present writing.

²⁹ pudgalaḥ sarītatih skandhāḥ pratyayā aṇavas tathā/
pradhānam īśvaraḥ kartā cittamātraṁ vikalpyate//
Vaidya, p. 34.

³⁰ This discussion occurs in Śāstrī, pp. 19–20.

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VERIDICAL AND DELUSIVE COGNITION:
TSONG-KHA-PA ON THE TWO SATYAS

1. INTRODUCTION

In many Buddhist countries, Madhyamaka is the main philosophical point of view (*darśana*). In Tibet, Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419), the founder of the dGe-lugs school, was among those responsible for its pre-eminence, and through his influence it also came to be a subject of academic teaching and inquiry. In all four main schools the problems to which any writer on Madhyamaka must address himself if he expects to be taken seriously are, in the main, those discussed by him. He inherited many of them from Candrakīrti, and after him most Tibetan Mādhyamikas regarded themselves as *Prāsaṅgikas*¹ and as followers of Candrakīrti²; and if they criticized Tsong-kha-pa, it was for misinterpreting Candrakīrti. Now Candrakīrti treats the two satyas fairly simply, and so do earlier Tibetan Mādhyamikas such as rMa-bya-pa Byang-chub brTson-'grus. Tsong-kha-pa changed this: though he claimed merely to follow Candrakīrti, in his *rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho* (RG) on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* and his *dgongs-pa rab-gsal* (GR) on the *Madhyamakāvātāra* the treatment of the satyas is detailed and complex.

Possibly this detail and complexity reflect the influence of the Vajrayāna, which is a very central feature of Tibetan culture; Atīśa and Tsong-kha-pa were both experts on it, even though their reforms in Tibet were largely motivated by the view that the Vajrayāna had become undesirably prominent. While in Indian Buddhist thought Madhyamaka belongs primarily to the sūtra level or the *pāramitā-vehicle* (*pāramitāyāna*), in Tibet³ it increasingly supplied the philosophical point of view for the Vajrayāna⁴, as is plain even in such non-scholarly writers as Mi-la-ras-pa. Later on, Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Klong-chen-pa, Bu-ston, Tsong-kha-pa, Padma dKar-po and others attempted in various ways to construct large-scale systems of exegesis embracing both vehicles and organized round the *madhyamaka*-

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THE BUDDHA AS AN OWNER OF PROPERTY AND PERMANENT RESIDENT IN MEDIEVAL INDIAN MONASTERIES

Probably all would agree that understanding the way in which the 'person' of the Buddha was understood is central to any attempt to characterize the Indian groups that came to coalesce around that 'person'. In fact, understanding how that 'person' was understood or perceived has, it appears, often times determined how a great many other things were understood. The old Anglo-German school of Pāli scholarship, for example, saw the Buddha as a kind of sweetly reasonable Victorian Gentleman. Such a view dominated not only the scholarly world, but — as Philip Almond has recently shown¹ — the popular press of the day. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 'religion' attributed to him was understood as an orderly system of sweetly reasonable, rational Victorian ethics, a system which — significantly — was seen to carry an implicit 'native' criticism of the actual, observable religions of 19th Century India, and to point up their 'decline'.²

This view, like virtually every other one that followed it, was built up almost exclusively from a particular, if not peculiar, selected reading of literary sources. The later views, the views of the so-called Franco-Belgian school, in this regard at least differed not at all. They treated later sources to be sure, but still only literary sources. They took seriously the works of the later Vasubandhu, of Asaṅga and Haribhadra — works of the Early Medieval and Medieval Period. They determined, for example, that "the extreme Mahāyāna reduced the Buddha to two elements: . . . indescribable reality and the supra-rational intuition of this reality"; that the Buddha was understood to have not one, but two, three or — eventually — four bodies each thought of in ever increasingly more abstract terms; that, finally, the 'real' Buddha was thought to be "the Dharmakāya which has no flesh or blood or bones."³ In light of this understanding of the Buddha the 'Buddhism' of this period was understood as a collection of loosely

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connected, increasingly convoluted systems of abstract theory. This 'understanding' still confronts the neophyte when he or she approaches the standard textbooks dealing with Mahāyāna Buddhism.

It is at least curious that this particular Buddhology, based as it is almost exclusively on a narrowly limited corpus of highly specialized literature, has persisted in virtually all of the work done by modern scholars on the Medieval Period, the period that will concern us here. It is curious because already sixty years ago Louis de la Vallée Poussin — a man whose knowledge of Buddhist scholastic literature has probably not yet been equalled — unequivocally declared it to be incomplete and merely partial. At the end of his long discussion "sur les corps du Bouddha," itself largely taken up with the beginnings of the increasingly abstract conceptions of the early Medieval Period, de la Vallée Poussin said: "La description des théories abstraites n'est qu'une partie, non négligeable, de l'histoire de la bouddhologie."⁴ Buddhist studies has been slow to realize the implications of this — and many other — observations scattered throughout the still astounding body of work left by this Belgian scholar.

Because of this slowness the "abstract theories" have by default been left to stand as the sole representatives of Medieval Buddhist conceptions of the Buddha, and this in turn has left an almost permanent distortion of the 'doctrinal record', a distortion which would require the availability of other sources to remove. But such sources — at least some of them — have been available for a very long time, and de la Vallée Poussin, at the head of the same discussion already referred to, had already pointed us in a promising direction: "la vénération des corps," he said, "occupe une place notable dans l'épigraphie."⁵ de la Vallée Poussin was referring here primarily to the various "hymns" (*stava*) found, not commonly it now appears, in Buddhist inscriptions. But he was at least still pointing to an important source, a source which we too might do well to consider, although with a broader and less self-consciously literary selection.⁶

There are considerable numbers of Buddhist donative records and land grants which have survived from the Medieval Period.⁷ We might look at a sample of these — and it is only a sample — paying particular attention to their language, to what they say about both the Buddha's location, about where he was thought to be, and to what they say about his role in the 'transactions' being recorded.

Earlier inscriptions already contain some hints of what is to come, but they are somewhat ambiguous or can, at least, be understood in more than one way. An inscribed 1st Century slab from Kauśāmbī which has the Buddha's footprints carved on it says, for example: "(this) slab was caused to be made . . . in the residence of the Buddha, in the Ghosītārāma" (. . . *budhāvāse ghoṣitārāme . . . śilā kāṣṛitā*).⁸ Given the traditions which assert that the Buddha had actually lived on occasion at Kauśāmbī, the "residence of the Buddha" referred to here may not refer to a 'current' residence, but a structure or room where the Buddha was thought to have *formerly* resided.⁹

Similarly, the inscription on a faceted stone pillar from Mithouri which "may be assigned to the 2nd Century A.D." may also be interpreted in more than one way. It says the donor "caused an umbrella to be set up for the Blessed One, the Pitāmaha, the Fully and Completely Awakened One, in the Saptaparnṇa Monastery" (. . . *saptaparnṇa-vihāre bhagavat-pitāmahasya samyaksambuddhasya . . . chaṣṭram praṭiṣṭhāpayati*).¹⁰ Although in the end the differences in possible meaning may be small, the inscription can be understood to be saying either that the umbrella was set up for the Buddha who was himself in the monastery, or it may be saying that the umbrella itself was set up in the monastery *for* the Buddha without specifying where the latter actually was. But even this second interpretation would suggest at least that things intended for, or at least belonging to, the Buddha were "set up" in this monastery.

If, however, the language of these and a small number of other early inscriptions remains ambiguous and not altogether explicit, the same cannot be said of a large number of inscriptions and land grants that belong to the Medieval Period. Starting from the 4th—5th Century the language of inscriptions becomes ever increasingly unambiguous and straightforward in regard to the Buddha's location, his proprietorship, and his permanent residency in local monasteries. The 5th Century inscriptional record of the 'foundation' of Cave XVI at Ajañṭā, for example, explicitly refers to this cave as the "excellent dwelling to be occupied by the best of ascetics," i.e., the Buddha (*udāraṃ . . . veśma yati[ndra-sevyam]*),¹¹ but this cave is not a 'shrine' or *caitya-grha*. It is a *vihāra* containing seventeen residential cells, only one of which — the central cell in the back wall — seems to have been intended for the Buddha.¹² Moreover, in spite of the fact that

this cave — cave XVI — was intended to provide residential quarters for monks, while the closely contemporaneous cave XXVI was a *caitya-grha*, both are referred to by the same term: *veśman* “dwelling”.¹³

If the Ajaṅṭā text locates the Buddha in monastic living quarters, a 5th/6th Century inscription from Cave VI at Kuda provides us with an early instance of his being the recipient of real property. It says:

This is the gift of the Śākyabhikṣu Saṃghadeva. And having here attached the Chemḍina field it is given to the Buddha as capital for lamps. Whoever would disrupt [this endowment] would incur the five great sins.

*deyadharmmoyam śākyabhikṣoḥ saṃghadevasya atra ca chemḍinakhetra[m] badhvā dīpamūlya-buddhasya dattam [||] yo lopaye[t] pa[m]ca-mahāpātakaba[sam]yukto bhave[t].*¹⁴

While the full technical sense of *badhvā* is not entirely clear, I have translated it as “having attached,” intending by that some of the legal sense of the English phrase. It is, however, clear from the imprecation that we are dealing with an ongoing endowment. It is equally clear that the field was given directly to the Buddha, and that the profit realized from it was to be applied to his service.

Equally interesting — although from a somewhat different angle — are two 5th/6th Century copper-plate land grants, one from Bagh in Madhya Pradesh, the other from Gunaighar in Bengal. The first of these records the gift of a village which was “to be used” to provide perfumes, incense and flowers, etc., “for the Blessed One, the Buddha,” and to provide the requisites for the monks, both of whom — the language of the record makes clear — were thought to reside “in the monastery called Kalāyana . . . caused to be constructed by Dattaṭaka” (*dattaṭaka-kārita-kalāyana-vihāre . . . bhagavato buddhāya gandhadhūpamālyabalīsatropayojyaḥ . . . āryya-bhikṣu-saṅghasya cāturddiśābhyāgatakasya cīvara-piṇḍapāta-glāna-pratyaya-śeyyāsana-bhaiṣajya-hetor . . .*)¹⁵ This ‘monastery’ is almost certainly Cave II, the cave in which the plate was found. It, like Cave XVI at Ajaṅṭā, was a residential *vihāra* having twenty-one cells, the central cell in the back wall being reserved for the Buddha.¹⁶

Although geographically speaking it was written a long way from Bagh, the Gunaighar grant is quite similar. It records the gift of five clearly delimited parcels of land

for the perpetual employment, three times a day, of perfumes, flowers, lamps, incense, etc., for the Blessed One, the Buddha, (who is) in the monastery in the *Aśrama* of Avalokiteśvara which is the property of the community of irreversible Mahāyāna monks received through just this Teacher [Śāntideva], and for the provision of robes, bowls, beds, seats, medicines, etc., for the community of monks (in the monastery).

(-*āryyāvalokiteśvarāśrama-vihāre anenaivācāryyena pratipādita- [read: -te] mahāyānika-vaivarttika- [read: -āvaivarttika-] bhikṣu-saṃghanām [read: -ānām] parigraha bhagavato buddhasya satatam triṣkālam gandha-puṣpa-dīpa-dhūpādi-pra[va]rttanāya [ta]sya bhikṣusamghasya ca cīvara-piṇḍapāta-śayanāsana-glāna-pratyayabhaiṣajyādi-paribhogāya*).¹⁷

As in the land grant from Bagh, the grammatical structure of the Gunaighar grant would seem to indicate that the locative phrase situates *both* the Blessed One, the Buddha, *and* the community of monks in the same establishment, and the donors’ intention seems to have been to provide for both. These two land grants have — as their very name implies — something else in common. Like most of the remaining inscriptions that will be cited here, these are not religious texts or panegyrics. Both the Bagh and Gunaighar grants are legal documents authorizing and recording the transferal of property. Their language, therefore, in regard to this transferal, is not likely to have been casual, but must have been chosen to articulate specifically perceived, legally acknowledged realities.

Much the same sort of thing as is found at Bagh and Gunaighar occurs also in the rich collection of Buddhist land grants from Valabhī, in Gujarat, even when — and that not infrequently — the vocabulary used is somewhat different. We find, for example, in a grant of Dharasena II dated to 575 C.E. that two villages were given, in part,

for the sake of furthering the activity — through flowers, incense, perfumes, lamps, oils, etc. — of/for the Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, in the monastery of the worthy Śrī-Bappa which the Ācārya-Bhadanta-Sthiramati had caused to be built (*ācāryya-bhadanta-sthiramati-kārita-śrī-bappa-pādīya-vihāre bhagavatām buddhānām puṣpa-dhūpa-gandha-dīpa-tailādi-kriyotsarpaṇārtham*).¹⁸

Elsewhere in the Valabhī grants the same expression is applied to monks in a given monastery, the only difference being that their activity is “furthered” through robes, bowls, and the other monastic requisites (-*vihāre nānādigabhyāgatāṣṭādaśa-nikāyābhyantarāryya-*

bhikṣu-saṅghāya grāsācchādāna-śayanāsana-glāna-bhaiṣajyādi-kriyotsarppanārtham).¹⁹

When taken together statements of this sort would seem to suggest that the Valabhī grants were intended to provide for the 'needs' of two groups both of which appear to have been thought of as residing in the local monasteries: Buddhas and monks. Although their specific needs might differ, it appears to have been thought that both groups must be provided for, and both were conceptually considered residents of a single kind of establishment. This, of course, must strike us as odd because we think of the members of the two groups as conceptually and completely different, and we are not in the habit of thinking that the Buddha — let alone several Buddhas — actually lived in any 7th Century monastery in Valabhī or anywhere else for that matter. But the wording of these grants, and all the records we have seen and will see further on, suggests that their drafters thought otherwise. Modern scholars have seen in these and similar passages references to what we call "images." But, although this may be correct from at least our own culturally limited frame of reference, and although the concrete referent in these passages may in fact have been an object of stone that we call an "image," the drafters of these grants and all the inscriptions we will deal with here never use a word which could — however unsuitably — be translated by "image." They talk about *persons*, not objects; and these *persons* — like the monks who are also to be provided for — always live in monasteries.²⁰ But if medieval records consistently locate these *persons* in monasteries, some of them specify even more precisely that location. Yet another Valabhī grant of Dhruvasena I appears to provide us one such instance.

[ā]cāryya-bhadanta-buddhadāsa-kārita-vihāra-kutyām pratisṭāpita-bhagavatām ssamya[ksambu]-[ddhānām buddh]-ānām gandha-dhūpa-puṣpa-dīpa-tailopayogi . . . catur-ddiś-ābhyāgatobhaya-vihāra-prativāsi-bhikṣu-saṅghasya [pi]ṇḍapāta-śayanāsana-glāna-pratyaya-bhaiṣajya-pariṣkāropayogārtham ca pra[ti]p[ā]ditāḥ [!/*].²¹

Given for the acquisition of perfumes, incense, flowers, lamps, oils, etc., for the Blessed Ones, the Fully and Completely Awakened Buddhas established in the chamber in the monastery built by the Ācāryya-Bhadanta-Buddhadāsa . . . and for the acquisition of the requisites — bowls, beds, seats and medicines — for the community of monks dwelling in the monastery from the four directions.²²

There are at least two points worth noting here. First the Buddhas are specifically said to be "established" not just in the monastery, but "in the chamber (*kuṭī*) in the monastery." The specificity intended here, however, seems oddly incomplete: although the text as it now stands seems to want to indicate a precise location it uses a generic term without further qualification, and which "chamber" was intended does not now appear to be indicated. This oddity, taken together with both epigraphical and textual parallels, would seem to suggest that we have here a scribal error, and that the intended reading was almost certainly *gandha-kutyām*. In the only other occurrences of the term *kuṭī* in the Valabhī grants, for example, the term always occurs in compound with a preceding *gandha-*: a grant of Śīlāditya III reads *gandha-kuṭī* [read: *-kutyām?*] *ca bhagavatām buddhānām pūjā-snapana-gandha-dhūpa-puṣpādi-paricaryyārtham*, "for serving the Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, and (or, in) the 'Perfume Chamber' with worship, baths, perfumes, incense, flowers, etc.,"²³ in a recently published plate of Dharasena IV the grant is said to be in part *gandhakutyās ca khaṇḍa-sphuṭita-pratisamskaraṇāya*, "for repairing the cracks and breaks in the 'Perfume Chamber'."²⁴ These passages not only support the emendation suggested above for the grant of Dhruvasena I, but indicate that the *gandhakuṭī* was an established and important element of the monasteries at Valabhī. We have moreover — as we shall see — a significant amount of evidence that indicates that this was the case as well in a considerable number of Medieval Buddhist monasteries elsewhere in India,²⁵ and we know — again as we shall see — that 'the Perfume Chamber' was supposed to be the central cell in a Buddhist monastery that was reserved for the residence of the Buddha himself.

The second point to be noted is that our passage says that the Buddhas were 'established' (*pratisṭ[h]āpita-*) in the monastery, but the monks were 'dwelling' (*prativāsi-*) in it. This verbal difference may be thought to be significant, and perhaps it is. It is, however, important to remember that the first meaning of *prati*√*sthā* is "to stand, stay, abide, dwell," and that the causative — which we have here — has marked tones of 'permanence', 'fixity', 'continued existence over time.' *prati*√*3.vas*, on the other hand, need imply none of this and is not

infrequently used in the sense of 'to lodge, receive as a guest.' The Buddhas, then, may have been considered the only permanent residents of a monastery.

It is perhaps also worth noting that — as the passages cited above show — the Valabhī grants frequently refer to Buddhas in the plural. This may be because there actually were several; or we may have here — as Sircar, for example, has suggested we have elsewhere — “the plural number signifying *gaurava* (venerableness),” the *pluralis majesticus*.²⁶ Although the use of the plural predominates, the fact that the use of the singular in virtually the same context and construction is not rare may well argue for the plurals being plurals of respect. In any case, references to a plurality of Buddhas are not infrequently found in Indian inscriptions from very early on.²⁷

The language of the Valabhī grants provides us, then, with important information on monastic conceptions of the Buddha in Medieval Gujarat, but this, of course, is not the only area for which we have records from this period. A roughly contemporaneous record from Nālandā, for example, provides us with a particularly striking instance of the language of 'personal presence' in a form that we have not yet seen. The record in question, the Stone Inscription of Yasovarmadeva has been variously dated to 6th or 8th Century.²⁸ It is written in an elaborate *kāvya* style and is, as a consequence, not always easy to interpret. It would appear that its primary purpose was to record a series of benefactions made by the son of a royal minister. Among these there is a “permanent endowment” which is specifically said to be “for the Blessed One, the Buddha” (*akṣaya-nīvikā bhagavate vuddhāya*); the same donor provided the monks with food and gave to “the sons of the Śākya” a *layana*, a 'residence', 'house'. The most interesting statement, however, occurs as a part of the concluding imprecation and constitutes a clear warning:

*yo dānasyāsyā kaścīti kṛtājagadavadher antarāyam vidadhyāt sākṣād vajrāsanastho jina
iha bhagavān antarasthaḥ sadāste* |²⁹

“Whoever would create an obstacle to this gift which is to last as long as the created world” — our inscription warns — “(he should know that) the Conqueror in person, the Blessed One, dwells always here within on the Diamond Throne.”

The language is very strong here, and the sense of personal

presence (*sākṣād, iha*) and permanent abiding (*sadāste*) is pronounced. Although — as has already been noted — the 'style' of our record sometimes makes it difficult to understand, this much is certain. It is equally certain that the permanent endowment was given directly to the Buddha himself, and reasonably certain that the place wherein the Blessed One is said to “always” dwell was the *layana* or 'residence' which had been given to the monks.³⁰

Yet other forms of expression involving both the sense of legal recognition and personal presence are found in yet other grants. In the Toramāna Inscription from the Salt Range in the Pañjāb, for example, which Sircar dates to the 6th Century, the statement which seems to have been intended as a description of the primary act that was being recorded reads: “This religious gift, the establishment of a monastery for the community of monks from the four directions which is headed by the Buddha” (*buddha-pramukha* [read: -*khe*] *cāturdiṣe bhikṣusamghe deyadharmo* [!] *ya[m] vihāra-pratiṣṭhāpana*).³¹ Fortunately we have a fairly good idea of how such an expression would have been understood from both literary sources and contemporary or near-contemporary epigraphical records.

Strikingly similar expressions occur throughout both Pali and Sanskrit canonical literature in passages which are, of course, narrating events that are supposed to have occurred while the Buddha was very much alive and a living presence. Some of these passages are so common as to be clichés. In a stereotyped passage describing the feeding of the Buddha and his disciples, for example, that group is described as *buddhapramukhaṃ bhikṣusamghaṃ / buddhapamukhaṃ bhikkhusamghaṃ*, “the community of monks headed by the Buddha.”³² Rhys Davids translates one such passage in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* by: “And the Exalted One robed himself early, took his bowl with him, and repaired, with the brethren [*saddhim bhikkhusamghena*], to the dwelling-place of Sunidha and Vassakāra . . . and with their own hands they set the sweet rice and the cakes before the brethren with the Buddha at their head [*buddhapamukhaṃ bhikkhusamghaṃ*].”³³ Equally interesting is another passage from the same text. Ambapālī's gift of the “mango grove” is there expressed in the following form: *imāhaṃ bhante ārāmaṃ buddhapamukhassa bhikkhusamghassa dammūti. paṭiggahehi bhagavā ārāmaṃ*; “Reverend,”

Ambapāli says, "I give this grove to the community of monks with the Buddha at their head. The Blessed One accepted the grove."³⁴ That the 'monastic' recipients of gifts of food and real property should be described in this way in texts narrating events that are set during the lifetime of the Buddha is not surprising. Such a description says nothing more than that the actual community that received these gifts was headed by the still living Buddha and that it was he — explicitly at least in the case of Ambapāli's grove — who accepted or took possession of them. But if that is what *buddhapamukhassa bhikkhusamghassa* means in Buddhist texts, it is hard to see how *buddhapramukhe cāturdise bhikṣusamghe* could mean anything essentially different in the Toramāṇa Inscription, an inscription which shows clear signs of having been authored by someone familiar with even the most technical textual definitions of the Buddha.³⁵ It is hard to argue that the conception changed if the expression remained constant, regardless of how much time intervened. Much the same point is reached if we look at epigraphical usage.

At the end of an inscription from Nāgārjunikoṇḍa which makes provision for the maintenance, etc., of a *devakula* or temple, the body charged with the ultimate responsibility for seeing that the work was done is called the *seṭhi-pamakha* [= Skt. *śreṣṭhi-pramukha*] -*nigamo*, "the council of citizens headed by the banker."³⁶ Similarly, in a 6th Century land grant from Andhra Pradesh the order transferring the land is addressed to the *rāṣṭrakūṭa-grāma-vṛddha-pramukha-ṣayya-ṅi]vāsinaḥ*, "to the inhabitants of the district headed by the elders of the village and district officer."³⁷

The Nāgārjunikoṇḍa inscription and the Andhra land grant are, of course, describing corporate or legal entities with a particular structure. But the fact that a Buddhist monastic community could be described in the same way in a 'document' like the Toramāṇa Inscription dealing in part with the transfer of property would seem to suggest that it too was considered to be organizationally similar. This in turn would mean that if "the council of citizens" was legally or corporately recognized as headed "by the banker," the 6th Century Buddhist monastic community in the Salt Range must have been thought of as legally or corporately headed "by the Buddha." Moreover, in the same way that, for example, the council, and particularly

its head, was charged with the responsibility for making sure the provisions of the gift were fulfilled, the monastery whose erection was recorded in the inscription of Toramāṇa must have been intended for *both* the monastic community *and*, particularly, its corporate head. Finally — and perhaps most significantly — these epigraphical parallels appear to indicate that the designation *-pramukha* was never applied 'symbolically,' but always referred to actual individuals holding certain responsible positions.

This corporate or legal language continues to be used for a very long time, and when it is not used it is not infrequently replaced with an even more interesting turn of phrase. It is used for example in a 12th Century inscription from Śrāvastī which records the grant of six villages together with all "water and dry land, mines of iron and salt, repositories (i.e. ponds) of fish," etc., within their boundaries. These six villages are said to be granted to:

śrīmaj-jetavana-mahāvihāra-vāstavya-buddha-bhattāraka-pramukha-parama-ārya-
[śākyabhikṣu-samghāya . . .]³⁸

The Community of Excellent Venerable Śākya-Monks which is headed by the Lord Buddha who resides in the Great Monastery in the Illustrious Jetavana.

or:

The Community of Excellent Venerable Śākya-Monks headed by the Lord Buddha which resides in the Great Monastery in the Illustrious Jetavana.

However this long compound is nuanced, it seems fairly certain here again that ownership of the villages in question was being transferred to the monastic community as a corporate group, that, in terms of the transferral, the Buddha was considered to be the legal head of the group, and that both the Buddha and the monastic community were thought to reside in the same monastery. This last point, at least, again draws support from the living arrangements reflected in the ground plan of the monastery in question. Monastery 19 is described as having "an open courtyard in the centre surrounded by rows of [residential] cell on all sides . . . The central chamber in the row facing the entrance forms the shrine and is situated directly opposite the main entrance-gate, so that the statue that it enshrined was the first object coming to the view of the visitor . . ."³⁹

This same sense of personal presence and of ownership by the Buddha is, however, by no means restricted to passages in which he is designated as *-pramukha* of the community. We have already seen one instance — the Yasovarmmadeva inscription — in which this vocabulary does not occur. An early 9th Century copper-plate grant of Devapāla from Nālandā is yet another. In this grant we find the gift of five villages being made, in part, to provide the resident Buddha with an income:

suva[rnna]dvipādhipama[hā]rājaśrībālaputradevena dūtakamukhena vayam vijñāpitāh
yathā mayā śrīnālandāyām vihāraḥ kāritas tatra bhagavato buddhabhaṭṭārakasya
prajñāpāramitādisakaladharmmanetrishthānasyāyārthe . . . pratipādit[ā]h⁴⁰

We, being requested to by the Mahārāja, the Illustrious Bālaputradeva, the king of Suvarṇadvīpa, through an ambassador, (declare): 'As I have had constructed a monastery in Illustrious Nālandā [the previously mentioned villages] . . . are granted for the sake of providing an income to the Blessed One (residing) there, the Worshipful Buddha, the Store-house of All Methods of Dharma, the Perfection of Wisdom, etc.'

As in the Yasovarmmadeva inscription, the sense of presence is clear: the Buddha in question is *there (tatra)* in the monastery. As in the Yasovarmmadeva inscription where a permanent endowment is given directly to the resident Buddha, here too the Buddha himself is provided with an "income" (*āya*) in his own right and not as the head of the Saṃgha. The implication here is that some of these villages are transferred directly to the Buddha himself, that he himself owns them. This again is very clear in yet other copper-plate grants.

In the so-called "Larger Leiden Plates," for example, the wording is straightforward. These plates — which date to the 11th Century — record the gift of a village . . . *atiramaṇīyañ cūlāmaṇivarmma-vihāram adhivasate buddhāya*, "to the Buddha residing in the surpassingly beautiful Cūlāmaṇivarma Monastery" in Nāgapaṭṭinam.⁴¹ Here again there is no reference to the Buddha as the head of the monastic community and the village is given to him directly as an individual. He and he alone became the "owner" by the terms of the grant. Here too the explicit wording of the grant leaves no room to doubt that the Buddha himself was thought to actually reside in the specifically named monastery. It is, moreover, worth noting that there was 'official', *external* recognition of the Buddha's legal ownership of land even in non-Buddhist records which record gifts similar to those recorded in

both the Nālandā Grant of Devapāla and the "Larger Leiden Plates." A Chandella copper-plate grant of the 12th Century, for example, records the donation of a village to a number of Brāhmaṇas. But it explicitly excludes from the grant five *halas* of land within the village that already belonged to the Buddha: *deva-śrī-bauddha-satka-pāñcahalāni bahihkrtya*.⁴²

The last examples we might look at refer — like some of the Valabhī grants — to the Gandhakuṭī, 'the Perfume Chamber'. D. C. Sircar, for example, has noted that originally the term Gandhakuṭī referred to "the room occupied by the Buddha at Śrāvastī, but later indicated the Buddha's private chamber in any Buddhist establishment,"⁴³ and Edgerton has noted literary uses which seem "to imply that any monastery might be provided with one."⁴⁴ The epigraphical sources confirm both.

The earliest inscriptional reference to the Gandhakuṭī occurs in a label from Bharhut and it is clear that here the term is applied to the 'original' chamber at Śrāvastī.⁴⁵ But the epigraphical sources also indicate that from the 4th/5th Century on the Gandhakuṭī was an established part of Buddhist monastic establishments everywhere. There is a 3rd/4th Century reference to a Gandhakuṭī in the inscriptions from Ghaṇṭaśāla;⁴⁶ a late 4th Century reference in an inscription from Hyderabad to the Gandhakuṭī in the monastery named after Govindarāja, the founder of the Viṣṇukuṇḍi Dynasty;⁴⁷ references in inscriptions from Ajaṇṭā,⁴⁸ Kanheri,⁴⁹ and Kauśāmbī⁵⁰ — all probably dating from around the 5th Century; several references in inscriptions from Sārnāth dating from the 4th/5th Century to the 11th,⁵¹ and from Bodhgaya⁵² covering much the same period; references from Valabhī (6th/7th Century),⁵³ for Kurkihar (9th–11th Century)⁵⁴ and from Nālandā.⁵⁵ Both the geographical and chronological range of these references establish that a large number of Buddhist monasteries had, in the Medieval Period, a "private chamber" reserved for the Buddha. Some of these references in addition make it very clear that these 'private chambers' were formally recognized as distinct organizational components of their monasteries and had specifically titled monks or groups of monks attached to them.

The monk donor in the Hyderabad inscription, for example, is called a *gamdhakuṭī-vārika*, and we have a reasonably good idea of

what this might have meant from a series of similarly constructed monastic titles, all of which have *-vārika* as the final element. Literary sources know, for instance, *bhājana-vārika*, "(monks) in charge of receptacles", *pānīya-vārika*, "(monks) in charge of beverages," *upadhivārika*, "(monks) in charge of physical properties," or a "beadle, or provost of a monastery," etc.⁵⁶ Titles ending in *-vārika*, would appear, then, to have been used to designate the monk or monks who were officially in charge of important areas or aspects of a functioning monastery. To judge by his title a *gandhakuṭī-vārika* must have been a similar official, a monk or the monk "in charge of the Perfume Chamber." The fact that such an 'office' was formally instituted and acknowledged would argue for the importance this 'chamber' had in the life of the community, and would seem to indicate that it was already a fully integrated institutional element of Medieval Buddhist monasteries. The same conclusions would seem to follow from the fact that references to "monks in charge of the Perfume Chamber" are found not only in Andhra Pradesh, but also at such widely separated sites as Kanheri and Nālandā: in a 4th/5th Century donative record from the former site the monk donor is called a *mahā-gandhakuṭī-vārika*, "one who is in charge of the Great Perfume Chamber";⁵⁷ from the latter come a number of interesting sealings, two of which refer to two distinct groups of *gandhakuṭī-vārikas*. The first of these reads:

*śrī-nālandāy(āṃ) śrī-bālādīya-gandhakuṭī-vārika-bhikṣū[ṇām]*⁵⁸

Of/for/belonging to the monks in charge of the Perfume Chamber of Śrī-Bālādīya at Śrī-Nālandā.

and the second:

*śrī-nā-dharmapāladeva — gandha-kuṭī-vārika-bhikṣū[ṇām]*⁵⁹

Of/for/belonging to the monks in charge of the Perfume Chamber of Dharmapāladeva at Śrī-Nālandā.

These sealings are, however, important not just because they help to establish the wide geographic spread of the *Gandhakuṭī* as a formally recognized component of Buddhist monastic establishments. They also indicate that in at least some cases it was not a single monk who was charged with the oversight of the Perfume Chamber, but a group of monks. They confirm as well the fact that different individual

monasteries at a single site each had its own *Gandhakuṭī* and suggest that, like the monasteries themselves, these *Gandhakuṭī* could be individually named after their chief sponsors or donors. Finally, the mere existence of these sealings would suggest that the *Gandhakuṭī* functioned as a distinct and individual entity within the monastery that either owned its own movable property, or had its own official correspondence with other monasteries or concerns. In fact the two primary uses of such sealings appear to have been either to mark ownership of the property they were attached to, or to "vouch for the genuineness" of the letters or documents that were sent or circulated under their seal.⁶⁰

But if the sealings from Nālandā indicate that the *Gandhakuṭī* as a corporate entity either owned its own property or had its own official correspondence, yet another type of sealing indicates that this was true as well for the individual who resided in it. Several specimens of the sealing in question have been found at Sārnāth — Marshall and Konow refer to "a number" of such sealings in their report for the year 1907,⁶¹ and Hargreaves recorded two more.⁶² These sealings have all been dated to the 6th/7th Century, and the text on all of them is essentially the same:

śrī-saddharmmacakre mūla-gandhakuṭyām bhagavataḥ

Although the meaning of this seems to be straightforward, the treatment of the text has been somewhat disingenuous. Vogel, for example, has translated it as:

at the Saddharmacakra in the principal *Gandhakuṭī* of the Lord.⁶³

But Vogel's translation — suggesting as it does that it is the *gandhakuṭī* which is "of the Lord" — violates what little syntax the sealing provides and differs markedly from his translation of other similarly constructed 'texts' on other sealings. A seal-die from Kasia, for example, which has a legend with virtually the same grammatical construction, reads: *śrī-viṣṇudvīpavihāre bhikṣusaṅghasya*. Here Vogel takes the final inflected form for what it most obviously is — an independent genitive — and translates the legend as "of the community of friars at the Convent of Holy Viṣṇudvīpa."⁶⁴ Bearing in mind that "an independent genitive is used . . . on seals and personal belongings

to name the owner of the object,"⁶⁵ the sense of the Kasia legend is clear: the document or property to which the sealing was attached was 'of', 'from', or 'belonged to' the monks in the Viṣṇudvīpa Monastery. In light of this Kasia legend, and others like it, the sense of the Sārnāth sealing must almost certainly be the same, and must almost certainly be translated: "of/belonging to the Blessed One in the original Perfume Chamber in the Śrī-Saddharmacakra (Monastery)."

Understood in this way these Sārnāth sealings — which date from the 6th/7th Century — would seem to indicate that it was not just the monks attached to the Gandhakuṭī who owned their own property or carried on their own distinct official business. The same apparently was true of "the Blessed One in the original Perfume Chamber." The language of the legend and what we know of the function of such sealings would seem to allow little room for other conclusions. Moreover, by using the designation "original," these sealings would seem to suggest that — as Marshall and Konow noted long ago — "there were also other *gandhakuṭīs* in Sārnāth,"⁶⁶ that at Sārnāth, as at Nālandā and probably at Kanheri,⁶⁷ there were several. But if nothing else, these sealings provide us with yet another kind of evidence which indicates that the Buddha was thought to have been a current resident and an abiding presence in Medieval Buddhist monasteries. The language of the sealings makes it clear that the Blessed One himself was thought to be *in* the Perfume Chamber. It was his location, and it alone, that was noted on these sealings, sealings whose mere existence would seem to indicate that the Blessed One resident in the Perfume Chamber had certain active functions which required an official documentation. In fact, these sealings of the Blessed One are like — perhaps more than anything else — those contemporary living kings attached to their land grants and other official records.⁶⁸

The apparent emphasis on the Blessed One's presence in the Gandhakuṭī is not, however, found at Sārnāth only on these sealings. It is expressed as well in at least one donative record from the site. The record occurs on an old railing pillar that appears to have been re-cut and re-used as a lamp stand in the Gupta period. Though now fragmentary its restoration is fairly sure. It reads:

*deyadharmmo yam paramopā- / -sika-sulakṣmaṇāya mūla — / [gandhakutyām
bha]gavato buddhasya / pradīpāḥ⁶⁹*

This is the religious gift of the excellent lay woman Sulakṣmaṇā: a lamp for the Blessed One, the Buddha, in the Original Perfumed Chamber.

When the lay woman Sulakṣmaṇā gave a lamp to the Buddha she did not apparently think of him as gone or unlocatable, but as present in and available at the Perfume Chamber, the cell or room reserved for him in the monastery. In this she perhaps differed from the authors of Medieval Buddhist *sāstras* — or at least from the views they formally stated. But, as we have seen, she differed very little from a large number of other donors, or fully literate and probably monkish scribes, who throughout the Medieval period likewise appear to have had no doubts about where the Buddha was.

Sulakṣmaṇā's record, in fact medieval epigraphic material as a whole, appears then, to provide us with conceptions of the Buddha which otherwise have not been noted, conceptions which are embedded in and underlie a whole series of legal or quasi-legal documents connected in the main with the transferral of property, and conceptions which differ markedly from those that are articulated in formal Buddhist literary and doctrinal sources of much the same period. These 'epigraphical' conceptions are, moreover, not limited to a specific region, but are pan-Indian. They are expressed from the 5th Century on in 'documents' from Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal, from Uttar Pradesh and Maharastra, from Gujarat and the Pañjab. These are conceptions that — without the usual exaggeration implied in the phrase — can be said to occur everywhere.

This epigraphical material is, however, sometimes fragmentary, sometimes elusive, and not infrequently difficult to interpret. But we are not, fortunately, without some means to test our interpretation. If the interpretation of the epigraphical material presented above is correct — if the Buddha was actually thought to reside in monasteries — then we should find, for example, clear evidence in monastic architecture of accommodations being provided for him. Moreover, if the Buddha was considered to be an actual individual within the monastic community who owned or had a claim to certain property, we should expect to find at least some rulings or regulations within the monastic codes or Vinayas to confirm this. Happily, we find both and, in fact, a bit more, but none of this can here be treated in detail. Here we can simply note, for example, that the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* —

the one Vinaya for which we have some evidence of use in Medieval Indian monastic communities⁷⁰ — contains numerous passages that explicitly treat the Buddha as a juristic personality and describe the appropriate procedures for dealing with *buddhasantaka*, “that which belongs to the Buddha.”

Typical of such passages is that in the *Adhikaraṇa-vastu* where a pearl is given “one part for the Buddha, one part for the Dharma, and one part for the Saṅgha” (*ekaṃ buddhāya ekaṃ dharmāya ekaṃ saṅghāya*), and where the Buddha is made to specify how each part is to be used: *ato yo buddhasya bhāgas tena gandhakutyām pralepaṃ dadata; yo dharmasya sa dharmadharānām pudgalānām; yaḥ saṅghasya taṃ samagraḥ saṅgho bhajayatu*,⁷¹ “what of this is the Buddha’s share, with that you should plaster the Perfume Chamber; what belongs to the Dharma, that is for the persons preserving the Dharma; what belongs to the Saṅgha, the entire Saṅgha should share that!” Likewise in the *Civara-vastu*, in a passage dealing with the distribution of the estate of a wealthy layman who had intended to become a monk but who had died before he could do so, we find:

suvarṇaṃ ca hiraṇyaṃ cānyacca kṛtākṛtaṃ trayo bhāgāḥ kartavyāḥ; eko buddhasya, dvitīyo dharmasya, tṛtīyāḥ saṅghasya. yo buddhasya tena gandhakutyām keśanakha-stūpesu ca khaṇḍachūṭṭaṃ pratisamskartavyam; yo dharmasya tena buddhavacanam lekhatavyam simhāsane vā upayoktavyam; yaḥ saṅghasya sa bhikṣubhir bhājayitavyaḥ⁷²

The coined and uncoined gold and other worked and unworked metal is to be divided into three shares — one for the Buddha, a second for the Dharma, a third for the Saṅgha. With that which belongs to the Buddha the dilapidation and damage in the Perfume Chamber and on the hair and nail *stūpas* is to be repaired; with that which belongs to the Dharma the word of the Buddha is to be copied, or it is to be used on the Lion Throne; that which belongs to the Saṅgha should be shared by the monks.

Elsewhere in the *Civara-vastu* a similar threefold division is to be effected and it is said *buddhasantakena buddhapūjā vā gandhakutyām stūpe vā navakarma kartavyam*,⁷³ “with that belonging to the Buddha worship of the Buddha is to be performed, or new work in the Perfume Chamber or on the *stūpa* is to be undertaken.” Yet another passage from the *Civara-vastu* refers to two distinct categories of real wealth that belong to the Buddha and indicates that both could be drawn on to finance *pūjās* of the Buddha undertaken for sick or dying

monks. The monastic community could use — among other things — “that belonging to the perpetual endowment for the Buddha” (*buddhākṣayanīvisantakaṃ*), or they could “sell” (*vikriya*) an “umbrella or flag or banner or jewel on the *tathāgata-caitya* or in the Perfume Chamber” (*tathāgata-caitye vā gandhakutyām vā chatraṃ vā dhvajam vā patākā vā ābharanakaṃ vā*); in either case the funds obtained were then to be used to attend to the sick or dying monk and to perform a *pūjā* of the Teacher on his behalf (*upasthānaṃ kartavyam śāstus ca pūjā*). Should the latter recover he is to be told “that belonging to the Buddha was used for you” (*yad buddhasantakaṃ tavopayuktam iti*), and he should make every effort to repay it (*tena yatnam āsthāya dātavyam*).⁷⁴ There is, finally, at least one passage in the *Vinayaśūdraka-vastu* where the otherwise fairly consistent anachronizing language of these passages appears to break down and the “share” apparently belonging to the Buddha appears to be specifically assigned to an “image”. Here, in the account of events surrounding the housing of Śāriputra’s relics, the text says the monks received precious jewels and pearls, but did not know how they should be distributed. In response to the situation the Buddha is made to say:

bud dud gang yin pa de dag ni shing 'dsam bu'i grib ma na bzhugs pa'i sku gzugs la dbul bar bya'o/ gzhan yang chung shas shig ni shā ri'i bu'i mchod rten de'i bcos legs bya bar bzhag la lhag ma ni dge 'dun tshogs pas bgo bar bya'o/ de de bzhin gshegs pa'i mchod rten gyi ma yin gyi/ shā ri'i bu'i mchod rten gyi yin te/ de lta bas na 'gyod par mi bya'o/⁷⁵

Which are for the Buddha, those are to be given to the image which is sitting in the shadow of the *jambu* tree. A small part is to be put aside to repair the *stūpa* of Śāriputra. The remainder is to be divided by the community of monks — this does not belong to the *stūpa* of the *tathāgata*, it belongs to the *stūpa* of Śāriputra: therefore there is no fault (in the latter usage).

The translation given here of the first clause is tentative. I do not know what *bud dud* means, although this reading appears in all the Kanjurs available to me — the Peking, Derge, and Tog Palace.⁷⁶ Context and similar passages suggest that it might be the equivalent of *buddhasya*, *buddhasantaka* or *bauddha*, and I have translated it accordingly. It may, however, be the name of a specific gem or precious jewel. But in either case, the passage indicates that a “share” of valuable property was explicitly assigned to an image. An instance

of just such an image may be had in the headless figure discovered at Sāncī which bears on its base a Kuṣān inscription indicating, it seems, that it is "a stone (image depicting) the 'Jambu-shade' (episode) of the Bhagavat (Śākyamuni) (*bhagava[sya] . . . sya jambuchāyā-śilā*).⁷⁷

These passages and others like them scattered throughout the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* deserve and require a thorough study — they need to be studied in light of the similar passages and conceptions signalled by Gernet in *Vinayas extant now only in Chinese*;⁷⁸ they need to be studied further in connection with Medieval Indian land grants and inscriptions which make explicit provision for copying texts.⁷⁹ For the moment, though, we need only note that the *Vinaya* that may well have governed the majority of Medieval monastic communities in Eastern India, as well, perhaps, as those residing at Ajanṭā and similar sites, contains exactly what we would expect if our interpretation of the epigraphical material is correct. It contains explicit rules which acknowledge at the very least the juristic personality and presence of the Buddha within the midst of the monastic community that it envisions. It contains explicit rules concerning the property and real wealth owned by this "person", and contains specific directions concerning the central accommodations provided for him. This Buddha, at least, was a force and a factor in almost every aspect of everyday Medieval monastic life. What is almost unavoidably indicated by the epigraphical material and monastic codes is, however, only confirmed more fully by what we know about the development of Buddhist monastic architecture.

V. Dehejia says "the early rock-cut caves of western India . . . are all Buddhist monasteries. Each site consists of one or more *caityas* — chapels for congregational worship — and several *vihāras* which were residential halls for the monks."⁸⁰ What needs to be emphasized here, though, is that, although each early site necessarily had both "chapels" and residential quarters, they were kept spatially and architecturally distinct and separated the one from the other. The Buddha resided, as it were,⁸¹ in his own separate quarters, in the *stūpa* housed in a separate excavation which was used for public and "congregational worship." Exactly the same pattern occurs at the much less numerous and much less well preserved early structural sites. The earliest monastic residential quarters at the Dharmarājika at Taxila, for

example, although they face the "Great *Stūpa*," are separated from it.⁸² This pattern becomes even clearer in the Taxila area with somewhat later *vihāras*. They are typically quadrangular structures having an open court surrounded by rows of residential cells usually on all four sides. The main entrance to these monasteries almost always faces directly — and if possible is symmetrically aligned with — the main *stūpa* which is outside of, and separate from, the monastic residential quadrangle.⁸³ There is, of course, some variation, and some movement towards a different arrangement — attempts towards tentatively drawing the two types of "residence" into a tighter intimacy. Sometimes the *stūpa* is moved into the middle of the residential court and, though remaining distinct, is surrounded by the living quarters of the monks.⁸⁴ But these attempts remain tentative, and pale in comparison with a major rearrangement which begins to appear everywhere in the 5th Century — at exactly the time that we start to get clear epigraphical references to the Buddha as an actual resident of Indian monasteries.

J. Ph. Vogel was perhaps the first to sense the significance of this rearrangement, first at Kasia,⁸⁵ then at Bagh, where he alluded at least to its possible connection with the *gandhakuṭi*.⁸⁶ It has, however, been most fully studied at the Western Cave sites in several works by M. K. Dhavalikar. Dhavalikar notes that in the early Western Caves "the standard *vihāra* plan from the beginning consisted of a squarish hall with cells in side and back walls," and that the *caitya-gr̥ha*, "the shrine proper for the congregation" was separate from the *vihāra* which "was for the residence of monks." Then, through a reconstructed sequence the details of which may or may not be entirely acceptable, he clearly showed that the later *vihāras* too "were squarish pillared halls, with cells in side and back walls," but they now also had "a shrine in the centre of the back wall containing a Buddha image. The *vihāra*", he now says, "also thus served the purpose of a shrine."⁸⁷ He also notes "that by the middle of the fifth century the typical . . . plan of the shrine-cum-vihāra was completely standardized."⁸⁸ We have already noted this "plan" at the *vihāra* Cave XVI at Ajanṭā, *vihāra* Cave II at Bagh, Monastery 19 at Śrāvastī, and Monastery I at Nālandā — all sites from which we have contemporary inscriptional records which speak of the Buddha as residing in these specific monasteries. Two additional very clear structural examples of this "shrine-cum-*vihāra*"

plan are provided by Sirpur Monastery⁸⁹ and Monastery I at Ratnagiri.⁹⁰

This plan — both pervasive and standardized after the 5th Century — is not difficult to describe. It was achieved by only a slight modification of the typical layout for early Buddhist monasteries. Structural examples were quadrangular structures surrounding an open court with rows of residential cells on all four sides, or, occasionally on only three. But in this plan what would have previously been only another monastic residential cell in the middle of the back wall facing the main entrance has been architecturally set off as a very special room. The old plan has been altered to accommodate a new and equally special resident — the Buddha has moved into private monastic quarters. This new addition is, however, in at least one important sense, only a return to a much earlier tradition, and in a sense the Buddha has only reoccupied his old quarters.

In the *Śayanāsana-vastu* a householder in Vārānasi named Kalyāṇabhadra asks permission of the Buddha to build a *vihāra* for “the disciples of the Blessed One” (*bhagavataḥ śrāvakāṇāṃ vihāraṃ kārayeyam iti*). The Buddha grants permission, but Kalyāṇabhadra is presented as not knowing how such a structure should be made. At this point the Buddha is made to give specific instructions.

*bhagavān āha: yadi trilayanam kārayasi madhye gandhakuṭiḥ kārayitavyā dvayoḥ pārśvayor dve layane; evaṃ triśāle nava layanāni; catuḥśāle madhye dvāra-koṣṭhakābhimukhaṃ gandhakuṭiḥ dvāra-koṣṭhakapārśvayor dve layane.*⁹¹

The Blessed One said: if you have three cells made the Perfume Chamber is to be made in the middle, the two (other) cells on each side; likewise if there are nine cells in three wings; in a quadrangular (*vihāra*) the Perfume Chamber (is to be placed) in the middle (of the back wall) facing the main entrance, two cells on each side of the entrance.

That these instructions constitute a virtually exact description of what Dhavalikar called “the shrine-cum-vihara” plan — a plan found almost everywhere after the 5th Century — is probably obvious. We need only note that this correspondence between Vinaya rule and actual ground-plan allows us to label more precisely the special cell in the middle of the back wall of post-5th Century Buddhist monasteries: though called by Dhavalikar and others simply a “shrine”, it could hardly have been intended as anything other than the *gandhakuṭi*. This means, of course, that the monastic architects at Ajantā, Bagh,

Nālandā and numerous other post-5th Century sites provided — exactly like Kalyāṇabhadra in early Benares and Anāthapiṇḍika at Śrāvastī — special accommodations in their respective monasteries that were reserved for the Buddha himself. It was, apparently, in such monastic quarters that, from the 5th to the 14th Century, the Buddha was thought to live.⁹² There may, however, be one final bit of archeological evidence that further confirms what epigraphical, architectural, and Vinaya sources all suggest.

If the “images” which were housed in Medieval monastic *gandhakuṭi*s were cognitively classified with the living Buddha, if such stone Buddhas were actually thought to *live* in these establishments, they also — at least occasionally, and in spite of their unusually hardy constitutions — must have *died* there. The remains of such “dead” Buddhas — if, again, our interpretation is correct — should have been treated not as mere objects. They should have been treated as the mortuary remains of any other “dead” Buddha had been treated, and that, it seems, is exactly what occurred.

When Marshall opened a 9th/10th Century *stūpa* at Śrāvastī he did not find human remains. Instead he found the remains of an old and broken “image”, an “image” which was probably made in the Kuṣāṇ period at Mathurā.⁹³ This was not an isolated find. In *stūpa* no. 9 at the same site yet another similar broken “image” had been deposited. This *stūpa* was “also of the Medieval Period”, though the “image” was much older.⁹⁴ Marshall noted at least three additional instances of such “burials” in the Medieval *stūpas* at Sāñci⁹⁵ and still other instances at Sārnāth.⁹⁶ More recently yet another instance was discovered at the latter site.⁹⁷ Marshall, more than forty years ago had already drawn a first, obvious conclusion: “the burial of older cult statues, whole or fragmentary, in Buddhist *stūpas* is a practice which appears to have been common during the medieval age”.⁹⁸ It would seem, then, again in “the medieval age,” that the remains of dead “images” were ritually treated and permanently housed exactly like the mortuary remains of dead Buddhas, that — in fact — the equivalence of “image” and “actual person” that we have noted held not just during the life of the “image”, but in its death as well.⁹⁹

If nothing else, the convergence here of these distinct and very different kinds of sources is remarkable. Epigraphical, architectural,

Vinaya and archeological sources all come together towards the same point: all document in different ways a conception of the Buddha that was very widely and very deeply held. This conception is important for the history of Indian religion because it is — in many respects — strikingly similar to the conception of divinity which predominates in Medieval Hindu 'Temple Religion' and raises, therefore, the question of the relationship, chronological and otherwise, between the two.¹⁰⁰ But it is also important — and perhaps most interesting — because it tells us a number of things that we otherwise could not know about "the abstract theories" concerning the "person" of the Buddha. It confirms and gives specificity to the wisdom of de La Vallée Poussin's observation: "the abstract theories" were, indeed, "one part," but "only one part of the history of Buddhology" or the conception of the Buddha. That part, to be sure, was not "insignificant," but it was, apparently, not unduly significant either. Bearing in mind that our inscriptions, for example, do not express the views of 'the masses', but were obviously written by literate individuals familiar with Buddhist doctrines of the day, it would appear that "the abstract theories" — which, significantly, were being developed at virtually the same time — had little, if any, direct *detectable* influence on a large segment of even the already limited number of literate members of the "Buddhist" society of their day — most of whom were probably monks.

This is particularly striking if we bear in mind that two of the sites that have produced some of the fullest epigraphical documentation for the conception of the Buddha as a permanent monastic resident were — during the period from which this documentation comes — the two most important centers of Buddhist scholasticism in Northern India. I Tsing, for example, says that in his day (the 7th Century), "After having studied this commentary [the *Kāśikāvṛtti*], students begin to learn composition in prose and verse, and devote themselves to logic (*hetuvidyā*) and metaphysic (*abhidharmakośha*) . . . Thus instructed by their teachers and instructing others they pass two or three years, generally in the Nālandā monastery in Central India, or in the country of Valabhī (Walā) in Western India. These two places," he says, "are like Chin-ma, Shih-chiü, Lung-mên and Ch'ue-li" — the foremost seats of learning in China.¹⁰¹ J. May says: "Quant à l'idéalisme proprement dit, il connaît, parallèlement à l'école des logiciens, une brillante

floraison: il se scinde en deux écoles principales . . . L'une, est l'école de Valabhī . . . L'autre école, celle de Nālandā, eut une destinée brillante et devint le plus important centre d'études bouddhiques dans les derniers siècles du bouddhisme indien."¹⁰²

The chronological synchronism between, for example, both the epigraphical and architectural sources and the development of the abstract theories points us, as well, toward another curious observation: language expressing the personal presence and permanent abiding of the Buddha begins to appear explicitly in inscriptions at almost exactly the same time — the 4th/5th Century — that monastery ground plans begin to show that specific and elaborate accommodations were beginning to be provided for the Buddha in Indian monasteries. But both these phenomena begin to appear, then, at or during the period in which some of the most abstract theories concerning the person of the Buddha were beginning to take definitive shape. This, of course, would suggest that all three developments were not unrelated, but specifying the nature of the relationship is not easy. Several possibilities present themselves. It is conceivable that the 'security,' if you will, of dwelling in daily domestic intimacy with the Buddha provided a certain freedom of thought on the theoretical level — that increased etherealization and abstraction were possible precisely because the domestic presence of the Buddha was firmly established. It is conceivable, as well, that the abstract theories constituted a kind of minority report and were, in fact, a reaction to the apparently pervasive sense of the Buddha's personal presence, that they were in intent, at least, an attempt at reformation. It is also conceivable, finally, that the reaction went in the opposite direction, that the increasing emphasis on the abiding presence of the Buddha, and the architectural efforts to assure daily domestic contact with him, were fueled by the 'anxieties' that were engendered by the increasingly abstract and ethereal character of current theoretical discussions. All these are possibilities, but all too have one thing in common: they all indicate that any attempt to assess the actual historical significance of Buddhist śāstric notions must take into account a far broader range of sources than has heretofore been considered. They remind us — if such a remainder be required — that Indian Buddhism is very much more than the sum of its *śāstras*.

NOTES

- ¹ P. C. Almond, *The British Discovery of Buddhism* (Cambridge: 1988) esp. 77–79; the first half of Ét. Lamotte, “La légende du Buddha”, *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 134 (1948) 37–71, contains a still useful sketch of the changing scholarly perceptions of the ‘historical’ Buddha.
- ² Almond, *The British Discovery of Buddhism*, 70–77; curiously, it was also explicitly argued that the promotion of archeological work could provide a useful critique of 19th century “Brahmanism” by showing that “Brahmanism, instead of being an unchanged and unchangeable religion which has subsisted for ages, was of comparatively modern origin, and had been constantly receiving additions and alterations . . .”, A. Imam, *Sir Alexander Cunningham and the Beginnings of Indian Archaeology* (Dacca: 1966) 39–41.
- ³ L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Le siddhi de Hiuan-tsang*, T. II (Paris: 1929) 762–813; esp. 774; 776; 788–791.
- ⁴ de La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, T. II, 811.
- ⁵ de La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, T. II, 763.
- ⁶ de La Vallée Poussin does refer to the “invocation” of at least one inscription, but his example is non-Indian and he does not pursue the possibilities further. In fact similar “invocations” or *maṅgalas* are frequently found at the head of several varieties of the more elaborate types of Buddhist inscriptions and they constitute a rich potential source for future study. A cursory study of some of the epithets applied to the Buddha in pre-Gupta inscriptions has been published by A. M. Shastri, “The Legendary Personality of the Buddha as Depicted in Pre-Gupta Indian Inscriptions”, *The Orissa Historical Research Journal* 8 (1960) 168–76 (reprinted, with few alterations, as pp. 22–35 of A. M. Shastri, *An Outline of Early Buddhism (A Historical Survey of Buddhology, Buddhist Schools & Sanghas Mainly Based on the Study of Pre-Gupta Inscriptions)* (Varanasi: 1965)).
- ⁷ “Medieval” is here being used in a very broad and very loose sense to cover the period from the 5th to about the 14th Century C.E. — cf. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India*, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: 1967) xxi–xxii. This periodization reflects the fact that what is usually called — using an unsatisfactory dynastic terminology — the “late Gupta” represents not an end, but the beginnings of a number of new developments in the form and content of Indian Buddhist inscriptions. For a recent attempt to catalog the Buddhist inscriptions of this period — although already now somewhat out-dated — see Shizutani Masao, *Indo bukkūyō himei mokuroku* (Kyoto: 1979) 159–232.
- ⁸ A. Ghosh, “Buddhist Inscription from Kausambi”, *Epigraphia Indica (= EI)* 34 (1961–2) 14–16. The inscription is fragmentary and its interpretation consequently not sure.
- ⁹ Cf. E. J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History*, 3rd ed. (London: 1949) 115 n. 2: “It is doubtful if Buddha ever went so far west as Kosambi. There were later important monasteries there, and this is sufficient to explain the existence of legends attached to it.”
- ¹⁰ P. R. Srinivasan, “Two Brahmi Inscriptions”, *EI* 39 (1971 but 1985) 123–28.
- ¹¹ V. V. Mirashi, *Inscriptions of the Vākātakas* (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 5) (Ootacamund: 1963) 103–11, esp. 109, line 18. The reading is in part a reconstruction, but is fairly sure — cf. *īyaṅi* as a title of the Buddha in line 1 of this same

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- inscription, and note that he is also referred to elsewhere at Ajaṅṭā as *munindra*- (Cave XVII inscription (Mirashi) 127, line 28).
- ¹² For the plan of Cave XVI see J. Fergusson & J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India* (London: 1880) pl. xxxiii, 1; but see too the discussion and plans in W. Spink, “Ajaṅṭā’s Chronology: The Crucial Cave”, *Ars Orientalis* 10 (1975) 143–69 and Spink, “The Splendours of Indra’s Crown: A Study of Mahāyāna Developments at Ajaṅṭā”, *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 122, no. 5219 (1974) 743–67, esp. 758–60 & figs. 13a–d.
- ¹³ For the Cave XXVI inscription see G. Yazdani, *Ajaṅṭa*, Part IV: Text (London 1955) 114–8, vs. 14. What in vs. 14 is called a *veśma* is called a *śaīla-grhaṃ* . . . *śāstuh*, “a stone residence . . . for the Teacher”, in vs. 6, and a *sugatā[layaṃ]*, “a house for the Sugata”, in vs. 13.
- ¹⁴ J. Burgess, *Report on the Buddhist Cave Temples and Their Inscriptions* (Archaeological Survey of Western India, vol. IV) (London: 1883) 86, no. 10.
- ¹⁵ V. V. Mirashi, *Inscriptions of the Kalachuri-Chedi Era*, Pt. I (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 4) (Ootacamund: 1955) 19–21, esp. 20, line 5ff. I have omitted here — and in a number of the grants quoted below — the portion explicitly providing for the maintenance and upkeep of the monastery. Such a provision is a common, even a standard, element in land grants to Buddhist monasteries. The failure to take this into account in specific regard to the Bagh grant has, unfortunately, affected Spink’s attempt to date the caves. Spink argues in part that the presence of such a provision in the Bagh grant indicates that Subandhu actually made “repairs” to the caves and that they were, therefore, excavated earlier than had been previously thought. But the provision, of course, need not imply any of this — see W. M. Spink, “Bāgh: A Study”, *Archives of Asian Art* 30 (1976/77) 53–84; esp. 54, 56, 58, 83. It might also be noted that Mirashi’s translation of the grant is not free of problems. The key phrase “for the Blessed One, the Buddha”, has, for example, been entirely omitted.
- ¹⁶ For the plan of Cave II at Bagh see J. Marshall *et al.*, *The Bagh Caves in the Gwalior State* (London: 1927) pl. I.
- ¹⁷ D. C. Bhattacharyya, “A Newly Discovered Copper-plate from Tippera [the Gunaighar Grant of Vainyagupta: The Year 188 Current (Gupta Era)]”, *Indian Historical Quarterly* 6 (1930) 45–60; D. C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions Bearing on Indian History and Civilization*, vol. I, 2nd rev. ed. (Calcutta: 1965) 340–45; P. K. Agrawala, *Imperial Gupta Epigraphs* (Varanasi: 1983) 113–16. The preservation of the plate is not entirely satisfactory, nor is anything certain known about the monastery referred to, the plate being an accidental find (see, however, F. M. Asher, *The Art of Eastern India, 300–800* (Delhi: 1980) 16, 32, 63). The identity of the Ācārya Śāntideva mentioned in this record also remains unclear.
- ¹⁸ G. Bühler, “Further Valabhī Grants”, *Indian Antiquary* 6 (1877) 9–2, esp. 12, line 3. The Sthiramati of this record has been persistently identified with the Yogācāra author of the same name — see S. Lévi, “Les donations religieuses des roi de Valabhī”, *Bibliothèque de l’école des hautes-études, sciences religieuses, études de critique et d’histoire*, 2^e série, 7^e vol. (1896) 75–100 (repr. in *Mémorial Sylvain Lévi* (Paris: 1957) 218–34, esp. 231); Y. Kajiyama, “Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 12–3 (1968–69) 193–203; etc.
- ¹⁹ G. Bühler, “Grants from Valabhī”, *Indian Antiquary* 5 (1876) 204–21, esp. 207, line 7.

²⁰ This, of course, is not to say that words for "images" do not occur in Buddhist records and inscriptions of this period. They do occur, but not commonly — see, for example, the 7th/8th Century inscription from Nālandā in D. C. Sircar, "Nalanda Inscription of King Prathamāsiva", *EI* 39 (1971 but 1985) 117–22, esp. 122, line 10 (*bhagavato buddhasya bimbari*), line 12 (*pratīkṛtir . . . śās(tu)ṛ*). The occurrence of such terms in a small number of Medieval inscriptions may or may not point to the not unlikely possibility that different groups had different conceptions of these 'objects', but terms like *bimba*, *pratīkṛti*, *pratimā*, etc. must be much more fully studied and much more carefully nuanced before this will become clear — to translate them all automatically and indiscriminately by "image" is, to say the least, not helpful. For some remarks on the patterned occurrence and non-occurrence of the term *pratimā* in the pre-Gupta inscriptions from Mathurā see G. Roth, "The Physical Presence of the Buddha and its Representation in Buddhist Literature", in M. Yaldiz & W. Lobo, eds., *Investigating Indian Art. Proceedings of a Symposium on the Development of Early Buddhist and Hindu Iconography held at the Museum of Indian Art, Berlin, in May 1986* (Berlin: 1987) 306 n. 8, and the sources cited there. For the Khotanese terms *pratībimbaa* (Skt. *pratibimba*) and *pe'ma*, *pema*, *paima* (Skt. *pratimā*) and some interesting material illustrating Khotanese conceptions of Buddhist "images" see H. W. Bailey, "The Image in Gaustana", in N. A. Jayawickrama, ed., *Paranavitana Felicitation Volume* (Colombo: 1965) 33–36: "The Buddhas were conceived to be in these images. Thus we have the Khotanese verse *ramani tcaṣū paima bisai jista bai'ysa*, 'the deva Buddha resident in the delightful splendid image'; etc. These Khotanese conceptions are particularly interesting because they are articulated in sources which are broadly contemporaneous with a considerable number of the Indian inscriptions cited here. See also n. 39 below. Though further afield see H. Delahaye, "Les antécédents magiques des statues chinoises," *Revue d'esthétique* 5 (1983) 45–53, and the very interesting paper by B. Frank, "Vac.ité et corps actualisé: la problématique de la présence des 'personnages vénérés' dans leurs images selon la tradition du bouddhisme japonais", *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 11.2 (1988) 53–86.

²¹ Th. Bloch, "An Unpublished Valabhī Copper-plate Inscription of King Dhruvasena I", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (1895) 379–84, esp. 383, line 18.

²² Note that Lévi, "Les donations religieuses des roi de Valabhī", 232, identifies the Ācārya Buddhadasa with the scholastic of the same name who "était l'élève d'Asaṅga".

²³ D. B. Diskalkar, "Some Unpublished Copper-plates of the Rulers of Valabhī", *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1 (1925) 13–64, esp. 63, line 53. This text too is faulty and it is not impossible that the intended reading was *-kutyām*, not *-kuṭī*. *-kuṭī* in any case is, as it stands, almost certainly a scribal error. In form it could only be either a stem form without grammatical marker or a nom. sing. Context and syntax, however, make the second alternative virtually impossible.

²⁴ P. R. Srinivasan, "Two Fragmentary Charters of Maitraka Dharasena IV", *EI* 38 (1970 but 1976) 219–24, esp. 223, line 8.

²⁵ See below pp. 193ff.

²⁶ D. C. Sircar, *Epigraphic Discoveries in East Pakistan* (Calcutta: 1973) 11; 62, line 9; D. C. Sircar, "Jagadishpur Plate of the Gupta Year 128", *EI* 38 (1970 but 1979) 247–252, esp. 249. Sircar sees in the passage he is dealing with here a reference to a Buddhist establishment, but it might very well be Jain — cf. S. Siddhanta, "The

Jagadishpur Copper Plate Grant of the Gupta Year 128 (A.D. 447–48)," *Journal of the Varendra Research Museum* 1 (1972) 23–37. If the record is in fact referring to Jain Arhats its language would provide an early and striking Jain parallel to what we find in Buddhist records from Valabhī and elsewhere. An equally early and more certainly Jain parallel may be seen in K. N. Dikshit, "Paharpur Copper-Plate Grant of the [Gupta] Year 159", *EI* 20 (1929–30) 59–64 (*kāśika-pāñca-stūpa-nikāyika-nigrantha-śramanācāryya-guhanandi-śiṣya-prāśiṣyādhiṣṭhita-vihāre bhagavatām arhatām gandha-dhūpa-sumano-dīpādy-arthan . . .*, etc.). Asher, (*The Art of Eastern India*, 15) has expressed some doubt about the Jain character of this record, but the epithet *pañca-stūpa-nikāyika* makes it virtually certain that it is Jain — see A. K. Chatterjee, *A Comprehensive History of Jainism [up to 1000 A.D.]* (Calcutta: 1978) 105–06. The mere fact that it is not always easy to distinguish Buddhist and Jain inscriptions of this sort is, however, in itself significant.

²⁷ See G. Schopen, "The Inscription on the Kuṣān Image of Amitābha and the Character of the Early Mahāyāna in India", *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 10.2 (1987) 99–134, esp. 105–06, 121–22.

²⁸ H. Sastri, "Nalanda Stone Inscription of the Reign of Yasovarmadeva", *EI* 20 (1929–30) 37–46; H. Sastri, *Nalanda and its Epigraphic Material* (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, 66) (Delhi: 1942) 78–82; D. C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions Bearing on Indian History and Civilization*, vol. II. (Delhi: 1983) 229–32; S. M. Mishra, "The Nālandā Stone Inscription of the Reign of Yaśovarmadeva — A Fresh Appraisal", *Studies in Indian Epigraphy* 3 (1977) 108–15.

²⁹ Sastri, *EI* 20 (1929–30) 44, line 9.

³⁰ The last assertion at least may, perhaps, draw some support from the fact that the inscription of Yasovarmadeva "was found buried in the debris of the southern verandah of the old *vihāra* — now called Monastery I" at Nālandā. Sastri says of this *vihāra* and the others in the eastern row: "The [monastic] quadrangles had a projecting porch on one side which gave the entrance to the monastery . . . Directly opposite to the entrance was the shrine wherein the principal image of Tathāgata was enthroned as we see in Monastery No. I where the chapel still preserves the remains of a colossal figure of the Buddha . . ." (*Nalanda and Its Epigraphic Material*, 22). What this means, of course, is that Monastery I — in fact all the *Vihāras* in the eastern row — had exactly the same basic layout as Cave XVI at Ajañṭā and Cave II at Bagh: although all were primarily intended as monastic residences and consisted of individual residential cells, each had the central cell in the back wall specially reserved for the Buddha (for the layout at Nālandā see pl. 23 in B. Kumar, *Archaeology of Pataliputra and Nalanda* (Delhi: 1987) and pp. 181–82). On the uncertainties concerning the second half of the verse quoted above see Sastri, *EI* 20 (1929–30) 39 & n. 1; 46, n. 3; etc.

³¹ G. Bühler, "The New Inscription of Toramana Shaha", *EI* 1 (1892) 238–41, esp. 240, line 6; Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, vol. I, 422–24; Bühler's notes to his edition reflect the curious character of the language of this record: "a mistake," "a monstrous form," "utterly wrong," "the utter loss of all feeling for the rules of the language;" cf. É. Senart, "L'inscription du vase de Wardak", *Journal Asiatique* (1914) 581.

³² T. W. Rhys Davids & J. E. Carpenter, eds., *The Dīgha Nikāya*, vol. II (London: 1903) 88, 97, etc.; E. Waldschmidt, ed., *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, T. II (Berlin: 1951) 152 (6.9), 188 (12.4), 256 (26.15), etc.; (cf. G. von Simson, *Zur Diktion einiger Lehrtexte des buddhistischen Sanskritkanons* (München: 1965) 16.7, 16.9, 16.11, etc.);

- J. S. Speyer, ed., *Avadānaçataka*, vol. I (St. Petersburg: 1906) 9.8, 58.5, 64.9, etc.
- ³³ T. W. & C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, part II (London: 1910) 93.
- ³⁴ Rhys Davids & Carpenter, *Dīgha* ii 98.
- ³⁵ Among the various epithets applied to the Buddha in the Toramāna Inscription we find, for example, *daśabalabalinacatuvaśāradyacatasrapratīsam[vidā]-aṣṭādaśāveṇikādbhutadharmasamanvāgatasya sarvasatvavatsalamahākārunikasya* (Bühler, *EI* 1 (1892) 240 line 5ff). These qualities or characteristics are not only textual, but were involved in "the controversy about the nature of the *āvenikabuddhadharmas* . . . reflected in a number of important Sanskrit Buddhist scholastic texts" — see Y. Bentor, "The Redactions of the *Adbhutadharmaparyāya* from Gilgit", *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 11.2 (1988) 21—52, esp. 25—26 & notes.
- ³⁶ D. C. Sircar, "More Inscriptions from Nagarjunikonda" *EI* 35 (1963) 1—36, esp. 7, line 7; cf. D. C. Sircar, "Note on Nagarjunikonda Inscription of 333 A.D.", *EI* 38 (1969 but 1971) 183—85.
- ³⁷ S. S. Ramachandra, "Hyderabad Museum Plates of Prithivi-Sri-Mularaja", *EI* 38 (1969 but 1971) 192—95, esp. 194, line 15. For some earlier instances of the use of the term *-pramukha* see H. Lüders, *Mathurā Inscriptions* (Göttingen: 1961) §§47—51 (all of which are associated with what Lüders translates as "the commissioners of the Community": *saṅghaprakṛtān[ā]m bh[ad]rāghoṣa-pramukhā[nām]*, "the commissioners of the Community headed by Bhadrāghoṣa", etc.), and §27.
- ³⁸ D. R. Sahni, "Saheth-Maheth Plate of Govinda-Chandra [Vikrama-] Samvat 1186", *EI* 11 (1911—12) 20—26, esp. 24, line 20.
- ³⁹ M. Venkataramayya, *Śrāvastī* (New Delhi: 1956) 13—15 — Khotanese material again provides some interesting parallels. First of all, according to Bailey, "In Khotanese texts the Sanskrit *pramukha* 'chief' is used in various dialectal forms as the title of the head of a Buddhist monastery (*vihāra*)" (H. W. Bailey "Iranica", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 11 (1943—46) 2). Elsewhere he cites as examples *icarmaja p[ra]māha maledapraṇa*, "Maledapraṇa principal [pramukha] of Tcarma", and — notably — *drūtīrai p[ra]māha' tathāgatta śrībhadra*, "the Tathāgata Śrībhadra principal [pramukha] of Dro-tir" (H. W. Bailey, "Hvatanica IV", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 10 (1940—42) 921). Bailey's second example would seem to explicitly designate a Buddha as the head of a monastery. Notice too the invocation to P. 2026 treated in the same paper (pp. 894—95) where Buddhas dwelling in two local communities are referred to: "Homage, reverence to the Buddha dwelling in Brrūya; homage, reverence to the Buddha in Khāmhyape". For even more generalized uses of *pramukha* as a monastic title in Khotanese and in Tibetan sources dealing with Khotan see H. W. Bailey, *Indo-Scythian Studies. Being Khotanese Texts*, volume IV (Cambridge: 1961) 24 (7), 82ff; H. W. Bailey, *The Culture of the Sakas in Ancient Iranian Khotan* (Delmar: 1982) 66 (both dealing with a letter in which several monks are referred to by name with titles: *Dvipitaka Ācārya Pramukha Yaśah-prajña*, *Tripitaka Ācārya Pramukha Puṇya-mitra*, etc.); R. E. Emmerick, *Tibetan Texts Concerning Khotan* (London: 1967) 60.3, 137 (*par-mog = pramukha*).
- ⁴⁰ H. Shastri, "The Nalanda Copper-plate of Devapala-deva", *EI* 17 (1923—24) 310—27, esp. 322, line 38; Sastri, *Nalanda and Its Epigraphic Material*, 92—102, esp. 98, line 38.

- ⁴¹ K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyer, "The Larger Leiden Plates (of Rajaraja I)", *EI* 22 (1933—34) 213—65, esp. 242, lines 83—84.
- ⁴² R. B. Hiralal, "Four Chandella Copper-plate Inscriptions", *EI* 20 (1929—30) 125—36, esp. 130, line 14; see also R. K. Dikshit, "Land-grants of the Chandella Kings", *Journal of the Uttara Pradesh Historical Society* 23 (1950) 228—51, esp. 239.
- ⁴³ D. C. Sircar, *Some Epigraphical Records of the Medieval Period From Eastern India* (New Delhi: 1979) 32.
- ⁴⁴ F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (New Haven: 1953) 209.
- ⁴⁵ H. Lüders, *Bharhut Inscriptions* (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 2.2), rev. E. Waldschmidt & M. A. Mehendale (Ootacamund: 1963) 107—08 (B 34).
- ⁴⁶ J. Ph. Vogel, "Prakrit Inscriptions from Ghantasala" *EI* 27 (1947—48) 1—4, esp. 3, A&B. The same inscriptions were published some twenty years later as recent discoveries and without reference to Vogel in M. S. Sarma, "Some Prakrit Inscriptions from Ghantaśāla", *Epigraphia Āndhrīca* 2 (1979) 1—3, — none of these inscriptions contain a date. Two of them are virtually identical and record the construction of a "stone *mandapa* with a *gandha-kuṭī*, a railing (*vedikā*) and a *torana*."
- ⁴⁷ P. V. P. Sastry, "Hyderabad Prakrit Inscription of Govindaraja Vihara", *Journal of the Epigraphical Society of India* 11 (1984) 95—100 — This inscription is poorly edited here and must be studied again. For now the readings marked "[ed.]" in the notes are to be preferred. The donor in this record — a monk — is called among other things *govīṃdarāja-vihārasa gaṃdhakuṭī-vārika*, the sense of which has been misunderstood; see below n. 56.
- ⁴⁸ Mirashi, *Inscriptions of the Vākātakas*, 120—29 (no. 27), esp. 127, line 27. This is the "Inscription in Ajaṅṭā Cave XVII". It records the 'construction' of, among other things, a *gandhakuṭī*, but because it is badly preserved and fragmentary there is some uncertainty about which of the extant excavations at Ajaṅṭā it refers to.
- ⁴⁹ J. Burgess, *Report on the Elura Cave Temples and the Brahmanical and Jaina Caves in Western India* (London: 1883) 77 (no. 6); the inscription records the gift of a *śākyabhikṣu* (*śākya*- has been inadvertently omitted from the reading published here but is easily read in the facsimile, pl. LI); this monk is also called *mahāgandhakuṭī-vārika*; cf. below.
- ⁵⁰ G. R. Sharma, "Excavations at Kausāmbī, 1949—1955", *Annual Bibliography of Indian Archaeology*, Vol. XVI (Leyden: 1958) xlv: "Inscription on a lotus-shaped lamp (pl. Vc and d). The inscription records the donation of the lotus-shaped lamp by Bhikṣu Pradipta for the use in the Gandhakuṭī of the monastery". Although the bibliography of B. Ch. Chhabra's work published in *Svasti Śrī Dr. B. Ch. Chhabra Felicitation Volume*, ed. K. V. Ramesh et al. (Delhi: 1984) lists the "Ghoshitarama Terracotta Lamp Inscription", and says it was "published twice in English and once in Sanskrit", it gives no further details and I have yet to locate it. In the photograph published by Sharma the whole inscription is not clearly readable.
- ⁵¹ E. Hultzsch, "The Sarnath Inscription of Mahipala", *Indian Antiquary* 14 (1885) 139—40; and see below ns. 61—2, 69.
- ⁵² B. Indrājī, "An Inscription at Gayā Dated in the Year 1813 of Buddha's Nirvana, with Two Others of the Same Period", *Indian Antiquary* 10 (1881) 341—47, esp. 342, line 13, Th. Bloch, "Notes on Both Gayā", *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1908—09* (Calcutta: 1912) 139—58, esp. 153, line 1; R. D. Banerji, *The Palas of Bengal* (Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 5 no. 3) (Calcutta: 1915) 35, line 3; D. C. Sircar, "Three East Indian Inscriptions of the Early

Medieval Period", *Journal of Ancient Indian History* 6 (1972-3) 39-59.

⁵³ See above ns. 21, 23, and 24.

⁵⁴ A. Banerji-Sastri, "Ninety-three Inscriptions on the Kurkihar Bronzes", *The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 26 (1940) 236-51, esp. nos. 31, 32.

⁵⁵ See below ns. 58-9.

⁵⁶ Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, 477 s.v. *vārika*. Edgerton cites as the usual Tibetan equivalent *zhal (l)ta pa*, "guard, superintend(ent)". Curiously this Buddhist material has not been taken into account in an exchange between Sircar and S. P. Tewari concerning the meaning of *vārika* in inscriptions (See S. P. Tewari, "A Note on Varika of the Inscriptions", *Journal of the Epigraphical Society of India* 9 (1982) 34-36 (also in Tewari, *Contributions of Sanskrit Inscriptions to Lexicography* (Delhi: 1987) 208-11); D. C. Sircar, "The Designation 'Varika'" in *Vajapeya: Essays on Evolution of Indian Art & Culture. Prof K. D. Bajpai Felicitation Volume*, Vol. I, ed. A. M. Sastri et al. (Delhi: 1987) 111-12). The Buddhist usage clearly favors Sircar.

⁵⁷ See n. 49 above.

⁵⁸ Sastri, *Nalanda and Its Epigraphic Material*, 38 & n. 4 (S.I. 675).

⁵⁹ Sastri, *Nalanda and Its Epigraphic Material*, 43 (S.I. 730), but accepting the emendation proposed in P. V. B. Karunatilaka, "The Administrative Organization of the Nālandā Mahāvihāra from Sigillary Evidence", *The Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities* 6.1 & 2 (1980) 62; (see too the more general discussion here (pp. 61-64) of the term *vārika*). There is a third sealing published in Sastri (p. 40, S.I.A. 357) which refers to a *gandhakuṭi* but it does not contain the term *vārika: śrīdevapāla-gandhakudyām*.

⁶⁰ See Sastri, *Nalanda and Its Epigraphic Material*, 27, for example. It is a pity that in one of the very few studies connected with the *gandhakuṭi* the title *gandhakuṭivārika*, and a considerable number of other things, have been so carelessly treated. J. S. Strong, "Gandhakuṭi: The Perfumed Chamber of the Buddha", *History of Religions* 16 (1977) 390-406, referring to the Kanheri inscription (n. 48 above) cites the title as "*gandhakuṭi-bhārika*". This, of course, is wrong and had he actually checked the work he cites as his primary source — Lüders list in *EI* 10 (1909-10) no. 989 — he would have seen that it was so. "*gandhakuṭi-bhārika*" is an invention of S. Dutt (*Buddhist Monks and Monasteries in India* (London: 1962) 149) which is nowhere attested, and certainly not at Kanheri. The form found at Kanheri is — as given by Lüders — "*mahāgandhakuṭivārika*?", the question mark reflecting the uncertainty expressed in Burgess (n. 48 above) concerning the possibility of reading *-cārika* instead of *-vārika*, an uncertainty which was removed by the publication of the Nālandā seals. In both Lüders and Burgess the title is translated as "the guardian of the great *gandhakuṭi*", but because, apparently, he wants the title to 'confirm' a story in the *Avadāna-śataka* about a monk sweeping the *gandhakuṭi*, Strong himself invents a quotation that he attributes to S. Dutt: He says that the title means "according to Sukumar Dutt, a 'monk in charge of keeping the sanctuary clean'." What Dutt actually says is "... *Gandhakuṭi-bhārika* who was in charge of the sanctuary (Lüders, no. 989 at Kanheri) and probably had to keep it clean and make arrangements for the daily worship." The Nālandā material, long available, should have indicated to both how unlikely it was that the term referred to a janitor. Strong too says of the *gandhakuṭi* that it was "never itself a canonical tradition, figuring only sporadically in a few popular texts." But unless he wants to argue that the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* is not

"canonical", this is contradicted in one of his own notes. In his n. 19 he says: "... there are two references to the *gandhakuṭi* in the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins" — he then cites probably only by coincidence, the only two passages that occur in Bagchi's index, and adds: "the first of these is just a passing reference; the second specifies the location of the *gandhakuṭi* as being in the middle of the monastery. Together they add little to the Pāli materials we have reviewed ...". There are several problems here. First, there are many more references to the *gandhakuṭi* in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* than the two in Bagchi's index. This will be clear from the fact that the passage he refers to as "just a passing reference" is only one of a series of passages which indicate that certain kinds of material possessions and moveable wealth that "belonged" to the Buddha had to be lodged in or used on the *gandhakuṭi* and that — since such wealth frequently consisted of things like jewels and pearls — the *gandhakuṭi* was not only a central unit in the monastic economy, but also one of the wealthiest (see N. Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Pt. 2 (Srinagar: 1942) 142.10, 143.12, 146.3; N. Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Pt. 4 (Calcutta: 1950) 210.4; R. Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscripts of the Śāyanānavastu and the Adhikaranavastu* (Roma: 1978) 68.22; etc. and below). More could be added here, but it is probably clear that few of the facts, and perhaps even less of the interpretation, in Strong's paper can be taken with confidence.

⁶¹ J. H. Marshall & S. Konow, "Sārnāth", *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1906-07* (Calcutta: 1909) 97. See also J. H. Marshall & S. Konow, "Excavations at Sārnāth 1908", *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1907-08* (Calcutta: 1911) 66.

⁶² H. Hargreaves, "Excavation at Sārnāth", *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1914-15* (Calcutta: 1920) 127.

⁶³ J. Ph. Vogel, "Seals of Buddhist Monasteries in Ancient India", *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, n.s. 1 (1950) 27-32, esp. 27.

⁶⁴ Vogel, "Seals of Buddhist Monasteries in Ancient India", 30.

⁶⁵ G. Fussman, "Numismatic and Epigraphic Evidence for the Chronology of Early Gandharan Art", in *Investigating Indian Art*, ed. M. Yaldiz & W. Lobo (Berlin: 1987) 80.

⁶⁶ Marshall & Konow, *Annual Report of the Archeological Survey of India for the Years 1906-07*, 99.

⁶⁷ The presence of more than one *gandhakuṭi* at Kanheri is at least suggested by the designation *mahā-gandhakuṭi-vārika* (above n. 48), "the superintendent of the Great *gandhakuṭi*", the specificity added by the *mahā-* being otherwise unnecessary.

⁶⁸ See, for example, H. Shastri, "The Nalanda Copper-plate of Devapaladeva", *EI* 17 (1923-24) 310-27, esp. 310 (where the seal reads simply *śrī-devapāladevasya*, "of the Illustrious Devapāladeva"), and D. C. Sircar, "Lucknow Museum Copper-plate Inscription of Surapala I, Regnal Year 3", *EI* 40 (1973 but 1986) 4-16, esp. 5 (*śrī-sūrapāladevasya*, "[this] belongs to the Illustrious Sūrapāladeva").

⁶⁹ The text cited here is that found in D. R. Sahni, *Catalogue of the Museum of Archaeology at Sārnāth* (Calcutta: 1914) 211. A second similar inscription on yet another recut pillar was also found at the site. It reads: *deyadharmmo yam paramopa-[-sa]ka-kīrteḥ [mūla-ga]ndhaku-[-t]yām pra[d]īp . . . ddhahj* (also, Sahni, 211). What remains of both inscriptions, taken together with the sealings already discussed, allows for a fairly certain restoration.

⁷⁰ The most direct evidence comes, of course, from Gilgit. To judge by the

manuscript material recovered from this site, the monastic community at Gilgit was governed by this Vinaya, although the rest of the literature it had available was primarily — although not exclusively — Mahāyāna (See O. von Hinüber, “Die Erforschung der Gilgit-Handschriften (Funde buddhistischer Sanskrit-Handschriften, I)”, *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen I. Philo-Hist. Klasse*, Jahrgang 1979, Nr. 12 (Göttingen: 1979) 329–59; O. von Hinüber, “Die Bedeutung des Handschriftenfundes bei Gilgit”, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Supplement V (XXI. Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 4 bis. 29 März 1980 in Berlin) (Wiesbaden: 1982) 47–66; etc. That virtually the same situation is mirrored in the Tibetan Kanjur — primarily Mahāyāna sūtra literature, but only the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* — would seem to argue for the pervasiveness of this Vinaya in the primarily Mahāyāna Indian communities from which Tibet got its Buddhism, and may, in fact, suggest that this was the standard Vinaya in Eastern India at the time. I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* points in the same direction. More specifically his remarks suggest the importance of this Vinaya at Tāmralipti and Nālandā (the latter, incidentally, has produced the only epigraphic reference I know to the *Mūlasarvāstivāda*; see S. L. Huntington, *The “Pāla-Sena” Schools of Sculpture* (Leiden: 1984) 225–26, no. 34). There are, moreover, indications of a connection between this Vinaya and Ajanta: J. Przyluski, “La roue de la vie à Ajanta”, *Journal Asiatique* (1920) 313–331; M. Lalou, “Trois récits du dulva reconnus dans les peintures d’Ajanta”, *Journal Asiatique* (1925) 333–37; M. Lalou, “Notes sur la décoration des monastères bouddhiques”, *Revue des arts asiatique* 5.3 (1930) 183–85; D. Schlingloff, *Studies in the Ajanta Paintings. Identifications and Interpretations* (Delhi: 1987) 14, 34, 70–71, 77–78, 153, etc.

⁷¹ R. Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscripts of the Śayanāsanavastu and the Adhikaraṇavastu* (Roma: 1978) 68.9ff.

⁷² N. Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Pt. 2 (Srinagar: 1942) 143.10. This passage — like a number of other passages from the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* — has been incorporated by I-Tsing in his *Record*; see J. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* (London: 1896) 192.

⁷³ Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Pt. 2, 146.3.

⁷⁴ Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Pt. 2, 124.11ff. There are a number of textual problems in the passage as a whole — Dutt, for example, makes several emendations — and the Tibetan translation (Peking (Tokyo-Kyoto) ed., Vol. 41, 280-3–6ff) differs here, as it frequently does, just enough so that it does not provide a sure guide. The general sense of the passage is not, however, in doubt.

⁷⁵ Peking (Tokyo-Kyoto) ed., Vol. 44, 95-3–5ff.

⁷⁶ Given the not infrequent difficulty in distinguishing *dng* especially, but not exclusively, in the Peking edition, it is, of course, not impossible to read *bud dung*, etc. *dung* can mean ‘a kind of shell or conch’.

⁷⁷ The inscription is fragmentary and has given rise to somewhat different interpretations. J. Marshall, A. Foucher, and N. G. Majumdar, *The Monuments of Sāncī*, Vol. I (Delhi: 1940) 385–86; Vol. III, pl. 124b. Two interesting studies of this “episode” — the so-called “First Meditation” — have recently been published: H. Durt, “La ‘visite aux laboureurs’ et la ‘méditation sous l’arbre jambu’ dans les biographies sanskrites et chinoises du buddha”, in *Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. L. A. Hercus et al. (Canberra:

1982) 95–120; D. Schlingloff, “Die Meditation unter dem Jambu-Baum”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasien* 31 (1987) 111–30 (118, n. 32: “Die Inschrift [on the Sāncī figure] vermeldet die Errichtung einer Statue des Erhabenen, der sich auf einem Steinsitz (?) unter dem Schatten des Rosenapfelbaumes befindet”). The passage cited above is not the only one in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* to refer to this image; see Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, vol. III, pt. 2, 142.1: *yaṣṭaḥ yā jātātā jāmbūcchāyī-kāḥ pratimāyā dhvajavaṃśāḥ kārayitavyāḥ*, and Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion* 190.

⁷⁸ J. Gernet, *Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la société chinoise du v^e au x^e siècle* (Paris: 1956) esp. 61–70; 149–62 (Gernet, given his primary focus, justifiably paid little attention to the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*: “Le Vinaya des Mūlasarvāstivādin, traduit au début du viii^e siècle par Yi-tsing, et venu trop tard n’a pu avoir sur la constitution des institutions monacales autant d’influence que les précédents”; p. 62, n. 1); see also A. Bareau, “La construction et le culte des stūpa d’après les *vinayapitaka*”, *Bulletin de l’École française d’extrême-orient* 50 (1960) 229–74, esp. 230, 242–43, 244, 256–57; A. Bareau, “Indian and Ancient Chinese Buddhism: Institutions Analogous to the Jisa”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3.4 (1961) 443–51; for traces of similar ideas in the Pāli Vinaya see G. Schopen, “The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pāli Vinaya”, *Journal of the Pāli Text Society* 13 (1989) 83–100, esp. 89–91; and, for the strong continuance of such ideas in Mahāyāna sūtra literature, G. Schopen, “Burial ‘ad Sanctos’ and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism. A Study in the Archeology of Religions”, *Religion* 17 (1987) 193–225, esp. 206–09; see, finally, for some brief remarks on some of these ideas in the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Mahāvibhāṣa*, M. Hofinger, “Le vol dans la morale bouddhique”, in *Indianisme et bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à Mgr. Étienne Lamotte* (Louvain-La-Neuve: 1980) 177–89, esp. 185.

⁷⁹ See, for example, from Valabhī, G. Bühler, “Additional Valabhī Grants, Nos. IX–XIV”, *Indian Antiquary* 7 (1878) 66–72, esp. 67, line 5: . . . *tasya gandhapuṣpadhūpadipatāilādīkriyotsarpanārtham saddharmmasya pustakopakra- . . . ānādeśasamatvāgatāṣṭādaśanikāyā[ābhyanantarā]ryyabhikṣu[saṃgha]sya civrapinḍapa[ta] . . . vihārasya ca khaṇḍasphuṭitaviśīrṇapratisaṃskāraṇārtham . . .*; from Nālandā, Shastri, *EI* 17 (1923–24) 322, line 38: . . . *bhagavato buddhabhaṭṭārakasya . . . āyārthe . . . cāturdśīryābhikṣu-saṅghasya balicarasatracivarapinḍapātāśayanāsanāglānapratyaya-bhaiṣajyādyartham dharmaratnasya lekhanādyartham vihārasya ca khaṇḍasphuṭitasamādhanārtham*; from Kailān, D. C. Sircar, “The Kailān Copper-plate Inscription of King Śrīdhāraṇa Rāta of Samatata”, *Indian Historical Quarterly* 23 (1947) 221–41, esp. 239, line 22: . . . *bhagavatas tathāgataratnasya gandhadhūpadīpa-mālyānulepanārthan tadupadiṣṭamārggasya dharmmasya lekhanavācanārtham āryasāṅghasya ca civarapinḍapātādivividhōpacārtham . . .*; etc; all of which make clear provision for copying texts as well.

⁸⁰ V. Dehejia, *Early Buddhist Rock Temples. A Chronology* (London: 1972) 71.

⁸¹ On the Buddha as a living presence in his *stūpa* and relics see Bareau, “Le culte des stūpa d’après les *vinayapitaka*”, 269: “D’autre part, la participation du *stūpa* au caractère sacré des reliques et de la personne du Buddha ou du saint tend à le personnaliser le monument . . . le *stūpa* est plus que le symbole du Buddha, c’est le Buddha lui-même”; Schopen, “Burial ‘ad Sanctos’ and the Physical Presence of the Buddha”, 193–225; and G. Schopen, “On the Buddha and His

there is a collection of over sixty copper-plate grants, few of which have been published. Future work will concentrate on these grants.

³⁸ For examples of these *kaṭṭalais* and grants, see *Travancore Archaeological Series*, Vol. 1, Nos. XVI and XVII, which discuss the Tirukuttalam Plates of Śivāla Varagunārāma alias Pandya Kulaśekharadeva Dikshitar, dates śaka 1670, in which *kaṭṭalai* is endowed to the Tiruvāṭuturai Adhinam; and A.R.E. no. 420 of 1918, from Vaitūśvarankōil, which records that the temple tank, Nacciyar shrine, and its *mantapa* were renovated during the time when Kaderāyer was governing Sīrkāli Sirmāi (around 1720 CE), which was during the time when Muttukumaracuvāmitan pirān, a disciple of Śivānānacampantar of the Dharmapuram *maṭam* was the endowment manager.

³⁹ See Arjun Appadurai, 'Kings, Sects and Temples in South India, 1350—1700', in *South Indian Temples: An Analytical Reconsideration*, ed. Burton Stein (New Delhi: 1977).

⁴⁰ An example is an unpublished copper-plate, dated 1763, from the Kāśi Maṭha of Tiruppanaṅṭāl. The donor is Niḷaiyitta Muttuvaṭukanatappēriya Uṭaiyarttēvar, a Setupati from Irāmanatapuram.

⁴¹ An example is the unpublished copper-plate, dated 1603 from Tiruvāṭuturai. The donor is Rēkunāta Vānaṅkamuttittontaimān. This example, and the one cited in the note above are two of several examples.

⁴² See David Ludden, 'Agrarian Organization in Tinnevely District', pp. 108—217 in discussion of the *vēlāla* position in agrarian production.

⁴³ See *Sahityaratnakara, Composed by Yajñanārāyana Dikṣita, Court Poet of Raghunāta Nāyaka, Ruler of Tanjore during the first half of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. by T. R. Chintami (Madras: 1932), for a traditional account of how Govinda Dikṣita accompanied Cevappa Nayāya to Tanjavur during the time that *nāyak* rule was established in Tanjavur.

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REMARKS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NĀGĀRJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY

Abbreviations: MMK = Mūlamadhyamakakārikās; VV = Vigrahavyāvartani

I

There are a number of apparent tensions and inconsistencies in Nāgārjuna's writings as well as in Madhyamaka philosophy which have to be taken into account by any attempt at a satisfying interpretation. The most important tensions are the following:

(1) Denial of cause-effect-relationships in MMK I ⇔ declaration that *pratīyasamutpāda* is *śūnyatā* in MMK XXIV, 18.

(2) Apparent rational argumentations in the MMK and other works ⇔ denial of the existence of an own *pratijñā* in VV XXIX.

(3) Rejection of *bhāva* as well as of *abhāva*, statements to the effect that one has to reject both the 'it is' and the 'it is not', e.g. in MMK XV, and the famous *cauṣkoṭi* ⇔ explicit statements saying that certain (kinds of) entities do not exist (e.g. MMK V, 5) and passages suggesting denials of the existence of certain types of things or of all *dharmas* in general.

(4) Apparent propagation of a doctrine of voidness/*śūnyatā* of all *dharmas* ⇔ rejection of consequences allegedly implied by a doctrine declaring the voidness of all *dharmas* in MMK XXIV.

(5) Apparent incompatibility of Nāgārjuna's tenets with common-sense views ⇔ statements suggesting that (the doctrine of) *śūnyatā* is not incompatible with ordinary views, e.g. in MMK XXIV, 14.¹

(6) Apparent acceptance of *nirvāṇa* as an essential and integral part of Buddhism ⇔ declaration that no difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* exists in MMK XXV, 19, 20.

(7) Apparent extremity of Madhyamaka-tenets ⇔ the fact that Nāgārjuna's doctrine has been referred to by the term *madhyamā pratipat* in MMK XXIV, 18 and had been regarded as a teaching of the middle which avoids extreme views.

In view of these facts it is tempting to assume that at least some of Nāgārjuna's tenets are different from what they prima facie appear to be and to resort to interpretations which entail major deviations from the wording of the (authentic) texts. One possible strategy to dissolve apparent inconsistencies lies in supposing that some of the claims a philosophical author makes are essentially weaker than they seem to be. There are scholars who have adopted such views. An example of an interpretation which follows this strategy we find in a book which has been published recently by A.M. Padhye.² The author assumes that the writer of the MMK did not go so far as to affirm the non-existence of empirical reality but rather intended to remove some fundamental misconceptions about it. In this spirit Nāgārjuna is credited with the view that wrong conceptions exist which are commonly superimposed on the discrete, uniquely particular and mutually independent things which constitute the real world and that this is the true import of *pratīyasamutpāda*, if it is understood properly.

Admittedly, a number of the above listed tensions are dissolved in that way. Seen in this light, (1) presents itself as a consequence of the fact that the correct version of *pratīyasamutpāda*, by excluding everything which is not entailed by the mere existence of discrete particulars, debars causal connectedness and this opens the possibility of understanding the equation of *pratīyasamutpāda* with *śūnyatā* as a way of expressing the proposition that wrong notions like the above one do not apply to *pratīyasamutpāda* properly understood. Taking the propagation of a doctrine of voidness of all *dharma*s and the extremity of Madhyamaka-tenets as mere appearances, (5) and (7) become irrelevant. On the other hand, as the writer of the MMK would have to be credited with a genuine philosophical position which even accepts the existence of particulars on the final level of analysis, no incompatibility results between the views ascribed and the contents of the doctrine on the one hand and the behaviour which is manifested by the person to whom those views and tenets are attributed, namely the undertaking of propagating those views and tenets, on the other. By a corresponding reinterpretation of the statement that there is no own *pratijñā*, tension (2) can be equally resolved.

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In the face of these facts, it must be conceded that Padhye's interpretational hypothesis is not without merits and possesses a number of attractive features. But his treatise would have made a more valuable contribution to the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's thought if it had confined itself to saying that such and such difficulties are objectively posed by the textual material, i.e. by those texts which can be safely attributed to Nāgārjuna, and that an interpretation along the lines proposed by the author of the book would furnish at least one possible way of solving those problems, acknowledging that the positive textual evidence for all the relevant components of the interpretational hypothesis constitutes a different problem.

If, however, one takes Padhye's suggestions merely as an hypothesis explaining a range of facts, the idea of possible alternatives emerges. As a matter of fact, there is at least one rival interpretation which explains all the phenomena which Padhye's hypothesis and similar ones can explain in one way or the other equally well, which however furnishes comparatively elegant explanations of some other characteristics of Nāgārjuna's philosophy that cannot be so easily accounted for by any interpretation which, like Padhye's, assumes that the founder of the Madhyamaka-doctrine claimed essentially less than he appears to claim. Above all, the rival hypothesis can be brought into line much better with what we find in those texts which can be safely attributed to the author of the MMK. As it would require too much space to substantiate the last of those assertions, this must be stated rather dogmatically here. For clarification one can refer to my papers 'Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie Nāgārjunas' (in: 'Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik' 15, 1989, pp. 1-39), 'Die metaphysische Lehre Nāgārjuna's' (in: 'Conceptus' 1988, nr. 56, pp. 47-64) and 'On some non-formal aspects of the proofs of the Madhyamakakārikās' (in: 'Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka' 1990, pp. 91-109). But something more can be said on the other claims.

The favoured alternative comes quite close to the "traditional" view which holds that the founder of the Madhyamaka denied the existence of the phenomenal world, although it does not entirely coincide with any of the previous interpretations. The central tenet of Nāgārjuna's doctrine can be described by the sentence that on the level of the highest truth there is nothing of any kind.

It is of greatest importance to become clear about the logical structure of this proposition. It contains as ingredients something like a sentential operator "on the level of highest truth (it is the case that)" and a negated existential proposition, which could be represented by an expression of the form $\neg(\exists x) \dots x \dots$. Both these features must be kept in mind, whenever one wants to give an account of the above listed phenomena presenting major problems for the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy.

They immediately change the import of the phenomena mentioned in (3). For, seen in this light, the fact that *bhāva* as well as *abhāva* are rejected and that there are statements to the effect that both 'it is' and 'it is not' are disapproved can be understood as logical consequences of the main tenet, if only we assume that what is at stake in all these cases is the possibility of saying of something that it exists or does not exist at certain times or certain places, or more generally, of ascribing predicates to things. The feature of the central tenet that it has a negative general existential proposition as its component necessitates the rejection of all statements in which something is attributed to something (at the highest level of truth). Therefore the phenomena mentioned in (3) would by itself entail nothing more than that both propositions of the form $(\exists x)(Fx \& Gx)$ and $(\exists x)(Fx \& \neg Gx)$ — as well as $(\exists x)Fx$ and $(\exists x) \neg Fx$ — cannot hold in the final analysis. But this is completely compatible with the denial of the existence of things or of the whole phenomenal world — and it constitutes according to our proposal nothing but a logical consequence of this. For the existential denials possess the logical form of negative general existential propositions which are representable by expressions of the form $\neg(\exists x) \dots x \dots$ or $\emptyset \neg(\exists x) \dots x \dots$, where \emptyset would stand for a sentential operator like 'on the level of highest truth (it is the case that)'. Seen in this way, the tension of (3) turns out to be merely apparent. If this is correct, it would, incidentally, also follow that all analyses are fundamentally mistaken which describe the *catuṣkoṭi* and related phenomena on the propositional level, using propositional variables like ' p ', ' $\neg p$ ', ' $p \& \neg p$ ' & ' $\neg \neg p$ ' in order to represent the members to be negated. The fault lies in a too superficial consideration of the logical forms involved and the total neglect of the internal structures of the propositions in question.

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In order to account for the other phenomena mentioned which constitute tensions in Nāgārjuna's philosophy we must pay due attention to the second feature of the main tenet, i.e., the fact that it possesses a "sentential operator-component". Already in Hīnayāna-doctrine two different levels of things have been distinguished which have sometimes been indicated by the terms *prajñaptisat* and *paramārthasat* and related expressions. One characteristic of this distinction is important here: The *paramārtha*-level in Hīnayāna-doctrine was conceived similar to a theoretical level, as e.g. the theoretical level in natural sciences, and exhibited a kind of "neutrality" with respect to the non-*paramārtha*- the "phenomenal" level which is comparable to the way in which the assumption of theoretical entities in physics leaves ordinary states-of-affairs unaffected. Now we must only assume that Nāgārjuna's conception of levels of reality inherited the aspect that what is posited or not posited on the *paramārtha*-level does not affect the special constitution of the phenomenal world. Accordingly, negated or non-negated general existential propositions embedded under the operator 'on the level of highest truth it is the case that' would have to be taken as lacking any entailments with respect to propositions which exclusively pertain to the ordinary, phenomenal level. But once this is accepted, the phenomena mentioned in (4) and (5) do not present a problem any more. It can also be explained, why Nāgārjuna's teaching could be taken as a middle-doctrine, as soon as one assumes that it did not include anything essential in addition to the negative existential proposition(s) pertaining to the highest level of truth. In this case it would not entail any claims about that which holds on the phenomenal level³ and a fortiori would not imply any of the "extreme views". But as the central tenet has the negative existential import pertaining to the *paramārtha*-level, it could be naturally taken to imply that *nirvāna* is nothing else but what the world is on its theoretical, higher level, and therefore nothing surprising lies in the fact that we come across statements expressing that (in the final analysis) there is no difference between *nirvāna* and *samsāra*.

On the other hand the very idea that the *paramārtha*-level of the phenomenal world is *nirvāna* involves that on that level neither the proclamation of Buddhist doctrine nor the propagation of Nāgārjuna's teaching can be taken as existing entities and the same verdict

holds for any event whatsoever. This immediately enables us to understand both why Nāgārjuna faced the problem of justifying his activity of proclaiming and teaching something, which is the main subject of the VV, and why he could make a statement to the effect that there is no assertion of his own. In the light of what has been said above a denial of the existence of any assertion of his own should be taken as pertaining to the *paramārtha*-level, because the main tenet logically entails precisely this.⁴ The prose commentary on *kārikā* 29 of the VV supports this assumption, because it probably conveys that the non-existence of one's own as well as any other *pratijñā* is necessitated by the fact that all things/*bhāvas* are void. Therefore probably both Padhye's⁵ and the "traditional" interpretation of the famous *Vigrahavyāvartani*-passage are wrong, because they both assume that some specific peculiarity of Nāgārjuna's own assertions or theses is at stake, whereas in reality nothing is implied which holds for Nāgārjuna's assertions in contradistinction to any other statements. The passage rather says something about all (declarative) utterances whatsoever and therefore is not meant to tell us that the author's own statements differ from ordinary ones with respect to their declarative force. In this way the apparent tension of (2) is dissolved and only (1) needs a further comment.

Perhaps the facts mentioned in (1) can only be fully explained on a closer examination of the argumentations of the MMK. There are at least some passages which suggest that Nāgārjuna took relationships which we could describe as relationships of semantical entailments or of logical requirements as identical or at least similar to causal dependencies. We must only assume that the author of the MMK regarded the fact that e.g. the existence of a cause or that of a bearer of attributes can be said to require the existence of an effect or respectively of an attribute and similar ones as instantiations of the *pratīyasamutpāda*-principle. As this supposition quite directly leads to the result that relationships of *pratīyasamutpāda* must be mutual, while on the other hand the idea of a mutual dependence contradicts the asymmetrical character of causal relationships and the paradigmatic instances of the *pratīyasamutpāda* in Buddhist tradition, this assimilation inevitably leads to paradoxes. But this strongly suggests the thought that precisely because the assumption of the

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existence of things forces us to accept mutual dependences, which are something impossible, that assumption must be untenable in the final analysis. Therefore (the) things (of the phenomenal world) cannot exist in reality because they are subject to *pratīyasamutpāda*, since it is necessitated by the assumption of their existence. But the dictum that *pratīyasamutpāda* is what the Mādhyamika calls *sūnyatā* can easily be taken as a slightly rhetorical means to convey just this thought.⁶ In this way the facts involved in (1) can be elegantly accounted for and the appearance of an inconsistency vanishes. Furthermore, the proposed account possesses the attractive feature of explaining why dependent origination can have anything to do with non-existence at all. By allowing us to understand how Nāgārjuna could have felt compelled to derive the non-existence of the phenomenal world from the fact that it is subject to *pratīyasamutpāda*, the author of the MMK appears much less silly than he appears from those previous accounts that describe the situation as if the founder of the Madhyamaka-school took the step from the "conditional nature" of everything to its non-existence without any further warrant.

II

It has to be admitted, ignoring the fact that documentation from the textual sources has been left aside, that nothing more has been shown than that there is at least one interpretation which accounts for the phenomena taken into consideration. But this gives no reason for a reproach. As the discussion about the correct understanding of Nāgārjuna's works as well as of (early) Madhyamaka-philosophy in general has been going on for quite a long time and no agreement has been reached on the main issues, it seems that the textual sources themselves do not clearly attest one particular interpretation. Possibly there would remain room for significantly deviating interpretational alternatives, even if the question of the authenticity of Nāgārjuna's works were settled. As interpretations in such cases and on this level might be essentially and unalterably hypothetical, it is imperative that the basis of the hypotheses and the facts they are intended to account for be precisely and explicitly stated. For this

reason the defects of Padhye's aforementioned book are to a great extent identical with shortcomings in the secondary literature that give grounds for a general dissatisfaction with the way in which the works of Nāgārjuna as well as other philosophical texts have been treated up to now. It is to be hoped that the manner of dealing with these matters will change in the future and that scholars will attach more importance to transparency in establishing interpretational hypotheses in order that their basis, their explanatory scope and their limitations can be clearly discerned.

NOTES

¹ MMK XXIV, 14: *sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyam yasya na yujyate /*

² A.M. Padhye, 'The framework of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy', Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica No. 35, Sri Satguru Publications, New Delhi, 1988. See also my review of this book (forthcoming in the *Indo-Iranian Journal*).

³ It is important not to confuse this with the statement that in general no entailments hold between propositions pertaining to the *paramārtha*- and propositions pertaining to the ordinary level. Nāgārjuna obviously held the view that the opposite of the thesis of the voidness of all *dharma*s entails that the general structure of the phenomenal world would be entirely different from the one we encounter. The doctrine of *śūnyatā* is taken as the only theoretical alternative which is compatible with our ordinary world view, as MMK XXIV, 20ff shows, (However, even these remarks would not necessitate the existence of any entailments between propositions pertaining to different levels, if the alternative discussed here amounts to the assumption that on the *phenomenal* level there are non-void and not dependently originated *dharma*s, a reading which is not implausible). On the other hand, the founder of the Madhyamaka-school probably held the view that, what he thought was the case with respect to the *paramārtha*-level, yielded a justification for the fundamental tenet of Buddhism which implied that the attainment of *nirvāna* is something every human being should strive after. In this way a fact pertaining to the highest level of truth was assumed to possess consequences with respect to the question of how people *should* live in this world.

⁴ From the proposition 'On the level of highest truth it is the case that there is no *dharma* of whatever kind' the proposition 'On the level of highest truth it is the case that there is no *dharma* of the kind of an assertion/a statement' as well as the proposition that on the level of highest truth there is no own statement follow by simple universal instantiation. For it can be safely assumed that the operator 'on the level of highest truth it is the case that' "preserves logical entailments" in the sense that, if a proposition of the form 'On the level of highest truth it is the case that p' is true, any proposition which results by substituting the proposition occurring in the place of 'p' by any proposition logically entailed by it, must be equally true.

⁵ Pādhye interprets the passage of the VV as expressing the contention that

Nāgārjuna has nothing to expound (p. 135). In other words, Nāgārjuna wants to say in *kārikā* 29 that his doctrine is nothing but an explication of the doctrine of the Buddha.

⁶ The same goes for the equation of *śūnyatā* and *pratītyasamutpāda* with *upādāya prajñapti*, equally suggested in MMK XXIV, 18. The remark that *pratītyasamutpāda* is what the Madhyamaka calls *śūnyatā* and that just this is *prajñaptir upādāya* can on the basis of our interpretational hypothesis be understood as conveying the thought that because of the universality of the *pratītyasamutpāda* principle all *dharma*s whatsoever are merely *upādāya prajñaptis* i.e. everything there is has only the status of what tradition described by the term *prajñaptisat*. There is nothing which meets the necessary requirements for the status of a *paramārthasat*-entity, and as the phrase 'x has a *svabhāva*' probably has to be taken as an idiomatic variant for the concept of something's being constituted by or founded in entities of the *paramārtha*-level it follows that there is no *dharma* of which it can be said that it possesses a *svabhāva*. Consequently we can expect the thought that (the universality of) *pratītyasamutpāda* and (of) *upādāya prajñapti* amounts to nothing other than the fact that any *dharma* is without a *svabhāva*, i.e. the (universal) voidness/*śūnyatā* of all *dharma*s, and this might be very well the import of the *kārikā* in question. (Why this in turn amounts to a "middle" doctrine avoiding extremes is evident from what has been said previously).

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF MADHYAMAKA
THOUGHT

C. W. Huntington, Jr., with Geshe Namgyal Wangchen: *The Emptiness of Emptiness: an introduction to early Indian Mādhyamika*. xvi, 287 pp. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989.

Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* is the main Indian expository text on Madhyamaka thought used in Tibetan Buddhism, and accordingly is one of the principal scholastic textbooks employed to the present day in Tibetan monasteries. One reason for the pre-eminence of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* is that it integrates Madhyamaka philosophy, the search for wisdom, into the Mahāyāna spiritual path as it is expressed in the scheme of ten stages of a *bodhisattva* on his or her way to perfect Buddhahood. Thus wisdom has its place within a context of spiritual praxis motivated and animated by compassion. This reason alone, however, would not suffice to explain the pre-eminence of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* in Tibet, for the same can also be said of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, which has the advantage of a deep poetic and religious sensitivity with which Candrakīrti's work in general cannot compare. Nevertheless, Candrakīrti's work had other advantages. While the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* may be an introduction (*avatāra*) to the conduct of the *bodhisattva*, Candrakīrti's work is an introduction to the Madhyamaka itself — more specifically, the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna's principal treatise, the *Madhyamakakārikā*. Thus the *Madhyamakāvatāra* is held to clarify and systematise what is contained in compressed and deep shape in the root text of the Madhyamaka tradition. In general Madhyamaka thought in one or other of its forms was felt in Tibetan Buddhism to articulate the highest wisdom teaching of the Buddha, the way things really are (*yathābhūta*), the final truth (*paramārthasatya*). Moreover from about the eleventh century, when the works of Candrakīrti were first translated into Tibetan, the sub-school of Madhyamaka known as 'Prāsaṅgika', of which Candrakīrti was the most distinguished exponent, began to increase in significance

in Tibetan Buddhism until Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka itself became accepted almost universally as the final truth inasmuch as that truth could be expressed in words.¹ Śāntideva, the author of the *Bodhicary-āvatāra*, was also a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, but proportionately more of Candrakīrti's text is devoted to Madhyamaka philosophy, and Candrakīrti's reputation as also the author of the principal Prāsaṅgika commentary to the *Madhyamakakārikā* (his *Prasannapadā*) and defender of the Prāsaṅgika faith would have ensured that attention be given to his *Madhyamakāvatāra* as a fundamental exposition of Madhyamaka thought and its place in praxis. Moreover Candrakīrti devoted a lot of attention to elaborating both the Madhyamaka refutation of causation, and particularly a systematic treatment of the refutation of Self, which had been dealt with only in passing in the *Madhyamakakārikā*. Since the refutation of Self forms the first and most important stage of meditation on emptiness, the *sine qua non* of developing wisdom, so the *Madhyamakāvatāra* became the most important primer for a Tibetan monastic education which seeks to understand Madhyamaka and integrate it into the spiritual path and the cultivation of wisdom.

The Emptiness of Emptiness consists of an exposition of Madhyamaka thought in the light of Candrakīrti's portrayal of it, and the first complete published translation of the *Madhyamakāvatārakārikā*. This translation is enhanced by extensive further material from Candrakīrti's own commentary (the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*), and occasional references to the great *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* commentary written in the early fifteenth century by the Tibetan Tsong kha pa. For the translation Huntington has collaborated with Geshe Namgyal Wangchen, a Tibetan lama who speaks excellent English and is now resident in the United Kingdom. Geshe Wangchen is himself a learned monk from the dGe lugs pa tradition founded by Tsong kha pa.

Huntington's project is to appropriate Candrakīrti's thought and make it relevant to contemporary Western readers and needs. For him this is an issue of philosophy, the expression of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka in a way meaningful to contemporary philosophers. The following quote expresses well some important themes and the overall direction of Huntington's interpretation:

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If we are interested in these texts not simply as "philological material," but as "sacred texts which proclaim a message of salvation," then we must let them speak to us in the only way we can understand such a message — in a voice that incorporates, illuminates, and challenges the prejudices and presuppositions that are a part of our cultural and linguistic inheritance. One need sacrifice neither rational standards nor philological rigor in order to make room for the anticipation of meaning that allows for understanding. Here is the challenge: We need to discover if the Mādhyamika's rejection of all views can be understood not in the anachronistic context of a logical or epistemological project, but as a significant contribution to the general force of a movement that is vital to our present philosophical conversation, for this is the place where philosophical meaning must be sought and found. What might this denial of all views mean *to us* (pp. 134–5 — italics in original)?

The attempt is to transcend an opposition between treating these texts as purely historical documents of philological interest only, on the one hand, and the appropriation of the texts as they stand 'in the guise of an exotic new style of belief . . . like a set of royal vestments brought from some foreign court' (p. 137) on the other. The middle way is to 'work toward an interpretation which is not in open conflict with either Buddhist or modern Western concepts of philosophy' (p. 139). It is clear that for Huntington the interpretation of Madhyamaka is an interpretation of a philosophy, and a philosophical enterprise. It can be related to the work of a number of contemporary writers, most notably Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Feyerabend and Rorty, although it can also gain from tangential reference to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Dewey among others. Huntington has taken from Gadamer the suggestion that treating a text in purely historical ('philological') terms necessarily involves denying its truth, since it is to deny that it has any truth for us today. It is simply 'other'. Thus to see that it does have truth for us today is to overcome its pure historicity, to appropriate it for us (p. 13). It might perhaps possible to do both, to treat a text as a historical and philological document, to examine what it meant in its own time, while subsequently seeing what the text may have to say to us today. Yet Huntington also appears to question the very notion of 'objectivity' present in historical scholarship, once more following Gadamer and others (p. 7). Indeed much of Huntington's approach is underpinned by appeals to scriptural testimony, that is, the work of contemporary thinkers like Wittgenstein and Gadamer, who have 'shown us' various things which we ignore at our peril. To deny these

things is to indicate that we still live in an outmoded attitude of an impossible objectivity. And yet to maintain that all attempts at objectivity necessarily reflect the subject, the scholar and therefore fail as absolutely objective can scarcely *in itself* be taken to justify appropriation in contemporary terms instead. If all historical scholarship conceals subjectivity then this is not to deny a great difference between the sort of subjectivity manifested by the 'philologist' and that of Huntington's project. It is simply fallacious to think that because absolute objectivity is a myth, reading Madhyamaka through the eyes of Wittgenstein is no different from the attempt to understand Madhyamaka on its own terms in its own historical context. Both historical scholarship and appropriation are possible. Problems arise, however, when they are confused.

From Rorty Huntington has taken the notion of an 'edifying philosophy', a philosophy which aims to help the escape from 'outworn vocabularies and attitudes' (p. 125). This is related to Wittgenstein's comment that he uses philosophy as 'propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another' (quoted p. 127). Madhyamaka is essentially not another form of epistemology or ontology, another philosophy like those which it opposes. Rather it aims to teach us to see things in a new and liberating way, a way that cuts all grasping — including grasping after truth, reason, and Madhyamaka itself — and therefore all egoistic preoccupation. Huntington's use of thinkers such as Wittgenstein stands within an important contemporary tradition in the interpretation of Madhyamaka, and he is impressive in the creative and imaginative way in which he welds the insights of contemporary philosophy towards offering an interpretation of Madhyamaka which may indeed be of interest to philosophers and those who like Huntington himself see the appropriation of Madhyamaka as involving primarily the relating of Madhyamaka to contemporary philosophical concerns.² Nevertheless the appropriation of Buddhist thought might not involve only relating it to Western philosophy, as he seems to imply. When expressed in its broadest sense, in a sense not culturally determined, the principal message of Madhyamaka is to 'let go all holding'. This can be related to a number of contemporary concerns — psychotherapy and body work, for example. To adopt Madhyamaka for the West is not the same as expressing it in terms of contemporary

Western philosophy, and the transcendence of an opposition between philology and exoticism need not express itself in terms of 'our present philosophical conversation'. Indeed it could also be argued that the rhetorical reference to exoticism is inappropriate, for those Westerners who adopt and practice the Madhyamaka as it was taught for centuries in Oriental cultures would be very likely to maintain that it cannot mean for them what it meant in the context of, say, Tibet, but nevertheless the practices still work, for between Tibet and the modern Western world there are sufficient features in common — grasping, suffering and their antidotes — for the traditional techniques still to be appropriate. A true Buddhist compassion for suffering Western philosophers may involve engaging in Huntington's project, but it is arguably not necessary in order to make Madhyamaka thought relevant to Westerners. If change is required in making these teachings real in the Western context then these changes will occur by themselves, as natural responses to the new context. This is after all what happened in the transmission of Buddhism to China. Initial attempts to express Buddhist ideas in the language of contemporary Chinese thought, largely Taoist, were subsequently abandoned because they involved an invariable distortion of the Buddhist message. Nevertheless Buddhism was adapted to the Chinese environment in the nature of things through centuries of Chinese Buddhists trying to follow faithfully the teaching of the Buddha. Huntington's rethinking of Madhyamaka in the light of contemporary philosophical concerns is viable and perhaps laudable, but it should not be represented as the only option for those who would take the relevance of these texts to modern Western concerns seriously.

It is clear from what has been said already that for Huntington the Madhyamaka has no views, it is not itself another rationalistic philosophy setting forth an ontological or an epistemological position but is rather precisely the critique of all such positions. Madhyamaka is not nihilism, nor is it an absolutism. It denies both in an attempt to break out of ways of thinking based on objective notions of truth which they presuppose and which would transcend the context of everyday sociolinguistic transaction. Huntington finds most value in understanding the Madhyamaka in terms of what he calls the 'linguistic interpretation':

According to the linguistic interpretation . . . the Mādhyamika analysis can best be understood as a critique of the referential theory of meaning and the correspondence theory of truth which had preceded it. . . . If this beginningless cycle of misery is ever to be transformed, then it is necessary to escape from any form of life where words are felt to derive their meaning through reference to one or another object. The very questions which, under the spell of reified thought, seem so engaging are invariably founded upon a tacit, deep-rooted presupposition that truth and reality can be discussed only in the language of epistemological and ontological propositions, that they must in some manner be susceptible to interpretation through the application of a rationalistic or idealistic grid over the data of everyday experience. The Mādhyamika's deconstructive analysis tries to illuminate and dissolve this presupposition by turning epistemological and ontological language back on itself. . . . The real task is completely to surrender the compulsion to define any and every problem in the propositional structure and vocabulary of rationalism (pp. 31/106–7).

For the Madhyamaka, Huntington argues, the meaning of a term derives from its everyday use, and problems result when it is taken to refer to 'any self-sufficient, independently real object' (p. 113; much of this relies on Wittgenstein). Terms do not have to refer to an extra-linguistic reality in order to have meaning; they have meaning if they are used correctly, and philosophical problems occur when, as Wittgenstein put it, 'language goes on holiday', that is, when terms which, like all terms, only have meaning in the context of everyday life are stretched beyond this context and taken to have some special meaning referring to some reality or real situation outside the everyday context of sociolinguistic conventions. Thus the Madhyamaka project is to undermine philosophical rationalism by showing that it is misusing language, taking language to refer to an ultimate real of some sort which can be shown to be incoherent and contradictory. The goal is return to the everyday context, to the everyday conventional use of language which does not give rise to these problems of ultimate reality and their attendant grasping.

One of the principal problems with the linguistic interpretation of Madhyamaka is that it requires a distinction between meaning and reference. Words, it is maintained, can have meaning without referring to any extra-linguistic reality. Unfortunately it is not clear that this is a distinction which is made, or makes much sense, in the context of Buddhist thought. The word usually translated as 'meaning' is the Sanskrit *artha* (Tibetan: *don*), but this word is also used for the referent of an action, which includes linguistic and cognitive acts. It is

that *to which* action is directed, and is thus more often than not better translated by 'referent' than 'meaning'. This referential use of the word *artha* was part of their Sanskrit grammatical heritage and was accepted rather than denied by Madhyamaka. It is clearly indicated by the standard Madhyamaka etymology of *paramārthasatya*, ultimate truth. This is a context where problems of reference, with their dualistic connotations, are paramount.³ Nevertheless it is quite clear that the word *artha* even in *paramārtha* is better translated by 'referent' than 'meaning'. According to Bhāvaviveka (Bhavya) in his *Tarkajvālā* (quoted by Tsong kha pa in his *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*) it is called an *artha* because it is a knowable (*shes par bya ba = jñeya*). That is, it is that which is to be examined or recognised (*brtag par bya ba*), and to be understood (*go bar bya ba*)⁴. The Tibetan construction using *bya ba* here expresses the Sanskrit gerundive, 'something which is to, or which ought to, suffer the action expressed by the root' (Whitney's *Sanskrit Grammar*, para. 961). Its referential nature in the present context is brought out even more clearly by Bhāvaviveka's subsequent comment that it is called *paramārtha* because it is the *artha* of supreme nonconceptual gnosis (*mam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes = nirvikalpajñāna*). It is difficult to see how the *paramārtha* itself could be the *meaning* of supreme nonconceptual gnosis. Bhāvaviveka's etymology of *paramārtha* (*satya*) is not denied by Candrakīrti, and is frequently quoted by Tsong kha pa. Equivalents used elsewhere in Madhyamaka texts for *artha* in the context of a discussion of *paramārtha* include *viśaya* (see, for example, the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, Vaidya edition, p. 174), a word which has a venerable ancestry in Buddhist thought as the referent usually of a sense organ, and *gocara* (Tibetan: *yul*, *Madhyamakāvātārabhāṣya* on 6:23), with roughly the same meaning as *viśaya*. The Tibetan word *yul* refers in everyday, non-technical usage to a land or region, and its general meaning is sphere of activity, that *to which* activity is directed. Huntington at one point seems to recognise the equivalence here of *yul* and *artha*, for he states in a footnote that 'it is necessary to isolate the specific *yul* ('object' or 'meaning') that must be rejected' (p. 231). The word *yul* however can never be translated as 'meaning', and in general the word *artha* is better translated as 'referent'. This certainly seems to be the natural way it is taken by the

Madhyamaka, and it is clear that Indian thought generally, and the Madhyamaka in particular, fails to make a distinction which is crucial to the linguistic interpretation espoused so enthusiastically and lucidly by Huntington.

It is also not apparent to me that the Madhyamaka holds that words can lack referents, which is a further important aspect of the linguistic interpretation. An examination of what Madhyamaka texts actually say about language, in the context of their Abhidharma and Sanskrit grammatical background suggests rather the opposite.⁵ In Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* an opponent, probably a Naiyāyika, argues that if all entities lack inherent existence then without a referent even the word *niḥsvabhāva* (lacking inherent existence) could not occur, for 'there does not exist a name without an object'.⁶ In his reply, Nāgārjuna grants the point, but he denies that it has any ontological implications since discourse also does not ultimately exist.⁷ He says that 'one who maintains that there exists a real name "having inherent existence" thus is to be answered by you, sir. We, however, do not maintain that a name is existent'.⁸ In his commentary Nāgārjuna explains that if there really exists a name then necessarily because of that there exists a real entity as a referent. 'A nonexistent inherent existence cannot have a really existent name' (*na hy asadbhūtasya svabhāvasya sadbhūtaṃ nāma bhavātīti*). That is, the ontological status of name and referent is the same — from which in context it also seems to follow that if there is a name there must be a referent.⁹ This context in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* would have been a perfect chance for Nāgārjuna to explain what would have been the revolutionary suggestion, that names do not require referents in order to be meaningful. He does not do so, nor is this clearly expressed in any Madhyamaka texts, as far as I know. Of course Nāgārjuna is here arguing against his Naiyāyika opponent using premisses accepted by the Naiyāyika himself. But if Nāgārjuna does not hold any views from the ultimate point of view then this includes the view that names can be meaningful without referents. On the conventional level he appears to accept the Nyāya position, referring, of course, on the conventional level to non-inherently existing language and referents. This is not surprising as it was part of the semantic cultural inheritance which Nāgārjuna had no wish to deny. The fact that Madhyamaka accepts that words require

referents does not in itself carry with it any commitment as to the exact ontological status of those referents. The universal denial of inherent existence in Madhyamaka entails that both language and its referents lack inherent existence. There is no necessity for the Mādhyamika to go further and suggest that language does not require referents at all. In fact Nāgārjuna was probably aware of his Abhidharma inheritance — language has referents which enjoy the status of *prajñaptisat*, conceptually created existence.¹⁰

The position that Madhyamaka has no theses and puts forward no views of its own at all has been extensively debated in both ancient and modern times, as Huntington admits. He states that 'Early Mādhyamika explicitly claims to operate as a rejection, or deconstruction, of all attempts to create a value-free, objective view of truth or reality. . . . Ultimately, the Mādhyamika's rejection of all views is more the rejection of an attitude or *way of thinking* [italics in original] than the rejection of any particular concept' (p. xii). The word for 'view' is *dr̥ṣṭi*, translated by Huntington as 'philosophical view'. According to a famous verse in Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamikakārikā* the teaching of emptiness is the 'antidote to all *dr̥ṣṭis*' (13:8 — *śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnām proktā niḥsaranam jinaiḥ*). In an equally famous (or notorious) verse in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* Nāgārjuna declares that he has no *pratijñā*, no proposition or thesis (verse 29 — *nāsti ca mama pratijñā*). The literal interpretation of this, that the Madhyamaka has no thesis and no viewpoint of its own, is a perfectly respectable one which has been held by many who call themselves Mādhyamikas in Tibet and China. Nevertheless it was vigorously opposed in Tibet by the dGe lugs tradition of Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje. David Seyfort Ruegg, who has devoted much space to the consideration of this topic, argues that while, for the dGe lugs, Madhyamaka has no *dr̥ṣṭi* it nevertheless has a *darśana*, that is, the Madhyamaka was held to be an approach to the way things really are, an approach considered by its advocates to be the correct one. What it was not thought to have is a *dr̥ṣṭi*, a dogmatic viewpoint involving holding to the existence of something as inherently existent.¹¹ Unfortunately, as José Cabezón has pointed out, in Tibetan the same expression *lta ba* is used for both *dr̥ṣṭi* and *darśana*. Thus in the dGe lugs tradition it is not held that emptiness denies literally all views, but only all incorrect or perverse views.

There is such a thing as the Madhyamaka viewpoint, it is the correct viewpoint which sees things the way they really are. Nevertheless if the Madhyamaka viewpoint were held to involve inherent existence, or is itself held with a grasping mind then it could not be the Madhyamaka viewpoint. There is a Madhyamaka thesis, but it is not a thesis involving the inherent existence of anything, or held itself to have inherent existence. To speak of the Madhyamaka view is to say that there *is* a correct way of things, and this is correctly expressed by such statements as 'all entities lack inherent existence'.

There are paradoxes involved in maintaining that Madhyamaka has no approach or viewpoint *in any sense*. Certainly the expression of truth is not a view alongside others, rivals for allegiance. And if the position of complete lack of inherent existence is true, then it follows that Madhyamaka cannot be a viewpoint like others which do involve inherent existence. Nevertheless Madhyamaka must be a second-order viewpoint, that is, it makes statements which embody an approach and, for its adherents, a truth about, among other things, all viewpoints. The statement that all entities lack inherent existence is a statement, and it is held to be true, really true, in Madhyamaka. Its very truth entails that it cannot be taken as involving inherent existence, and its truth cannot be approached in the way one approaches a (supposed) inherently existent entity. The fact that those who see things this way are in some sense enlightened beings and no more bound up in the grasping and egoity which involves inherent existence is a reflection of the truth of these second-order statements and not a denial of their truth. Madhyamaka texts do not deny that there is a distinctive Madhyamaka position and approach in this second-order sense. Candrakīrti refers to the *śūnyatādarśana* twice in his *Prasannapadā*. The first time (18:5) the Tibetan expression is *stong pa nyid du lta ba*, the second (24:13) *stong pa nyid du smra ba*. Nāgārjuna refers twice to the *śūnyatāvādin*, the one who holds the doctrine of emptiness.¹² Both Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje point out that from a textual point of view Madhyamaka writers often make assertions of position, approach and viewpoint (see the *Lam rim chen mo* folio 446, and *sTong thun chen mo*, pp. 784ff in Cabezón's translation, for example). mKhas grub rje in the course of a series of arguments against the no-view approach to Madhyamaka points out that if the

Madhyamaka holds no tenets then one cannot maintain that the view enunciated in Madhyamaka is the supreme position (pp. 778ff). The notion of a 'supreme position' in this context carries with it the idea of final correctness, but need not be taken to entail universal applicability. Buddhist texts claim that there are many for whom the teaching of emptiness is not suitable, but (*pace* the implications of what Huntington seems to be saying) that does not make it sometimes true and sometimes false. Even Huntington seems to think that the Madhyamaka is *saying something* which is important and, he appears to think, true. It is certain that Mādhyamikas like Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti considered that they were making veridical statements, and the very claim by Huntington that Madhyamaka is not to be taken as making statements of objective truth seems in fact to follow for Huntington from an acceptance of its truth.

Huntington's insistence that the Madhyamaka has no views and is not putting forward a position of its own pervades his understanding of what Madhyamaka is all about. Among other things, it affects his assessment of Candrakīrti's critique of the tenets of other schools. For Huntington it cannot be the case that Candrakīrti is saying that Yogācāra tenets, for example, are actually wrong, for this would be to put forward a position on the wrongness of those tenets: 'it is not that the Yogācāra is wrong *per se*, but that given his soteriological aim, the Yogācāra philosopher's use of language is unskillful' (p. 64). On the Yogācāra concepts of the *ālayavijñāna* — the substratum consciousness — and the Three Aspects (*trisvabhāva*) Huntington observes that the 'Mādhyamika attempts to defuse these terms by calling them into question on pragmatic and soteriological grounds' (p. 96). In other words, while the Yogācāra position is not actually wrong, it does not contradict an objective way of things, nevertheless it is soteriologically inapplicable. The Yogācāra teachings do not help on the path to liberation, freedom from clinging. Unfortunately Huntington's portrayal of Candrakīrti's project here appears to be almost the exact reverse of Candrakīrti's intentions. Candrakīrti maintains that there is no inherent existence either conventionally or ultimately (on *MA* 6:108, for example, although he makes this point repeatedly), from which it follows that there can be no *ālayavijñāna* or *trisvabhāva* as it is understood by the Yogācāra either conventionally or ultimately. Candrakīrti is

indeed perfectly willing to make categorical assertions in negation of the positions of his rivals. He states concerning causation (in Huntington's translation): 'There is no production' (6:112). As far as production involves inherent existence this applies as much to the conventional realm as from an ultimate point of view (see the commentary to 6:112). It is not simply that the *ālayavijñāna* and inherent existence have no soteriological value. Rather, they do not exist at all, in any sense. Nevertheless, Candrakīrti explains, the Buddha did indeed teach mind-only (*cittamātra*) doctrines, which include that of the *ālayavijñāna* when its purport is understood correctly, as a skillful means in order to introduce people gradually to the true teaching of emptiness, including non-Buddhists who hold the Self doctrine (6:79–97; on the *ālayavijñāna* see also 6:43). Thus although the ontological doctrines of Yogācāra are not true even conventionally, nevertheless the teaching of *ālayavijñāna* may not be useless, it may help practitioners as a stage on the path to the true teaching. The only real fault in Madhyamaka is the concept of inherent existence, with its attendant grasping. Therefore the *ālayavijñāna* and associated doctrines may have soteriological value; what they do not have is truth. Which appears to be the exact reverse of the way Huntington portrays Candrakīrti's position.

Part of the problem is that rather than using his translation to support his thesis of interpretation, Huntington has used his view of what Madhyamaka is all about in order to colour his translation.¹³ Thus, commenting on *Madhyamakāvatāra* (MA) 2:1 he tells us that the tenth 'path of pure conduct' is abstention from 'attachment to beliefs and philosophical views'. Since Huntington has chosen to translate *dr̥ṣṭi* by 'philosophical views' it appears from what is said here that we are to abstain from all *dr̥ṣṭis*. Candrakīrti's own commentary, however, simply says that the *bodhisattva* abstains from perverse or distorted views (*log lta*), and this is the normal expression used by Tibetans to refer to the tenth path of pure conduct. Again, in translating Candrakīrti's commentary to MA 6:26 Huntington refers to the '(abyss of) philosophical views' when Candrakīrti simply refers to *lta ba ngan pa*, bad views. Once more, this time quoting from Tsong kha pa's commentary to 6:81 we are told of the need 'to persuade students of the Mādhyamika to reject philosophical views'. The Tibetan for 'philosophical views' here is *grub mtha' ngan pa* bad tenets. Since the

expression 'philosophical views' is used by Huntington to translate *dr̥ṣṭi* this could make it look quite incorrectly as though Tsong kha pa supports Huntington's interpretation of Madhyamaka as directed against all *dr̥ṣṭis*. He does not. 'Philosophical views' is also given for *lta ngan* in 6:115. It is clear that Huntington's translation is not free from his interpretation of what Madhyamaka is all about, and his translation cannot be used as independent evidence for that interpretation without circularity.

Which gives rise to the question of the role of the Venerable Geshe Wangchen in all of this. This interpretation and translation of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* differs markedly at a number of points from the view of dGe lugs orthodoxy. There is nothing wrong as such in that — the dGe lugs view is at variance with the view of a number of other interpreters of Madhyamaka in the East and the West. The dGe lugs view could be wrong. But Geshe Wangchen is a learned Tibetan monk of the dGe lugs tradition who knows his own tradition intimately and as far as I know does not hold any wayward views of his own on Madhyamaka. It is fashionable nowadays to work on Buddhist texts, even those originally from India, with a Tibetan lama. This gives the translation a certain *imprimatur*, and can give valuable insights into a text and its place in spiritual and philosophical praxis. The problem is that Tibetan lamas can sometimes make mistakes, and even when they are right it is the Western scholar who uses their advice and help, and molds it into a finished work which he or she sees through the press and presents to the scholarly (and Buddhist) public. This can give rise to problems, for it is invariably the Western scholar who uses the help supplied by his informant as part of his own project. One would dearly like to know just how far Geshe Wangchen agrees with the final translation and interpretation of Madhyamaka found in this book.

For Huntington, as we have seen, the *paramārthasatya* cannot be an objective truth, since he denies that there is such a thing. There cannot therefore be a cognition which is finally and definitively true, which takes *paramārthasatya* as its content: 'The Mādhyamika does not advocate any radically unconventional category of epistemic act, but rather a radically unconventional form of life, in which one is constantly and profoundly in touch with the holistic, contextual nature of all experience — with the "suchness of dependent origination" (pp.

119—20; italics in original). *Artha* refers here not to a referent, a thing or state of affairs, but to a meaning, indeed the 'truth of highest meaning'. Meaning has to be contextualised (p. 95), so that the *paramārthasatya* becomes a way of seeing and operating in the world, without grasping attachment. The importance of *paramārthasatya* therefore is not that it is true but that it cuts all clinging and therefore all egoism and suffering. That the ultimate truth does do this is, of course, a basic tenet of Buddhism. That it does not refer to an objective way of things, true of all possible worlds, which can be seen directly and nonconceptually in a particular cognitive act which for unenlightened beings would be classed as paranormal would not seem to be the normal way *paramārthasatya* is taken in Buddhism.

We have already seen that the word *artha* in *paramārthasatya* is indeed used to refer to a referent, the expression does not simply indicate soteriological importance. In fact *paramārthasatya* is most important precisely because it is the way things really are, and from the beginning in Buddhism understanding things the way they really are (*yathābhūtarśana*) has always been taken as the way to liberation from the bonds of ignorance. Reference to *yathābhūtarśana* is for Huntington talk of the way the *bodhisattva* sees the world (p. 39), for he maintains that 'the higher, soteriological truth is in one sense simply another way of interpreting the truths of everyday affairs' (p. 95). 'For the *bodhisattva* conventional truth is indistinguishable from the truth of emptiness' (p. 122). This follows for Huntington from his refusal to see the *artha* in *paramārthasatya* as referring to a state of affairs, a referent. Yet he himself refers to the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* where the expressions *yathābhūtarśana* and *yathābhūtajñānanāśakti* are used (in spite of what he says) not in the context of the *bodhisattva's* apprehension of the world but rather with reference to a meditation stage which is directed towards emptiness, the ultimate truth of things.¹⁴ Emptiness is not itself the same as the world which is empty, the two truths are not literally the same thing, emptiness and the thing which is empty could not be literally the same otherwise cowherders would see emptiness and be enlightened.¹⁵ Candrakīrti speaks of all things having two natures (*ngo bo*), that seen by those who apprehend correctly and that seen by those whose vision is distorted. That object (*yul*) found by those who see correctly is reality (*de nyid* = *tattva* —

MA 6:23). Huntington's translation adds here that it is real 'in the highest, soteriological sense', but it is clear that for Candrakīrti the *paramārtha* is real not just because it is liberating and is valuable, but because it is truly the way things really are. Moreover it is a different *ngo bo* and a different *yul* from the conventional realm. There is no indication here that the *paramārthasatya* is just a different way of seeing the everyday world. What is seen in *yathābhūtarśana* is the *dharmatā*, the true nature of things. In a section of the *Madhyamakāvaiśarabhasya* not translated by Huntington Candrakīrti quotes from the *sūtras* that whether Buddhas occur or not the *dharmatā* of *dharma*s, the true nature of things, remains. This *dharmatā* exists (*chos nyid ces bya ba ni yod do*). It is, says Candrakīrti, the essence of things such as the eye and so on (*mig la sogs pa 'di dag gi rang bzhin no*). It is that about them which is noncontingent and not dependent on another. It is their nature which is to be understood by cognition free from the obscurations of nescience (*ma rig pa'i rab rib dang bral ba'i shes pas rtogs par bya ba'i rang gi ngo bo'o*).¹⁶ Therefore Candrakīrti and the Madhyamaka tradition do speak of an objective truth, in the sense of that which really is true of things, the knowledge of which is not just beneficial but also correct, and which can indeed be known in a paranormal experience.

For Huntington emptiness cannot be an 'objective, value-free truth' possessed in the last analysis only by the Madhyamaka perspective (see p. 47). As Nāgārjuna says, what is dependent origination is declared to be emptiness (*Madhyamakakārikā* (MMK 24:18: *yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tāṃ pracakṣmahe*). Emptiness thus becomes a way of seeing and acting in the conventional world of mutual dependence, the only order of reality there is. However Candrakīrti makes it clear in his commentary to MMK 24:18 that this text by Nāgārjuna does not mean that emptiness and dependent origination are literally the same. Rather, those things which originate in dependence are empty of inherent existence. 'What is nonorigination of entities from the point of view of inherent existence, that is emptiness' (*yaś ca svabhāvenānutpādo bhāvānām sā śūnyatā*; the Tibetan omits *bhāvānām*). Emptiness is therefore itself the very absence of inherent existence of entities, and is not the entities seen dependently originated and empty.¹⁷ Emptiness is not just 'an exhorta-

tion to *act* in a particular way' (p. 59 — italics in the original), although its discernment, first intellectually, and eventually nonconceptually in a direct nondual experience, does in the Mahāyāna carry with it implications for action. For Huntington it would appear that emptiness is not really true. Emptiness would seem to be simply a skilful device to help suffering sentient beings, by which one would have to conclude that it is not actually the case that all entities exist only in dependence. Huntington says that 'this emptiness, which is implied in every aspect of everyday affairs, is no more than a useful designation (a *prajñapti*) to apply in study and practice as a means to a soteriological goal — the end of fear and suffering for all sentient beings' (p. 111). Huntington is no doubt thinking here again of *MMK* 24:18, which continues with reference to emptiness that it is a dependent concept, and that very thing (emptiness) is also the middle way (*sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā*). The word *prajñapti* had already been used in the Abhidharma (Vaibhāṣika) for the sort of existence borne by something which exists but not in any ultimate sense. This is contrasted with substantial existence (*dravyasat*). Thus persons, tables, chairs and so on exist, but have *prajñaptisat*, conceptual existence, inasmuch as they are constructed out of those fundamental data (*dharmas*) which for the Abhidharma form the substantially existent building blocks of the universe.¹⁸ For the Madhyamaka all things have only conceptual existence inasmuch as they are all dependently originated. Thus a *prajñapti* is a concept constructed in dependence upon other factors, which in the Madhyamaka are also themselves constructed in dependence on other things. Candrakīrti, in commenting on *MMK* 24:18, states that a chariot is conceptualised in dependence upon its parts, such as the wheel and so on. What is conceptualised in dependence on its own parts is not born from the point of view of inherent existence. That non-birth from the point of view of inherent existence is emptiness. In neither the Madhyamaka nor the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma is it true to say that a conceptually existent entity is nonexistent. This would be to destroy the conventional world and would lead for Madhyamaka to the fatal flaw of nihilism (*ucchedavāda*). Thus to say that emptiness is *prajñaptir upādāya* is to say that what originates in dependence on another

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thing is empty of ultimate, inherent existence, but is not to say that it does not exist at all. Nāgārjuna's statement that emptiness is the antidote to all *dr̥ṣṭis* (*MMK* 13:8) but should not itself be taken as involving a *dr̥ṣṭi* is also taken by commentators as entailing that emptiness itself is empty of inherent existence, it is not an ultimate real *in that sense* (*na ca dr̥ṣṭikr̥ānām nivṛttimātram bhāvaḥ*). That emptiness itself is empty of inherent existence in the Madhyamaka is now well known, and was an important point stressed again and again by Tsong kha pa. Thus emptiness is also a conceptual entity (*prajñaptisat*) existing in dependence. It does not follow from all of this, however, that emptiness does not exist in the only way that anything can exist, as a conventionally existent phenomenon (see the comment above from Candrakīrti that the *dharmatā* exists (*yod do*)). In terms of existence, emptiness has as much real existence as anything else. It is the true, really true, way of things, inasmuch as it is the way things really are. In this sense it is an ultimate truth. But if emptiness itself is searched for, then, as Tsong kha pa emphasises, emptiness is not found and therefore there is emptiness of emptiness. Emptiness is the truth of emptiness itself; emptiness really is empty of inherent existence.¹⁹ There is nothing here to suggest that emptiness is just a useful designation for practical soteriological purposes, although it is also a useful designation for soteriological purposes precisely because it is true. The word *prajñapti* as a technical term in Buddhist thought does not have the meaning of simple pragmatic value contrasted with objective or epistemic truth.

Madhyamaka texts make a distinction, much elaborated in Tibet, between seeing emptiness conceptually and the direct nonconceptual insight into emptiness which can occur in those who are not Buddhas only in meditative equipoise.²⁰ In both cases analysis is involved in the earlier stages, for an understanding that the object lacks inherent existence can only be reached through analysing it to find out if it does indeed have inherent existence. The distinction is between focussing the mind on the conceptual emptiness of inherent existence which has been found through analysis on the one hand, and a meditative absorption which is directed nonconceptually and nondualistically towards emptiness itself on the other. This second experience is said

to be of emptiness alone, the object which is empty is not at that time experienced. In other words emptiness itself is the referent (*artha*) of an experience, experienced in a nondualistic and nonconceptual way.

These distinctions and stages of meditation are not clearly treated in Candrakīrti's work, and Tibetan discussions certainly owe something to later Indian developments. Nevertheless it seems that something like this must be applicable to Candrakīrti. For Huntington of course there can be no experience of emptiness, the ultimate way of things, alone. He is keen, however, to make a distinction between accepting and appreciating Madhyamaka analyses intellectually, and allowing the results of those analyses to penetrate in a way which liberates from grasping. Thus instead of distinguishing between conceptual and direct insight into emptiness, Huntington talks of 'wisdom (*prajñā*) expressed in both intellectual discernment and actualization of the concept of emptiness at emotional and volitional levels' (p. 69). 'Prajñā is a matter both of intellectual understanding and of action' (p. 90), it involves a 'total assimilation of an alternative form of life' (p. 114). Thus the distinction between two phases of appreciating emptiness becomes a distinction between understanding and action springing from a life transformed by that understanding. This, for Huntington, is the essential soteriological dimension of Madhyamaka thought which he is concerned not to neglect through portraying Madhyamaka as simply a philosophy. This is what Wittgenstein omitted. He failed to practice that meditation and those other practises which would lead to the results of his analyses transforming his life for the better.²¹ One problem for Huntington's schema however is that it would portray the liberating nonconceptual insight into emptiness as nothing more than allowing the results of philosophical analysis to penetrate into one's being. The distinction between intellectual insight and direct nonconceptual insight into emptiness, on the other hand, eventually involves the distinction between ideas (of Self) acquired through following wrong philosophies, and those which are innate in all beings whether they know of philosophy or not.²² All beings who are not enlightened have ideas of inherent existence; *pace* Wittgenstein the everyday world is not alright as it is, for even cowherders who have heard nothing of philosophy see things as inherently existent and thus do not see correctly (see Candrakīrti on *MA* 6:28). This means

that things as seen by ordinary people, including Wittgenstein, are for Candrakīrti not correct even from a conventional worldly point of view (a fact strongly stressed by Tsong kha pa). The intellectual results of philosophical analysis may, if deep and prolonged, be sufficient eventually to eradicate intellectually mistaken philosophical tenets concerning the Self, causation and so on. But they cannot eradicate the deeply rooted innate notions. And if philosophical analysis alone cannot eradicate innate notions of Self, then repeated familiarisation with the same philosophical analysis until its results penetrate the volitional and emotional level will still not eradicate innate notions of Self. A major, although not sufficient, contributory factor in the eradication of innate notions of Self is, according to Candrakīrti's tradition as it is represented in Tibet, single-pointed meditative equipoise directed nonconceptually towards emptiness, the final result of analysis and ultimate referent (*paramārtha*).

It also follows from what has been said above that the Madhyamaka stress on the importance of the conventional world cannot be equated with Wittgenstein's return to everyday language, for the everyday of Wittgenstein is from Candrakīrti's point of view riddled with notions of an inherent existence which cannot be found even on the conventional level. Huntington appears to be quite aware of this, but he loses that awareness in such statements as 'what is immediately given in everyday experience is indeed all that there is' (p. 40), and his portrayal of the noncritical farmer's attitude to causation and its similarity to the perspective of the *bodhisattva* (p. 116), for what is given in the farmer's immediate experience is not for Candrakīrti all there is, for the farmer's experience is pervaded through and through by innate notions of an inherent existence which does not exist at all. It is therefore misleading for Huntington to portray the Madhyamaka project as a 'return to the everyday', equating such expressions as *tha snyad bden pa*, transactional truth, and 'jig rten (world) with 'everyday experience' (p. 109, and translation of e.g. 6:30—1). The everyday experience of those who still see inherent existence is for Candrakīrti not even true from a conventional point of view. When Candrakīrti says that entities do not exist when subject to analysis, but do exist in dependence upon worldly renown ('jig rten grags pa'i sgo nas yod pa yin: 6:167) he does not mean that they 'exist insofar as they are taken

for granted in the context of everyday experience' as it is translated by Huntington, since they are taken for granted in the context of everyday experience as having inherent existence.

Finally, some salient points on the translation. A translation of this material is indeed welcome, but in general, as I have noted above, Huntington's translates in accordance with his interpretation of Madhyamaka. Thus the translation may prove acceptable to those who share his interpretation, but cannot be used to support that interpretation and should be used carefully outside its interpretive context.

p. 154, verse 10 — 'attachment to reified concepts concerning' absent in the Tibetan.²³ Also, on the same page, the word 'sun' has been omitted from verse 13.

p. 228, note 19: 'For just that (reason), the master (Nāgārjuna) made a distinction (between soteriological and conventional perspectives in this matter) and repudiated production in a general way, stating that it is not from self.' This contradicts the verse (6:12), which states that production from self occurs neither conventionally nor ultimately, and also the Tibetan *khyad par ma sbyar* — the Master *did not* make a distinction. Candrakīrti points out that the making of a distinction between ultimate and conventional in a refutation of production is senseless (it is the position of Bhāvaviveka).

p. 159, verse 16 and note 23: This verse has been misunderstood. *sa lu'i sa bon yang ni de yi min te gzhan nyid phyr* = 'Likewise the grain of rice also is not [a cause] of that [rice sprout] because of otherness'. According to Tsong kha pa there are four reasons given in the verse, not three, as in Huntington's translation.

p. 160, verse 25: on the conventional truth — 'while any remaining reified concepts (*vikalpas*) are false according to this same criterion' (Huntington). The Tibetan reads *thag ma ni / 'jig rien nyid las log par rnam par gzhas* = Sanskrit: *śeṣaṃ vikalpitaṃ lokata eva mithyā* // This does not mention reified concepts. Huntington has read *vikalpi-taṃ* as *vikalpa*. The piece should read 'The remainder is conceived as false (or 'conceived falsely') from [the position of that] world itself'.

p. 233, note 47: 'it is the fabrication which constitutes dependent origination' = *de ni bcos ma rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ngo /*, i.e. 'that is fabrication, dependent origination'. Also *ngos su bstan par mi nus* with reference to the *paramārthasatya* 'it is impossible to teach of it as though it were an [objectively present] fact' (Huntington). I suggest 'one is not able to teach it as an entity'. Also (ibid.) 'That which is deceptive for naive people (reified concepts of 'self', 'intrinsic being', etc), as well as other things like magical illusions and so forth, are mere screen . . . because they [too] are dependently originated' = *byis pa rnam la ni slu bar byed pa yin la / de las gzhan pa rnam la ni sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar rten cing 'brel bar 'byung pa nyid kyis kun rdzob tsam 'gyur ro*, i.e. 'What deludes children [unenlightened people], for those who are other than that [enlightened people] are merely-conventional, because they originate in dependence like illusions and so forth.' Tables and chairs delude children, who think they are really inherently existent. Actually they are dependently originated, like illusions. The Self and inherent existence themselves as reified concepts are not existent even conventionally (cannot be even 'mere screen').

p. 161, verse 30: 'It is unreasonable for such foolishness to be accepted as entirely authoritative' (Huntington — the foolishness referred to appears to be that of taking 'everyday experience' as authoritative). The text reads *blun po tshad mar rigs pa'ang ma yin no /* = 'A fool moreover is not reasonable as an authority', that is, an unenlightened man cannot be an authority for reality at all.

p. 164, verse 56: Should this read 'in those *not* afflicted by ophthalmia'? Also verse 58: *'byung 'gyur* = *bhaviṣyatā* is better read as 'futurity' than 'imminence'. The opponent's point is that perhaps there may be a potentiality because the cognition will occur in the future. 'Imminence' does not make much sense.

p. 165, verse 68: 'An opponent is refuted by perceiving that each and every response he offers is nothing but an unsubstantiated thesis.' This has the ring of A. J. Ayer and Logical Positivism. The text reads: *'di yis lan ni gang dang gang btab pa / de dang de ni dam bca' mshungs*

mthong bas / rtsod 'di sel byed . . ., i.e. 'In the case of what reply is given by the opponent, one refutes him by seeing that whatever he says conforms to the thesis'. This corresponds to Nāgārjuna's comment in *MMK* 4:8 about *samam sādhyena*, and it refers more or less to 'begging the question'. The note on p. 243 does not really help clarify this verse.

p. 166, verse 78: the expression 'philosophical views' is absent from the Tibetan. *'jig rten grags pa* translated again as 'everyday experience'.

p. 246, note 106: from Tsong kha pa — 'watery, unsystematic rational analysis' translates *tshul min gyi dpyad pa chu dang 'dra ba*. It looks in context rather as though Tsong kha pa is condemning rational analysis *per se*. Far from it. Better read 'analysis which is, like water, without order (or sequence)'; 'used reason to negate' (*ibid.*) is missing from the Tibetan.

p. 167, verse 80: *rnam rtog log pa = mīthyāvikalpa*; perverse or false concepts/constructs. It is translated by Huntington simply as 'reified concepts', as *vikalpa* has been translated throughout. Thus no distinction can be made *de facto* with hypothetical correct concepts in Huntington's translation.

p. 167, verse 82: 'even in this qualified sense' — *'jig rten las kyang*; 'even from the world'.

p. 247, note 110: 'appreciation of the reality' for *de kho na nyid rtogs pa*; *rtogs pa* here rather connotes direct experience, direct awareness.

p. 170, verse 105: no mention of 'reified concepts' in the Tibetan.

p. 254, note 153, and verse 127: 'The self would become a [conventionally] real substance . . .'; this misses the point. The argument against his opponent is that the self would become a real substance *per se* on their premisses.

p. 173, verse 131: This is ambiguous. Read for *gzugs sogs de nyid rtogs par mi 'gyur* '[He] would not cognise the nature of form etc.'.

p. 174, verse 140: This is very unclear — 'the philosophical view of a real substantial self' is in fact a reference to the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, the root innate cause of unenlightenment, and Candrakīrti is saying that just because the eternal Self is denied it does not follow that one has overcome the innate conception of Self.

p. 177, verse 159: 'Do not lose touch with the screen taken for granted in the context of everyday experience'; *'jig rten grags pa'i kun rdzob ma brlag cig* = 'Do not overthrow the conventional which is renowned in the world'.

p. 178, verse 168: 'when the cause exists, the effect will necessarily be produced' — the necessary production of effects from causes is a philosophically significant point, but in the Tibetan there is no word for 'necessary'.

ibid., verse 172: The view of an opponent — 'The consequence of your words is like a two-edged sword — without reason you deny [the existence of] all entities. . . lacking any position of your own, you make use of any sort of refutation so as to construct an argument.' — *gang phyir rang gi tshig la'ang thal ba mshungs pa'i ltag chod kyis / rigs pa med par dngos mtha' dag la skur debs . . . khyod la rang phyogs med pas sun ci phyin du rgol pa'ang yin /* = 'Therefore, because your own words also have the fallacy (*ltag chod* — 'futile rejoinder') of conforming to the *prasāṅga* ('*reductio ad absurdum*'), unreasonably you over negate real things. . . Because you have no thesis your argument also is pure malicious refutation' (*vitandā*, an approach where the opponent puts forward no position of his own, but simply refutes presumably for the fun of it). Huntington has not brought out the significance of these technical terms from the Nyāya tradition.

p. 179, verse 177: 'the dangerous net of your rationalism' — *rtog ge ngan pa'i dra bas* = 'the net of bad logic/reasoning'.

ibid., verse 178: 'It is not true that we Prāsaṅgikas make use of any sort of refutation.' — *sun ci phyin du rgol ba po yang ji ltar yod min pa /* = 'Moreover we are not those who use purely malicious refuta-

tion' (*vaitandika*). Tsong kha pa explains that a *vaitandika* is afraid to set forth his own position, and simply refutes that of an opponent. Even though Mādhyamikas refute the position of an opponent, this refutation does not exist ultimately, because ultimately nothing exists. A Mādhyamika is not one who accepts the 'not setting forth of one's own position from a transactional viewpoint, and the wish to refute the position of the opponent from an ultimate point of view', as does the *vaitandika*. Both do not exist (pp. 418–9). In fact, of course, for Tsong kha pa there is a Madhyamaka position conventionally, although there can be no position ultimately (which is not the same as saying that there cannot be a conventional position about the ultimate). Thus the Madhyamaka position for Tsong kha pa is the exact reverse of the *vaitandika*

It should be clear that I have considerable reservations about the interpretation of Madhyamaka suggested in Huntington's book. This is not to say, however, that I did not enjoy reading his work. It is written with lucidity and enthusiasm, and his concern to see how Madhyamaka can be made relevant to twentieth century interests is praiseworthy. Huntington's approach represents a widespread contemporary orientation to understanding the Madhyamaka, found particularly in the United States, and he demonstrates considerable acumen and intelligence in the way in which he has welded the perspectives and conclusions of contemporary philosophers towards a systematic statement of the whole Madhyamaka project. In addition, we have here useful — if sometimes problematic — translations of the whole of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* and substantial selections from the *Bhāṣya*. Huntington's book will be widely read, and it stands as the most coherent statement available of this approach to Madhyamaka. It is an approach with which I have some disagreement, but I like the book as a statement of that approach. Huntington forced me to clarify my thoughts on a number of important points. I do not expect everyone to agree with me, and this is a book which I am very pleased to recommend.

NOTES

¹ Note that the distinction between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka, and

certainly the use of these terms (in their Tibetan equivalents) was probably elaborated in Tibet. In India matters were not so clear-cut. Moreover there is no evidence for the predominance of Candrakīrti and his form of Madhyamaka in Indian Buddhism. Huntington speaks of the *presumed* importance of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* in India (p. xi), although there is only one late commentary by an Indian author on the work, and that was composed outside India in Central Asia. In spite of Huntington's reference to an 'ongoing debate' (p. 34) between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka in India between the sixth and the eighth centuries, as far as we can tell at the moment the predominant form of Madhyamaka in India was that later to be known in Tibet as Svātantrika particularly, in later Indian Buddhism, Yogācāra-Svātantrika. And it seems that there are no clear and systematic attempts by Svātantrika writers to refute the criticisms made of their position by Candrakīrti. It is difficult to speak of an ongoing debate in which only one side is conscious of taking part.

² Huntington makes it clear that he does not maintain that modern thinkers are saying the same thing as the Madhyamaka, however. Rather 'I introduce these writings to help us approach the Mādhyamika literature as something other than an historical relic from a distant culture with nothing interesting or relevant to contribute to our present conversation' (p. 134). And yet he sometimes does leap to find similarities where they are highly debatable (see pp. 41–2 and p. 208n73, for example). Moreover in the interests of similarity he sometimes appears to distort his Western material. Wittgenstein's comments, quoted on p. 39 (about 'neither a something nor a nothing') are made to look like the Madhyamaka but are not in context about the referent of words at all, as Huntington states, but specifically about sensations (*Philosophical Investigations*, para. 304). Huntington has also taken from Thurman the identification of Wittgenstein's criticism of 'private objects' with the Madhyamaka criticism of inherent existence, the *svabhāva* (eg. p. 37). I have argued elsewhere that this identification is incoherent, and actually reverses what is really the case. See my 'Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold', BSOAS XLIX, part 2, 1986, pp. 300–1.

³ Huntington translates *paramārthasatya* by 'truth of the highest meaning', and maintains that it is a *soteriological* rather than a referential truth.

⁴ From the text of Tsong kha pa's *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* published by the Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, Sarnath, 1973, p. 31. Tsong kha pa quotes the same material in his *Lam rim chen mo*, f. 431a of my undated blockprint.

⁵ There is not the space to do this here. I have attempted to do so in my *Language and Existence in Madhyamika Buddhist Philosophy*, D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1978. Most of this remains unpublished. Not surprisingly I now disagree with some of the conclusions drawn there, but I hope the detailed textual analyses still have some value.

⁶ *nāmāpi nirvastukam nāsti/See the Vīgrahavyāvartanī and vṛtti contained in the Madhyamakāśāstra of Nāgārjuna with the commentary: Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti.* edited by P. L. Vaidya (Mithila Institute, Darbhanga. 1960), verse 9 and comments thereon.

⁷ Commentary on verse 58: *yo nāma sadbhūtaṃ nāma brūyāt sa svabhāva iti sabhavatā prativaktavyah syāt — yasya sadbhūtanāmasvabhāvāsya tasmāt tenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyam/na hy asadbhūtasya svabhāvāsya sadbhūtaṃ nāma bhavātī/na punar vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtaṃ brūmah/tad api hi svabhāvāsya abhāvān nāma niḥsvabhāvatvāt śūnyam . . .* This corresponds to the commentary on verse 57 in Johnston and Kunst's edition.

⁸ See verse 58: yaḥ sadbhūtaṃ nāma brūyāt sa svabhāva ity evam / bhavatā prativak-tavyo nāma brūmaś ca na vayam sat //

⁹ The point of the close relationship between language and its referents also appears to be accepted by Candrakīrti in his commentary on *Cauḥṣāta* verse 377, where he suggests that if there is no linguistic agent so there can be no discourse, and without language there can also be no *artha*.

¹⁰ For more on this see my 'Some aspects of language and construction in the Madhyamaka', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 8 (1980), pp. 1–45; and 'On the Abhidharma ontology', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981), pp. 227–57. These papers are both revised versions of sections from my D. Phil thesis mentioned above. The fact that language requires referents in the Madhyamaka is not contradicted by the frequent Mahāyāna comment that all things are 'mere names' (*śabdāmātra*). Clearly this is not to be taken as literally true within the everyday sphere, but is rather a stage in the process of clarifying what it is to be merely conceptually existent. In fact the Madhyamaka was vigorous in denying the literal identity of word and referent, for otherwise the word 'fire' would burn the mouth when uttered. See here the *Akutoḥ-ayā*, Peking edition, folio 37a/b, and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra* in K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy* (London, Books from India, 1976), p. 79. The point I am making has also been made by José Cabezón, specifically referring to a previous paper by Huntington: 'No Buddhist, Mādhyamika or otherwise, would deny that words have referents, that the vase is the referent of the word "vase". Buddhists however differ as to the nature of those referents . . . 'When the tradition claims that all entities are "mere names" (ming tsam) it does not mean to imply that every entity is but a sound, which is absurd, nor does it mean to imply that they have other sounds as their referents. Instead they are claiming something more profound about the ontological nature of entities.' See José Ignacio Cabezón, *The Development of A Buddhist Philosophy of Language and its Culmination in Tibetan Mādhyamika Thought*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987, p. 173. This thesis contains what appears to be an excellent translation of probably the longest single work purely on Madhyamaka philosophy, the *sTong thun chen mo* by Tsong kha pa's pupil mKhas grub rje. mKhas grub rje, and the dGe lugs tradition generally, contradict Huntington's interpretation of Madhyamaka at numerous points. It is to be hoped that Cabezón's thesis will soon be published.

¹¹ See Ruegg's 'On the thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma', in Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher ed., *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy* (Wien, Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1973), pp. 205–41.

¹² See here David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrasowitz, 1981), p. 2.

¹³ No doubt this reflects his view that objective scholarship is impossible. All translation embodies interpretation. But there are degrees of interpretation.

¹⁴ See Huntington, p. 82, and *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, Vaidya's edition, p. 67.

¹⁵ For Tibetan arguments, deriving in the main from Indian sources, against the possibility of the two truths being either the same or different, see Donald S. Lopez, Jr., *The Heart Sūtra Explained* (New York, State University of New York, 1988), pp. 73–5. The final Tibetan view is that the two truths are the same nature or entity but different opposites of negative (*ngo bo gcig ldog pa tha dad*), which seems to be another way of saying that they refer to the same entity but different aspects of that

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entity (they have different meaning?). According to Candrakīrti, on the other hand, the two truths are different natures or entities (*ngo bo*) in at least one sense.

¹⁶ That about entities which is noncontingent (*bcos ma ma yin*) and not dependent on another (*gzhan la btos pa med pa*) could clearly not be another way of seeing everyday phenomena, particularly as Huntington stresses that the way the *bodhisattva* sees everyday phenomena is in their mutual dependence. What Candrakīrti is referring to here is emptiness, their true nature, which is true, objectively true, 'whether Buddhas occur or not'. See *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* on 6: 181–2, and for further discussion see my 'Silence and truth: some aspects of the Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet', *The Tibet Journal* 7, nos. 1–2, 1982, pp. 67–80.

¹⁷ Of course the other verses which might be taken to support Huntington's thesis are Nāgārjuna's famous assertion of the identity of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*: *MMK* 25: 19–20. Verse 19 is indeed quoted by Huntington on p. 207 in support of the view that 'the components of [everyday] experience is the truth of highest meaning' (his italics). It should be clear, however, that Nāgārjuna cannot be proclaiming the literal identity of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* since other wise cowherders would be enlightened and Buddhas unenlightened. In context it is clear that Nāgārjuna is denying the ontological reality of *nirvāṇa* as another realm somewhere else contrasted with the unreal world of *samsāra*. As Candrakīrti clarifies (*Prasannapadā*), we cannot say of the Buddha that he really exists or does not exist either while he is in this world or after his death. On critical investigation *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are found to have the same nature (*vicāryamāṇayastulyarūpatvāt*). Tsong kha pa is surely right in his *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* commentary on this verse when he explains that the identity of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* lies in their both lacking inherent existence, not in their being the same thing. Moreover the identity of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* would not anyway entail the identity of conventional and ultimate, since *samsāra* does not equal conventional or otherwise enlightened beings could not see the conventional, and *nirvāṇa* when used for the attainment of an enlightened being does not equal emptiness. Rather, *nirvāṇa* involves directly seeing emptiness. *Nirvāṇa* is a cognitive state (*jñāna*); emptiness is the final nature of all phenomena. *Nirvāṇa* does not involve seeing *nirvāṇa*; emptiness does not always involve seeing emptiness.

¹⁸ On all of this, see my papers published in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, mentioned in note 10 above.

¹⁹ For some controversies between Tsong kha pa and his rivals on this see 'Silence and truth', note 17 above.

²⁰ For a short statement of the stages of meditation on emptiness, based largely on Jeffrey Hopkins' expositions of the dGe lugs schema, see Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations* (London, Routledge, 1989), pp. 72–4.

²¹ For Wittgenstein why should meditation have any value? His 'liberation' was seen as a liberation from bewitching philosophical problems — suffering for philosophers, perhaps, but not the general suffering experienced by humanity. For Wittgenstein the return is to everyday language, which is perfectly in place as it is. His message is not for those who are not philosophers or prey to philosophical questions. The return to everyday language does not require or suggest meditation, and meditation is not an extra which Wittgenstein failed to take up. This all goes to suggest that Wittgenstein was not engaged in an analogous project to that of the Madhyamaka, and the results of Wittgenstein's analyses are not the emptinesses referred to by Madhyamaka.

²² For the full complexity of the dGe lugs treatment of Candrakīrti's discussion of

Self, in which all the distinctions are made, see Joe Wilson, *Chandrakīrti's Sevenfold Reasoning: Meditation on the Selflessness of Persons* (Dharamsala, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1980). Huntington has a particular problem with the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, the 'view of a transitory collection' which he translates as 'the philosophical view of a real, substantial self' (p. 225). This is the root ignorance which underpins all of *samsāra*. Thus it is misleading to see it simply as a philosophical view (which corresponds with Huntington's translation of *dr̥ṣṭi*) since the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* also covers those innate notions of self possessed even by those who have never heard of philosophy.

²³ For the text of the *Madhyamakāvātārakārikā* I am using that published with the verses of the *Abhisamayālamkāra* and *Abhidharmakośa* by the Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, Tibetan Monastery, Sarnath, 1978. My edition of Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* is also from the same source, 1973, and the *Madhyamakāvātārabhāṣya* is the Cone edition, mDo xxiii, ff. 217–350.

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REVIEW

T. S. Rukmani (trans.), *Yogavārtika of Vijñānabhikṣu* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1981–89). Four Volumes; Vol. I: *Samādhipāda*, 1981, pp. xii + 282; Vol. II: *Sāadhanapāda*, 1983, pp. xii + 256; Vol. III: *Vibhūtipāda*, 1987, pp. xi + 229; and Vol. IV: *Kaivalyapāda*, 1989, pp. xi + 215.

In any attempt to understand and analyze the philosophy of classical Yoga in India, one must continually consult at least four interrelated and fundamental texts, namely the *Yogasūtra* itself, compiled by a certain Patañjali (probably in the first centuries of the Common Era, ca., 400–500), the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* of the so-called Vyāsa (ca., 500–700), the *Tattvavaiśārādī* of Vācaspatimiśra (ca., 850 or 975) and the *Yogavārtika* of Vijñānabhikṣu (ca., 1550–1600). There are, of course, many other important texts as well (for example, Bhojarāja's *Rājamārtanda*, Rāmānandayati's *Mañiprabhā*, and so forth), but the first four mentioned are a *sine qua non* for the serious study of Yoga philosophy. T. S. Rukmani's completion of her massive translation project of the whole of *Yogavārtika* (together with the *Yogasūtra* and the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*), therefore, is a most welcome and important publishing event. For the first time a reasonably complete corpus of Yoga texts is now available in English so that the serious study of Yoga philosophy can be taken up by more than language specialists. Heretofore, philosophers, historians of religion, comparativists, *et al.*, who were not directly specialists in the Sanskrit texts of Yoga, were largely dependent on such texts as J. H. Woods' *Yoga-System of Patañjali* (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 17, 1914), Rama Prasada's *Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras* (in the Sacred Books of the Hindus Series, 1912, reprint 1978) and Hariharānanda Āraṇya's *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali* (SUNY Press, 1983, reprint of University of Calcutta edition, 1963), all of which provide reasonably reliable access to the *Yogasūtra*, the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* and the *Tattvavaiśārādī* (as a whole or

at least in parts) but none of which provides a proper treatment of Vijñānabhikṣu's *magnum opus*, the *Yogavārttika* (although it should be noted, parenthetically, that Hariharānanda Āraṇya closely follows Vijñānabhikṣu in his interpretation of Yoga philosophy).

Rukmani has used three published editions of the Sanskrit text of the *Yogavārttika* as the basis for her translation, as follows: (1) an old Calcutta edition of *Yogavārttika*, edited by Sri Jivananda Vidyasagara, and published in 1897; (2) the Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 110, issued by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office in 1935; and (3) a Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan edition, Varanasi, 1971. No one of these is a critical edition nor does Rukmani claim to have established a critical reading of the text. She has, of course, compared the three published editions and cited variant readings in her notes to the various sections of her translation.

Each volume of the translation is given over to one full book of the traditional four parts of the *Yogasūtra*, namely, *Samādhipāda*, *Sādhana-pāda*, *Vibhūtipāda* and *Kaivalyapāda*. In the Introduction to Volume I (on *Samādhipāda*), in addition to discussing the editions used for her translation, Dr. Ms. Rukmani takes up issues related to the dating of Vijñānabhikṣu and to the determination of his corpus. Regarding the matter of dating, Rukmani largely accepts the scholarly consensus that Vijñānabhikṣu did his work in the latter half of the sixteenth century. He was probably a Bengali, but the tradition also links him with Varanasi, since his chief disciple, Bhāvagaṇeśa, was a resident of Varanasi. Regarding the extent and chronological order of the corpus of Vijñānabhikṣu, Rukmani argues for sixteen texts altogether, eleven of which are on Vedānta philosophy and five of which are on other traditions (mainly *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga*). Chronologically it appears that the Vedānta texts come first, including *Upadeśaratnamālā*, *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya* (on the *Brahmasūtra*), a series of commentaries on the Upaniṣad-s (called collectively *Vedāntāloka*), a commentary on the *Īśvaragītā*, and *Brahmādarśa*. Then, at a more mature stage of his career Vijñānabhikṣu wrote *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (a large commentary on the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*) and *Yogavārttika* (a massive commentary on the *Yogasūtra* and *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*), both texts, according to Rukmani, being composed at about the same time or possibly even in tandem. Finally, presum-

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ably near the end of his life, Vijñānabhikṣu composed two shorter summaries of his large works on *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga*, namely, *Sāṃkhyasāra* and *Yogasārasaṃgraha*. Also, in her Introduction to Volume I, Rukmani points out that Vijñānabhikṣu was familiar with the *Navya-nyāya* style of writing Sanskrit, exhibits immense learning as evidenced by the extensive quoting that occurs in his texts from a great range of Sanskrit sources, and perhaps of greatest interest, was probably a practicing Yogin in view of his detailed and apparently intimate personal acquaintance with altered states of awareness (*samādhi-s*) and *Yoga* practices in general.

Rukmani does not quarrel with the traditional arrangement of the *Yogasūtra* nor does she enter the various debates about the possible influence of Buddhist traditions on *Yoga* or vice versa. Regarding such matters she simply (and perhaps wisely) notes that there is insufficient evidence to judge such matters one way or another at the present time. In terms of the present arrangement of the *Yogasūtra*, Rukmani suggests the following simple sequence: Book I or *Samādhipāda* is designed for the advanced aspirant; Book II or *Sādhana-pāda* is a general treatment of *Yoga* practice for any aspirant, whether beginning or advanced; Book III or *Vibhūtipāda* is again for advanced aspirants and particularly those who are deeply involved in *saṃyama* or, in other words, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*; and Book IV or *Kaivalyapāda*, while to be sure taking up the matter of *kaivalya* (IV.25—34) also deals with several topics not previously discussed, including the notion of *nirmāṇacitta* (IV.4—5), arguments against idealism (IV.14—24), and a detailed treatment of the theory of double reflection (IV.19, 21, 22, 23).

Some attention is also given to Vijñānabhikṣu's own philosophy in her Introduction to Volume I of the translation as well as in the short Introductions to the subsequent volumes. She points out, for example, that Vijñānabhikṣu is a Vedāntin of the *bhedābheda* variety but most certainly not of the *Śaṅkara* or *māyāvāda* variety. Indeed, as is well known, the Advaita Vedānta of *Śaṅkara* and his followers was the great adversary, according to Vijñānabhikṣu. The Advaita Vedāntins are "closet-Buddhists" (*pracchanna-bauddha*), "au courant so-called Vedāntins" (*ādhunika-vedānta-bruva*), "philosophical air-heads" (*dig-bhrānta*), purveyors of arid nonsense (*śuṣka-tārkika*), and, generally

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Journal of Indian Philosophy encourages creative activities among orientalist and philosophers along with all the various combinations that two classes can form. Contributions to the journal are boundly the limits of rational inquiry and avoid questions that lie in the fields of speculative sociology and parapsychology. In a very general sense, the method is analytical and comparative, aiming at a rigorous precision in the translation of terms and statements. Space is devoted to the works of philosophers of the past as well as to the creative researches of contemporary scholars on such philosophic problems as were addressed by past philosophers.

UNIVERSAL SENTENCES: RUSSELL, WITTGENSTEIN, PRIOR, AND THE NYAYA

The aim of this paper is to discuss (i) whether the following sentences have the same meaning, (ii) whether they have the same truth-value, (iii) whether there is some assertion common to all of them, and (iv) if there is some such assertion, whether it can be defined.

- (1) All men are mortal.
- (2) Whoever is a man is mortal.
- (3) Wherever there is humanity, there is mortality.
- (4) If anyone is a man, then he is mortal.
- (5) If humanity is present somewhere, then mortality is also present there.
- (6) (If x_1 is a man, then x_1 is mortal), and (If x_2 is a man, then x_2 is mortal), where the universe of discourse contains only two objects.
- (7) (If x_1 is man, then x_1 is mortal), (If x_2 is man, then x_2 is mortal), and (x) (If x is a man, then $(x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2)$).

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Both Russell and Wittgenstein have discussed the question whether there is any universal fact corresponding to a universal sentence or proposition. According to Russell a universal proposition such as (1) is not reducible to a conjunctive proposition such as (6). Moreover, according to Russell, a universal proposition is not deducible from a set of singular or atomic propositions such as ' x_1 is a man and mortal', and ' x_2 is a man and mortal', if there are only two human beings. We need to add a universal proposition among our premises in order to deduce a universal as a conclusion from those premises. Hence if a universal proposition cannot be deduced from a set of singular propositions, then obviously they do not have the same

meaning. Now the question is whether the meaning of (1) can be the same as the meaning of any other universal proposition such as (2) or (3). Russell says:

Now when you come to ask what really is asserted in a general proposition, such as 'All Greeks are men' for instance, you find that what is asserted is the truth of all values of what I call a propositional function.¹

From this remark it follows that what has been asserted in (1) is the truth of all values of the propositional function 'If x is a man, then x is mortal'. He also says that 'All men are mortal' means the same as "' x is a man' implies ' x is mortal'" whatever x may be,² and it also means the same as 'If anyone is a man, then he is mortal'.³ From some of his remarks about the 'is' of predication,⁴ and the meaning of a predicate such as 'mortal' which means a certain quality,⁵ it follows that 'All men are mortal' would mean the same as 'Wherever there is humanity, there is mortality'. Hence, according to Russell, the sentences from (1) to (5) would not differ in meaning.

Now the question is whether (1) is equivalent to (6). In several passages he has said that a universal proposition (or a general proposition) cannot be made true by a set of particular facts. He says:

There are *particular facts*, such as 'This is white'; then there are *general facts*, such as 'All men are mortal'.⁶

Moreover, according to Russell, we cannot describe the world completely in terms of particular facts or atomic facts. He says:

Suppose that you had succeeded in chronicling every single particular fact throughout the universe, and that there did not exist a single particular fact of any sort anywhere that you had not chronicled, you still would not have got a complete description of the universe unless you also added: 'These that I have chronicled are all the particular facts there are'.⁷

As regards the objectivity or the nature of a general fact Russell says:

It is perfectly clear, I think, that when you have enumerated all the atomic facts in the world, it is a further fact about the world that those are all the atomic facts there are about the world, and that is just as much an objective fact about the world as any of them are. It is clear, I think, that you must admit general facts as distinct

from and over and above particular facts. The same thing applies to 'All men are mortal'.⁸

From these remarks of Russell it follows that a general fact cannot be inferred from a set of particular facts because it is something over and above particular facts. For this reason we cannot infer 'All men are mortal' from ' x_1 is a man that is mortal' and ' x_2 is a man that is mortal', if there are only two men. In order to infer the proposition 'All men are mortal' we must add the general proposition 'All men are among those I have enumerated'.⁹ Hence, according to Russell, (1) is equivalent to (7), but not to (6). Furthermore, according to Russell, if there is a knowledge of general propositions such as 'All men are mortal', then there must be *primitive* knowledge of general propositions such as ' (x) (If x is a man, then $(x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2)$)', which are not derivable from inferences.

But Wittgenstein does not subscribe to the Russellian conclusion that a general fact is over and above particular facts or atomic facts. Hence a general proposition like any other proposition is a truth-function of atomic propositions. It is, in fact, equivalent to a conjunction of singular propositions which are reducible to a set of atomic propositions unless they are themselves atomic propositions. Wittgenstein says:

If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false. (4.26, *Tractatus*)¹⁰

From this remark it follows that according to Wittgenstein the world can be fully described in terms of the atomic or elementary propositions alone. For this reason the analysis of any proposition, including a general proposition, must end with a set of elementary propositions. To quote Wittgenstein:

It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination. (4.221, *Tractatus*)¹¹

Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into propositions that describe the complexes completely. (2.0201, *Tractatus*)¹²

From these passages of Wittgenstein it follows that component

universal propositions such as ' x_1 and x_2 are all the men that there are' in the analysis of universal propositions such as 'All men are mortal' are reducible to universal propositions about objects which are, in turn, reducible to atomic propositions about objects.¹³ Hence the universal proposition in (7) which is about complexes is reducible to a universal proposition about objects which is again reducible to a set of elementary propositions. In support of the view that the quantifier 'all' can be dispensed with a few more passages may be cited from his *Tractatus*.

I dissociate the concept *all* from truth-functions. Frege and Russell introduced generality in association with logical product or logical sum. (5.521)

If objects are given, then at the same time we are given *all* objects.

If elementary propositions are given, then at the same time *all* elementary propositions are given. (5.524)¹⁴

Hence, according to Wittgenstein, the proposition ' x_1 and x_2 are all the men that there are' is not something over and above the proposition ' x_1 is a man' and ' x_2 is a man', if there are only two men. Moreover, according to Wittgenstein if we do not reduce a universal proposition about objects to a conjunction of elementary propositions about objects, then it will result in meaningless expressions. This point of Wittgenstein can be stated clearly if we take a universal proposition about objects such as 'Everything is red'.

According to Russell the proposition 'Everything is red' is equivalent to ' x_1 is red, x_2 is red, and if anything is an object, then it is identical with x_1 or with x_2 '. But according to Wittgenstein the third conjunct which is a primitive universal proposition in Russell is a meaningless expression. Wittgenstein says:

Thus the variable name ' x ' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept *object*. . . . Wherever it is used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical pseudo-propositions are the result.

So one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects': . . . (4.1272, *Tractatus*)¹⁵

From the above passage of Wittgenstein it follows that any proposition of the form ' x is an object' is a meaningless expression. Since this type of meaningless proposition (expression) is entailed by the proposition ' x_1 and x_2 are all the objects that there are', the latter is also meaningless. It can be demonstrated in the following way:

If the proposition ' (x) (If x is an object, then $(x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2)$)' which is the symbolic counterpart of the proposition ' x_1 and x_2 are all the objects that there are' is meaningful, then the proposition '(If x_1 is an object, then $(x_1 = x_1) \vee (x_1 = x_2)$)' which follows from the former is also meaningful. Again if it is meaningful, then its antecedent, viz., ' x_1 is an object' is also meaningful. If ' x_1 is an object' is meaningful, then its negation ' x_1 is not an object' is also meaningful. This follows from his acceptance of the thesis that a proposition is meaningful if and only if its negation is also meaningful. He says, 'The positive *proposition* necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative *proposition* and *vice versa*'. (5.5151, *Tractatus*).¹⁶ Now let us consider whether ' x_1 is not an object' is meaningful. If it is meaningful, then it is either true or false. If it is true, then the name ' x_1 ' does not designate anything. If a logically proper name does not designate an object, then it is meaningless. If it is meaningless, then the sentence which contains it is also meaningless. Hence the proposition ' x_1 is not an object' is meaningless. If it were so, then ' x_1 is an object' is also meaningless according to the significant criterion of negation. Since ' x_1 is an object' is the antecedent of the proposition '(If x_1 is an object, then $(x_1 = x_1) \vee (x_1 = x_2)$)', the latter is also meaningless. Hence the proposition ' (x) (If x is an object, then $(x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2)$)' which implies a meaningless proposition is also meaningless.

From this proof of Wittgenstein it follows that the irreducible universal proposition of Russell is meaningless. Hence (1) cannot be equated with (7) which contains or implies a meaningless proposition. What (1) expresses can be expressed by (6). Hence, according to Wittgenstein, (1) and (6) are not only equivalent, but also express the same proposition.

This objection of Wittgenstein remains unanswered from the standpoint of Russell so long as we accept the significance criterion of negation as a universally valid criterion. Since Russell himself has accepted this criterion, and since one of his proofs for the view that ' x_1 exists' is meaningless is similar to Wittgenstein's above proof, there is no answer to Wittgenstein's criticism from the standpoint of Russell. In the context of our discussion of the Nyāya view we shall see how Russell can be defended by restricting the universal validity of the significance criterion for negation.

II

Arthur Prior in his article¹⁷ 'What Do General Statements Refer To?' has raised the question whether there are different types of universal propositions. In this article he is proposing the view that there are different uses of the word 'all' depending on the context of its use. Some uses of the word 'all' refer to existent objects, some other uses refer to actual (or present), past, and future objects; still other uses either refer to mythical objects or do not have any existential import.

Let us consider the following propositions of Arthur Prior:

- (a) All John's children are asleep.
- (b) All cats like fish.
- (c) All unicorns have a single horn.

First of all, Arthur Prior asks whether the question, 'What has been referred to in these sentences?' is an appropriate question. It may be said that if we emphasize the word 'all', then this very question can be ruled out. The propositions from (a) to (c) have the form 'All *Xs* are *Ys*' and any proposition of this form simply says that 'No matter what *X* you take, you will find it is a *Y*.' But he has ruled out the possibility of dissolving the question in this way. He says:

Still maybe there is the odd case in which the question is in order. For example, suppose some adults are gathered in a downstairs room and there is a great clatter of children upstairs, and some member of the party says wistfully, 'All *John's* children are asleep anyhow.'¹⁸

Now the question is whether the proposition 'All John's children are asleep' can be equated with 'If John has a child, then he/she is asleep', as we equate 'All *Xs* are *Ys*' with 'If anything is an *X*, then it is a *Y*', or 'Whatever is an *X* is *Y*', where '*X*' and '*Y*' are predicate expressions. It seems to us that Arthur Prior is not willing to ascribe the same 'If-then' or 'whatever' interpretation to all propositions of the form 'All *Xs* are *Ys*'. He says:

One thing that people might mean by saying that a general statement 'All *Xs* are *Ys*' refers to a certain individual *A*, is that *A* is one of the individuals that would have to be a *Y* for this general statement to be true. And the sorts of individual that qualify as being 'referred to' in this sense will differ a great deal from one sort of general statement to another.¹⁹

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From this remark of Prior it follows that the type of entities referred to by a general proposition will not be the same in all contexts. In the case of 'All John's children are asleep', Prior thinks the reference is confined to the existing children of John. Hence it cannot be interpreted as 'whoever is a child of John is asleep' or 'If *x* is a child of John, then *x* is asleep.' But the reference of the proposition 'All cats like fish' is not confined to existing cats only. Hence it cannot be interpreted as 'Produce me any cat you like: that cat will like fish.' Since we cannot produce dead or long-dead and unborn cats, this interpretation cannot be assigned to this type of general proposition. Hence according to Prior it is not equivalent to 'Whatever is a cat likes fish.' What it says, Prior thinks, can be stated as follows: It not only is the case, but always *has been* the case and always *will be* the case that whatever is a cat likes fish. Hence in this case the reference is not confined to the existing cats only. It includes both the past and the future cats as well, but it does not include any imaginary cats. But in the case of 'All unicorns have a single horn' there is no reference to any past, present or future unicorns. According to Prior the person who utters this sentence might mean that *it is said in the books that* whatever is a unicorn has a single horn.

From this discussion of Prior it follows that there are different uses of a universal proposition, and the meaning or the reference of it depends, in some cases at least, upon the context of utterance. Hence the meaning of 'All men are mortal' cannot be equated with 'Whoever is a man is mortal' or 'If anyone is a man, then he is mortal', because in one of its uses 'All men are mortal' refers to past, present and future human beings. Since there is no such reference in the hypothetical proposition 'If anyone is a man, then he is mortal', the meaning or the reference of it cannot be equated with 'All men are mortal'. In the context of our discussion of the Nyāya view we shall see how the distinction between (1), (2) and (3) can be drawn.

III

(a) The Nyāya answer to Wittgenstein:

According to both Russell and Wittgenstein the criterion of significant negation is a universally valid criterion. According to both of them if we take a predicate

which is true of every object, then it can be shown that an atomic proposition of the form 'a is F' is meaningless if the meaning of 'a' lies in its denotatum. Moreover, according to both of them atomic propositions contain logically proper names. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, even one of Russell's proofs for the view that existence is not a predicate of an individual is similar to Wittgenstein's proof that 'a is an object' is meaningless. For this reason Russell is not willing to consider something as a predicate if it cannot be denied of some objects. Hence he says:

There is no sort of point in a predicate which could not conceivably be false.²⁰

Wittgenstein also claimed that the word 'object' is a pseudo-concept expression. Hence according to both of them a universal predicate is not a genuine predicate, and the use of it will lead to meaningless propositions.

But the Nyāya has not followed this approach of Russell and Wittgenstein. According to the Nyāya one of the fundamental problems of metaphysics is to discuss whether there is anything common to all objects, and, if there is, what is the nature of this property in relation to other properties. If several properties are common to all objects, then how are they to be related to each other? Since the Russell-Wittgenstein view of a predicate is restrictive, the Nyāya rejects the universal validity of the Significance criterion for negation. According to the Nyāya there are certain restrictions on negative expressions. According to this view the term 'not-F' is meaningful if 'F' does not represent a universal property such that nothing lacks it and 'F' is not an empty term.

Since everything is an object in the ontology of Wittgenstein, according to the Nyāya the word 'object' is a genuine universal predicate and it represents a universal property. Hence sentences such as 'a is an object', 'b is an object', are true; but their denials violate one of the criteria for negation. Hence their denials are not well-formed expressions. This is how the Nyāya refutes the claim that 'a is an object' is meaningless. Hence if we reject the universal validity of the significance criterion, then it cannot be said that the sentence 'a, b, c, are all the objects that there are' is meaningless. This is how the Nyāya refutes Wittgenstein's objection and establishes the position of Russell that a universal proposition is not reducible to a set of singular propositions. Hence the Nyāya, like Russell, claims that the proposition 'Everything is F' is not equivalent to 'x₁ is an F' and 'x₂ is an F, if there are only two objects. We need to add the proposition 'x₁ and x₂ are all the objects that there are'. Hence, according to the Nyāya, the proposition 'All men are mortal' is not equivalent to a set of propositions which do not contain a universal proposition. For this reason (1) is equivalent to (7), but not to (6). But they do not have the same meaning. This is how the Nyāya would reinstate the position of Russell.

(b) The Nyāya use of the word 'all':

It is claimed by the Nyāya philosophers that the word 'all' refers to a collection of objects. Hence in a sentence such as 'All S is P' the word 'all' refers to the collection (or set) of subjects S without any remainder (*aśeṣatvaviśiṣṭa*), and the limiter of the property of being the referent is the property of being without remainder.²¹ Now the question is, what is the nature of the property of being without remainder?

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Gadādhara, a Navya-Nyāya philosopher, explains this property in terms of the concept of number. He claims that the property of being without remainder is the same as the property of being a collection (or a class), which is nothing but a positive number. This number, in the sentence 'All S is P', is the pervader of the limiter of the property of being the subject and pervaded of the predicate. A limiter, according to the Nyāya, determines the referent(s) of a term and it is also a mode of presentation of the object(s) referred to by it. Since it belongs to the referent, or it is a property of the referent, it cannot be identified with the Fregean sense. Hence what the sentence 'All S is P' asserts is that wherever the limiter of the subject S is present, the number which qualifies the collection is present, and wherever the latter (i.e. the number) is present, the predicate is present. If the property of being the collection is F, the limiter of the property of being the referent of the term 'S' is G, and the predicate is H, then what the sentence 'All S is P' says can be stated in the following way:

$$(x) (Gx \supset Fx) \text{ and } (x) (Fx \supset Hx)$$

In this context the Nyāya use of the word 'number' requires some explanation. A particular use of a number such as 'two' in the expression 'two apples' refers to a collection and the number two is a property of this collection. But this property should not be equated with the universal twoness. Hence there are as many particular number twos as there are pair classes. The relation of a particular number two to a collection is a self-linking relation which is called '*pariyāpti sambandha*' in the technical language of the Nyāya. A self-linking relation in the Nyāya system does not have any separate ontological status, and it is to be identified with one of the terms of it or with both. It has been introduced to solve some of the puzzles about relations or their ontological status. Moreover, according to the Nyāya, the particular number two in 'two apples' is a quality of each member of this collection, and it is related to each of them by the relation of inherence. Hence when we talk about the collection we are talking about something to which the number two is related by one relation, and when we talk about the members of this collection we are talking about the things to which the same number is related by another relation. These two uses of the word 'two' explain the difference in our cognitions about the same object which is a member of different classes. In addition to particular number twos the Nyāya has postulated the universal twoness which is present in each of these particular twos which are considered qualities in the Nyāya ontology.²²

Now let us consider Prior's example 'All John's children are asleep.' According to the Nyāya the word 'all' refers to a collection of John's children and this collection is characterised by a particular number depending on the number of John's children. Hence what this sentence asserts is that the individuals which are characterised by the property of being John's children are characterised by this particular number, and the individuals which are characterised by this number are characterised by the property of being asleep. Similarly, the sentence 'All men are mortal' means that the individuals which are qualified by humanity are qualified by a number which belongs to the collection of men, and the individuals which are qualified by this number are qualified by mortality.

So far we have discussed the use of the word 'all' as a qualifier of the subject-term; now let us discuss the use of it as a qualifier of the predicate-term. Let us consider the sentence 'Wellington has all the twenty-storied buildings.' According to

the Nyāya, here also the word 'all' refers to a collection which is qualified by a number depending on the number of twenty-storied buildings. This number which is the property of being the collection is the pervader of the limiter of the property of being the predicate and the pervaded of the relation of the subject to the predicate. In this example Wellington is the subject, twenty-storied building is the predicate, and the property of being the twenty-storied building is the limiter of the property of being the predicate. If the relation of the predicate to the subject is belonging, then the relation of the subject to the predicate would be the converse of this relation of belonging. What this sentence asserts is that the things which are qualified by the property of being a twenty-storied building are qualified by a particular number which belongs to this collection, and the things which are qualified by this number are qualified by the converse relation of belonging. If we consider F as the property of being a twenty-storied building, G as the number which belongs to the collection, and H as the converse of the relation of belonging, then what the sentence asserts can be stated in the following way:

$$(x) (Fx \supset Gx) \quad \text{and} \quad (x) (Gx \supset Hx)$$

The Nyāya analysis not only explains the distinction between the use of 'all' as the qualifier of the subject-expression and the qualifier of the predicate-expression, but also explains how the sentence 'Wellington has all the twenty-storied buildings' is transformationally related to the sentence 'All twenty-storied buildings are in (belong to) Wellington.' The ' F ' in the former sentence would represent the limiter of the property of being the predicate, but in the latter sentence it would represent the limiter of the property of being the subject. Since the subject of the former sentence has become the predicate in the latter sentence and the predicate of the former has become the subject in the latter, the relation of the predicate to the subject in the latter sentence would be the converse of the former. Since ' H ' represents the converse of the relation of belonging in the former sentence, it would represent the relation of belonging to Wellington in the latter sentence. Hence the Nyāya explains the equivalence between these two sentences and at the same time explains the difference in meaning between them. Hence a transformation of this sort does not preserve the meaning, although it preserves the truth-value.

(c) Meaning and Equivalence of universal sentences:

From the above discussion of the Nyāya, it follows that a universal sentence such as 'All John's children are asleep' or 'Wellington has all twenty-storied buildings' has a reference to a collection and thereby to a number which characterizes the collection or the class. Hence the meaning of 'All men are mortal' has also a similar reference to a number which characterizes the class of men. Since there is no such reference to a class and thereby to a number in 'Whoever is a man is mortal', the meaning of (1) cannot be identified with that of (2). According to the Nyāya the subject in (2) is a man, and the predicate is mortality. The relation of the predicate to the subject is self-linking (*svanīpa*). Hence this relation is to be identified with the first or the second term of it or with both. In (2) a pervader-pervaded relation has been asserted between humanity and mortality. Humanity is the pervaded (*vyāpya*), and mortality is the pervader (*vyāpaka*). Hence, like (1), it does not refer to any collection or the pervader-pervaded relation between a number and humanity or between a number and mortality. Now the question is whether the meaning of

'Wherever there is humanity, there is mortality' can be identified with that of (1) or (2). The Nyāya claims that the subject in (3) is humanity and mortality, and the predicate is the property of being the superstratum determined by the substratum, which is the meaning of 'wherever there'. What this sentence asserts is that the property of being the superstratum resides in both humanity and mortality, and this property is determined by the locus of humanity and mortality. If we take a person such as John as the locus (or substratum) of humanity and mortality, then the property of being the superstratum residing in humanity and mortality is determined by John. But if we take a table as a locus, then the property of being the superstratum determined by it does not reside in humanity and mortality. Here also the relation of the predicate to the subject is self-linking. Since the subject and the predicate in (3) are different from those in (1) or (2), the meaning of (3) cannot be identified with that of (1) or (2).

Since they do not have the same meaning, the cognitions generated by them would not be the same. They would generate three different cognitions. As regards (4) and (5), the Nyāya claims that the meaning of (4) is the same as that of (2), and the meaning of (5) is the same as that of (3). As regards (6) the Nyāya claims that since the names of individuals (or objects) have been mentioned in (6), its meaning is different from the meanings of all other sentences. Since (7) is a conjunction of (6) and the sentence ' $(x) (\text{If } x \text{ is a man, then } (x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2))$ ', its meaning cannot be identified with the meaning of any other sentence in the above list.

Now let us discuss the question whether (1) to (7) are equivalent. The Nyāya claims that (2) to (5) have the same truth-value, and they are implied by (1). But neither (2) nor (3) implies (1) unless an omniscient being has already formed a collection which includes past, present and future human beings. Hence neither (4) nor (5) would imply (1). From this it follows that (2) to (5) are equivalent, but (1) is not equivalent to them. As regards (6), the Nyāya claims that it could be true without any other sentence being true. Hence (6) is not equivalent to them. But (6) would be equivalent to (1) if the universal sentence ' $(x) (\text{If } x \text{ is a man, then } (x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2))$ ' is added to it. Hence (7) is equivalent to (1). (2) can be inferred from (1) as well as from (7). Since (3) is equivalent to (2), it can also be inferred from (7). But we cannot infer ' $(x) (\text{If } x \text{ is a man, then } (x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2))$ ' from the fact x_1 is a man that is mortal and x_2 is a man that is mortal. Hence 'All men are mortal' cannot be inferred from the latter sentence. From this it follows that according to the Nyāya also if a universal sentence is true then there is a general fact which is over and above the particular facts about the individuals, and if there is a *knowledge* of a universal sentence, then there is a primitive knowledge of a universal sentence, which is not reducible to any other knowledge. Hence, if there is a knowledge of 'All men are mortal', then there is a primitive knowledge of 'These are all men.' In this respect there is no difference between the views of Russell and the Nyāya. Moreover, according to both of them we cannot infer 'All men are mortal' from ' x_1 is a man and mortal' and ' x_2 is a man and mortal.' But if we add ' $(x) (\text{If } x \text{ is a man, then } (x = x_1) \vee (x = x_2))$ ' to it then, according to both of them, we can infer 'All men are mortal.' Hence the Nyāya, like Russell, asserts the equivalence between (1) and (7).

(d) Common assertion:

According to the Nyāya there is some assertion which is common to all the

sentences in our above list, although all of them do not have the same meaning and are not equivalent to each other. This common assertion is the pervader-pervaded (or pervasion) relation between two entities. In (1) the pervader-pervaded relation has been asserted between humanity and the property of being the collection which is a particular number according to Gadādhara, and between this number which resides in each of the members and mortality. In (2) the pervader-pervaded relation holds between humanity and mortality; but in (3) it holds between humanity and mortality on the one hand, and the property of being the superstratum determined by the substratum on the other. Since (4) means the same as (2), it asserts the same pervader-pervaded relation as (2). Similar is the case with (5) which means the same as (3). (6) also asserts the pervader-pervaded relation between x_1 being a man and x_1 being mortal, and x_2 being a man and x_2 being mortal. (7) asserts the pervader-pervaded relation between humanity and being identical with x_1 or x_2 in addition to the pervader-pervaded relation asserted in (6). Hence all of them assert the pervader-pervaded relation between two entities.

Now let us discuss this pervader-pervaded relation which is common to all the above sentences. According to Ingalls²³ the *Nyāya-Kośa* has listed thirty-four definitions of pervasion i.e. the pervader-pervaded relation. Most of them are associated with the names of particular logicians and they were studied in groups such as *vyāpti-pañcaka*. Ingalls also makes the claim that *hundreds* of manuscripts of commentaries are still available on these *single* groups. Since the literature is vast and highly technical I shall mention only the definitions of *vyāpti-pañcaka* and Gaṅgeśa's conclusive definition mentioned in his *siddhānta-lakṣaṇa*.

Let us consider the pervader-pervaded (or pervasion) relation in a sentence of the form 'If there is *F*, then there is *G*', where '*F*' is to be called 'the probans' ('hetu') and '*G*' is to be called 'the probandum' ('*sādhya*'). Since the validity of an inference depends on the validity or the truth of the sentence which states the pervader-pervaded relation between the probans of the premiss and the probandum of the conclusion, it is very important for any discussion of inference. In fact, it plays a central role in the *Nyāya* discussion of inference.

The first definition of *vyāpti-pañcaka* may be stated in the following way:

(i) The probans (i.e. *F*) has the absence of the property of being the superstratum which is determined by the substratum which is qualified by the absence of the probandum (i.e. *G*).

Let us apply this definition to an example such as 'If this has smoke, then this has fire.' In this example the probandum is a fire. The absence of the probandum is the absence of a fire, and the substratum of the absence of the probandum is an object where there is no fire, such as a lake. The property of being the superstratum determined by the substratum of the absence of the probandum is the property of being the occurrent (*ādheyatā*) which resides in those objects which have occurred in those places where there is no fire such as a lake. If a log of wood is in a lake where there is no fire, then it is a superstratum in relation to the lake which is the substratum, and it has the property of being the superstratum which is determined by the lake. Now the absence of this property resides in those objects which have not occurred in those places which are characterised by the absence of fire. Since the smoke in our example has not occurred in a lake or in a similar place, it is characterised by the absence of this property. Hence the pervader-pervaded relation is the absence of this property which resides in a smoke in the above example. It is a type of relational abstract property of a smoke.

But this definition of pervasion is not applicable to valid (or true) statements such as 'If it has the property of being this tree (which includes all the present properties of this tree), then it has the contact with a bird.' Here we presuppose that at the time of making this statement a bird is in contact with this tree. The probandum in this example is the contact with a bird. The absence of the probandum is the absence of this contact. The substratum of this absence would be any object which is not characterised by this contact. This absence will characterise this table where there is no bird. Now the *Nyāya* claims that as this absence characterises this table so it characterises this tree limited by its roots or the trunk. Hence the tree limited by one of its branches has this contact, but it lacks this contact if it is limited by its roots or the trunk. Hence the tree is also a substratum of the absence of this contact. In this context it is to be noted that according to the *Nyāya* if a property does not characterise its entire locus, then it is considered a non-pervasive occurrent, but if it characterises its entire locus, then it is considered a pervasive occurrent. Properties like humanity or a class-character are pervasive occurrents, but properties like contact or colour are non-pervasive occurrents. Since contact is a non-pervasive occurrent, its absence characterises the tree limited by its roots or the trunk. Now the property of being this tree which characterises the tree is a superstratum of it. So it has the property of being the superstratum. According to our definition the probans should have the absence of the property of being the superstratum. Since the property of being this tree is the probans, it does not have the absence of the property of being the superstratum. Instead it has the property of being the superstratum determined by the substratum which is characterised by the absence of the probandum. Hence this definition of pervasion suffers from what is called 'undercoverage' ('*avyāpti*'). In order to overcome this type of undercoverage the second definition of pervasion has been proposed, which may be stated in the following way:

(ii) The probans has the absence of the property of being the superstratum which is determined by the substratum which is qualified by the absence of the probandum which (i.e. the absence of the probandum) resides in those places which are different from the thing(s) qualified by the probandum.

Now let us see how this definition avoids the objection raised against the previous definition. Consider the previous example 'If it has the property of being this tree, then it has the contact with a bird.' The probandum is the contact with a bird. The thing qualified by this contact is the tree, and the things which are different from it would be all other things. In this case we have to take those loci of the absence of the probandum, which are different from the tree. Hence we cannot take the tree limited by its roots or the trunk as a locus of the absence of the probandum. Hence the substratum of this type of absence would be any object which is different from this tree. Similarly, the superstratum would be those objects which are present in this type of substratum. If we take this table as a substratum of this type of absence, then the pen which is present on it would be its superstratum. Hence the pen will have the property of being the superstratum which is determined by this table. According to this definition the absence of this type of property of being the superstratum will characterise the probans which is the property of being this tree. Since the probans has this type of absence, the second definition avoids the previous objection.

But this definition poses another problem. In order to avoid the previous objection this definition presupposes the controversial thesis that absences would

differ if their loci differ. For this reason the absence of the contact which resides in the tree limited by its roots or the trunk is not equated with the absence of contact which resides elsewhere. If we do not accept this controversial assumption, then the second definition, like the first one, would not validate the above example, and hence it would also suffer from undercoverage (*avyāpti*). For the absence of contact with a bird which characterises this table would not be different from the absence of contact which characterises the same tree limited by its roots or the trunk. Since most of the Navya-Nyāya philosophers do not accept this controversial thesis, the third definition of pervasion has been proposed to avoid this assumption. It can be stated in the following way:

(iii) The probans has the property of not being present (or occurrent) in the same locus as the locus of the mutual absence, the counterpositive (negatum) of which is something which is qualified by the probandum.

Now let us see how this definition applies to the above example even if we do not accept the thesis that absences differ if their loci differ.

The probandum is the contact with a bird. The locus of the probandum is the tree which is characterised by the contact with a bird. Now we have to consider the mutual absence or the difference, the counterpositive (negatum) of which is the locus of the probandum. Since the tree is the locus of the probandum, we have to consider the difference from this tree (or the mutual absence of this tree). The loci of the mutual absence of this tree would be things which are different from this tree. Hence everything other than this tree would be a locus of this absence. Now the probans will not occur in this type of locus. Since the property of being this tree does not occur in this type of locus, it has the property of not being present in this type of locus. This is how this third definition would validate the above example without presupposing the controversial assumption.

Now this definition gives rise to another problem. It cannot validate a sentence in which the probandum has several loci. Hence in such cases it suffers from undercoverage. Let us see how this objection can be raised against this definition. Consider the valid sentence 'If there is smoke, then there is fire.' Here the probandum is fire. Since it has several loci such as the mountain, the hearth, etc., we can take any one of them to be the locus of the probandum. Let us take this mountain to be the locus of the probandum. Now we have to consider the mutual absence, the counterpositive of which is this mountain. The mutual absence of this mountain (or the difference from this mountain) resides in those places which are different from this mountain. It resides in this table as well as in a hearth. Let us take a hearth to be a locus of this mutual absence. Since smoke occurs in a hearth, it is a locus of both the mutual absence of this mountain and the smoke. Hence the smoke which occurs in a hearth *does not have* the property of not being present (occurrent) in the same locus as the locus of this mutual absence. For this reason the third definition fails to validate this sentence. In order to avoid this difficulty the fourth definition has been put forward, which can be formulated in the following way:

(iv) The probans has the property of being the counterpositive (negatum) of the absence residing in all loci of the absence of the probandum.

Now let us see how this definition avoids the difficulty mentioned in the third definition. Since this definition explicitly refers to all the loci of the absence of the probandum, we cannot take a hearth as the locus of this absence. Here the set of

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loci would include objects such as this table or a lake where there is an absence of fire. Now we have to consider the absences which reside in the loci which are characterised by the absence of fire. Since smoke does not reside in a lake which is characterised by the absence of fire, the absence of smoke would be an absence of this sort. Since smoke is the counterpositive of the absence of smoke, it has the property of being the counterpositive. Hence the fourth definition validates the sentence 'If there is smoke, then there is fire', without encountering the difficulty present in the third definition.

But this definition also suffers from certain defects. It is claimed that the use of the word 'all' in this definition presupposes more than one locus of the absence of the probandum. Hence this definition is not applicable to those cases where the absence of the probandum has only one locus. Let us consider the sentence 'If there is the absence of the property of being the smallest prime number, then there is the absence of the property of being the immediate predecessor of number two.'

In this example the probandum is the absence of the property of being the immediate predecessor of number two. The absence of the probandum would be the absence of the absence of this property which is the same as the property of being the immediate predecessor of number two. Since the locus of the absence of this probandum is only one object, the possibility of having more than one locus is ruled out. Hence the use of the word 'all' in the definition is inappropriate. Moreover, if the word 'all' in the definition is to be defined in terms of the pervader-pervaded relation, then the definition involves circularity. In order to avoid such criticisms the fifth definition has been proposed, which can be stated in the following way:

(v) The probans has the absence of the property of being the superstratum which is determined by the object(s) which are different from those which are qualified by the probandum.

Now let us see how this definition validates the previous example.

The probandum in this example is the absence of the property of being the immediate predecessor of number two. Hence the object qualified by this probandum would be any number other than one. Now the object which is different from those qualified by the probandum would be number one. The property of being the superstratum determined by this object resides in the properties of number one. Hence the absence of this property of being the superstratum resides in the absence of the property of being the smallest prime number. This is how the fifth definition validates the previous example. Moreover, since this definition does not use the word 'all', it is free from circularity. Hence each of the successive definitions is proposed to overcome the objection mentioned in the previous definition. But none of these definitions can validate a sentence which contains an unnegatable or universal positive property such as knowability or nameability as the probandum. Hence the sentence 'If something is nameable, then it is knowable' cannot be validated by any of the above definitions as each of them requires a locus for the absence of the probandum. Since the absence of a universal property such as knowability cannot be located anywhere in the Nyāya ontology, the expression 'unknowable' or 'the absence of knowability' would be an ill-formed expression according to the Nyāya criterion for negation. For this reason Gaṅgeśa proposed a new definition of pervasion which overcomes this difficulty. His definition known as 'the conclusive definition' may be stated thus:

The probans has the property of being present (or occurrent) in the locus of the probandum which is not limited by the limiter of the property of being the counterpositive of the absence residing in the locus of the probans.

Now let us see how this definition applies to a valid sentence such as 'If something is nameable (or has nameability), then it is knowable (or has knowability).'

In this example the probans is nameability and the locus of the probans would be any object in the Nyāya ontology. Let us consider this table as a locus of this probans. If there is no cat on the table, then the absence of a cat resides in this locus of the probans. Since a cat is the counterpositive (negatum) of this absence, the property of being the counterpositive residing in this counterpositive is limited by the limiter cathood. But the probandum is not limited by any limiter of this type. In this case knowability is not limited by cathood. Since knowability is present in this table, it would be a locus of the probandum. Since nameability is present in the same table, it has the property of being present in the locus of the probandum.

It has also been claimed that Gaṅgeśa's definition applies to all other types of valid universal sentences. Hence it is free from the defect of undercoverage (*avyāpti*). For this reason Gaṅgeśa's definition of pervasion is superior to all other definitions.

From the above discussion of the Nyāya it follows that there are different types of universal sentences or propositions. If we consider our sentences (1) to (7), then it follows that the meaning of (4) can be identified with that of (2), and the meaning of (5) can be identified with that of (3), but the meanings of (1), (2) and (3) cannot be identified with each other. Similarly the meanings (6) and (7) cannot be identified with each other, and they are different from the meanings of all other sentences. As regards their truth-values, the Nyāya claims that all of them do not have the same truth-value. (1) is not equivalent to (2) or (3), although (1) implies (2), and (2) implies and is implied by (3). Hence (2) and (3) are equivalent. Since (2) and (4) have the same meaning, they are equivalent. Similarly, (3) and (5) are equivalent. But (6) is not equivalent to any other sentence. (1) and (7) are equivalent, although they do not have the same meaning. As regards the common assertion, the Nyāya claims that all of them assert the pervader-pervaded relation between two terms, and the Nyāya philosophers have tried to define this common assertion. Since Arthur Prior, in recent philosophy, has raised certain questions about universal sentences which have been extensively discussed in the Nyāya system, his questions might serve as a bridge between the Western and the Indian tradition.²⁴

NOTES

- ¹ B. Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', in *Logic and Knowledge*, ed. by R.C. Marsh, London and New York, Allen & Unwin, 6th impression, 1977, p. 230.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 237.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 237.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 245.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 186.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 183.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-4.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 236.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 235.
- ¹⁰ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, London and New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961, p. 63.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ¹³ For a more comprehensive discussion see G. Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1964.
- ¹⁴ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, p. 103.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- ¹⁷ A.N. Prior, 'What Do General Statements Refer To?', *Papers in Logic and Ethics*, ed. by P.T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1976.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 177.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 179.
- ²⁰ B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 241.
- ²¹ Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha, 'The Nyāya on the Meaning of Some Words', transl. with explanatory notes by J.L. Shaw, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, forthcoming; and R.N. Ghosh, *Vyāptipañcaka*, Calcutta, West Bengal State Book Board, 1982, pp. 532-4.
- ²² J.L. Shaw, 'Number: From the Nyāya to Frege to Russell', *Studia Logica*, 1982.
- ²³ D.H.H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 29.
- ²⁴ For the Nyāya discussion of the meaning of a universal sentence and Gaṅgeśa's definition of pervasion I am greatly indebted to Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha.

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ŚAṆKARA ON REASON, SCRIPTURAL AUTHORITY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

This paper seeks to indicate what according to Śaṅkara is the basic concern of the philosophic enterprise, why he attached the highest value to it and how he goes about trying to accomplish it. In this connection his attitude to reason, scriptural authority and Self-knowledge will be discussed and it will be shown in what sense he regards scripture (*śruti*) as the valid source of knowing the ultimate Reality and how scriptural authority as a source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) differs from and is yet vitally related to the realization (*sākṣātkāra*, *avagati* or *anubhava*) of this ultimate Reality.

In keeping with his uncompromising commitment to non-dualism, Śaṅkara, unlike many other Indian philosophers, directs his metaphysical enquiry to the non-dual Reality, known as Brahman or Ātman. Philosophy for Śaṅkara is not a science of the manifold existents; it is rather an enquiry into what is ultimately Real. A philosopher *qua* philosopher is not so much interested in an analytical division and classification of the manifold objects of the variegated world; rather he is concerned mainly with the unitary knowledge of the Indestructible. Philosophy thus is primarily concerned with the highest wisdom (*parā vidyā*) and not with the ordinary lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*) of the world. Brahman or Ātman is not one among many knowables (*prameyas*)¹, but the only Reality worth knowing. In this respect Śaṅkara's position may be contrasted with those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and Buddhism. Ātman is one among many knowables according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as well as the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. For the Sāṅkhya-Yoga also the knowledge of both Prakṛti and Puruṣa is equally important in order to attain discriminative knowledge. As for the Buddhists, they are chiefly interested in comprehending the truth of Anātman rather than of Ātman. But Śaṅkara closely adheres to such Upaniṣadic utterances as "That Ātman which is free from evil should be sought after, should

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ON AVOIDING GHOSTS AND SOCIAL CENSURE: MONASTIC FUNERALS IN THE MŪLASARVĀSTIVĀDA-VINAYA

Funeral rites and burial practices in Indian Buddhist monasteries have received very little scholarly attention. This is, perhaps, because such rites and practices — like those in so many other religious traditions — call clearly into question the degree to which “official” and purportedly “central” doctrines were known to the members of actual Buddhist monastic communities, or — if known — the degree to which they had actual impact on behavior. This may be particularly annoying to modern scholars of Buddhism because they seem to like “official” literary doctrine, and seem to want to think — in spite of the apparent absence of good evidence — that it somehow had importance beyond a narrow circle of scholastic specialists. It is, however, perhaps more certainly true that certain statements made by early and good scholars did little to direct attention towards such rites and practices. Hermann Oldenberg, as early as 1881, said “. . . the Vinaya texts are nearly altogether silent as to the last honours of deceased monks. To arrange for their cremation was perhaps committed to the laity”.¹ T. W. Rhys Davids went even further only eighteen years later. “Nothing is known”, he said, “of any religious ceremony having been performed by the early Buddhists in India, whether the person deceased was a layman, or even a member of the order. The Vinaya Piṭaka, which enters at so great length into all details of the daily life of the recluses, has no rules regarding the mode of treating the body of a deceased Bhikkhu”.²

That such statements would not have encouraged further research would hardly be surprising. If, too, they were entirely correct, there would be little need for it. But they are not. There are at least two things wrong with statements of this kind. First of all, both Oldenberg and Rhys Davids — like so many scholars still — axiomatically assumed that evidence for Buddhist practices can only be found in texts, that texts and texts alone reflect what actually occurred. It does

not seem to matter that there was and is clear epigraphical and archeological evidence that proves that Buddhist monastic communities at Sāñci, Sonari, Andher and Bhojpur, at Bhaja, Bedsa and Kanheri, at Amaravati and Mathura were concerned — even pre-occupied — with ritually depositing and elaborately housing the remains of at least some of the local monastic dead. It does not seem to matter that a good deal of this evidence was available long before either Oldenberg or Rhys Davids were writing, or that a good deal of it dates to the earliest period of Buddhist monasticism that we have certain knowledge of.³ But even if we put aside — as we must here — this epigraphical and archeological evidence,⁴ the fact remains that both Oldenberg's and Rhys Davids' statements are still distortive. Both refer to "the Vinaya", but that meant for them — as it still means for many — only the Pāli *Vinaya*. We now know, however, that the Pāli *Vinaya*, in fact the Pāli canon as a whole, is — in K. R. Norman's words — "a translation from some earlier tradition, and cannot be regarded as a primary source", that in some cases the Pāli *Vinaya* is "markedly inferior" to the other *Vinayas*, and in some cases appears decidedly later.⁵ Moreover, Csoma's analysis of the Tibetan 'dul ba, published almost fifty years before Oldenberg, contained enough in summary form to make it clear that if the Pāli *Vinaya* as we have it had "no rules regarding the mode of treating the body of a deceased Bhikkhu", the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* did.⁶ Rockhill's extracts from the same *Vinaya* — published only two years after Oldenberg and six before Rhys Davids — should have put this beyond all doubt.⁷ This *Mūlasarvāstivāda* material, however, was and has remained largely ignored, while Oldenberg's, and especially Rhys Davids', assertions — although demonstrably distorted if not entirely wrong — have come to be taken as established fact. P. V. Kane, for example, in his influential *History of Dharmasāstra* simply paraphrases Rhys Davids' remarks concerning the Buddhist treatment of their dead.⁸ This clearly will not do, and the *Mūlasarvāstivāda* material — available in part in Sanskrit from the Gilgit manuscripts,⁹ in part from a partial and far from perfect Chinese translation,¹⁰ and in its entirety in the Tibetan Kanjur — needs to be brought fully into the discussion. There have already been, to be sure, limited and partial attempts to do this, notably by L. de La Vallée Poussin.¹¹ What follows is only, I hope, a more concerted

attempt to be added to those that have gone before, but it too remains very much in the category of the tentative: it is based only on a far from full familiarity with two *Vinayas*; it does not take into account the important monastic codes preserved in Chinese — but hopefully might stimulate others to do so; it does not solve — but in fact exiles to the forest of footnotes or ignores — numerous lexical, terminological and textual problems which are encountered in these legalistic codes; it merely suggests — it does not necessarily establish — some possible lines of interpretation which might or might not prove fruitful. It does, however, I think, make more fully available some interesting data.

There are literally dozens of references to the death of a local monk in both the Pāli *Vinaya* and the *Vinaya* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādins*, but the bulk of these in both *Vinayas* occur in what at first sight might seem an unlikely place. In both *Vinayas* the death of a local monk is treated most fully in their respective "section on robes or robe-material" (*Cīvaravastu*, *Cīvarakkhandhaka*). The explanation for this, however, seems to be that the death of a local monk raised for the *Vinaya* masters one of the same problems that death in almost every community, whether secular or religious, raises: the problem of property and inheritance. Since the "robe" was one of the primary items of personal property that belonged to a monk, and since inheritance might be an important means by which other monks might acquire robes, it is only natural that the disposition of a deceased monk's property would be discussed together with the other means of legitimately acquiring robes and the rules governing such acquisition. In the Pāli *Cīvarakkhandhaka* inheritance of a monk's property is not heavily legislated or encumbered. The formal rules are kept to a minimum. Typical is the first promulgation in this regard: two monks tend to a sick monk who dies. They take the deceased monk's robe and bowl and report his death to the Buddha. The latter says:

Monks, the Order is the owner of the bowl and robes of a monk who passed away. But truly those who tend the sick are of great service. I allow you, monks, to give through the Order the three robes and the bowl to those who tended the sick.¹²

The formal procedure is then explained. This relatively simple legisla-

tion becomes, of course, more complicated when the property of a dead monk is more extensive, when, for example, it involves both what the texts call “biens légers” (*lahu-bhaṇḍa*, *lahu-parikkhāra*) and “biens lourds” (*garu-bhaṇḍa*, *garu-parikkhāra*).¹³ But on the whole the Pāli *Vinaya* legislates far fewer situations than does the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, and limits itself to the enunciation of a few general principles. The *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, on the other hand, devotes nearly thirty-five pages to the disposition of a dead monk’s property, taking pains to make detailed rulings on a large range of specific situations.¹⁴

There has been a clear tendency to explain differences of this sort in the *Vinayas* as reflections of differences of chronology, to see an increase in number and specificity of rules as an indication of later composition. But this explanation — though a favorite of Western scholars — is only one explanation, and a very narrow one at that. It completely overlooks a number of other equally possible explanations. It is equally possible, for example, that what has been taken as a reflection of a chronological difference may in fact reflect “sectarian” differences in legal rigorism which need not involve any chronological component at all. Looked at in this light the Pāli rules governing the disposition of a deceased monk’s property may simply have been loose, if not lax. They would have allowed a fair amount of ambiguity and leeway for individual judgement. The compilers of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* appear to have intended to prevent both and to frame a far stricter and more comprehensive code, a code in which little was left to an individual’s or local community’s discretion. The *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* may, then, represent a far stricter rule, rather than a later one.

The *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* also appears to be straightforward about the kind and range of problems that could arise in the distribution of a dead monk’s property. It contains, for example, the following detailed case which concerns a monk named Upananda who had amassed a considerable estate.¹⁵ The community at Śrāvastī, after establishing its right to the estate which was initially impounded by the King, proceeded with its distribution among the monks in Śrāvastī. But then the monks from Sāketā heard about Upananda’s death and came to claim a share (*asmākam api bhadantopanandaḥ sabrahmacāri*.

asmākam api tatsantako lābhaḥ prāpadyata iti). As a result, the text says: *bhikṣubhiḥ pātayitvā taiḥ sārđham punar api bhājitaḥ*, “after having brought (the estate) together again, the monks (of Śrāvastī) once more divided it together with those (monks from Sāketā)”. But this too was not the end. Monks from Vaiśālī, Vārāṇasī Rājagṛha and Campā came and the whole procedure had to be repeated again and again. The situation reached the point that, according to the text: *bhikṣavaḥ pātayanto bhājayantaś ca riñcanti uddeśam pātham svādhyāyaṃ yogaṃ manasikāram*, “the monks (because they were always) bringing together and dividing (estates), abandon (their) instruction, recitation, study, yoga and mental concentration”.¹⁶ The Buddha is informed of the situation and as a consequence he declares:

*pañca karaṇāni lābhavibhāge. katame pañca. gandī tridaṇḍakam caityaṃ śilākā jñaptiḥ pañcakam. yo mṛtagaṇḍyām ākopyamānāyām agacchati, tasya lābho deyah. evam tridaṇḍake bhāṣyamāne caityavandanāyām kriyamānāyām śilākālyām ājçaryamānāyām. tasmāt tārhi bhikṣavaḥ sarvaṃ mṛtapariṣkāram jñaptim kṛtvā bhājayitavyam. akopyam bhaviṣyati.*¹⁷

There are five occasions for the distribution of (a deceased monk’s) possessions. Which five? The gong; the Tridaṇḍaka; the caitya; the ticket; the formal motion is the fifth. Who, when the gong for the dead is being beaten, comes — to him something is to be given. It is the same for when the Tridaṇḍaka is being recited, when the worship of the caitya is being performed, when tickets are being distributed, [when a formal motion is being made].¹⁸ Therefore, then, monks, having made a formal motion concerning all the personal belongings of the deceased, they are to be distributed. It will be a fixed procedure [which is then described].¹⁹

A passage such as this is an explicit recognition that Buddhist monastic communities had a wide range of potentially conflicting concerns and preoccupations, all of which were accepted as legitimate. Notice that concern with the distribution of a deceased monk’s property is not here — nor in the Pāli *Civara-kkhandhaka* — in itself ever criticized. It is presented as perfectly legitimate. A problem arises, or a situation requiring legislation appears, only when that concern distracts monks or communities from other legitimate concerns. In the present case there is no hint that one set of concerns was considered more important than the other. The problem was to accommodate both. Since there is no legislation in the Pāli *Vinaya* for the particular situation addressed in this *Mūlasarvāstivādin* passage, and yet we know that the kinds of activities involved were known to, and

recognized as legitimate concerns of a monastic community by the compilers of the Pāli *Vinaya*, we might be able to see in this *Mūlasarvāstivādin* passage another good example of the consistent tendency on the part of its compilers to insist on a far stricter and more comprehensive code than was framed in the Pāli *Vinaya*. Again, chronological considerations need not enter in. It is, finally, also important to note that this passage presents us with the first direct indication of the intimate connection in the *Cīvara-vastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* between the distribution of a deceased monk's property and what it presents as the proper performance of his funeral: the first of the "occasions" for the distribution mentioned in this passage, and very probably the second and third as well, are — as we shall see — particular moments in a *Mūlasarvāstivādin* monastic funeral. We know — again as we shall see — from a variety of *Mūlasarvāstivādin* sources that the sounding of "the gong or bell for the dead" (called variously the *mṛta-*, *anta-* or *muṇḍikā gaṇḍī* in Sanskrit,²⁰ and *shi ba'i gaṇḍī* or *gaṇḍī mjug* (v.l. 'jug) *med pa* in Tibetan²¹) was used "pour l'annonce d'une mort", and appears to have signalled the beginning of the formal funeral proceedings.²² We know too that the recitation of the *Tridaṇḍaka*,²³ or giving a recitation of Dharma (*dharmāśravaṇam dattam*)²⁴ or of "the Dharma connected with the Impermanent" (*mi rtag pa dang ldan pa'i chos dag bshad nas*)²⁵ took place at the end of, or during, the cremation, and that "worshipping the Stūpa or caitya" (*mchod rten la phyag 'tshal bar bya'o*) appears to have formally terminated the proceedings as a whole.²⁶ The moments chosen for the distribution of a dead monk's property do not appear to have been arbitrary, but appear initially to have been closely linked to significant moments in his funeral. The order in which they occur also does not appear to be arbitrary, but seems to reflect a sequence of moments which are increasingly removed from the moment of death and would appear to involve a decreasing degree of participation in the funeral activities. He "who, when the gong for the dead is being beaten, comes" is present and participates from the very commencement of the funeral. But he who comes "when the worship of the caitya is performed" need only be present at the end, and he who comes only "when a formal motion is being made" need not have been present at all. That the 'first' moment is 'first' in more than just a numerical sense and involves both a

priority in time and a priority of rights to inherit is virtually certain. If the distribution takes place at the 'first' moment, there will be no others and only those present at that moment could partake in the distribution. Priority of rights therefore seems directly linked to degree of participation in the funeral. Even if, it is important to note, one might argue that 'the recitation of the *Tridaṇḍaka*' and 'the worship of the caitya' referred to here need not necessarily refer to moments in the funeral — both activities, after all, as we shall see below, occur in other contexts as well — still the principle holds: preference and priority are still given to those "who, when the gong for the dead is being beaten, come", and there can be no doubt about whether this refers to participation in the funeral. It is also worth noting that the fact that the funeral commences with the sounding of the gong significantly underlines its communal character — this means of summons is only used for activities which concern the entire community: it is used "pour la convocation des moines, . . . l'appel au travail, . . . pour le repas", and "pour annoncer un danger".²⁷ It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that by making physical presence at key moments of the funeral the determining factor in defining who had first rights to participate as a recipient in the distribution of the estate the compilers of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* assured or reinforced the communal character of the proceedings.

The linkage between the distribution of a deceased monk's property and the performance of his funeral is in fact a central theme of one of the two promulgations of rules governing monastic funerals found in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* that we will look at here. This promulgation is the least known and consists of three interlocked texts which mark out individually what appear to have been considered the important elements of a monastic funeral. They are now found together, one after the other in the *Cīvara-vastu*. The edition of these texts published by N. Dutt is not always satisfactory so, although I cite his edition here, I have inserted into it in brackets at least the more important "corrections" which a study of the manuscript itself has indicated are required. I have also occasionally likewise inserted the "corresponding" Tibetan in parentheses.

1. *śrāvastyām nidānam. tena khalu samayenānyatamo bhikṣur glāno layāne kālagataḥ. amanuṣyakeṣūpapannaḥ. cīvarabhājako bhikṣus taṃ layanaṃ praveṣṭum ārabdhah.*

pātracivaram bhājayāmiti. sa tīvrena paryavasthānena laguḍam ādāyōṭhitāḥ kathayati: yāvan mām abhinirharatha [but ms: mamābhinirharatha] tāvat pātracivaram bhājayatheti (re zhiḡ kho bo dur khrod du yang ma phyung bar lung bzed dang gos 'ged par byed dam). sa samtrasto nispalāyitāḥ.

etat prakaranam bhikṣavo bhagavata ārocayanti.

bhagavān āha: pūrvam tāvan mṛto bhikṣur abhinirhartavyaḥ; paścāt tasya pātracivaram bhājayitavyam iti.²⁸

Although the sense of this text — and the two following — is generally clear, it is still not always easy to arrive at an altogether smooth or satisfying translation. This is in large part due to the language of the greater part of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, to what Lévi calls “ses étrangetés”, and to its “almost colloquial style”.²⁹ There is, for example, a heavy reliance on pronouns, and sometimes the same pronominal form is used in close proximity with two entirely different referents. This, together with an even more general tendency towards elliptical expression sometimes requires that a good deal of padding be added to any translation. The Tibetan translators too have sometimes been forced in this direction. Moreover, each of the texts in this series employs a *yāvat . . . tāvat* construction, the exact sense of which is neither easy to determine nor easy to render into English, and there is some disquieting variation. The Tibetan translations — though sufficiently clear — seem to presuppose a slightly different text as well. Either that, or they have settled for a far looser translation than usual. With these provisos, the first text may be translated:

I. The setting was in Śrāvastī. On this occasion a certain monk, being sick, died in his cell. He was reborn among the non-human beings. The monk who was the distributor-of-ropes started to enter the cell (of the dead monk) saying “I distribute the bowl and robes”. (But) he (— the deceased monk —) appeared there with intense anger wielding a club and said: “When you perform for me the removal of the body, (only) then do you effect a distribution of (my) bowl and robe” (Tibetan: “How could one who had not even carried me out to the cremation ground effect a distribution of (my) robe and bowl?”)³⁰ He (— the distributor-of-ropes —) was terrified and forced to flee.

The monks ask the Blessed One concerning this matter.

The Blessed One said: “Now first the removal of a dead monk is to be performed. Then his robe and bowl are to be distributed.

Here we have legislated what appears to be the minimum funereal procedure that must be effected before any distribution of a dead monk’s property can take place. This procedure is here expressed by

forms of the verb *abhi-nir-|hr*. This verb, or close variants of it with or without the initial *abhi-*, is in fact something of a technical expression for the initial act of funereal procedures described in a variety of Buddhist sources.³¹ It also occurs in Jain texts dealing with funerals.³² But even when this exact expression is not used, we find a whole series of parallel expressions — *ādahanam nītvā, śmaśānam nītvā, tam ādāya dahanam gatāḥ, ro bskyal nas*, etc.³³ — which indicate that the removal of the body, undoubtedly ritualized, was a first and minimal procedure involved in carrying out a monastic funeral or a funeral of any kind. It would appear, however, that the compilers of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* did not consider this minimum procedure to be necessarily sufficient. After the passage cited above the second in the series immediately follows:

II. *śrāvastīyam nidānam. tena khalu samayenānyatamo bhikṣuḥ kālagataḥ. bhikṣavas tam abhinirhr̥tya evam eva śmaśāne chorayitvā vihāram āgataḥ. civara-bhājakas tasya layanam pravīṣṭaḥ pātracivaram bhājayāmiti. so 'manuṣyakeṣūpapannah; laguḍam ādāyōṭhitāḥ sa kathayati: yāvan mama śarīrapūjām-kurutha tāvat pātracivaram bhājayatheti (re zhiḡ kho bo'i ro la mchod pa yang ma byas par chos gos dang lung bzed 'ged par byed dam zhes).*

etat prakaranam bhikṣavo bhagavata ārocayanti.

bhagavān āha: bhikṣubhis tasya pūrvam śarīrapūjā kartavyeti. tataḥ paścāt pātracivaram bhājayitavyam. eṣa ādinavo [na] bhaviṣyatīti (nges dmigs 'dir mi 'gyur ro, supporting Dutt's [na])³⁴

II. The setting was in Śrāvastī. On that occasion a certain monk died. The monks, having performed the removal of that one’s body, having simply thrown it into the burning ground, returned to the vihāra. The distributor-of-ropes entered his (— the dead monk’s —) cell saying “I distribute the bowl and robe”. He (— the dead monk —) was reborn among the non-human beings. Wielding a club he appeared (in his cell) and said: “When you perform the worship of the body for me, (only) then do you distribute (my) bowl and robe” (Tibetan: “How could one who had not even performed the worshipping of my body effect a distribution of (my) robe and bowl?”)

The monks asked the Blessed One concerning this matter.

The Blessed One said: “By the monks the worship of the body for him (— the deceased monk —) is first to be performed. After that (his) bowl and robe are to be distributed. This will (otherwise) be a danger (Tibetan: There would not be in this case a calamity/fault)”.

This second text, while indicating that the first procedure was still required, indicates as well that it might not prove sufficient, and provides separate legislation for what appears to have been considered a second necessary component of a *Mūlasarvāstivādin* monastic

funeral. This procedure is called here — and in a considerable number of other places — *śarīra-pūjā*. And this is a term which, although widely cited, has generally not been carefully studied and has, perhaps, been very badly misunderstood. It has very commonly been taken to refer to the worship of relics, but I have recently tried to demonstrate that *śarīra-pūjā* — whatever it involved — took place after the body had been removed and taken to the cremation ground, but before it was cremated, before there could have been anything like what we call relics”, and that it is “fairly certain that *śarīra-pūjā* involved the ritual handling or treatment of the body prior to cremation . . .”³⁵ Not surprisingly this second text played a part in that attempted demonstration: it, perhaps better than any other passage, points towards what *śarīra-pūjā* involved by clearly stating what its opposite was. *Śarīra-pūjā* is presented in our passage as the opposite of, and correct alternative for, ‘having simply thrown the body into the burning ground’, or unceremoniously dumping it. That this alternative involved what we understand by the term “worship” seems unlikely, and from this point of view at least “worship of the body” is undoubtedly not a very good translation of *śarīra-pūjā*. I have retained it only to maintain some consistency with the way in which the term *pūjā* is generally rendered.³⁶ The Pāli sources here offer little aid. In fact the term *śarīra-pūjā*, although found throughout Mūlasarvāstivāda literature, is curiously uncommon in Pāli canonical literature outside of the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* where it is not impossible that it — like several other lexical items there — may represent a borrowing from continental Sanskrit sources.³⁷ Although it also is not common, a Pāli parallel expression may be had in the term *sarīra-kicca*, but it too lacks a precise definition, being defined only as “the duties of the body, i.e. funeral rites”.³⁸

We have, then, in these two texts the legislation of two distinct funereal procedures which appear to have been considered necessary to keep angry ghosts at bay and allow the distribution of a dead monk’s property to go forward unobstructed. These same two procedures, however, are by no means exclusive to a dead monk’s funeral. They are also components of, for example, the funerals of the Kings Aśoka (. . . *śibikābhir nirharitvā śarīrapūjāṃ kṛtvā*) and Prasenajit (. . . *dur khrod du skyol cig . . . ’di’i khog pa la mchod pa lhag par bya*

ba),³⁹ and therefore do not specifically define a monastic funeral. Something more would appear to be required, and this is precisely what we find in the third and final text of this series:

III. *śrāvastīyāṃ nidānam. tena khalu samayenānyatamo bhikṣur glāno layane kālatah. sa bhikṣur ādahanam nītvā śarīrapūjāṃ kṛtvā dagdhaḥ. tato vihāram āgataḥ* [but ms: *āgataḥ. cīvarabhājakas tasya layanam pravīṣṭaḥ. sa laguḍam ādāyotthitah, tat tāvan* / but ms. clearly *na tāvan*, in this instance agreeing with Tibetan] *mām uddīśya dharmāśravaṇam anuprayacchatha tāvac cīvarakāṇi bhājayatheti* (*re zhig bdag gi ched du chos bsgrags pa ma byas par chos gos mams ’ged par byed dam*).

etat prakaranam bhikṣavo bhagavata ārocayanti.

bhagavān āha: tam uddīśya dharmāśravaṇam dattvā dakṣiṇām uddīśya paścāc cīvarakāṇi bhājayitavyānīti (*de’i ched du chos bsgrags pa dang / de’i ched du yon bsngo ba byas nas chos gos rnam bgo bar bya’o*).⁴⁰

III. The setting was in Śrāvastī. On that occasion a certain monk, being sick, died in his cell. After having brought him to the burning ground, (and) having performed (for him) the worship of the body, that (deceased) monk was cremated. After that they (— the monks who had performed these procedures —) returned to the vihāra. The distributor-of-ropes entered that (dead monk’s) cell. He (— the dead monk —) appeared wielding a club, saying “you do not yet give a recitation of the Dharma for my sake, (but only) then are you to effect a distribution of my monastic robes” (Tibetan: “How could one who had not performed a recitation of Dharma for me effect a distribution of (my) robes?”).

The monks ask the Blessed One concerning this matter.

The Blessed One said: “Having given a recitation of Dharma in his (— the deceased’s —) name, having directed the reward (to him), after that his monastic robes are to be distributed”.

In this third and final text of the series the monks, although they have performed the removal of the body, and although they have performed as well the worship of the body, are still confronted by the belligerent ghost. He still has not relinquished ownership rights to his property. For that to happen one further — and by implication final — procedure appears to be required. This procedure is the most distinctively Buddhist of those so far met and appears to be particularly — perhaps exclusively — associated with monastic funerals. Although, as we have seen, both the ‘removal’ and ‘the worship of the body’ occur in the descriptions of the funerals of the Kings Prasenajit and Aśoka, there is no reference in either account to a ‘recitation of Dharma’ having been made for their sake or a transfer of the resulting merit to their account. This stands in clear contrast with what we often find in the accounts of funerals performed for monks or nuns. In the latter

accounts there is not infrequently reference either to a recitation of Dharma, or to the transfer of merit, or both.⁴¹ The recitation and transfer of merit are the last and apparently sufficient elements of a monastic funeral that are separately legislated here. They appear to achieve the definitive separation of the deceased monk from his property and allow the distribution of that property to go forward unencumbered. It is important to note that the monks who participate in the funeral generate the merit by giving a recitation of the Dharma, and it is the monks who assign the merit to the deceased. This appears to be a straightforward case of religious merit being transferred or assigned to one that did not produce it.⁴² This straightforward transfer of merit is in fact characteristic of many parts of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, and this *Vinaya* contains as well numerous indications of its compilers' concerns with making such transfers to several categories of the dead.⁴³ There is, however, more here.

It is, of course, not simply the merit itself which allows the distribution of a dead monk's property to go forward. It is perhaps more the proper and complete performance of his funeral by the monks in attendance. The distribution, therefore, would appear to turn on two points: one, before the property is unencumbered, before any distribution can take place, a set of ritual procedures must be performed or a set of ritual obligations owed to the deceased must be met; two, those who participate in these rituals or in meeting these obligations are — as the account of Upananda's estate makes clear — precisely the same individuals who have a first and prior claim on the estate ("who, when the gong for the dead is being beaten, comes — to him something is to be given"; etc.). It is, moreover, almost certainly not accidental that the monks who perform or participate in the dead monk's funeral are the monks who have the first rights and opportunities to receive or 'inherit' the deceased's property. In fact such an arrangement would appear to suggest that — at least — these Buddhist monastic regulations governing the distribution of a dead monk's property were framed to conform to, or be in harmony with, classical Hindu laws or Dharmaśāstric conventions governing inheritance. In his *History of Dharmaśāstra* Kane says, for example, that "there was a close connection between taking the estate of a man and performing the rites after death up to the 10th day", and "that it was obligatory on everyone

who took the estate of another . . . to arrange for the rites after death and śrāddha".⁴⁴ The *Baudhāyana-Pitrmedha-sūtra* says that "proper cremation-rites" should be performed not only for one's mother, father, preceptor, etc., but also for any "person who leaves inheritance for one whether he belongs to one's gotra or not".⁴⁵ This congruency between Buddhist monastic rule and "Hindu Law" is not only interesting,⁴⁶ it is also in striking contrast with the apparent lack of congruency between the same *Vinaya* rule and formal Buddhist doctrine.

There can be little question that the promulgation of this set of rules is based on a belief in an individual "personality" that survives after death. That "personality", moreover, was thought to retain an active interest in, and ownership rights to, his former possessions. The claims of that "person" had to be compensated before any distribution of those possessions could take place. This belief — it is important to keep in mind — was assumed and articulated by monks in a code of behavior meant to govern monks. It is not part of some ill-defined "lay" or "popular" Buddhism. It is an element of official monastic Buddhism, and precisely for that reason its seemingly total lack of congruency with the supposedly fundamental Buddhist doctrine of the absence of a permanent self is even more striking. In speaking of the "traditional Buddhism" of the rural highlands of modern Sri Lanka, Richard Gombrich has said that

though the doctrine of *anatta* can be salvaged by the claim that the personality continuing through a series of births has as much reality as the personality within one life, *prārthanā* for happy rebirths and the transfer of merit to dead relatives show that the *anatta* doctrine has no more affective immediacy with regard to the next life than with regard to this, and that belief in personal survival after death is a fundamental feature of Sinhalese Buddhism in practice.⁴⁷

The set of rules governing monastic funerals and inheritance that we have been looking at suggests the very real possibility that there is nothing new in the modern Sri Lankan case. It suggests as well the distinct possibility that purportedly "fundamental" Buddhist doctrine may not only have had little influence on lay Buddhist behavior, it may as well have had equally little influence on even highly "educated" literate monks.⁴⁸ The implications of this possibility are, of course, far reaching, and there are some equally interesting implications for our understanding of monastic Buddhism in a second promulgation of rules

concerning monastic funerals which occurs in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*.

Unlike the set of rules for monastic funerals that occur in the *Cīvara-vastu*, the second promulgation, perhaps because it is preserved as well in Chinese, has been referred to several times in the scholarly literature. In fact, apart from short or incidental references we also have several paraphrases or summaries of the text — the earliest, perhaps, by Rockhill, based on the Tibetan;⁴⁹ the fullest, based on the Chinese, by de la Vallée Poussin;⁵⁰ and the most recent, again based on the Chinese, by Anna Seidel.⁵¹ None of these paraphrases or summaries is, however, entirely satisfactory from at least one point of view. This text — which is preserved in Tibetan in the *Vinaya-kṣudraka-vastu* — does not link the proper performance of a monastic funeral with the distribution of a deceased monk's property as do the texts preserved in the *Cīvara-vastu*. The text in the *Kṣudraka-vastu* is, rather, preoccupied with yet another problem which the death of a local monk would have raised for a Buddhist community. Unlike the *Cīvara-vastu* texts which appear to respond to the kind of problems which such a death would occasion within the group — to what might be called internal problems — the text in the *Kṣudraka-vastu* appears to have been intended to respond to the kind of problems that such a death could occasion between that group and the larger world that surrounded it and on which it was almost entirely dependent. These external problems are most fully articulated not so much in the rules themselves but in the frame-story which accounts for their promulgation, and it is this frame-story which has suffered the most in the paraphrases. As a consequence there are good reasons for citing here the Tibetan text as a whole. The text I cite is based on the three Kanjurs available to me: the Derge, Peking, and Tog Palace.⁵²

sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das mnyan yod na rgyal bu rgyal byed kyi tshal mgon med zas sbyin gyi kun dga' ra ba na' bzhugs so /

mnyan yod na khyim bdag cig² gnas pa des rigs mnyam pa las chung ma blangs te / de de dang lhan cig ces bya ba nas / bu pho zhig³ btas te de³ btas⁴ pa'i btas ston zhag bdun gsum nyi shu gcig tu rgya cher byas nas rigs dang mihun⁵ pa'i ming btags te bsrings bskyed⁶ nas chen por gyur to zhes bya ba'i bar snga ma bzhin no /

ji tsam dus gghan zhig na legs par gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la rab tu byung ba dang / de'i kham ma⁷ mnyam nas na bar gyur te / de rtsa ba dang / sdong bu dang / me tog dang / 'bras bu'i sman dag gis rim gro byas na ma phan te dus las 'das so /

de dge slong dag gis lhung bzed dang bcas / chos gos dang bcas par⁸ lam dang nye bu zhig tu bor ro /

ji tsam na lam de nas bram ze dang khyim bdag 'gro ba de⁹ dag gis de mthong ste / de ni¹⁰ kha cig gis smras pa / shes¹¹ ldan dag sākya'i bu¹² zhig dus las 'das so / gghan dag gis smras pa / tshur sheg¹³ blta bar bya'o / ¹⁴de dag gis mthong nas ngo shes te de dag gis smras pa / shes ldan dag 'di ni khyim bdag che ge mo'i bu yin te / dge sbyong sākya'i bu pa mgon med pa nmams kyi nang du rab tu byung bas gnas skabs 'di 'dra bar gyur to / 'di dag gi nang du rab tu byung bar ma gyur na de¹⁵ nye du dag gis 'di rim gro byas par 'gyur ba zhig /

skabs de bcom ldan 'das la dge slong dag gis gsol ba dang / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / dge slong dag de lta bas na gngang gis dge slong shi ba'i rim gro bya'o / bcom ldan 'das kyis dge slong shi ba'i rim gro bya'o zhes gsungs¹⁶ pa dang / dge slong dag ji ltar rim gro bya ba mi shes nas / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / bsreg¹⁷ bar bya'o /

bcom ldan 'das kyis bsreg par bya'o zhes gsungs pa dang / bcom ldan 'das la tshe dang ldan pa nye ba 'khor gyis zhus pa / bisun pa bcom ldan 'das kyis lus 'di la srin bu'i rigs brgyad khri yod do zhes gang gsungs pa de dag ji lta bu lags / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / nye ba¹⁸ 'khor de skyes¹⁹ ma thag tu de dag kyang skye la / shi ba'i tshe de dag kyang 'chi mod kyi 'on kyang rma'i sgo nmams su brtags te bsreg par bya'o /

bcom ldan 'das kyis bsreg par bya'o zhes gsungs ba dang / shing ma 'byor nas skabs de bcom ldan 'das la dge slong dag gis gsol ba dang / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / chu klung dag tu dor bar bya'o / chu klung med nas bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / sa brkos te gzhug par bya'o / dbyar kha sa yang 'thas la shing yang srog chags can du gyur nas / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / thibs po'i phyogs su mgo byang phyogs su bstan te sngas su rtsva²¹ bam po bzhag la glo g-yas pas bsnyal te rtsva²² 'am lo ma'i ishogs kyis²³ g-yogs la yon bsngo zhing rgyun²⁴ chags gsum gyi chos mnyan pa byin nas 'dong bar bya'o /

dge slong dag de bzhin du dong ba dang / bram ze dang khyim bdag dag sākya'i bu'i dge sbyong nmams ni ro bskyal nas khru mi byed par de bzhin 'dong ste gtsang sbra med do / zhes 'phya bar byed nas / skabs de bcom ldan 'das la dge slong dag gis gsol ba dang / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / de bzhin du 'dong bar mi bya'i 'on kyang khru bya'o / de dag thams cad bkru bar brtsams pa dang / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / thams cad krus mi bya'i gang dag reg pa de dag gis gos dang bcas te bkru bar bya'o / gghan dag gis ni rkang lag nyi tshe bkru bar bya'o /

de dag mchod ren la phyag mi 'tshal nas / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa mchod ren²⁵ la phyag 'tshal bar bya'o

NOTES

- ¹ P omits na. ² P gcig. ³ P omits btas te de. ⁴ P bcas. ⁵ P 'thun. ⁶ P bskyad. ⁷ T mi. ⁸ P bad. ⁹ P da. ¹⁰ T na. ¹¹ P shas. ¹² T adds pa after bu. ¹³ T shog. ¹⁴ T has an additional de before de dag gis. ¹⁵ T omits de. ¹⁶ P gsangs. ¹⁷ P bsregs. ¹⁸ P, T bar; the name is commonly spelled nye bar 'khor. ¹⁹ T skyed. ²⁰ P gsung. ²¹ P rtsa'i. ²² P rca. ²³ P kyas. ²⁴ P, T rgyud. ²⁵ P, T both add dag after ren.

The Buddha, the Blessed One, dwelt in Śrāvastī, in Prince Jeta's grove, in the park of Anāthapiṇḍada.

In Śrāvastī there was a certain householder. He took a wife from a family of equal standing and, having laid with her, a son was born. Having performed in detail for three times seven, or twenty-one, days the birth ceremonies for the new born son, he was given a name corresponding to his gotra (*trīṇi saptakāni ekaviṃśatīdivasāni vistareṇa jātasya jātimahaṃ kṛtvā; gotrānurūpaṃ nāmadheyaṃ vyavasthāpitam*).⁵³ His upbringing, to his maturity, was as before.⁵⁴

When, at another time, he (— the householder's son —)⁵⁵ had entered (the Order of this) well-spoken Dharma and Vinaya, his bodily humors having become unbalanced, he fell ill. Though he was attended with medicines made from roots and stalks and flowers and fruits, it was of no use and he died (*sa . . . mūlagandapatra- puṣpaphalabhaiṣajyair upasthīyamāno na svasthībhavati . . . sa ca kālagataḥ*).⁵⁶

The monks left him (i.e. his body), together with his robe and bowl, near a road. Later, Brahmins and householders who were out walking saw him from the road. One said, referring to him: "Good Sirs, a Buddhist monk (*śākyaputra*) has died". Others said: "Come here! look at this!" When they looked they recognized the dead monk and said: "Good Sirs, this is the son of such and such a householder. This is the sort of thing that happens when someone joins the order of those lordless Buddhist śramaṇas. Had he not joined their order his kinsmen would have performed the funeral ceremonies for him".⁵⁷

The monks reported this matter to the Blessed One, and the Blessed One said: "Now then, monks, with my authorization, funeral ceremonies for a (deceased) monk are to be performed" ("Bhikṣus, il faut rendre les derniers devoirs au cadavre").⁵⁸ Although it was said by the Blessed One "funeral ceremonies for a deceased monk are to be performed", because the monks did not know how they should be performed, the Blessed One said: "(A deceased monk) is to be cremated".

Although the Blessed One said: "(A deceased monk) should be cremated", the Venerable Upāli asked the Blessed One: "Is that which was said by the Reverend Blessed One — that there are 80,000 kinds of worms in the human body — not so?" The Blessed One said: "Upāli, as soon as a man is born, those worms are also born, so, at the moment of death, they too surely die. Still, (only) after examining the opening of any wound, is the body to be cremated" ("Quand le corps présente des ulcères, on doit voir s'il n'y a pas d'animaux, et alors le brûler". "Si le cadavre a des plaies, on ne peut le brûler qu'après avoir vérifié s'il n'y a pas de vers").⁵⁹

Although the Blessed One said (a deceased monk) is to be cremated, when wood was not at hand the monks asked the Blessed One concerning this matter, and the Blessed One said: "The body is to be thrown into rivers". When there is no river, the Blessed One said: "Having dug a grave, it is to be buried". When it is summer and both the earth is hard and the wood is full of living things ("En été, la terre est humide et fourmille d'animaux"; "[et] en été, [quand] la terre est humide et fourmille de vers et d'insectes?"),⁶⁰ the Blessed One said: "In an isolated spot, with its head pointing North, having put down a bundle of grass as a bolster, having laid the corpse on its right side, having covered it with bunches of grass or leaves, having directed the reward (to the deceased),⁶¹ and having given a recitation of the Dharma of the *Tridandaka*, the monks are to disperse".⁶²

The monks dispersed accordingly. But then Brahmins and householders derided

them saying: "Buddhist śramaṇas, after carrying away a corpse, do not bathe and yet disperse like that. They are polluted." The monks asked the Blessed One concerning this matter, and the Blessed One said: "Monks should not disperse in that manner, but should bathe". They all started to bathe, but the Blessed One said: "Everyone need not bathe. Those who came in contact (with the corpse) must wash themselves together with their robes. Others need only wash their hands and feet".

When the monks did not worship the stūpa, the Blessed One said: "The stūpa (v.l. stūpas) is to be worshipped" ("Rentrés au couvent, ils ne vénéraient pas le *caitya*. Le Bouddha dit: 'Il faut vénérer le *caitya*'").⁶³

Anyone who has read even a little *Vinaya* will immediately recognize this promulgation of rules as yet another instance — though perhaps a particularly striking one — of the preoccupation of the compilers of these codes with avoiding social censure. This preoccupation — which not infrequently appears obsessive — has been described in a number of ways. I. B. Horner has said, for example, in referring to the Pāli *Vinaya*:

For the believing laity, though naturally not to the forefront in the Vinaya, are in a remarkable way never absent, never far distant . . . thus the Vinaya does not merely lay down sets of rules whose province was confined to an internal conventual life. For this was led in such a way as to allow and even to encourage a certain degree of intercommunication with the lay supporters and followers, no less than with those laypeople who were not adherents of the faith. What was important, was that the monks should neither abuse their dependence on the former, nor alienate the latter, but should so regulate their lives as to give no cause for complaint. With these aims in view, conduct that was not thought seemly for them to indulge in had to be carefully defined; and it became drafted in rule and percept.⁶⁴

Elsewhere Horner again says: "It must be remembered that it was considered highly important to propitiate these [lay followers], to court their admiration, to keep their allegiance, to do nothing to annoy them".⁶⁵ But she also raises another point which may be germane to our *Ksudraka-vastu* passage and — when seen in a certain light — only underscores the curious absence of such a passage in the Pāli *Vinaya*. She says: "We cannot tell with any degree of accuracy the historical order in which the rules [in the *Vinaya*] were formulated", but she notes too that "it is, however, more likely that the majority of the rules grew up gradually, as need arose, and are the outcome of historical developments that went on within the Order".⁶⁶

Miss Horner's observations concerning the monastic sensitivity to lay values are important for a full understanding of our passage

because there can hardly be a doubt that this passage — and the rules promulgated there — concern two related topics on which any even partially brahmanized social groups would have been acutely sensitive: death and pollution. Professor Malamoud has not only said that “le rituel funéraire est le *saṃskāra* par excellence”, but has noted as well that “les injonctions, les instructions techniques et les justifications théologiques qui traitent de la manière dont les vivants doivent se comporter à l’égard des morts forment une part considérable de la littérature normative de l’Inde brâhmanique (hymnes védiques, Brâhmaṇa, Kalpasūtra, Dharmasūtra et Dharmasāstra). Le rituel funéraire . . . frappe par sa richesse, sa complexité, sa cohérence”. “Le service des morts,” he says, “l’institution des morts pèsent d’un poids très lourd dans la vie des Indiens qui se rattachent en quelque manière au brâhmanisme”.⁶⁷ Much the same, of course, has been said of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’. “Normative literature”, says Dumont, “the literature of the *dharma* or religious law, has purification (*śuddhi*) as one of its main themes, the impurity resulting from birth and death being specially designated *āśauca* . . . Family impurity is the most important: it is that of birth (*sūtaka*) and above all death”.⁶⁸

As the sources cited especially by Malamoud would indicate, the brahmanical preoccupation with the proper ritual treatment of the dead was not only broad but very old. It would presumably have informed and presumably have framed the attitudes of any brahmanical or brahmanized community that Buddhist monastic groups came into contact with, and such contact must have been early and frequent at least in the middle Gangetic plains — the area including Śrāvastī, Kauśāmbī, Rājagṛha, Vaiśālī, etc. Any disregard of such set attitudes in the surrounding population, especially of those touching on the treatment of the dead and pollution, would have opened the Buddhist monastic community to immediate criticism and opprobrium. Such criticism would have been especially strong if the case involved a deceased individual who had originally been a member of the local group, an individual whose history and birth were widely known. The compiler of our *Kṣudraka-vaṣṭu* passage seems, in fact, to have encountered or envisioned just such a situation. He seems to have taken some pains to clearly indicate that the deceased monk had been born from a perfectly regular, normatively sanctioned marriage; that

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the full complement of normative birth rituals had been performed for him; that he had been named according to his *gotra*. The proper performance of ritual that accompanied his birth, however, only provides a stronger contrast for the initial total disregard of normative procedures in regard to his death on the part of the Buddhist monastic community. The response such disregard is said to have provoked seems entirely believable — even the language seems particularly appropriate here: “Come here! Look at this! . . . This is the sort of thing that happens when someone joins the order of those lordless Buddhist śramaṇas”. Such behavior would most certainly have ‘alienated’ “those lay-people who were not adherents of the faith”, and almost certainly would not have been long tolerated by either that group or — importantly — the Buddhist community that had to interact with and depend on it. In fact, unless the extent and depth of brahmanical attitudes among actual communities have been badly overestimated — and this is not impossible — it is almost inconceivable that such blatant disregard of established custom and local feeling would not have been immediately checked and regulated “in rule and precept”. But this would in turn suggest that such rules, regardless of where they now occur, would probably have been in place very early on, and would suggest that a *Vinaya* which — like the Pāli *Vinaya* — did not contain such rules would have been poorly equipped to deal with monastic communities in close contact with brahmanical societies. The first of these suggestions has historical implications: it may be that this set of rules — like much else in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* — is very old indeed;⁶⁹ the second may underscore the importance of geography for understanding the various monastic codes: a monastic code framed in a predominantly brahmanical area would almost certainly — regardless of chronological considerations — contain rules and sets of rules which may differ from or not be included in codes that were redacted in, or meant for, communities in, say, predominantly “tribal” areas. Local or regional standards may have determined a good deal.

But if this second promulgation of rules concerning the local monastic dead in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* was, unlike the first, intended to respond to a particularly sensitive concern of the larger social group with which Buddhist monastic communities had to

interact, and from which they drew recruits and economic support, still the funereal procedures which it prescribed were essentially similar to those of the first promulgation. Formal removal of the body — *abhinirhāra* — though not explicitly mentioned in the rules, is taken for granted throughout: the body is not to be casually dumped by the road side; there is clear reference to the monks having carried away the corpse (*śākya'i bu'i dge sbyong rnam ni ro bskyal nas*) in the remarks of the brahmins and householders concerning monks not having washed. Although the term *śarīra-pūjā / ro la mchod pa* is not explicitly used, *rim gro bya ba* — which generally translates some form of *sat/kr* — is contextually clearly its equivalent here: whereas in *Cīvara-vastu* II *śarīra-pūjā* is the prescribed alternative to simply dumping the body in the burning ground, *satkāra* here is the prescribed alternative to throwing it unceremoniously alongside the road.⁷⁰ The *Kṣudraka-vastu* passage differs, to be sure, in stipulating certain contingencies when alternative means of disposal could be used, but in doing so it only emphasizes the fact that the first choice in normal circumstances was cremation. The two related elements in the *Cīvara-vastu* monastic funeral which appear to be both most peculiarly Buddhist and, perhaps, restricted to funerals for monks — the recitation of Dharma and the transfer of merit — are also both explicitly mentioned and taken for granted. Although only actually mentioned after the last of the series of alternative means of disposal, it seems fairly certain that it was to be understood that both the recitation and the transfer of merit were to follow whichever alternative was undertaken.⁷¹

We have, then, in these passages from the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* that we have looked quickly at two sets of similar and mutually supplementary rules meant to govern a monastic funeral. They establish — contrary to the old and established conventional wisdom — that Buddhist *Vinaya* texts are by no means “nearly altogether silent as to the last honours of deceased monks”, and they point to yet another concern in regard to which the Pāli *Vinaya* as we have it appears to be markedly deficient and possibly unrepresentative. They also — together with various narrative accounts scattered throughout *Mūlasarvāstivādin* literature — allow us to reconstruct the complete outline of a *Mūlasarvāstivādin* monastic funeral, from the tolling of the

bell to the post-funeral bath, and they indicate that the laity was allowed no place in these procedures, that the funeral of a local monk was an exclusively monastic affair, participation being limited to monks and monks alone.⁷² Even more than this, they allow us entrée into the ‘mentality’ and concerns of the *Vinaya* masters that framed this code. They allow us to see learned monks and *Vinaya* authorities framing rules which were intended to avoid ghosts⁷³ and occupied with the problems of inheritance and estates; monks concerned with carefully regulating behavior to avoid social censure, and monks — perhaps most importantly — that appear to have been influenced and motivated as much by Indian mores, beliefs, and ‘legal’ conventions, as by specifically Buddhist doctrines. They allow us to see, in short, a Buddhist monk who is far more human, and far more Indian, than the monk we usually meet in the works of Western scholarship.⁷⁴

TEXTUAL SOURCES CITED & ABBREVIATIONS

- ACF = *Annuaire du collège de France*
 Aṅguttara = R. Morris & E. Hardy, eds., *The Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, Vols. 1–5 (London: 1885–1900) — cited by volume number & page.
 Avadānaśataka = J. S. Speyer, ed., *Avadānaśataka. A Century of Edifying Tales belonging to the Hīnayāna* (Bibliotheca Buddhica, III) Vols. 1–2 (St.-Petersbourg: 1906–9) — cited by volume, page & line.
 BEFEO = *Bulletin de l'école française d'extrême-orient*
 Derge = *The Sde-dge Mtshal-par Bka'-gyur, A Facsimile Edition of the 18th Century Redaction of Si-Tu Chos-kyi-'byuñ-gnas Prepared under the Direction of H. H. the 16th Rgyal-dbari Karma-pa*, Vols. 1–103 (Delhi: 1976ff) — cited by volume, ‘folio’ number in the facsimile (not by original pagination), & line.
 Divyāvadāna = P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Divyāvadāna* (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 20) (Darbhanga: 1959) — by page & line.
 Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts = R. Vira & L. Chandra, eds., *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile Edition)*, Part 6 (Śata-Pitaka Series 10 (6)) (New Delhi: 1974) — by volume number, ‘folio’ number assigned in the facsimile, & line.
 Gilgit Manuscripts = N. Dutt, ed., *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Part 1 (Srinagar: 1947); Vol. III, Part 2 (Srinagar: 1942); Vol. III, Part 3 (Srinagar: 1943); Vol. III, Part 4 (Calcutta: 1950) — cited by volume, part, page & line.
 HJAS = *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*
 IBK = *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū*
 IHQ = *Indian Historical Quarterly*
 JA = *Journal asiatique*
 JAOS = *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
 JIABS = *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*

- JOIB = *Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda*
Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra = E. Waldschmidt, ed., *Das Mahāparinirvānasūtra. Text in Sanskrit und Tibetisch, verglichen mit dem Pāli nebst einer Übersetzung der chinesischen Entsprechung im Vinaya der Mūlasarvāstivādins*, Teil I (Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse. Jahrgang 1949 nr. 1) (Berlin: 1950); Teil II (Abhandlungen . . . zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst, Jahrgang 1950 nr. 2) (Berlin: 1951); Teil III (Abhandlungen . . . und Kunst, Jahrgang 1950 nr. 3) (Berlin: 1951) — cited according to the "Vorgänge" and section numbers imposed on his restored text by Waldschmidt.
- Pāli Vinaya* = H. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakam. One of the Principal Buddhist Holy Scriptures in the Pāli Language*, Vols. 1–5 (London: 1879–1885) — cited by volume, page & line.
- Peking* = D. T. Suzuki, ed., *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Reprinted under the Supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto*, Vols. 1–169 (Tokyo/Kyoto: 1955–61) — cited by volume, page, 'folio' & line.
- Pravrajyā-vastu* = C. Vogel & K. Wille, eds., *Some Hitherto Unidentified Fragments of the Pravrajyāvastu Portion of the Vinayavastu Manuscript found near Gilgit* (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen I. Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1984, nr. 7) (Göttingen: 1984) — cited by page or folio number & line.
- Rab tu 'byuñ ba'i gzi* = H. Eimer, ed., *Rab tu 'byuñ ba'i gzi. Die tibetische Übersetzung des Pravrajyāvastu im Vinaya der Mūlasarvāstivādins*, Teil 1–2 (Asiatische Forschungen, Bd. 82) (Wiesbaden: 1983) — cited by volume, page & line.
- Saṅghabheda-vastu* = R. Gnoli, ed., *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu. Being the 17th and Last Section of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin*, Parts I–II (Serie Orientale Roma, XLIX, 1–2) (Roma: 1977–78) — cited by volume, page & line.
- Sayanāsana & Adhikarana-vastus* = R. Gnoli, ed., *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Sayanāsana-vastu and the Adhikaranavastu. Being the 15th and 16th Sections of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin* (Serie Orientale Roma, L) (Roma: 1978) — cited by page & line.
- Tog* = *The Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur*, Vols. 1–109 (Leh: 1975–80) — cited by volume, 'folio' number assigned in the reprint (not by original pagination) & line.
- TP = *T'oung Pao*
- Udāna* = P. Steinthal, *Udāna* (London: 1885) — cited by page & line.

NOTES

- ¹ H. Oldenberg, *Buddha. Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde* (Berlin: 1881) 384 n; H. Oldenberg, *Buddha. His Life, His Doctrine, His Order*, trans. W. Hoey (London: 1882) 376 n.
- ² T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Suttas* (Sacred Books of the East, XI) (Oxford: 1900) xlv–xlv. — In light of the references by both Oldenberg and Rhys Davids to the Vinaya, it is worth noting that there is good evidence for suggesting that the

Mahāparinibbāna-sutta — which contains, of course, elaborate rules for funerals — was originally a part of the Pāli *Vinaya*; see L. Finot, "Textes historiques dans le canon pāli", *JA* (1932) 158; Finot, "Mahāparinibbāna-sutta and Cullavagga", *IHQ* 8 (1932) 241–46; E. Obermiller, "The Account of the Buddha's Nirvāna and the First Councils according to the Vinaya-sūtra", *IHQ* 8 (1932) 781–84; E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature* (Serie Orientale Roma 8) (Roma: 1956) 42 ff. There are as well indications that when read as a piece of Vinaya, a number of puzzling elements in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* begin to make much better sense; see below notes 46 and 72.

³ For a discussion of the differential treatment of archeological/epigraphical and textual sources see G. Schopen, "Archæology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism", *History of Religions* 31 (1991) 1–23. One might suspect, moreover, that the inclination to locate Buddhism in canonical texts has had an inhibiting influence even on anthropological investigations. C. F. Keyes, for example, says — quoting Rhys Davids: "Because both men [i.e. two modern Thai "Saints"] were considered to be Buddhist saints, their deaths were interpreted in terms of Buddhist ideas about death and its aftermath. *There is really only one source for these ideas*, particularly since nothing is said in the Vinaya, the discipline incumbent upon monks, about the disposal of the corpses of members of the Sangha (Rhys Davids: xlv); and that is in the account of the death of the Buddha himself as given in the *Mahāparinibbāna sutta*" (C. F. Keyes, "Death of Two Buddhist Saints in Thailand", in *Charisma and Sacred Biography* (JAAR Thematic Studies XLVIII/3 and 4) 154; my emphasis). This seeming restriction of "Buddhist ideas" to canonical texts appears especially odd coming from an anthropologist. In fact Keyes himself has done perhaps more than anyone else writing on South East Asia to show that "Buddhist ideas about death" can come from a variety of sources: C. F. Keyes, "Tug-of-war for Merit: Cremation of a Senior Monk", *Journal of the Siam Society* 63.1–2 (1975) 44–62; P. K. Anusaranaśānanakiarti & C. F. Keyes, "Funerary Rites and the Buddhist Meaning of Death: An Interpretative Text for Northern Thailand", *Journal of the Siam Society* 68.1 (1980) 1–28; cf. S. J. Tambiah, "The Ideology of Merit and the Social Correlates of Buddhism in a Thai Village", in *Dialectic in Practical Religion*, ed. E. R. Leach (Cambridge: 1968) 41–121; esp. 88–99; etc. Significantly, there has been — in so far as I know — no work done on monastic funerals, and little on the disposal of the dead in general, in Sri Lanka, for example, in spite of the fact that we have a reasonably detailed description of a monastic funeral which took place there in the 5th century (Fa-hsien, *A Record of the Buddhist Countries*, trans. Li Yung-hsi (Peking: 1957) 83–84. (For some incidental references to monastic funerals in Tibet and Tibetan speaking areas see T. Wylie, "Mortuary Customs at Sa-Skya, Tibet", *HJAS* 25 (1964–65) 229–42; M. Brauen, "Death Customs in Ladakh", *Kailash* 9 (1982) 319–32; C. Ramble, "Status and Death: Mortuary Rites and Attitudes to the Body in a Tibetan Village", *Kailash* 9 (1982) 333–56; T. Skorupski, "The Cremation Ceremony according to the Byang-gter Tradition", *Kailash* 9 (1982) 361–76; etc.) It is, finally, worth noting that although an immense amount of work has been done on Medieval Christian monasticism relatively little has, again, been done on monastic funerals — see, however, for some interesting comparative and contrastive material, L. Gougaud, "Anciennes coutumes claustrales. La mort du moine", *Revue Mabillon* (1929) 283–302; J. Leclercq, "Documents sur la mort des moines", *Revue Mabillon*

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(1955) 165–79; (1956) 65–81; J.-L. Lemaître, “L’inscription dans les necrologes clunisiens, XI^e–XII^e siècles”, in *La mort au moyen âge. Colloque de l’association des historiens médiévistes français réunis à Strasbourg en juin 1975 au palais universitaire* (Strasbourg: 1977) 153–67; J.-L. Lemaître, “La mort et la commémoration des défunts dans les prieurés”, in *Prieurs et prieurés dans l’occident médiéval*, ed. J.-L. Lemaître (Genève: 1987) 181–190; L. Gougaud, *Dévotions et pratiques ascétiques du moyen âge* (Paris: 1925) 129–42 (“Mourir sous le froc”); etc.

⁴ For a preliminary survey and discussion of this evidence see G. Schopen, “An Old Inscription from Amarāvati and the Cult of the Local Monastic Dead in Indian Buddhist Monasteries”, *JIAS* 14.2 (1991).

⁵ K. R. Norman, “The Value of the Pāli Tradition”, *Jagajjyoti’ Buddha Jayanti Annual* (Calcutta: 1984) 1–9, esp. 4, 7; cf. K. R. Norman, “Pāli Philology and the Study of Buddhism”, *The Buddhist Heritage* (Buddhica Britannica, Series Continua I) (Tring, U.K.: 1989) 29–53; also the much earlier S. Lévi, “Observations sur une langue précanonique du bouddhisme”, *JA* (1912) 495–514, esp. 511.

⁶ A. Csoma de Körös, “Analysis of the Dulva”, *Asiatic Researches* 20 (1836) 41–93, esp. 71, 89; cf. A. Csoma de Körös, *Analyse du Kandjour*, traduite et augmentée par L. Feer (Annales du musée guimet, 2) (Lyon: 1881) 175, 192, 194.

⁷ W. W. Rockhill, *The Life of Buddha and the Early History of His Order derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkhaḥ-gyur and Bstan-gyur* (London: 1884) 112, 116, 150, etc.

⁸ P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmasāstra*, Vol. IV (Poona: 1953) 234–35. The idea that “the Vinaya” treats “all details of the daily life of the recluses” rather than simply the staggering number of areas in which there were problems is also still with us: “As the saṅgha evolved, regulations developed governing the cenobitical life. These ordinances, preserved in the Vinaya Piṭaka of the Pāli Canon, detail every aspect of the lives of monks and nuns [read: nuns] in the saṅgha”; K. G. Zysk, *Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India. Medicine in the Buddhist Monastery* (Oxford: 1991) 39. If such characterizations of the scope of “the Vinaya” are accepted, then we are stuck with an interesting irony: “. . . les Vinayapīṭaka . . . ne soufflent mot des nombreuses pratiques spirituelles, méditations, recueils, etc., qui constituaient l’essence même de la ‘religion’ bouddhique” (A. Bareau, “La construction et le culte des stūpa d’après les Vinayapīṭaka”, *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 249). To say that the Vinayas “ne soufflent mot” about such matters is too strong, but the point remains: if we had to judge by the Vinayas, we would have to conclude that “pratiques spirituelles” had little, if any, place in the daily life of monks and nuns.

⁹ See most recently A. Yuyama, *Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur*. Erster Teil. *Vinaya-Texte*, Hrsg. H. Bechert (Wiesbaden: 1979) 12–33; K. Wille, *Die Handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin* (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland. Supplementband 30) (Stuttgart: 1990).

¹⁰ Ét. Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien. des origines à l’ère śāka* (Louvain: 1958) 187, for example, refers to the Chinese translation as “médiocre et incomplète”; E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, 195 says it “is not only incomplete but also full of gaps”. “The Chinese translation”, he says, “is also much less exact than the Tibetan one”. Lévi, *JA* (1912) 509 had even earlier said: “Du Vinaya des Mūla-Sarvāstivādin, nous avons deux traductions: une en

chinois, par Yi-tsing, du type des ‘belles infidèles’; une autre en tibétain, scrupuleusement littérale”. J. W. de Jong, “Les *sūtrapīṭaka* des sarvāstivādin et des mūlasarvāstivādin”, in *Mélanges d’indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou* (Paris: 1968) 401, has, “en comparant les versions chinoise et tibétaine du Vinaya des Mūlasarvāstivādin”, argued that some of these characterizations are unjustified, that some of the omissions in I-tsing’s translation can be accounted for since “les manuscrits de Gilgit prouvent qu’il [I-tsing] a dû traduire une recension plus brève”; but see also E. Huber, “Études bouddhiques I. — Les fresques inscrites de Turfan”, *BEFEO* 14 (1914) 13–14.

¹¹ See below and n. 50.

¹² *Pāli Vinaya* i, 302 ff; I. B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline* (London: 1951) Vol. IV, 434 ff; for some discussion on the problems of inheritance and the Pāli Vinaya see U. Gaung, *A Digest of the Burmese Buddhist Law concerning Inheritance and Marriage* (Rangoon: 1908) Vol. I, 447–68; R. Lingat, “Vinaya et droit laïque. Etudes sur les conflits de la loi religieuse et de la loi laïque dans l’indochine hinayaniste”, *BEFEO* 37 (1937) 415–77; esp. 443 ff.

¹³ See J. Gernet, *Les aspects économique du bouddhisme dans la société chinoise du v^e au x^e siècle* (Paris: 1956) 61 ff — though dealing primarily with China, Gernet’s study is still probably the best thing we have on the economic structures of Indian Buddhist monasteries as they are described in texts of Indian origin.

¹⁴ *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 113–48.

¹⁵ *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 117 ff.

¹⁶ For *yogaṃ manasikāram* the Tibetan translation has only *yid la byed pa* (*Derge* 3, 204; *Tog* 3, 267; *Peking* 41, 279–5). Compare the list of activities ignored in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda* passage with the similar but divergent list found at *Pāli Vinaya* i 190 (*riñcanti uddesaṃ paripucchāṃ adhisilāṃ adhicitāṃ adhipaññaṃ* — said of monks preoccupied with making and ornamenting shoes), iii 235 (said of nuns preoccupied with washing, dyeing and combing sheep’s wool).

¹⁷ *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts* vi, fol. 848.7–9; *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 120.3–4 — Tibetan: *Derge* 3, 204; *Tog* 3, 267; *Peking* 41, 279–5.

¹⁸ Tibetan *gsoḥ ba byed pa na*, and context, both suggest that something like *jñāptyāṃ kriyamānāyām* has dropped out of the Gilgit manuscript; cf. the following note.

¹⁹ The *Civara-vastu*, the *vastu* in which this passage occurs in the Sanskrit text may not have been translated by I-tsing into Chinese (See Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, 195). Durt, however, refers to a very similar list of “five occasions” which occurs in the *Vinaya-saṃgraha* (Taisho 1458): “1° battement de gong . . . 2° récitation du Sankei Mujōkyō . . . le sūtra tripartite . . . 3° salutation profonde . . . 4° distribution de Bâtonnets . . . 5° proclamation d’une motion . . .”, (H. Durt, “Chū”, *Hōbōgirin*, cinquième fascicule (Paris/Tokyo: 1979) 437) and I-tsing certainly knew the *Civara-vastu*. At least one entire chapter of his *Record* is in fact a translation of a long passage from this *vastu*, as N. Dutt pointed out long ago (Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, x–xi) — the chapter in question is number xxxvi (see, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago by I-tsing*, trans. J. Takakusu (London: 1896) 189–93). — The failure to recognize that this chapter of the *Record* was a translation of part of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* has misled a number of scholars who have presented it as a reflection of actual monastic practice in India at the time of I-tsing’s visit — cf. Lingat,

BEFEO 37 (1937) 464; Gernet, *Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la société chinoise du v^e au x^e siècle*, 71–73; A. Bareau, "Indian and Ancient Chinese Buddhism: Institutions Analogous to the Jisa", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3 (1961) 447; A. Bareau, "Etude du bouddhisme. Aspects du bouddhisme indien décrits par I-tsing", *ACF* 1989–1990, 631–40.) The fact that the *Civara-vastu* is not now found in the *Taishō* may only indicate that it was one of I-tsing's works that was lost after his death (cf. A. Hirakawa, *Monastic Discipline for the Buddhist Nuns* (Patna: 1982) 12). For a detailed description of the procedure involved in distributing "tickets" mentioned in our passage see the article by Durt mentioned above.

²⁰ *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 120.6; *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 4, 79.13; *Avadānaśataka* i 272.1 (cf. L. Feer, *Avadāna-śataka. Cent légendes bouddhiques* (Paris: 1891) 185, who translates *mundikā gandī* by "la cloche funèbre".)

²¹ *Peking* 41, 279-5; *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 4, 79 n. 3; *Peking* 40, 184-3.

²² This is especially clear in the monastic funeral described in *Avadānaśataka* i 271 ff: *tato 'sya sabrahmacāribhir mundikām gandīm parāhatya śarīrābhinihārāḥ kṛtāḥ / tato 'sya śarīre śarīrapūjām kṛtvā vihāram āgatāḥ* / . It is almost equally clear that this *avadāna* is a narrative elaboration of the much simpler accounts in the *Civara-vastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* in which the first set of rules governing monastic funerals is presented (see below; on the 'sectarian' affiliation of the *Avadānaśataka* see J.-U. Hartmann, "Zur Frage der Schulzugehörigkeit des *Avadānaśataka*", in *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*, Hrsg. H. Bechert, Erster Teil (Göttingen: 1985) 219–24).

²³ See below n. 62.

²⁴ *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 144.14, in the account of the death of a monk who had left his bowl and robe in the keeping of others: *viśūcitāḥ kālagataḥ / sa bhikksubhīḥ śmaśānaṃ nīrvā dagdhaḥ / dharmāśravaṇaṃ dattam / anupūrveṇa vihāraḥ praviṣṭaḥ* / .

²⁵ *Derge* 10, 226.2, in an account of the funeral of Mahāprajāpatī in which the Buddha himself is given a prominent part.

²⁶ See below n. 63.

²⁷ M. Helffer, "Le gandī: un simandre tibétain d'origine indienne", *Yearbook for Traditional Music* 15 (1983) 112–25; I. Vandor, "The Gandī: A Musical Instrument of Buddhist India Recently Identified in a Tibetan Monastery", *The World of Music* 17 (1975) 24–27. (cf. S. Lévi & Éd. Chavannes, "Quelques titres énigmatiques dans la hiérarchie ecclésiastique du bouddhisme indien", *JA* (1915) 213–215.) References to the use of the *gandī* are frequent in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* — see, as a sample, *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 145, 156, 158; iii 3, 9; iii 4, 35, 36, 37, 81, 92; *Saṅghabhedavastu* ii 83; *Sāyanāsana & Adhikaraṇa-vastu* 41, 55, 85, 106; etc. It is interesting to note that striking "la tablette du cloître, . . . cette sorte de gong funèbre", also signalled the beginning of monastic funerals in Medieval Western monasteries (Gougaud, *Review mabillon* (1929) 281, 290), and its function there too marks the communal nature of the event (Lemaître, *Prieurs et prieurés dans l'occident médiéval*, 185: ". . . on sonne le claquoir (*tabula*) pour réunir les frères . . .").

²⁸ *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts* iv, fol. 852.3–5; *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 126.17–127.3 — Tibetan: *Derge* 3, 210.2–4; *Tog* 3, 275.5–276.1; *Peking* 41, 280–5–4 to 5–6.

²⁹ S. Lévi, "Les éléments de formation du *Divyāvadāna*", *TP* 8 (1907) 105–22, esp. 122 ("De ce point de vue, la langue du Mūla Sarvāstivāda Vinaya prend, par ses

étrangetés même, une importance exceptionnelle; elle montre le sanscrit de Pāṇini entraîné par la circulation de la vie réelle, en voie d'altération normale, sur les confins des *pracrits* . . ."); Gnoli, *Saṅghabhedavastu* i xx n. 2.

³⁰ Both here and in II and III below, the Tibetan translators appear to have construed the dead monk's speech as a rhetorical question. The Tibetan in fact looks like it might be translating an interrogative *mā* construction (cf. *BHSG* §§ 42.12–42.16); in III, the final text in this series cited below, the manuscript itself has a negative in the parallel construction, but it is *na not mā*.

³¹ *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 127.5 (*bhiksavas taṃ abhinirhṛtya*, of the dead body of an ordinary monk); *Pravrajyāvastu*, fol. 12r.2 (*bahir api nirhṛtya*, of the dead body of the teacher Saṃjayin); *Divyāvadāna* 281.30 (*śibikābhir nirharitvā*, of the dead body of Aśoka); *Avadānaśataka* i 272.1 (*sabrahmacāribhir . . . śarīrābhinihārāḥ kṛtāḥ*, of the body of a dead monk); *Udāna* 8.21 (*sarīrakam mañcakam āropetvā niharitvā*, of the dead body of an ascetic); *Pali Vinaya* iv 308 (*bhikkhuniyo taṃ bhikkhunim niharitvā*, of the dead body of a nun); etc. — there are, of course, other technical meanings for *abhinirhāra*; cf. M. H. F. Jayasuriya, "A Note on Pali *abhinirhāra* and Cognate Forms in the Light of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit", in *Añjali. Papers on Indology and Buddhism* (O. H. de A. Wijesekera Volume) (Peradeniya: 1970) 50–54.

³² J. Jain, *Life in Ancient India as Depicted in the Jain Canon and Commentaries. 6th Century B.C. to 17th Century A.D.*, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: 1984) 281–84; esp. 283 where *nihāraṇa* is cited as the term for "the ceremony of taking out the dead".

³³ *ādānaṃ nīrvā: Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 127.13 (*dur khrod du khyer te*; of the body of a monk); iii 2, 125.14 (*sreg tu khyer nas*; of the body of a monk); *śmaśānaṃ nīrvā: Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 144.14 (*dur khrod du bsregs nas*; of the body of a monk); *taṃ ādāya dānaṃ gatāḥ: Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 118.15 (*de khyer te sreg tu dong ngo*; of the body of a monk) — cf. *Saṅghabhedavastu* i 70; 163; *Derge* 10, 224 ff; 444; 472; *Divyāvadāna* 428; etc. It will, perhaps, be clear from even the small sample cited here that the Tibetan translations of the terms and phrases involved are neither consistent nor exact; cf. n. 38 below.

³⁴ *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts* vi, fol. 852.5–8; *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 127.4–11 — Tibetan: *Derge* 3, 210.4–6; *Tog* 3, 276.1–5; *Peking* 41, 280–5–6 to 281–1–1.

³⁵ G. Schopen, "Monks and the Relic Cult in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*: An Old Misunderstanding in Regard to Monastic Buddhism", in *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religions in Honour of Prof. Jan Yün-hua*, ed. G. Schopen & K. Shinohara (Oakville: 1991) 187–201.

³⁶ On the meaning of the term *pūjā* and the kinds and range of activities it can refer to see J. Charpentier, "The Meaning and Etymology of Pūjā", *Indian Antiquary* 56 (1927) 93–99; 130–36; L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Totémisme et Végétalisme", *Bulletin de la classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques, Académie Royale de Belgique*, 5^e série, T.XV (1929) 37–52; P. Thieme, "Indische Wörter und Sitten", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 93 (1939) 105–39; esp. 105–23; A. L. Basham, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Bodhisattva", in *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism*, ed. L. S. Kawamura (Waterloo: 1981) 19–59; esp. 35–36; G. E. Ferro-Luzzi, "Abhiṣeka, the Indian Rite that Defies Definition", *Anthropos* 76 (1981) 707–42; A. Ostor, *Puja in Society* (Lucknow: 1982); D. D. Malvania, "The Word pūjā and Its Meaning", *Indologica Taurinensia* 14 (1987–88) 269–73; etc.

³⁷ See below n. 43.

³⁸ T. W. Rhys Davids & W. Stede, *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary* (London: 1921–25) 698 s.v. *śarīra*. It is worth noting here that the handling of the term *śarīra-pūjā* by the Tibetan translators is far from satisfactory and a long way from their usual consistency. In this passage and in III cited below *śarīra-pūjā* is translated by *ro la mchod pa*, *ro la mchod pa byas la*, and *ro la mchod pa byas*; *ro* means first “dead body, corpse, carcass”, then “body”, then “residue, remains, sediment”. *Avadānāśataka* ii 272.2, however, which reads *śarīrābhīrharāḥ kṛtāḥ / tato 'sya śarīre śarīra-pūjāṃ kṛtvā* is translated *rus bu phyir phyung ngo / de nas de'i rus bu la rus bu'i mchod pa byas nas*. Here, then, where the first occurrence of *śarīra*, and almost certainly the second and third, can only mean “body”, the Tibetan translates it in all three instances by *rus bu* which can only mean “small bone” or “bones in general”. Again, especially in the first instance, *śarīra* cannot possibly mean “bone” since the context makes it certain that it refers to a newly dead “body” which has not even been removed from the monk's cell, let alone cremated. Likewise, in the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* there are several occurrences of the term *śarīra-pūjā* in passages narrating events which preceded the cremation, that is to say prior to the time that there could have been any “bones” or “relics”. At 36.2, where Ānanda asks what should be done with the body of the Buddha after his death, *śarīra-pūjāyām autsukyam āpadyemahi* is translated by *sku gdung la . . . mchod pa ji snyed cig brtson par bgyi lags* (similarly at 46.4); at 48.8, where the wandering Ājīvaka tells Mahākāśyapa that the Buddha is dead and that his body was honored for seven days, *śarīre śarīrapūjā* is translated by *sku gdung la mchod pa bgyis pa*; but at 49.19, where Kāśyapa formulates his intention to personally repeat the *śarīra-pūjā* of the Buddha's body that had already been performed by the Mallas, he says: *yan nv ahaṃ svayam eva bhagavataḥ śarīrapūjāyām autsukyam āpadyeya*, and this is translated into Tibetan by *ma la bdaḡ nyid kyis bcom ldan 'das la mchod pa'i las bya'o snyam du spro ba bskyed nas*. In other words, in the same text, *śarīra* is sometimes translated by *sku gdung*, which is the respect form of *rus* and means first of all — if not exclusively — “bone”, in contexts where there could not yet have been any “bone”; or it is sometimes not translated at all: 49.19, where the Sanskrit text has “worship of the body of the Blessed One”, the Tibetan has simply “worship of the Blessed One” himself. There are, moreover, numerous instances where we do not have the Sanskrit original, but where it was almost certainly *śarīra-pūjā*. Here too there is considerable variation: at *Derge* 10, 480, for example, immediately after Śāriputra's death a fellow monk is said to have *śā ri'i bu'i ring bsrel la lus kyis mchod pa byas te*. Context makes it virtually certain that this can only refer to funeral procedures, and it is very likely that the original read *śarīre śarīrapūjā*, but in spite of this the Tibetan literally means something like “performing the worship with the body on the relics of Śāriputra”. Later in the same account — *Derge* 10, 488 — where again the original almost certainly had *śarīre śarīrapūjā*, and where the reference is undoubtedly to post-cremation remains, the Tibetan has *ring bsrel la ring bsrel gyi mchod pa bgyi'o*. In the account of the death of Mahāprajāpatī (*Derge* 10, 224 ff) we find *lus la mchod pa*; in the account of the death of Prasenajit (*Derge* 10, 174) we find both *khog pa la mchod pa* and *lus la mchod pa*; in the account of the death of the monk Gavāmpati, *rus pa la rus pa'i mchod pa* (*Derge* 10, 606) — in all these cases the original was almost certainly *śarīrapūjā* or *śarīre śarīrapūjā*. It is not impossible that a systematic survey of the

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Tibetan handling of the term might reveal meaningful patterns in what now appears to be confusion, but such a survey has yet to be done. It is also worth noting that — although rare — there are traces of the use of the term *śarīra-pūjā* to refer not to a funeral procedure, but to honor directed towards post-cremational remains. This appears to be the case several times in the account concerning the remains of Śāriputra at *Derge* 10, 488 ff; likewise, at *Divyāvadāna* 252.10, when Aśoka expresses his desire to honor the stūpas of the Buddha's famous disciples, the Sanskrit text has him say *teṣāṃ śarīrapūjāṃ karisyāmi* (J. Przyluski, *La légende de l'empereur Aśoka (Açoka-avadāna) dans les textes indiens et chinois* (Annales du musée guimet, 32) (Paris: 1923) 257, however, translates the parallel passage in the *A-yü-wang-chuan* (Taisho 2042) as “Je veux maintenant honorer les stūpa des grands disciples . . .”); see also Schopen, *From Benares to Beijing*, 195 ff. Note, finally, that the Sanskrit sources themselves do not always use the term *śarīra-pūjā*; cf. n. 70.

³⁹ *Divyāvadāna* 281.30 (note that for Vaidya's *śivikābhīr nirharitvā śarīrapūjāṃ kṛtvā rājānaṃ pratiṣṭhāpayisyāma*, the text given in S. Mukhopadhyaya, *The Aśokāvadāna. Sanskrit Text compared with Chinese Versions* (New Delhi: 1963) 132.7 provides an important variant: *śivikābhīr nirharitvā śarīrapūjāṃ kṛtvā dharmāpayitvā rājānaṃ pratiṣṭhāpayisyāma* — this reading makes it very clear that *śarīrapūjā* preceded cremation); *Derge* 10, 174. The fact that known kings — including and especially Aśoka — did not receive the funeral of a Cakravartin only emphasizes the purely ideal, if not entirely artificial character of both the idea and the description of such a funeral in the texts and the fourfold classification of those “worthy of a stūpa” as well; cf. A. Barea, *Recherches sur la biographie du buddha dans le sūtrapitaka et les vinayapitaka anciens. II. Les derniers mois, le parinirvāna et les funérailles*, T.II (Paris: 1971) 50 ff; G. de Marco, *I “Kuṣāna” nella vita del Buddha. Per una Analisi del Rapporto tra Potere Politico e Religione nell' Antico Gandhāra* (Supplemento n. 34 agli *Annali*) (Napoli: 1983) 47–54; etc.

⁴⁰ *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts* vi, fol. 852.8–10; *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 127.12–18 — Tibetan: *Derge* 3, 210.7–211.2; *Tog* 3, 276.5–277.1; *Peking* 41, 281–1–1 to 1–3.

⁴¹ *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 144.14; *Derge* 10, 472.2 ff; *Derge* 10, 224.6 ff; *Avadāna-śataka* i 272 ff; etc. — reference to both or either is not, however, invariably found in references to monastic funerals. Sometimes such references contain only phrases like *tam ādahane saṃskārya* or *tam ādahanam nūvā saṃskārya* (*Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 118.16; 125.4), where a recitation of Dharma and transfer of merit are probably simply understood. — For the importance of performing a “pūjā of the teacher (i.e. the Buddha)” (*śāstus ca pūjā*) for a dying but not yet dead monk see *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 124.11 ff. — It is again worth noting the similar procedures stipulated in “les coutumiers monastiques” composed in the Medieval West: “. . . on annonce la nouvelle au chapitre et l'on fait aussitôt un office pour le défunt, avec sonnerie de cloches”; “les frères résidant dans cette dépendance (prieuré, prévôté, etc. . .) font pour le mort ce qui se fait dans le monastère, c'est-à-dire l'office des morts pendant sept jours, avec glas le premier jour, distribution d'une pitance (*justicia*) pendant trente jours avec chant du psaume *Verba mea* (Ps. 141) et de cinq autres psaumes pour le défunt” (Lemaitre, *Prieurs et prieurés dans l'occident médiéval*, 185; Gougoud, *Revue Mabillon* (1929) 281 ff.

⁴² For what is probably still the best discussion of the subtleties sometimes involved

in what is called the "transfer of merit" see J. Filiozat, "Sur le domaine sémantique de *puṇya*", in *Indianisme et bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à mgr. Étienne Lamotte* (Louvain-la-neuve: 1980) 102–116.

⁴³ See — noting the language used to express such "transfers" — *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 1, 220.12 (*nāmnā dakṣiṇām ādiṣeyam* — to pretas who were the deceased relatives of a group of laymen); *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 4, 181.5, 18; 182.12 (*nāmnā dakṣiṇām ādeśaya* — to deceased relatives); *Derge* 10, 472.2 ff (*yon bsngo zhing* — to a deceased monk); *Sayanāsana & Adhikarāṇa-vastus* 37.7 (*nāmnā dakṣiṇā ādeṣṭavyā-* 37.11; *nāmnā dakṣiṇām uddiśasi* — both to deceased donors who had given *vihāras* to the Order); *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 4, 161.1 (*nāmnā dakṣiṇām ādekyati* — to deceased parents by a son); *Rab tu 'byuñ ba'i gzi* ii 41.9 (*miñ gis yon bsno ba byed par gyur cig* — to deceased parents by a son); for literature related to this Vinaya see *Avadānaśataka* i 272.13 (*nāmnā dakṣiṇā ādiṣṭā* — to a deceased monk by the Buddha); *Divyāvādāna* 1.23; 286.24; *Avadānaśataka* i 15.1; 197.3; 277.2; etc. — all to deceased parents by a son). There are as well instances which use the same vocabulary but where the transfer is directed to living beings: *Saṅghabhedavastu* i 199.25 *dakṣiṇā ādiṣṭā* — by the Buddha to his father); *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 4, 80 (*dakṣiṇādeṣṭavyeti* — connected with the Pośadha — cf. the last verse of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Prātimokṣa Sūtra: prātimokṣasamuddeśād yat puṇyam samupārjitaṃ / aśeṣas tena lokoyam maunindram padam āpnyāt //* — A. C. Banerjee, *Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit* (Calcutta: 1977) 56); *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* 6.10, 6.13 (*nāmnā dakṣiṇām ādiśava; dakṣiṇām ādiṣet* — to local devas). In his work on the Pāli *Petavāthu* H. S. Gehman noted and carefully studied parallel expressions (H. S. Gehman, "Ādisati, Anvādisati, Anudisati and Uddisati in the *Petavāthu*", *JAOS* 43 (1923) 410–21). In a short note written long before the Sanskrit text of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* was available, he also argued that expressions like *nāmnā dakṣiṇādeśana* in the *Avadānaśataka* were "Pālisms" (H. S. Gehman, "A Pāliism in Buddhist Sanskrit", *JAOS* 44 (1924) 73–75). But in fact it now appears that such expressions are much more firmly anchored in Sanskrit — especially *Mūlasarvāstivāda* — sources and are of limited and late occurrence in Pāli sources: they occur frequently only in texts like the *Petavāthu*, very rarely elsewhere — at *Āṅguttara* iii 43 (*petānam dakkhiṇam anuppadassati*) and once in the Pāli *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* (I.31: *tāsam dakkhiṇam ādisē* — the same expression in the same verse also appears in the parallel accounts to the *Mahāparinibbāna* passage that are now found at *Udāna* 85 ff and *Pāli Vinaya* i 228 ff). This pattern of occurrence of the expression *dakkhiṇam ādis-* in Pāli sources — noting especially its occurrence in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* — parallels that of the term *śarīra-pūjā*. Both are firmly rooted and frequent in *Mūlasarvāstivāda* sources (see above n. 38), both are rare in anything but "late" Pāli sources, but both occur prominently in the Pāli *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* (cf. J. P. McDermott, *Development in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/Karma* (New Delhi: 1984) 41 ff, although his views are not themselves free of problems). It is possible that we may have in both expressions indications of the influence of continental sources on canonical Pāli. It is worth noting too that at least the expression *dakṣiṇādeśana* is not limited to *Mūlasarvāstivāda* sources. In the *Sphuṭārthā Śrīghanācāra-saṃgraha-tīkā* of Jayarakṣita, for example, the term occurs and is provided with a 'definition': *dakṣiṇādeśanaṃ ca dānaḡāthāpāṭhaḡ* (Sanghasena, ed.,

Sphuṭārthā Śrīghanācārasaṃgraha-tīkā (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series XI) (Patna: 1968) 36.10): "Assignment of gift" is the reading of gift-verses" (J. D. M. Derrett, *A Textbook for Novices. Jayarakṣita's "Perspicuous Commentary on the Compendium of Conduct by Śrīghana"* (Publicazioni di Indologica Taurinensia XV) (Torino: 1983) 44). This work it appears is affiliated with the Mahāsāṅghika (cf. M. Shimoda, "The *Sphuṭārthā Śrīghanācārasaṃgraha-tīkā* and the Chinese *Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya*", *IBK* 39.1 (1990) 495–92. Finally, for some interesting suggestions concerning the background of the expression see B. Oguibene, "La dakṣiṇā dans le Rgveda et le transfert de mérite dans le bouddhisme", in *Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. L. A. Hercus et al. (Canberra: 1982) 393–414.

⁴⁴ Kane, *History of Dharmasāstra*, Vol. IV, 257.

⁴⁵ Śrautakośa. *Encyclopedia of Vedic Sacrificial Literature*, Vol. I-English Section; Part II (Poona: 1962) 1037.

⁴⁶ This same congruency may also allow us a better understanding of some otherwise puzzling elements in the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*. The Sanskrit version, for example, goes to some trouble to indicate that although the funereal *śarīra-pūjā* had already been performed for the Buddha when Mahākāśyapa finally reached Kuśinagara he nevertheless is made to repeat the entire procedure himself (49.18–20). This at first sight seems both odd and unnecessary. But it makes perfect sense if — as is not unlikely — the compiler of the text 'knew' that Kāśyapa was the chief heir of the Buddha (cf. *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 1, 259–60), and if he 'knew' that for a monk to inherit he must perform or participate in the funeral of the deceased. Seen from this point of view Kāśyapa could not be what he was supposed to be unless he had performed the *śarīra-pūjā* or had participated in the funeral. Kāśyapa's role in the Pāli version of the text — though slightly less odd — can also be explained in this way.

⁴⁷ R. F. Gombrich, *Precept and Practice. Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon* (Oxford: 1971) 243.

⁴⁸ Something similar has somewhat hesitantly been noted by Knipe in regard to Hindu funereal practice: "The doctrines of transmigration and liberation transformed the whole of ancient Indian speculation and practice, but the rites accorded the ancestors bear a stamp of rigorous antiquity. They appear to endure beside the newer sentiments of *saṃsāra* and *mokṣa*". "The ritual world view of early vedic religion could abide through several strenuous periods via the directives of the *sūtras* and *śāstras* for individual funeral and ancestral rites, with remarkably little tampering from innovative doctrines, theologies, and cosmographies that gradually eroded the official, institutional structures of vedic religion. Although the concern shifted from the early vedic desire for a state of perpetual non-death or immortality to the dilemmas of *saṃsāra* and the ideal of *mokṣa*, the intention of the *śrāddhas* survived, and the understanding of the passage of the deceased as a cosmogonic progression, with an individual's salvation dependent on the correct ritual activity of his descendants, permitted these archaic ceremonies for the dead to continue to the present day"; D. M. Knipe, "Sapindīkaraṇa: the Hindu Rite of Entry into Heaven", in *Religious Encounters with Death. Insights from the History and Anthropology of Religions*, ed. F. E. Reynolds & E. H. Waugh (University Park & London: 1977) 111–24, esp. 112, 121–22.

⁴⁹ Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha and the Early History of His Order*, 112.

⁵⁰ L. de La Vallée Poussin, "Staupikam", *HJAS* 2 (1935) 286–87.

⁵¹ A. Seidel, "Dabi", *Hôbôgirin*, sixième fascicule (Paris/Tokyo: 1983) 577 f.

⁵² *Derge* 10, 472.2–474.1; *Tog* 9, 704.7–707.5; *Peking* 44, 91–4–3 to 92–1–1.

The footnote numbers inserted into the text refer to the separate critical apparatus which follows it and in which variants — most of little consequence — are recorded.

⁵³ This entire paragraph is made up of stereotypic phrases used to describe an orthodox union and birth — cf. *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 1–2, 52; iii 4, 6; 15; 23; 24; 28; 29; 53; *Sayanāsana & Adhikaraṇa-vastu* 13; *Saṅghabhedavastu* i 27; *Rab tu 'byuñ ba'i gzi* ii 7; 21; 23; 42; *Pravrajyāvastu*, 312; *Divyāvadāna* 2; *Avadānaśataka* i 206; 261; 295; etc.

⁵⁴ For the whole of what has been abbreviated here see Feer, *Avadāna-çataka*, 3; *Pravrajyāvastu* 16.

⁵⁵ As with the Sanskrit texts from the *Civara-vastu* treated above, so here in the Tibetan text the style is sometimes elliptical and there is a considerable reliance on pronouns whose referents sometimes need to be drawn out.

⁵⁶ The Sanskrit is cited from *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 140.14.

⁵⁷ For the Sanskrit underlying much of this paragraph cf. *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 1, 285.17 ff. (said of a monk bitten by a snake) *sa tathā vihvalo brāhmaṇagrhapatibhir dṛṣṭah / te kathayanti / bhavantaḥ katarasyāyam grhapateḥ putra iiii / aparaiḥ samākhyātam / amukasya iti / te kathayanti / anāthānām śramaṇaśākyaputriyānām madhye pravrajitah / yadi na pravrajito 'bhaviṣyat jñātibhir asya cikitsā kārītā abhaviṣyat iti /*; see also *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 1, ix, 10, although the passage there involves considerable reconstruction. Note too that our text has no word for "funeral" which I supply both here and below. A literal translation would be more like "would surely have performed the honors/ceremonies", "honors/ceremonies for a (deceased) monk are to be performed", etc. — For Sanskrit phrases which might lie behind *rim gro byas par 'gyur ba*, etc., see below n. 70.

⁵⁸ So de La Vallée Poussin, *HJAS* 2 (1935) 286, translates the Chinese. In a note he suggests the Chinese was translating *śarira-pūjā*, but the Tibetan would not support this; cf. n. 38 above.

⁵⁹ So de La Vallée Poussin, *HJAS* 2 (1935) 286; Seidel *Hôbôgirin*, sixième fasc. 578.

⁶⁰ So de La Vallée Poussin, *HJAS* 2 (1935) 286; Seidel *Hôbôgirin*, sixième fasc. 578; cf. J. Przyluski, "Le partage des reliques du buddha", *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 4 (1935–36) 341–67; esp. 345–46.

⁶¹ It is virtually certain that Tibetan *yon bsngo zhing* here is translating some form of *dakṣiṇām ādiś-*; cf. *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* 6.10: *nāmnā dakṣiṇām ādiśasva = yon sngo ba mdzad du gsol*; 6.13: *dakṣiṇām ādiśet = yon bsngo byas*; *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 127.18: *dakṣiṇām uddiśya = yon bsngo ba byas nas*; etc.

⁶² Determining the precise referent of the term or title *Tridandaka* is not as easy as one might expect. Modern scholars, on the basis of good Chinese evidence (I-tsing, colophons from Tun Huang) have with differing degrees of certainty seen in *Tridandaka* a reference to a specific text. Taishō 801, the text in question, has in fact been assigned in various Chinese sources two titles: (*Fo shuo*) *wu ch'ang ching*, "Sūtra (Spoken by the Buddha) on Impermanency", a title which has been taken as a translation of a Sanskrit title something like *Anityatā-sūtra*; and *San ch'i ching*, "Sūtra des Trois Ouvertures" or "les trois 'informations'". Sometimes the second title is given

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as an alternative, sometimes the two titles are simply combined into one: *Fo shuo wu ch'ang san ch'i ching* (de La Vallée Poussin renders the Chinese corresponding to our *Kṣudraka* passage by "récite les trois 'informations', *K'i* [et] le Sūtra sur l'impermanence", *HJAS* 2 (1935) 287). Taishō 801, or the *Anityatā-sūtra*, would appear to be well suited for a funeral text (see the Sanskrit version edited in I. Yamada, "Anityatāsūtra", *IBK* 20.2 (1972) 1001–996); it appears, moreover, from at least Takakusu's translation, that I-tsing says in his description of a monastic funeral in his *Record* that "while the corpse is burning . . . the 'Sūtra on Impermanence' (*Anitya-sūtra*) is recited" (Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago*, 81–82 — Bareau, however, in summarizing the passage says only: "Un moine récite un bref sermon (*sūtra*) sur l'impermanence (*anityatā*) . . .", *ACF* 1989–90, 636); in the account of the funeral of Mahāprajāpatī in the *Kṣudraka*, finally, the Buddha himself is said to have expounded teachings connected with impermanence" (*mi riag pa dang ldan pa'i chos dag bshad nas*; *Derge* 10, 226.2). All of this would seem to argue for identifying the *Tridandaka* with the *Anityatā-sūtra*. But there are still other indications that would seem to suggest that the *Tridandaka* was not, in fact, a specific text but a kind of ritual formulary into which any given text could be inserted. Although I-tsing does not appear to refer to the *Tridandaka* in his description of a monastic funeral, he does refer to it elsewhere in his *Record* and his description of it is of considerable interest. Lévi has translated the passage as follows: "Dans les pays occidentaux, l'adoration des caitya et le service ordinaire se font à la fin de l'après-midi ou au crépuscule . . . Quand tout le monde est définitivement assis, un maître des sūtra monte sur le siège aux lions (*siṃhāsana*) et déclame un peu de sūtra . . . Quant aux textes sacrés qu'on récite, c'est surtout les Trois Ouvertures qu'on récite. C'est un recueil dû au vénérable *Ma ming* (*Āsvaghōṣa*). La première partie compte dix vers; l'objet du texte est d'exalter les Trois Joyaux. Ensuite vient un texte sacré proprement dit, prononcé par le Buddha en personne. Après l'hymne et la récitation, il y a encore plus de dix vers, qui ont trait à la déflexion des mérites (*pariṇāmanā*) et à la production du vœu (*pranidhāna*). Comme il y a trois parties qui s'ouvrent successivement, on appelle ce texte sacré les Trois Ouvertures" (S. Lévi, "Sur la récitation primitive des textes bouddhiques", *JA* (1915) 401–47, esp. 432–34; cf. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago*, 152–53; R. Fujishima, "Deux chapitres extraits des mémoires d'I-tsing sur son voyage dans l'Inde", *JA* (1888) 411–39, esp. 416–18). This passage is important in at least two ways. First, the *Tridandaka* described here is not a specific text, but a set form of recitation consisting of three parts: (1) praise of the three precious things; followed by (2) the recitation of "un texte sacré proprement dit"; with the sequence concluded by (3) a formal transfer of merit. The "texte sacré" is unspecified and can apparently be any text suitable to the occasion of the recitation. The second important thing that I-tsing's description indicates would point in the same direction. We have seen so far in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* that the recitation of the *Tridandaka* is one of the specified moments for the distribution of a deceased monk's estate, and that it is recited as a part of a monastic funeral. I-tsing's description, however, makes it clear that these were not the only ritual contexts in which the *Tridandaka* was used. His description would seem to indicate that it was also used during the daily "adoration des caitya et le service ordinaire", and to these ritual moments we can add others. The *Posadha-vastu* of the *Mūlasarvās-*

īvāda-vinaya, for example, associates the recitation of the *Tridaṇḍaka* with the fortnightly communal recitation of the *Prātimokṣa* which is often presented as the most important congregational ritual in Buddhist monasticism (see *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 4, 80.5 where details concerning the appropriate length of its recitation are given) and this association is repeated in the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* which characterizes the *Tridaṇḍaka* as a procedure or method of practice connected with the Uposadha (*gso sbyong gi sbyor chog cig ste* — its description of the *Tridaṇḍaka* as a recitative formulary corresponds almost exactly to I-tsing's: . . . *phyag 'tshal ba'i rgyud / mdo 'don pa'i rgyud / bsngo ba'i rgyud de rgyud gsum dang ldan pa'i sgo nas tshul khriṃs mam dag gi mdo la sogs pa'i chos bshad cing nyan par byed pa'o* /; Krañ dbyi sun, ed., *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (Beijing: 1985) Vol. 1, 577). Elsewhere in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, moreover, the recitation of the *Tridaṇḍaka* is prescribed in the ritual required before cutting down a tree (see the text cited in K. Tokiya, "The Anityatā-sūtra Quoted in the Tibetan Version of a Mūlasarvāstivāda Text", *IBK* 34.1 (1985) 164); etc. It is, therefore, not just the structure of the *Tridaṇḍaka* as it is described by I-tsing, but also its use in a variety of different ritual contexts which suggests that it might well have been not a specific text but a specific set type of recitation or an established formulary into which any given *sūtra* text could be inserted. The Chinese identification of the *Tridaṇḍaka* with the *Anityatā-sūtra* may have resulted from the fact that I-tsing sent home the version of the formulary used for monastic funerals into which the *Anityatā* had been inserted and this came to be considered the only version. All of this will, of course, require further research to settle; so too will the attribution of the formulary to Aśvaghōṣa. For material bearing on both questions see — in addition to the sources already cited — P. Demiéville, "Bombai", *Hōbōgirin*, Premier fasc. (Tokyo: 1929) 93 ff; R. Sāṅkrtyāyana, "Search for Sanskrit Mss. in Tibet", *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24.4 (1938) 157–60; E. H. Johnston, "The *Tridaṇḍamālā* of Aśvaghōṣa", *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 25 (1939) 11–14; Lin Li-Kouang, *L'aide-mémoire de la vraie loi* (Paris: 1949) 303–05; L. Giles, *Descriptive Catalogue of the Chinese Manuscripts from Tunhuang in the British Museum* (London: 1957) 114–15; Durt, *Hōbōgirin*, Cinquième fasc., 437; P. Demiéville, "Notes on Buddhist Hymnology in the Far East", in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, ed. S. Balasooriya, et al. (London: 1980) 50 n. 31; Seidel, *Hōbōgirin*, Sixième fasc., 577–78; etc.

⁶³ de la Vallée Poussin, *HJAS* 2 (1935) 287 — here again we have a case where what should be a straightforward referent turns out not to be so. The problems start with an old one. Tibetan translations almost never distinguish between *stūpa* and *caitya*, both terms almost always being rendered by *mchod rten* (there are apparent exceptions, but they are extremely rare — see the *Mchod rten gcig tbiab na bye ba tbiab par 'gyur pa'i gzungs* (Peking 6, 151–2–2 to 3–2; 11, 168–4–8 to 5–8) where the transliteration *tsai tya* occurs several times). The original that was translated in our passage by *mchod rten la phyag mi 'tshal nas* and *mchod rten la phyag 'tshal bar bya'o* cannot therefore be determined. There is also the fact that the Tibetan versions are not in agreement as to whether the text is referring to one or to several *mchod rens*: the *Derge* has in the second occurrence *mchod rten la*, but both *Tog* and *Peking* have *mchod rten dag la* (de la Vallée Poussin translates the Chinese as singular). Both considerations may bear on an even more important point: we do not know to whom the *mchod rten* or *mchod rens* belonged; we do not know whether

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the reference is to a *stūpa* or *stūpas* of the Buddha, or to the *stūpa* or *stūpas* of the local monastic dead — it is now clear that the latter were found in considerable numbers at a considerable number of mostly very early monastic sites in India (cf. Schopen, *JHABS* 14.2 (1991); for some regional variation in regard to whether such structures were called *stūpas* or *caityas* see p. and n. 38). Taking this category into account it is, of course, not impossible that our text might be referring to a *stūpa* built for the deceased monk whose funeral has just been performed. It appears, however, that at least *Mūlasarvāstivāda* texts do not seem to link funereal activity *per se* with the erection of *stūpas* for the local monastic dead. In none of the numerous references to monastic funerals in *Mūlasarvāstivāda* literature that I know is there any reference to erecting a *stūpa*. In fact the erection of *stūpas* for the local monastic dead is legislated separately in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* not in an account of a funeral, but in an account concerning the post-funereal "relics" of Śāriputra (*Derge* 10, 488 ff). This would suggest, I think, that in this *Vinaya* funeral ceremonies and cult activity directed towards relics or reliquaries of the local monastic dead were conceived of as fundamentally different forms of religious behavior. (It is — in so far as I know — only in a few Pāli narrative passages that funeral ceremonies for local monks or nuns are directly linked with the erection of *stūpas* for them — cf. *Uddāna* 8.21; *Pāli Vinaya* iv 308.) In light of these considerations it might be well to assume — until it can be shown otherwise — that *mchod rten (dag) la phyag 'tshal bar bya'o* in our passage refers to worshipping the *stūpa* or *stūpas* of the Buddha, and that such an act was the final moment of a monastic funeral. What 'external' evidence we have also would seem to indicate that funeral activity and activity connected with *stūpas* were thought of as distinct. I-tsing in his *Record* refers to something "like a *stūpa*" for the local monastic dead, but he seems to indicate that such was not always erected and that when it was it was made an indeterminate time after the funeral: the monks, he says, "on returning [from the cremation] to their apartments, . . . cleanse the floor with powdered cow-dung. All other things remain as usual. There is no custom as to putting on a mourning-dress. They sometimes build a thing like a *stūpa* for the dead, to contain his *śarīra* (or relics). It is called a 'Kula', which is like a small *stūpa*, but without the cupola on it" (Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago* 82; cf. Bareau, *ACF* 1989–1990, 636: "Après la crémation, on recueille les restes corporels (*śarīra*) et on élève sur eux un petit tumulus appelé *kula*. Celui-ci ressemble à un *stūpa*, mais on ne dresse pas de parasols (*chattrā*) à roues (*cakra*) à son sommet . . ." — for an attempt to identify what I-tsing calls a *kula* with what is found at a number of monastic sites in India see G. Schopen, "Burial 'ad sanctos' and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism: A Study in the Archeology of Religions", *Religion* 17 (1987) 193–225, esp. 198–199). Note too that Rockhill's summary of our text is particularly unsatisfactory at this point: "Previously to being interred the body must be washed. A cairn or *tchaitya* (*mchod rten*) must be raised over the remains" (*The Life of the Buddha and the Early History of His Order*, 112). There is no justification in the text itself for his interpretation of either injunction: it is the monks who participated in the funeral who must wash, and the *mchod rten* is to be worshipped not "raised".

⁶⁴ I. B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, Vol. I (Oxford: 1938) xvi–xvii.

⁶⁵ Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, Vol. I, xxix.

⁶⁶ Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, Vol. I, xv.

⁶⁷ Ch. Malamoud, "Les morts sans visage. Remarques sur l'idéologie funéraire dans le brāhmanisme", in *La mort, les morts dans les sociétés anciennes*, ed. G. Gnoli et J.-P. Vernant (Cambridge & Paris: 1982) 441–453, esp. 445, 441, 449.

⁶⁸ L. Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus. The Caste System and Its Implications*; Comp. rev. Eng. ed. (Chicago: 1980) 49–50.

⁶⁹ Jain has recently argued that the "elaborate rules for disposing of the dead bodies of Jain monks" found in Jain literature are also early: "The material contained in the *BhagavatiĀrāḍhanā* belongs to the time of early Jainism when the division of Śvetāmbara and Digambara did not exist in the Jain *saṅgha*" (J. Jain, "Disposal of the Dead in the BhagavatiĀrāḍhanā", *JOIB* 38 (1988) 123–131. — Though a late text, see the interesting description of "The Funeral of a Renouncer" in J. P. Olivelle (ed.), *Samnyāsapaddhati of Rudradeva* (The Adyar Library Series 114) (Madras: 1986) 63 ff.). It should be noted too that the scholarly literature in regard to the date of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* is marked by ambivalence and seeming contradictions. Lamotte, for example, notably on the basis of the fact that this *Vinaya* contains a "prediction" relative to Kaṅka and was not translated into Chinese until the 8th Century, asserts that "on ne peut attribuer à cet ouvrage une date antérieure aux IV^e–V^e siècles de notre ère" (*Histoire du bouddhisme indien des origines à l'ère śaka*, 727). But Huber, already in 1914, had drawn very different conclusions from the presence of this prediction relative to Kaṅka. He had said: "Ce petit fait vient s'ajouter à un certain nombre d'autres déjà connus qui tendent à montrer que le *Vinaya* des Mūla-Sarvāstivādins a subi un remaniement aux environs de l'ère chrétienne", and then added: "sans discuter la date exacte du roi Kaṅka, on peut dire que la mention de son nom nous reporte vers le même temps" (E. Huber, "Études bouddhiques III. — Le roi kaṅka dans le vinaya des mūlasarvāstivādins", *BEFEO* 14 (1914) 19 — Gnoli, *Sanghabhedavastu* i, xix, has more recently made much the same observation). Moreover, and again long before Lamotte, Lévi had already counseled against attributing too much significance to the date of the Chinese translation: "La date tardive de la traduction chinoise . . . ne doit pas non plus nous entraîner trop vite à tenir l'ouvrage pour récent" (S. Lévi, *TP* 8 (1907) 115 f). To this might be added the fact that dating the compilation of a work does not necessarily date its specific contents: "dans l'état fragmentaire de nos connaissances sur le bouddhisme indien, la date récente du document qui nous fait connaître une légende, ne permet nullement de conclure à la formation récente de la légende elle-même" (Huber, *BEFEO* 14 (1914) 17). This is made strikingly evident in regard to the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* in another series of observations and investigations. Although he repeatedly characterizes the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* as "tardif" or "le plus récent de tous les recueils disciplinaires", Professor Bareau says as well that the form of the stūpa it describes appears to be the "most ancient" (A. Bareau, "La construction et le culte des stūpa d'après les vinaya-pīṭaka", *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 233). Elsewhere, while still pointing to its 'late' character he says: ". . . d'après des études comparatives approfondies mais très partielles, le *Vinayapīṭaka* des Mūlasarvāstivādin paraît nettement plus archaïque que celui des Sarvāstivādin et même que le plupart des autres *Vinayapīṭaka*" (A. Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule* (Paris: 1955) 154). More specifically Lévi, in a detailed study of certain linguistic forms in the *Vinaya*, says for example: "L'interdiction de 'boire à la sangsue', promulguée d'abord dans un dialecte qui pratiquait l'adoucissement de la sourde intervocalique, est arrivée telle quelle aux

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rédateurs du canon pali qui n'ont plus reconnu sous son altération le terme original; ainsi des autres écoles, à l'exception des Mūla-Sarvāstivādins, qui montrent encore sur d'autres points du canon une incontestable supériorité", *JA* (1912) 510); M. Hofinger in his study of the Second Council argues that the oldest extant accounts of these events are preserved in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-* and *Mahāsāṅghika-vinayas* (M. Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de vaicāli* (Louvain: 1946) 235–41; 256); I myself have suggested that the account of the remains of the former Buddha Kāśyapa found in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* appears from every angle to be earlier than the standardized, revised, and probably conflated accounts found in our other *Vinayas* (G. Schopen, "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit", *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1985) 18–22). If these divergent opinions and observations suggest a state of some uncertainty concerning the date of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, then their presentation has succeeded in representing the actual state of our knowledge. We simply know very little that is definitive about it — the illusion, of course, is that we know anything more about the dates of our other *Vinayas*, including that preserved in Pāli. It does, however, seem that there is mounting evidence that the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* — whatever its date or the degree of its "remaniement" — contains a good deal of very early material. The rules concerning monastic funerals may, in fact, be just another case in point.

⁷⁰ For the Sanskrit translated by *rim gro bya ba* see L. Chandra, *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary* (New Delhi: 1961) 2268–69, and note that Sanskrit *satkāra* when not actually a "w.r. for *saṃskāra*", can itself in one form or another mean "doing (the last) honour (to the dead), cremation of a corpse, funeral obsequies", "to pay the last honours to (acc.), cremate", etc. M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Oxford: 1899) 1134. Note too that — as has already been pointed out — Sanskrit accounts of monastic funerals do not always use the expression *śarīra-pūjā*: at *Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 2, 118.15, for example, we find *bhikṣavas tam ādāya dahanam gatāh . . . bhikṣavas tam ādāhane saṃskārya vihāram āgatāh*; at iii 2, 125.14: *bhikṣavas tam ādahanam nītvā saṃskārya vihāram āgatāh*.

⁷¹ Although it contains some details not yet found in the texts, I-tsing's description of a monastic funeral also contains — in one form or another — the same basic elements — Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago*, 81–82; Bareau, *ACF* 1989–1990, 636.

⁷² It would appear from Jain's remarks (*Life in Ancient India as Depicted in the Jain Canon and Commentaries*, 281–84; *JOIB* 38 (1988) 123–31) that the funeral of a dead Jain monk too was by preference and when at all possible an exclusively monastic affair. But Jain sources explicitly legislate for contingencies: "The question of carrying the dead [monk] for disposal was rather complicated . . . If there were only one single monk and it was not possible for him to carry the dead, ascetics belonging to non-Jain religion or laymen should be called, or help should be taken from the members of the Mallagaṇa, the Hastipālagana or the Kumbhakāragana, or in the absence of these a village-headman, *cāṇḍalas*, people from degraded castes, sweepers, barbers and others should be approached". It is not impossible that the Buddhist *Vinayas* also contained such legislation and it simply has not been recognized as such. The well-known passage which we associate with the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*, and which has been taken wrongly to establish that "śarīrapūjā, the worship of relics, is the

concern of the laity and not the bhikṣusamgha" (Schopen, *From Benares to Beijing*, 187–88), may be in fact just such legislation. In the passage in question (Sanskrit 36.2–3; Pāli V.10) Ānanda asks how the funereal *śarīra-pūjā* for the Buddha could be performed and the Buddha responds in the Sanskrit version: *alpotsukas tvam ānanda bhava śarīrapūjāyāḥ. prasannā brāhmaṇagrhapataya etad āpādayisyanti* — all of the other known versions are essentially similar: Pāli, "ne soyez pas occupés (*avyāvāṭā tumhe hotha*) du culte [à rendre au] corps du Tathāgata"; Chinese D, "ne vous souciez pas de cette affaire"; Chinese A and C, "restez tranquilles"; etc. All versions as well indicate essentially the same reason why Ānanda need not be concerned: "les pieux brahmanes et maîtres de maison (*grhapati*) s'en chargeront" (all quotations are from Bareau, *Recherches sur la biographie du buddha dans les sūtrapitaka et les vinayapitaka anciens*: II. *les derniers mois, le parinirvāna et les funérailles*, t.II, 36–37). Previous interpretations of this passage — and they have been many — have it seems never asked why Ānanda should have been so concerned in the first place. They have, moreover, failed to take into account, among other things, that the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* was almost certainly a piece of *Vinaya*; that the Buddha's declaration came at almost the very end of the various *Vinayas* and certainly at the very end of the narrative time or internal chronology assumed by the canonical texts; and that — finally — Ānanda found himself, in so far as we can tell, alone. This would mean in terms of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, for example, that by the time the reader or redactor of this *Vinaya* had reached this passage he would have seen or inserted both sets of rules governing monastic funerals that we have looked at here, and a host of narrative descriptions of monastic funerals, in all of which it was monks and monks alone who did and were explicitly directed to perform the funeral of a fellow-monk. But — again in so far as we can tell — Ānanda found himself alone or virtually so. He could not therefore fulfill the *Vinaya* rule. This situation can explain well Ānanda's concern, the Buddha's assurance, and the sense of the passage: the Buddha was allowing an exception to the rule. This interpretation, though differing markedly from others, is perhaps worth pursuing. It is also perhaps worth noting that it — or some residual sense that Ānanda had indeed broken the rule — may explain too one of the charges brought against Ānanda by Mahākāśyapa at "the council of Rājagṛha". Among other things and in all versions, Ānanda is criticized, in fact charged with a fault (*duṣkṛta*), for having allowed apparently unauthorized individuals — lay men, nuns, and especially women — to participate in what could only have been the funereal *śarīra-pūjā*: most of the versions emphasize that the women saw the Buddha's penis, and that could only have happened during the preparation of the body before it was wrapped (see, for the various accounts, J. Przyluski, *Le concile de rājagṛha. Introduction à l'histoire des canons et des sectes bouddhiques* (Paris: 1926–28) 15, 50–51, 64, 153, 157, etc.).

⁷³ The role of ghosts, demons, etc. in the promulgation of *Vinaya* rules would make an interesting topic of study. In both the Pāli *Vinaya* (i 149 ff) and the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* (*Gilgit Manuscripts* iii 4, 149 ff), for example, problems with or the presence of *pisāca* or *amanusyas* are cited as legitimate causes for cutting short the rain retreat, an act which otherwise was forbidden. Again in the Pāli *Vinaya* the case of a monk who had "a non-human affliction" (*amanussikābādha*) or was "possessed" prompted the Buddha to allow monks to eat raw flesh and drink blood (*Pāli Vinaya* i, 202, I. B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, Vol. IV (London: 1951) 274 n. 6); etc.

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It would appear, moreover, from Jain's remarks that many of the rules governing Jain monastic funerals were also connected with the fear of "ghosts": "If these rites are not followed, it is possible that some deity might enter the dead body, rise, play and create disturbances to the saṅgha" (*JOIB* 38 (1988) 127).

⁷⁴ Unfortunately, the material studied here makes little specific reference to nuns and in this it is probably typical of textual sources on the whole and unrepresentative of what actually occurred (see G. Schopen, "Monks, Nuns and 'Vulgar' Practices: The Introduction of the Image Cult into Indian Buddhism", *Artibus Asiae* 49.1/2 (1988/89) 153–68, esp. 163 ff). It is, however, true that none of the inscribed — and therefore certain — stūpas of the local monastic dead found at Indian monastic sites was erected for a nun (see Schopen, *JABS* 14.2 (1991)). The subject requires — and will undoubtedly reward — future research.

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STEVEN COLLINS

THE DISCOURSE ON WHAT IS PRIMARY
(AGGAÑÑA-SUTTA)

An Annotated Translation

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Although the *Aggañña Sutta* (hereafter AS), No. 27 of the *Dīgha Nikaya* (D III 80–98), is one of the best known early Buddhist texts,

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cited and discussed by scholars in various disciplines, I believe there are some central facts about it which have not been commented on before. But I do not imagine for a moment that what I say here exhausts the riches of this fascinating text; my intention is to encourage rather than foreclose discussion. I aim to do three things:

- (i) to prove, by means of close linguistic analysis, that what I shall call the 'parable of origins' in AS is permeated by references to the Monastic Code, the *Vinaya*: this, I think, must condition our understanding of the parable, and our assessment of the spirit in which it was offered;
- (ii) to provide in this General Introduction a context for reading and interpreting AS, on three levels: in relation to world history, to ancient Indian society, and to other early Buddhist texts;
- (iii) to illustrate by this one case what I think is a more general desideratum in Buddhist Studies: that the familiar and standard translation of early Pali texts issued by the Pali Text Society, mostly at the beginning of the century, should be treated not as definitive guides to the original, as I suspect they are in practice, even by some Buddhologists not specialising in Pali, but as they were intended — pioneering attempts in need of constant revision as knowledge progresses. This is the case, I hope to show, with the Rhys Davids's translation of AS (1921; hereafter RhD), sub-titled 'A Book of Genesis', which has become a cultural object in its own right, canonised and immortalised on our library shelves in one volume of 'the Sacred Books of the Buddhists'. While I have not catalogued every place where I have disagreed with their version, I do refer to it often, since the majority of those who have discussed AS have done so by reading it, rather than the original. It was an admirable achievement in its day, but I would like to think that the rendering given here represents an improvement, in accuracy if not in elegance. (Other previous translations of AS are listed in the Introduction of my own below [p. 148]).

Part I of this General Introduction offers some remarks, of varying levels of generality, on the socio-historical contexts in relation to which I find it most helpful to read AS; part II discusses the text of AS, and some other texts which I take to be relevant to it; part III collects together the evidence on the basis of which I argue that the story of the Fall/Evolution of Mankind in sections # 10ff. draws

explicitly on themes from the life and ideals of the Monastic Order, and on language from the *Vinaya*; part IV gives my view of the structure of the *sutta* as a whole, citing occurrences of what I see as the keywords of the text. I refer to the translation notes, which are found on pp. 159—88, by section and note number; notes of this Introduction follow it on pp. 144—7. The bibliography for both Introduction and translation notes is at the end.

Readers unfamiliar with AS might read through the translation at this point, without notes (pp. 148—58); some acquaintance with the text is necessary if the following Introduction is to be comprehensible.

I. *Some remarks on the context(s) of AS*

(i) *in world history: agrarian social order*

The first context I will provide for AS is a very general one indeed. I draw on Ernest Gellner's vision of the whole of human history thus far.¹ For Gellner, mankind has passed through three main historical stages, those of hunter-gatherers, agrarian society, and industrial society. These stages are defined in relation to the means (or their absence) of producing, accumulating and storing food and wealth, to the forms of coercion and legitimation which accompany them, and also, in the second and third stages, to the social distribution and varieties of cognition they encourage. My summary version of his argument will, of course, be unable to convey anything of its force and persuasiveness; and it is true that, as a reviewer quoted on the back cover of the 1990 paperback edition of *Plough, Sword and Book* states, 'deductive history on this scale cannot be proved right or wrong'. Nonetheless — and leaving aside any problems which arise in relation to the first and third of his stages — some things he says about agrarian society strike me as being plausible, and very revealing as a background to the concerns and motifs of AS. The main advance made in moving from hunter-gatherer to agrarian modes, he says, is the greatly increased presence in the latter, and virtual absence in the former, of the capacity to produce, accumulate and store food and wealth. As a result of this, a small surplus is produced (small when compared to industrial society), but one which is stable enough such

that 'agrarian societies tend to develop complex social differentiation, an elaborate division of labour. Two specialisms in particular become of paramount importance: the emergence of a specialized ruling class, and of a specialized clerisy (specialists in cognition, legitimation, salvation, ritual)' (p. 17). These two groups he calls, variously, kings-warriors and clerisy/priests, or most simply thugs and legitimators. Coercion can take two main forms, corresponding to the two specialisms (which can sometimes be combined): sheer physical force, or the threat of it, and the imposition of social-ideological norms (the latter significantly extended in the move to transcendentalist, universalist ideologies of 'salvation'). While in a direct contest, it is absurd to think that legitimators could overpower the thugs, in the normal course of settled life social order and control are maintained more directly by the imposition and internalization of norms than by brute force.

Although he does not say so directly, I think Gellner is aware of the relevance of this analysis to two classic themes in the writing of South Asian history. In the first place, given that the two specialisms are only possible because of agriculture and the surplus it produces, a tripartite structure of workers, warriors and priests is not so much a special feature of Indo-European society, as Dumézil and his followers claim, but a structural feature of any agrarian economy producing a reliable but small surplus. (Note that according to Gellner the enormously increased capacity to produce surplus wealth, and the correspondingly great increase in specialisation and the division of labour, are among the main features of industrial society.) Secondly, thugs and legitimators, where they are different, must, since they both exercise related forms of coercion, come to some sort of mutual *modus vivendi*: thus the complex and multivalent relations between kings and priests, *kṣatriyas* and *brahmins*² (which Louis Dumont saw in terms of a difference between power and status, a view which has occasioned much discussion) are again not specific traits of Indian society and culture but general features of the agrarian order.

The legitimators, of course, are not always of only one party (and this is one of the weaknesses of Dumont's view, which over-privileges the Brahmanical vision of society: see below). In the next two sections I shall apply Gellner's model to early South Asian history and cultural

debate, and include Buddhism, as a sub-division of what he calls 'the wider clerisy' (see quote on p. 306). Here I want to remain a little longer with one aspect of the analysis which has special relevance to AS: the storage of food, and its relation to power. Although towns do exist in agrarian society, as the seats of market, military and administrative activity, a

society with a small surplus cannot possibly become a generalized market society. By contrast, in the developed modern world, endowed with an enormous surplus, the individual hands over his labour and buys virtually all he needs with his wages. In the physical sense, there generally isn't any *thing* to hand over: the individual simply takes part in a very complex activity. With his remuneration, he draws from the market what he needs for survival, when he needs it. An analogous procedure in agrarian society would be absurd and disastrous. If the agricultural producer handed over his entire output and then relied on purchasing what he needs, the first fluctuation in prices, occasioned let us say by shortages in a neighbouring area, would leave him starving. In consequence, a very large part of production is stored for safety. Agrarian society is, in effect, a collection of protected storage units (p. 129).

Agricultural society is defined by the systematic production and storage of food, and in a lesser measure of other goods. The existence of a stored surplus inevitably commits the society to some enforcement of the division of that surplus, and to its external defence. Hence violence, merely contingent amongst hunters, becomes mandatory amongst agriculturalists (p. 275).

Two comments here: first, in general, this strikes me as a valuable perspective from which to view South Asian (and other) religious values of non-violence (*ahimsā*), and their relation to the maintenance of social order. To borrow a phrase from Gunawardana's discussion of Buddhist monasticism in medieval Sri Lanka (79: 344), there must always be an 'antagonistic symbiosis' between legitimators who expound non-violence, and the thugs whose (threat of) physical coercion maintains the social order which allows the legitimators to keep their economic and other resources, and to preserve an established role (which is, in ideological theory, outside the realm of production and reproduction). Second, in relation to AS in particular, not only is there an explicit connexion, in what I will call its parable of origins, between the cultivation and storage of food and the origins of violence and kingship (sections # 17–21), but also the motif of 'making a store' is the central figure around which I will group, on linguistic and semantic grounds, what I hope to show are a series of references to the Buddhist monastic code, the *Vinaya*. Monks, ideally,

like the beings in the parable when in the 'paradisial' state before their 'Fall' into agriculture and ordered society, neither produce nor store their food.

I shall say more below on the place of ascetic ideologies as hierarchical models of society in South Asia. For the moment I will end this section by quoting a little more from Gellner on the issue. Although, as mentioned,

agrarian society is doomed to violence . . . it does not always place violence at the summit of excellence, though the Western equation of nobility with military vocation does so. Sometimes it places the scribes/legitimators above the swordsmen, though we must remember that it is the scribes who write the record and formulate the principles . . .

Agraria does on occasion invert values. They [i.e. values] may conspicuously defy, rather than mirror, the social hierarchy. It may commend asceticism or humility rather than display, conspicuous consumption and assertiveness. These inversions of values, of the utmost importance in the history of mankind, can be seen in part as devices employed by rival elements within the wider clerisy. One way the legitimators gain influence and power is by being outside the formal system, by opting out, and asceticism or humility constitutes a kind of conspicuous self-exile. The logic of the agrarian world, however, does not allow such values to be implemented consistently and universally. (pp. 154, 155–6; cp. 225)³

(ii) *in early Indian history: towns and small-scale polities*

An account such as Gellner's, of course, operates at a very great level of generality, and describes socio-economic structures very much of the historical *longue durée*. It is thus reassuring when a specialist scholar of early Indian archaeology and history writes that by the 6th–4th centuries B.C. 'the technological base of the economy in this period [had] already reached a level not to be significantly exceeded until the 20th century' — that is, until the coming of industrialism.⁴ In this section I give a brief summary of what I believe to be a scholarly consensus on some aspects of the history of North India before the Mauryan empire, which began in the 4th century B.C. and reached its apogee under Aśoka in the 3rd. The study of early Indian history continues to struggle with the problem of assessing the relative weight of textual and archaeological evidence, but a reasonably clear picture can be drawn, to the best of our available knowledge.⁵ I am not concerned with precise dating: so much depends on the date of the Buddha, at present under much discussion.⁶ The most likely time for

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the Buddha and early Buddhism, it now seems, is the 5th–4th centuries B.C. There are three main points in what follows: first, during this period Brahmanism was more strongly established in the countryside than in the rising urban centres, where a competing plurality of ideologies was emerging; second, these urban centres, which arose from and encouraged a food surplus, were the market, military and administrative centres of small-scale polities, not metropolitan capitals of large empires; third, these polities were ruled, in the earlier part of the period, by oligarchies, and only gradually turned to monarchy, at the time of the Buddha himself and immediately thereafter. The society apparently presupposed by AS fits just this picture.

At this time, then, as far as the evidence allows us to know, the countryside of north India was permeated by Brahmanical ideology; more so in the west than the east, since it had been established there longer. This was suited to a rural society, where it makes sense to suggest that Brahmanical social hierarchy could be more easily stabilised and social order more easily enforceable on the basis of ritual alone. Urban centres and state formations had begun to arise, especially strikingly in the north-east, along the Ganges. The later Vedic texts produced by Brahmins, the *dharma-sūtra*-s, show both an uneasiness about urban life and a concern with 'the laying down of explicit codes of conduct . . . That rulers are now explicitly enjoined to enforce correct behaviour, signals a change in the orientation of government away from rituals and in the direction of secular administration based on force'.⁷ The connexion between early Buddhism and urban government and trade, as suggested in its texts, has long been known.⁸ Recently, moreover, Olivelle has argued that the appearance within Brahmanism of ascetic thought and practice at this time, as evident from the *Upaniṣad*-s, may be the result of urbanized Brahmins accommodating a trend towards asceticism within their own tradition, as against the continuing opposition of their (culturally-speaking) 'country cousins'.⁹ Although there is extensive evidence of urban centres at this time, and of a more complex social differentiation than earlier, there is no evidence of the larger kind of imperial metropolis which arose from the time of the Mauryan empire. There were a number of regional divisions, called *janapada*-s or *mahājanapada*-s, whose names are given variously in different texts but which are usually said to

number sixteen. These were not at first equivalent to political units, but were areas which contained powerful clans, ruled by local chiefs grouped in tribal oligarchies. But the *janapada*-s gradually came to be political units, particularly after the Kosalans conquered the Buddha's own clan, the Sākyaans (see # 8 and # 8.2.); and the transition to monarchical rule was in process during the Buddha's life. After the Buddha's death, the 16 *janapada*-s were reduced to four main rivals; and eventually that of Magadha became dominant, thus laying the foundation for the Mauryan empire, centred on Magadha.¹⁰

After such imperial formations were known, it became possible to imagine imperial cities to have existed at any period. Erdosi (88: 11–2) cites such a description of Ayodhyā from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, but adds 'that no such city existed in Ayodhya in the 7th century B.C. (the date assigned to events described in the Ramayana) is clear from the archaeological record; so is the fact that the author of the [passage cited] used the impressive cities of the post-Maurya period . . . as his models' (*sic*, without diacritics). To say this, of course, is not *ipso facto* to criticise the *Rāmāyaṇa*, since texts are not obliged to provide us with historical data, nor avoid anachronism. But to say this *is* to refute the suggestion that this passage of that text pre-dates the Mauryan empire. In this light, therefore, the absence of any depiction of imperial cities and larger-scale political formations in those Pali texts usually accepted to be early¹¹ renders it more plausible to trace them back to the pre-Mauryan period (though we will never be able to *prove* this). The view of kingship in AS is not that of a 'universal emperor', the *cakkavatti*, found in some canonical texts (although elements of the AS story were attached to that ideology by the later tradition).¹² What is perhaps the best-known episode in AS does concern a single figure, the 'Great Appointee' (*mahāsammata* — I argue in # 21.1 and Appendix 1 that in AS this was a title, not a proper name as it became later); but this is no more than a narrative device, as with the first individual who eats the 'earth-essence' in # 12, the first couple to have sex in # 16, the series of individuals in # 17 who store food, the being in # 19 who originates theft, and the series of individuals from each class who give birth to the 'ascetic-group' in # 26. In each of these cases the narrative either states explicitly or implies by ellipsis that the practice spreads from the first individual to

others. Likewise, after the first king is described in # 20—1, section # 22 refers to *rājadhāniyo*, 'royal cities', in the plural; in the text itself there is no hint of a single territory ruled by one 'universal' monarch, encompassing (ideally) the whole world; rather, power is held by a plurality of local chieftains (see # 22.3). As Sharma says (68: 69), 'the closing passage [i.e. # 21] . . . relates the origin of the *khattiya-maṇḍala*, namely, the ruling oligarchy'.

The rise of urban centers in this period and the production of a food surplus are obviously connected processes; it would seem that the two were mutually encouraging.¹³ Although no doubt many factors lay behind the increase in food production, one plausible candidate is the increased growing of rice (a higher-yield crop than the earlier dominant barley), and in particular the technique of transplanting rice in wet-land cultivation. According to Sharma 'although the later Vedic people grew rice, *vrihi* [the word then used] was a rainy season crop whose yield was limited on account of its being sown in the field. Obviously the people did not know the art of paddy transplantation, or wet paddy production, which appeared later as a winter crop (83: 161—2). Rice grown by the latter method was known as *sāli* (*ibid.* 96). A number of motifs in AS are also found in later Brahmanical asceticism, which like Buddhism reverses the earlier Vedic celebration of food as a cosmogonic force;¹⁴ they cannot therefore be linked to any specific period of history. But if we locate AS in the pre-Mauryan period, it is then not coincidental that its 'origin myth' deals with the aetiology of the cultivation of *sāli* (Pali *sāli*), a surplus of which was used to create the institution of kings.

Although none of this definitively proves that AS is pre-Mauryan, in the absence of positive reasons to doubt it, I think it reasonable to assume so, since the society presupposed in AS's parable fits so well with what else we know about that period. It is, of course, possible to remain sceptical; but in the present state of knowledge, if we are to locate AS in a historical context, the pre-Mauryan period seems the best candidate.

(iii) *in early Indian cultural debate: competing hierarchical models*

The main point of the historical specification attempted in the previous section is to give a richer sense of the cultural and ideological

milieu in which AS was produced. The fact that it seems to presuppose a society like that we conjecture to have existed in northeast India in the 5th—4th. centuries does not mean that it merely passively 'reflects' its environment; rather, to place it there is to see it as an interlocutor in an ongoing cultural debate, conducted by various groups within the ruling strata of the time. In section (i) above, I used Gellner's basic dichotomy of rulers and legitimators, albeit quoting from him on 'rival elements within the wider clerisy'; I wish now to specify more precisely what those rival elements were in ancient India, and how they, and kings, produced different hierarchical models of society. I take this phrase from Richard Burghart's 'Hierarchical Models of the Hindu Social System'.¹⁵ Restricting himself to the 'Hindu' world, Burghart claims that kings, brahmins and ascetics each produced ideologies of the social world which hierarchised it, and, naturally, placed themselves at the top of whatever value-scale the model embodied. 'Brahmans, ascetics and the king each claimed their superiority in the particular world in which they lived', and 'each person based his claim in terms of a particular hierarchy which was the exhaustive and exclusive order of social relations'. This Brahmanical hierarchy is expressed in terms of ritual purity and 'the sacrificial body of Brahma' (*sic*). Ascetic hierarchy is expressed in terms of 'the cycle of confused wanderings'; that is, rebirth. (I would add in the Buddhist case a universal morality which over-rides social hierarchy of all kinds, at the same time as it upholds the Buddhist ascetic one: see pp. 130—1 below.) Kingly hierarchy, which is found more in 'panegyric and epigraphic sources' than in the kind of text usually studied by historians of religion, is expressed in terms of a 'tenorial hierarchy which was derived from [the king's] lordship over the land', a lordship construed as a divine marriage between god-king and the earth (78: 520—1). We may add to the list of sources for kings' perspectives texts like the *Artha-śāstra*, redacted in its final form not before the 3rd. century A.D. but nonetheless usable for the earlier period;¹⁶ and, from a later period still the whole tradition of sophisticated court poetry (especially its erotic forms) drama (especially comedy), and the like.¹⁷ Of course kings would also use themes from 'religious' hierarchical models, particularly in their public pronouncements (as did Aśoka): but it is now clear that, for example, Dumont's

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vision of a monolithic India, where everyone was agreed on the status inferiority of the (power-ful) king compared to the Brahmin, is a reproduction of one Brahmanical hierarchical model rather than a comprehensive historical account recognising a plurality of voices within India.

The ascetics to whom Burghart refers are, in the 'Hindu' context, often though not always brahmins. The co-existence of ascetic and non-ascetic ideologies within Brahmanism has been called by Olivelle an 'inner conflict of [that] tradition', consciously taking up Heesterman's phrase referring to the relationship between kings and brahmins.¹⁸ In the pre-Mauryan and Mauryan periods one of the most important facts of society and culture in India as a whole was the existence and success of what used to be called 'heterodox' (= anti-Brahmanical) groups: Buddhists, Jains, and others. As we now know, in so far as we can speak of a 'Hindu orthodoxy', such a thing was developed, as a tension-filled amalgam, precisely as a response to them. Speaking more generally for a moment, the most extensive evidence we have of non-Brahmanical traditions throughout Indian history is of Buddhists and Jains: one of the most difficult but most pressing tasks of Indology, it seems to me, is to explore how far these traditions (which were obviously not monolithic and without subdivisions of their own) and Brahmanism shared the same language, both on occasion in the literal sense (Sanskrit) and in the wider sense of a shared cultural vocabulary, repertoire of stories, etc. To share a language is not to say the same things in it; and equally difficult and pressing is the task of assessing how far these various groups used similar concepts, narrative motifs, and the like, to say quite different things. Students of 'myth' have, of course, seen this: O'Flaherty (76: 33; cp. 25) introduced a summary of the AS story of origins by saying 'most cosmogonic myths in Buddhism are probably intended as satires on Hindu myths', both traditions drawing on a common fund of stories. Recently Obeyesekere (90: 128; cp. 130ff.) has written of 'the idea of debate [as] the hidden discourse that underlies myth variations'. AS has much in common with other origin stories in India; Gombrich (92a) has shown that there are specific and pointed references to Brahmanical motifs — in the form they are available to us, to specific Vedic texts, which he identifies. The target of the satire in AS

is, simultaneously, Vedic cosmogony and the social claims of the Brahmin class: as Smith (89), (92) has shown, the Veda as authoritative text and the social hierarchy were inter-related themes in pre-Buddhist Brahmanical cosmogony. Here, as in so many early texts, the Buddha is represented as knowing very well indeed the Brahmanism he rejects.

But it is not enough to position the authorial/redactional voice of AS in a pluralist, contested milieu of debate, and to speak of it as presenting a Buddhist-ascetic hierarchical model of society; nor is it enough to say that Buddhists and Brahmins (to keep to the two groups relevant to AS) speak the same language but say different things in it. For there may be differences in the *tone* of voice in which things are said; differences not just of content and meaning but also of style. The scholarly tradition of juxtaposing 'motifs' or 'themes', familiar in folklore, structuralist (and other) studies of myth, and elsewhere, may serve to hide from our view the particular qualities of a text which derive from its tone, its style. But to discuss this is to move from the context(s) of AS to the text itself; and for this I must stop and backtrack a little.

II. Some remarks on the text of AS

(i) *is the text as we have it a clumsy patchwork?*

Some previous scholarship on AS has taken the form of a textual analysis which sees inconsistencies and illogicalities in it, and then attempts to separate out its 'earlier' form.¹⁹ I find this approach unattractive for *a priori* reasons; I hope to show that it is inappropriate in relation to AS. It is true that the transition from #9 to #10 is sudden; and it is true that the 'origin myth', from #10 up to various points in #21, is found separately in later Buddhist texts, usually as a genealogy of the Śākya family. But since early Buddhist texts were composed and transmitted orally, it is no more than common-sense to assume that different tellings of a tale, in different discursive contexts, would be different, use elements from a repertoire differently, and so on. Given this, the mania — which is what I think it is — for an 'Ur-text' is entirely misplaced. Regardless of its origins in oral composition

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and transmission, the tradition has preserved AS in a particular (written) form; we must, I think, in the first instance seek for meanings in it *as it has been redacted to us*.²⁰ (I shall return to these issues in [iv] below.) We should approach the text as we have it respectfully, looking not to make hasty and superficial judgements about its disunity, but to seek out principles of structure and sequence which can give us a sense of why this particular crystallization²¹ of meanings took the form it did. I think such principles can be found: they are given in Parts III and IV below, and in the translation notes.

(ii) *what is the nature of the 'satire' in AS?*

Let me return here to the question of the tone of voice in AS. Earlier I cited O'Flaherty's description of it as satire. That there are humorous elements in the text has been accepted by all its modern readers. T. W. Rhys Davids wrote of AS, before any translation of it had appeared (1899: 107): 'we may not accept the historical accuracy of this legend. Indeed, a continual note of good-humoured irony runs through the whole story, with its fanciful etymologies of the names of the four *vanṇā*; and the aroma of it would be lost on the hearer who took it *au grand sérieux*'. Tambiah (89) quotes these words of Rhys Davids with approval, and argues, as he had done in (76) that 'behind the mockery directed at Brahmanical beliefs, there is a positive countervailing Buddhist account of the origins and evolution of the world, kingship and social differentiation'.²² He follows here, as earlier, Reynolds (72: 18), who wrote of a 'positive interpretation of the nature and function of royal authority' in AS. Gombrich (88: 85), seemingly to the contrary, writes that AS is 'an extended satire on brahminical ideas, full of parody and puns . . . As a debunking job I think the sermon is serious: its main aim is to show that the caste system is nothing but a human invention'. He adds there that 'I cannot go here into all the reasons why I think that the positive statements in the myth are satirical and not meant to be taken literally'. In his (92a) article he does so.

If there is disagreement here, what exactly is at issue? When Rhys Davids wrote of the text's 'historical accuracy', he was of course speaking in 19th. century historiographical terms: the story in AS, for us, cannot be taken to be, in von Ranke's phrase, *wie es eigentlich*

gewesen ist. No-one, I take it, would wish to disagree. (Even so, the quotation from Rhys Davids just given continues 'but it reveals a sound and healthy insight, and is much nearer to the actual facts than the Brahman legend it was intended to replace'.) There would seem to be an equivocation over the word 'positive'. Gombrich is using it partly in a historiographical sense, much as did Rhys Davids. Tambiah and Reynolds, it seems to me, are using the word in much the same sense that Gombrich intends when he says that the sermon is 'serious'; but they see the text, in addition to satirising Brahmanism, as intended to provide a non-satirical Buddhist charter for social arrangements. The issue then becomes one of what, if anything, we can say about the original sense and motivation of AS. Tambiah explicitly eschews the question: 'I must confess I was not there when the Buddha gave this discourse, nor was I able to ask him what he actually meant'; one should not, he thinks, 'take an absolutist stand, and insist on a single, unambiguous formulation of authorial intent' (89: 120; 102). (It is thus unclear, to me at least, exactly what exegetical status Tambiah accords to his own assertion that 'behind the mockery . . . there is a positive . . . account'.) Gombrich, on the contrary, wants to 'discover the original meaning of the Buddha's sermons' (92a: 160). I do not accept that we have only two options, either finding an 'original meaning' or abandoning ourselves to a free-for-all relativism, in which a text 'has no objective or inherent meaning' (ibid. 159). Varying readings of any text are always possible: but I think we have a responsibility to argue for different readings, some of which must be judged better than others. In this article I argue that AS was intended by its earliest composer(s) and redactors to be a humorous parable: its serious intent was as moral commentary rather than as a 'myth of origins = charter for society' or an account intended to be 'factually' or 'historically' accurate.

But what, again, is at issue here? One of the most discussed aspects of AS is its apparent proposal of a Social Contract theory of kingship (see Appendix 2). In western political thought it is still an uncertain, and in some ways now unimportant question how far social contract theorists believed their accounts of 'the Original Contract' to be historically factual descriptions of an event or allegories giving the justification for legal sanctions.²³ If western political thinkers in the

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last few centuries can be equivocal on the issue or unconcerned with it, why should we assume that the redactors of an ancient Indian narrative of the kind found in AS either did, or would have wanted to distinguish in the modern manner between 'empirical history' and 'legitimatory allegory'? I am certainly *not* saying that such a distinction would have been in all circumstances impossible: I am saying that it is not important in the interpretation of AS. Some words of T. S. Eliot seem apposite here: 'this alliance of levity and seriousness (by which the seriousness is intensified) is a characteristic of the wit we are trying to identify'.²⁴ One might adduce another analogy from the history of ideas in Europe. The utopian fables of Lucian seem to modern scholars to have been intended as satires; but later utopian writers regularly used themes from them non-satirically.²⁵ But here again, the distinction between 'literal' and 'allegorical' intent is often difficult to draw, and often unnecessary. The founder of the modern genre, Thomas More, seems to have intended the title of his *Utopia* specifically as an ambiguous (Greek) pun on *ou-topia*, 'No-place', and *eu-topia*, 'Good Place'. The ambiguity, both intended and not, between utopian texts as descriptions of real (actual or possible) societies and as fictions whose purpose is to criticize the writer's actual society runs throughout the utopian tradition. Many texts may be counted as much part of the tradition of (serious) political thought as of 'utopianism', *simpliciter*.²⁶

Indeed — to bring this discussion to a close — it seems to me that this issue can be seen to arise, in its most general form, from the nature of AS *as a text*. It is a commonplace nowadays to say that a text by definition presents us with a world, which cannot be *the* world. (I leave aside the difficult issue of how we can have cognitive access to *the* world outside textual representations of it.) If this is so, if the world of any text is necessarily *ou-topia*, a 'No-place', in relation to the real places of the material-historical world, then any composer/redactor/recounters of a text must present a world whose reference to *the* world is always up for discussion. It seems reasonable to assume not only that the ambiguities of that reference are not necessarily a matter of explicit concern to a text and its users, but also that they might offer — as in the case of western Social Contract and Utopian traditions — an opportunity for creativity.²⁷ I would suggest that AS

remains a lively and interesting text just because of this question (amongst other reasons), not in spite of it.

One last point needs to be dealt with here: that of what Rhys Davids called the 'fanciful etymologies' in AS. He was referring to the eight terms for social classes given in #21–5, and also by implication to the other things (surprisingly — see notes #13.4., 16.6, and Appendix 1) called *akkhara*-s; that is, the phrases 'oh the taste!' (#13) and 'we've had it, it's given out on us!' (#15), and the custom of throwing dirt, etc., at weddings (#16). In the case of the aetiologies given for the two phrases and the non-linguistic custom, I think there is clearly deliberate humor; and likewise with the derivations given for two of the terms for the brahmin class in #22–3 (see notes ad loc.). I argue (#21.1. and Appendix 1) that there are associations of the term *sammata* which render the choice of the title *mahāsammata* witty. But with the other five terms there is no humor obvious on the surface — indeed the etymology given for *rāja* in #21 also occurs in the Sanskrit *Mahābhārata*, without overt humor; and the last two are now rather opaque. Similar word-derivations are found in Pali canonical and commentarial texts where there is no humorous intent.²⁸ Such word-derivations were a long and established tradition in both Sanskrit and Pali; they are called *nirukti*-s in Sanskrit (the Pali sub-commentary to the first use of *akkhara* in AS #21 explains it as *nirutti*, DAT III 59–60).²⁹ For modern historical linguistics, these are indeed 'fanciful etymologies'; but the tradition of *nirukti* existed alongside that of *vyākaraṇa*, which we can recognise as very unfanciful, indeed as 'scientific' grammar. Both of these traditions, however, two of the traditional six kinds of Vedic study, are equally a-historical.³⁰ one might say that, for us, *vyākaraṇa* grammar is a-historical but scientific, *nirukti* etymology neither historical nor scientific. My conclusion in relation to AS is that while such word-derivations are not intrinsically humorous or 'fanciful', they are offered in this text, along with the three aetiologies, in such a way as to add to the tone of ironic and polemical wit. But the wit arises from the content of the aetiologies and 'etymologies', not their form.

(iii) *AS in relation to other early texts*

I want in this section to discuss some other texts, which like AS we

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have no reason to deny are early, and which seem to me to help clarify its meaning and style. First let me summarise my approach to AS. I take it to be a story whose *raison d'être* is to present a Buddhist-ascetic hierarchical model of society, offered with satirical and ironic wit in the manner of moral commentary, and with the discursive form of an aetiology. (For this reason I prefer to call its story of origins a parable rather than a myth.) Buddhist monasticism and morality order the logic of values and social relations: Brahmanical values are satirized and kingly values subordinated, albeit that neither the Brahmanical hierarchy of discrete social classes nor kingship are contested as 'social facts' (in the Durkheimian sense). This is the overall theme which structures the whole of AS as we have it, and which gives it unity and coherence. Brahmanical social classes are seen not as a cosmogonic 'success story' but as a 'Fall': this Fall/Evolution of Mankind is expressed in language and values derived from the Monastic Order. The earliest Community of Beings, what one might call the earliest *Samgha*, falls from 'glorious mind-made' celibacy to the contemporary, embodied Brahmanical social order, by a series of deeds which are described in the language used for the corresponding contraventions of the Monastic Rule, the *Vinaya*. Thus social classes and kings constitute a 'Fall' from an originally Buddhistic community (*aggañña* in the temporal sense of 'what is primary'); Buddhist moral values, which are laid out systematically in AS twice, before and after the story of origins, in #5–7 and #27–30, are 'what is primary' (*aggañña* in the evaluative sense: see p. 331 below). There are references to Brahmanical texts and practices in all parts of the text, and the story of king Pasenadi in #8 is thematically continuous with the understanding of kingship and the *ksatriya* class given in the parable.

Leaving aside whatever general value these introductory remarks might have, I hope that what I take to be my discovery of references to the *Vinaya* in AS represents a genuine contribution to knowledge. But if it is accepted that these references exist, one might then raise the general issue of what such 'reference' means: how far, and in what ways, can we use other texts to elucidate AS? Overall, there seems to me no *a priori* solution to the question of inter-textuality. There can be no way of proving that all, most or any audiences for individual Buddhist texts would have interpreted them in the light of others: we

must argue from internal evidence. I think that the references to Brahmanical ideas and texts for whose presence Gombrich argues, and those to the *Vinaya* I adduce here, suggest that AS was composed in and for an educated milieu familiar with both styles of thought, one which could smile at its wit, and appreciate its serious intention. If that were the case, then perhaps we may suppose, not that other texts were automatically in the minds of its audience in an academic-commentarial manner, but that certain lines of interpretation would be made possible (or impossible) by what is found in other texts on comparable themes, and with which an educated Buddhist audience might also be expected to be familiar. That such texts are directly relevant to AS must be shown not merely by thematic resemblance, but by specific textual cues: similarity of phrasing, shared characters, etc. On this assumption, then, I will describe briefly some texts from the *Sutta Nipāta* and *Majjhima Nikāya* which I think help us to appreciate the nature of the ascetic hierarchy presented in AS, and to get closer to assessing the spirit in which its parable of origins should be read.

The Buddha's discussion in AS is said to have taken place with two young brahmins, 'aspiring to become monks', who bear the names of two famous old Brahmanical families, Vāseṭṭha (Sanskrit Vāsiṣṭha) and Bhāradvāja. They appear in two other well-known texts in which Brahmanism is criticised, the *Tevijjā Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (no. 13), and the *Vāseṭṭha Sutta*, redacted in both the *Sutta Nipāta* (Sn. pp. 115–123) and the *Majjhima Nikāya* (no. 98). (This very fact suggests that the *Vāseṭṭha Sutta* might be well-known to Buddhist audiences.) At the start of the latter, before their conversion to Buddhism, they declare themselves 'adept in the three vedas . . . philologists, grammarians, like our teachers in (vedic) recitation',³¹ but in disagreement as to whether a person becomes a brahmin by birth (*jāti*: cp. AS # 3–4) or by action (*karma*, Pali *kamma*). The Buddha's reply first states that although 'manifold indeed are [the] species of living beings' (the word for 'species' here is also *jāti*, which is in addition the usual word for 'caste'), there are no such sub-divisions among human beings: 'among men difference in spoken of as a matter of designation' (*samaññā*: cf. Appendix 1 for this as a commentarial gloss on *akkhara* in AS, and below on the Discourse at Madhurā). Thereafter, as

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ubiquitously in early texts, the Buddha uses the designation 'brahmin' to refer to one who lives according to Buddhist values, not to the members of a particular group.³² First, he says that 'whoever among men makes his living by keeping cows . . . is a farmer not a brahman'; then the same thing is said of various 'occupations': craftsman, merchant, servant, thief, fighting man, sacrificer (one who lives by *porohicca*, a reference to the Brahmanical office of *purohita*) and king. 'Nor do I call (him) a brahman (who is) born in a (particular) womb, and has his origin in a (particular) mother' (*yonija . . . mattsambhava*; cf. AS # 4). After a long and lyrical evocation of the values which define a (true, Buddhist) brahmin, each of these occupations is said to be a matter of 'action', and 'the supreme state of being a brahman' is said to be attained by the religious life of celibacy; any person who has reached liberation (in Buddhist terms) 'is Brahmā (and) Sakka [i.e. the Brahmanical gods Brahmā and Indra] to those who know'.

In this text the two youths are first presented as pupils of 'distinguished and wealthy brahmins', in dispute over an issue central to Brahmanism; at the end they declare themselves lay-followers of the Buddha. Exactly the same thing is true of the *Tevijjā Sutta*, in which the dispute concerns their respective Brahmin teachers, and where the closing refrain is identical to that of the *Vāseṭṭha Sutta*. In AS they are presented as living with the monks at Sāvathī, and aspiring to become monks (themselves). The commentaries to both the *Tevijjā Sutta* and AS (Sv 406, 860) connect the three stories about the two youths into a continuous narrative: after the *Vāseṭṭha Sutta* they declared themselves lay-followers; after the *Tevijjā* they did so again, but thereafter (after a few days according to Sv 406) took the Minor Ordination to become Buddhist novices. At the start of AS they are aspiring to become monks, hoping to take the Major Ordination. (Sv 406 says that after AS they did so, and attained liberation; cp. Sv 872.) Being formerly 'adept in the three vedas . . . philologists, grammarians, like our teachers in (vedic) recitation', they would thus be a good audience both for the references to Vedic hymns and for the 'etymologies' in AS; as novices they would presumably be becoming familiar with the *Vinaya* rules,³³ and thus also a good audience for the references to it in the parable of origins. (Obviously, in a historical sense, the 'audi-

individual from any class leaves home for homelessness, and lives virtuously, the king 'salutes him respectfully, rises up from his seat for him' (as in AS #8), supports him materially and affords him protection: in such a case, 'the previous designation "kṣatriya" (etc.) has disappeared, and he is reckoned simply as "ascetic"' (*yā hi 'ssa . . . pubbe khattiyo ti samaññā, sā 'ssa antarahitā, samaṇo t' eva saṅkham gacchati*). Two things are worthy of comment: first, it is a condition of such respect that the ascetic be virtuous; second, as in the *Vāsetṭha Sutta*, the designation 'ascetic' is no more an ascribed social status than is 'thief'. Both can be acquired by behaviour, by an individual from any of the four ascribed Brahmanical classes.

In *Majjhima Sutta* 93 (M II 147–157), the Discourse with Assalāyana, the Buddha persuades the eponymous Brahmin to agree that 'purity belongs to (all) four classes' (*cātuvaṇṇi suddhi*), in opposition to the notion that Brahmins are the best class, etc. He does this by means of a long series of arguments, of which the first three are relevant here. The first is that that Brahmin women give birth in the normal way, and so Brahmins are not 'born of Brahmā' (the same as AS #4: see #4.2). The third is exactly the same as (ii) in the Discourse at Madhurā above, blending language from sections #5, #6, #27 and #28 in AS. The second is that 'in Yona, Kambojā and other neighbouring areas' there are only two classes, masters and slaves, and that these positions can be reversed (a striking anticipation of Hegel). If we can assume that the narrative voice in texts which use the same language to make the same points is homogenous, it follows that AS cannot be thought to offer a myth of cosmogony and society which takes for granted the universal existence of the four Brahmanical classes, when they are specifically said in the Assalāyana Sutta to be local and contingent arrangements. When the two texts are taken together, we must take the story of origins in AS to be a parable exemplifying a moral truth rather than an account intended to convey a simple (and single) historical truth.

(iv) *notes on the status of my interpretation*

It might be useful to offer some remarks on the status of the interpretation offered here. As mentioned earlier, the story of origins, from section #10 to some or all of #21, circulated separately elsewhere in

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the Buddhist tradition, from at least the time of the *Mahāvastu* and the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*. The Pali commentarial tradition seems not to have understood the text in the way I do, or if it did has not said so; the commentary does notice some jokes (see #4.3) and both commentary and sub-commentary are aware of one of the references to Vedic ideas (see #3.3), but neither mention the *Vinaya*. For some readers, perhaps, this in itself might be enough to render what I say an over-speculative and purely modern reading. Ultimately, the worth of my interpretation must be judged on its own merits, according to the weight of the detailed evidence and arguments adduced. Modern scholars of Classical Greek texts are not necessarily concerned if their interpretations of them were not shared by commentators in the intervening centuries. I do think that, in the Pali Buddhist case, there are reasons for paying great attention to the commentarial tradition when considering the development of systematic and context-free religious doctrine, and the way the later tradition understood (and redacted) its canonical texts from that point of view. But with a text as context-sensitive as I believe AS to be, perhaps we might accord ourselves greater interpretive autonomy. I do not wish merely to say that, as a reader, I have the privilege to respond in any way I like to a text, and so my interpretation is self-justificatory. I want my reading to be accorded historical value, to be seen as discovering motifs and intentions genuinely present in the text and in the minds of its original composer(s) and (at least some of) its original audience(s). If this is so, how can I explain the fact that other texts present versions of #10–21 with apparently straightforward seriousness, and that the commentarial tradition has failed either to notice or to mention the references to the *Vinaya* I see in AS? I will sketch out an answer to these questions, but I do not expect to close the issue decisively — I am content to leave the matter open for discussion.

If I am right, AS (that is, some oral ancestor of our written text) was originally composed in the pre-Mauryan period in Northeast India, in the socio-economic and political circumstances described in Part I (ii) and (iii), circumstances discovered by modern historiography. Although it would be wrong to allege that ancient South Asians had no 'historical consciousness', it is hardly surprising that memories and narratives of the past were then deployed, in texts, in ways very

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different from those of modern socio-political history. So perhaps it is no surprise that the picture which modern historians reconstruct, and which I have used to elucidate AS, was not of concern to the Buddhist tradition. Both the *Mahāvastu* and *Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya*, in the form we have them, are without doubt post-Mauryan (although they may preserve some materials from earlier times),³⁷ and are contemporary with what I called earlier the 'tension-filled amalgam' of 'Hindu orthodoxy', which evolved as a successful response to the challenge posed by non-Brahmanical groups during the Mauryan empire. Perhaps in such changed socio-political and cultural circumstances the situational relevance of AS was lost. I cited earlier the fact of Lucian's 'satires' being treated non-satirically by later writers in Europe. AS may be a parallel case. Furthermore, while I hold that AS as we have it is a coherent and continuous whole, with lexical, semantic and thematic elements common to both the parable of origins and its frame, there would seem no reason to deny that some comparable story of origins could have existed separately in the oral culture of early Buddhism. If so, and if later composers wished to use it in other ways, they may have adopted the version redacted in AS, without worrying that the connexions between the origin-story and its frame therein would be lost. Once the frame-story had been excised, and with it what I have called the aspect of moral commentary in AS, there would remain little significance in the references to the *Vinaya*, and so they too would have been ignored.

What of the commentarial texts, redacted as we have them in Sri Lanka in the second half of the 1st. millenium A.D.? Gombrich (92a: 160—1) has argued that the composition of the commentaries was 'separated from that of the *suttas* not only in time but also in space' (that is, in South India and/or Ceylon centuries later); this is undoubtedly true of their present redaction, but it may be that some commentaries preserve much earlier material.³⁸ In the case of the commentaries on AS, I must simply argue that the fact that they misunderstand and/or ignore many of the references and meanings that I allege it contains, is in itself evidence that they were not composed in close temporal and spatial cultural proximity to it. (In the case of resonances with the *Vinaya* rules, perhaps they were too obvious to need mention?) Certainly the cultural circumstances of Theravāda

Buddhism in Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia were very different from those of early (and, indeed, later) Buddhism in India. Indian Buddhist texts were produced in a milieu of constant and endemic ideological plurality: kings, Brahmins, Jains and others all had their own hierarchical models of social relations. In Sri Lanka, however, although it would be severely mistaken to assume that the Mahāvihārin version of Theravāda which survives was ever the only and unchallenged version of Buddhism,³⁹ and although there were periodically kings who favoured some version of what is now called 'Hinduism', by and large Pali commentaries were produced in a cultural situation where articulated alternative visions of society were very much less powerful. Accordingly here, as in Southeast Asia after Theravāda had been 'established' there by kings, given that Brahmanical ideology was not a significant competitor, Buddhist intellectuals had merely to work out some *modus vivendi* with kings. Thus as a system of thought Buddhism became more concerned with cosmology and cosmogony, in the sense that it became more concerned to give its own ideological grounding of the existing social 'world' than it ever was in India, where it could preserve its stance of moral commentary on Brahmanism. It would, indeed, also be severely mistaken to see such later Buddhist texts as proffering a whole and complete legitimation of social and political life: no transcendental salvation system can ever be without some tension with mundane matters, and I prefer to speak, as earlier, of an antagonistic symbiosis between king-thugs and Buddhist-legitimizers. Both the antagonism and the symbiosis could fluctuate in different times and places. But it becomes less surprising in such a context that the story of origins in AS should no longer be read as a parable, and that, since elements from it were now detached from their original context in AS,⁴⁰ it should take on the force of a legitimacy myth-charter. Here again, once the references to Brahmanical ideology and the socio-moral context of AS had been lost, it is plausible to assume that the allusions to other Buddhist texts I adduce here would also have been lost, or ignored.

III. *The Story of Origins, monastic life and ideals, and the Vinaya*

(i) *individual verbal reminiscences of the Monastic Code (Vinaya)*

Here I simply list the relevant places: the translation notes contain the textual and linguistic detail.

11ff. The first food-stuffs likened to ghee (*sappi*), cream (*navanīta*) and honey (*madhu*): three of the five 'medicines' allowed to monks and nuns (Nissaggiya Pācittiya 23, et freq.; see below).

12. Tasting the 'earth-essence' with the finger: contravenes Sekhiya rules 52 and 53 (see # 12.2).

12. Taking (big) mouthfuls with the hands: contravenes Sekhiya rules 39, 40, and (possibly) 42 and 46 (see # 12.3).

16. Having sex: contravenes Pārājikā 1. Note the use of *āpajjati* in # 17 (see # 17.3). 'Away with you and your impurity!' (*nassa asuci*): recalls use of *nāseti* as a technical term for expulsion from the monkhood (see # 16.4 and 5).

17. Making houses (*agārāni . . . kātum*): contradicts the fundamental symbol of monastic life, 'going forth from home to homelessness' (*agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajjā*). Such *pabbajjā* constitutes the (first) change of status from layperson to (novice) monk, the 'lower ordination'. Houses are said to be made for the purpose of concealing/covering immorality; cp. the ubiquitous motif 'dwelling in a house is a constriction . . . going-forth is an open-air life'.⁴¹

17. Storing food for 8 days: contravenes Nissaggiya Pācittiya 23 and Pācittiya 38. Note the grammatical peculiarity of *sannidhi-kāraṇaṃ* (see below pp. 328–9).

18. 'Setting a limit' (*mariyādā*): may recall monastic boundaries (*sīmā*) (see # 18.2).

20. The verb *khīyati*, 'become angry': found standardly in this sense only as a formulaic expression in the *Vinaya* (see # 20.1).

21. The term *mahāsammata*: modelled on monastic appointments (see Appendix 1).

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(ii) *the Five Impossible Things*

These verbal reminiscences are already enough to suggest that AS is deliberately alluding to the *Vinaya*; this is proven, I think, by the semantic and lexical parallels between AS, the *Vinaya* Code, and a list of ascetic ideals found in a number of texts, which give five 'impossible things' (*abhabba-tthānāni*), five things which an enlightened monk cannot commit (*so abhabbo pañca thānāni ajjhācaritum*). The similarities are striking, albeit that many of the phrases are common in other texts. The five things are listed, in only very slightly differing forms, at D III 133 (in a list of nine), 235, M I 523 and A IV 370; I cite the version at M I 523. The first four are similar in content, though not in language, to the first four of the Five Precepts, incumbent on all Buddhists; the specific wording of all five recalls directly various rules from the *Vinaya* code:

'It is impossible that a monk who is an Arahant, in whom the corruptions have wasted away, who has lived the (holy) life, done what has to be done, laid down the burden, attained the true goal, in whom the fetters of existence are destroyed, who is released by right wisdom, should commit the five crimes.' (This list of epithets is found very frequently, and appears in AS # 7, 31) They are:

1. 'He cannot intentionally deprive a living thing of life' (*sañcicca pānaṃ jīvitaṃ voropetum*). The wording here is identical to Pācittiya 61, and almost identical to Pārājikā 3, against killing human beings (*sañcicca manussaviggahaṃ jīvitaṃ voropeyya*).
2. 'He cannot take what is not given, intending to steal it' (*adinnaṃ theyyasamkhātaṃ ādātum*). This is identical to Pārājikā 2. The texts explain *theyyasamkhātaṃ* as referring to the intention to steal (Vin I 46, Kkh 26–7) (but see # 20.2).
3. 'He cannot have sex' (*methunaṃ dhammaṃ patisevitum*). This is identical to Pārājikā 1.
4. 'He cannot tell a conscious lie' (*sampajānamusā bhāsītum*). This is identical to Pācittiya 1 (the first ten Pācittiyas are called the 'chapter on lying', *mūsāvādavaggo*); it also recalls Pārājikā 4, against falsely claiming higher spiritual achievements.

5. 'He cannot enjoy (objects of) desire, making a store (of them) as he formerly did when living in a house' (*sannidhikāraṇaṃ kāme paribhuñjītuṃ seyyathā pi pubbe agāriyabhūto*). This recalls both Nissaggiya Pācittiya 23 and Pācittiya 38: the similarity calls for extended comment.

(iii) 'making a store'; the Fall of Mankind and Vinaya infractions

The word *kāma* can be both subjective and objective, referring to desire and its objects. While it stands for attachment to anything and everything in Buddhist psychology, there is clearly an emphasis on sensual and sexual pleasure. The verb *bhuj*, used here, can mean to eat, and also to consume or enjoy in any and every sense. In this context all these connotations of the word are in play, with the idea that the householder stores both the actual objects of his enjoyment (from food to wife) and the psychological propensity to desire them. The form of the word *sannidhi-kāraṇaṃ* is of particular importance here. The suffix *-kāraṇa* is usually used to refer to a person or process which makes something, or to the act of making. Here neither sense is syntactically appropriate, and the word seems to agree with nothing in the sentence. The commentary to the passage cited (Ps III 234) glosses it as an absolutive or gerund, *sannidhiṃ katvā*, 'having made a store', and states that such a monk cannot eat foods such as sesame, husked rice, ghee, cream, etc., which he has stored for present consumption, as he did when a layman enjoying material pleasures (*yathā pubbe gihībhūto sannidhiṃ katvā vatthukāme paribhuñjati evaṃ tila-taṇḍula-sappi-navanīṭādīni sannidhiṃ katvā idāni paribhuñjītuṃ abhabbo*).⁴² The explanation of *sannidhikāraṇaṃ* as a gerund is found in most of the relevant commentaries,⁴³ and seems to be historically correct. Edgerton, in BHS Grammar # 22.5 and # 35.5. describes what he calls 'quasi-gerunds' in *-akam*, and adds that some are found in the Pali Pātimokkha. Examples in the Pātimokkha are Nissaggiya Pācittiya 23, Pācittiya 38 (both with exactly this phrase; see below), and Sekhiya 18–28. Gerunds in *-am* are called adverbial by Whitney (1989: 359–60), *ṇamul* in the terminology of Pāṇinian grammar: they are even rarer in Pali than in Sanskrit, but they are found.⁴⁴ AS contains two, in # 12 *ālumpa-kāraṇaṃ* (see # 12.3), and in # 17 this word, *sannidhi-kāraṇaṃ*.

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Nissaggiya Pācittiya 23 forbids storing the five medicines for longer than 7 days: . . . *sappi, navanīṭam, telam, madhu, phānītam: tāni paṭiggahetvā sattāhapaṇamam sannidhikāraṇaṃ paribhuñjītabbāni; tam atikkāmayato, nissaggiyaṃ pācittiyaṃ*, 'after ghee, cream, oil, honey and molasses have been accepted, they can be eaten after keeping them in store for seven days at most; if someone lets (seven days) pass, this is an offence requiring expiation with forfeiture'. Pācittiya 38 forbids storing all foods: *yo pana bhikkhu sannidhikāraṇaṃ khādanīyaṃ vā bhojanīyaṃ vā khādeyya vā bhūñjeyya vā, pācittiyaṃ*, 'if a monk eats hard or soft food which he has stored, there is an offence requiring expiation'; an amendment given immediately after the rule (Vin IV 87) states that storing food for up to seven days (here using a standard gerund *nīdahitvā*) is allowable (cp. also Vin I 209, with the gerund form *-kāraṇaṃ*). The motif of the ideal monk not storing food was well-known; it appears, for example, at Sn 924, in one of the earliest Buddhist poems known to us: 'having received (something) he would not make a hoard [*na sannidhiṃ kayirā*] of food and drink, eatables and clothes'. (Cp. Sn 306 concerning the [true] brahmin, cited on p. 320.) Note that the commentary cited above, Ps III 234, used 'husked rice' (*taṇḍula*) to exemplify the things an ideal monk cannot store. Monks, of course, are presented with husked rice by their donors, cooked or uncooked — it is one of the foods which monks are allowed to accept and take into the monastery to be kept and cooked up to a week later at Vin I 211 — as were the beings in AS before storing began. In AS # 17, it is after storing has reached 8 days that 'powder and husk covered the grain' ('grain' = *taṇḍula*). Thus storing rice in the parable has no consequence until one being goes over the seven day *Vinaya* limit. Storing food beyond that time, of course, is allowable for a layperson; the fifth impossible thing specifically states that the monk cannot now make a store of (objects of) desire 'as he formerly did when living in a house'. In AS # 16 and # 17, two sections which could be separated differently, as does Walshe's (87) translation, or run together to form a single section, there is a close connexion between sex, living in houses, storing food, and the subsequent need for rice-cultivation.

The conclusion seems to me inescapable that both the 'five impossible things' and AS are deliberately recalling the *Vinaya* rules, both in

language and content. The rules should have been familiar to all monks and nuns, as the *Pātimokkha* was (supposed to be) recited every fortnight in the presence of all members of each monastic community. The five infractions of the *Vinaya* impossible for an ideal ascetic are thus precisely the stages in the Fall of Mankind from celibacy to civilisation, in sections # 16—20. Each and every event in the degeneration of beings is in some way related to the monastic order, its ideals and its Code:

12 eating with a finger and then in handfuls: contravenes Sekhiya rules (as above, p. 326).

13—5 'pride in appearance' (*vaṇṇa*): cp. the class- (*vaṇṇa*-)pride and related denigration of Buddhist monks attributed to Brahmins at the start of the sutta, which had been abandoned by Vāsetṭha and Bhāradvāja in their intention to become monks (cf. IV below on keywords).

16 having sex: (Impossible Thing no. 3) contravenes *Pārājika* 1: *methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiseviṃsu*; beings 'expelled from the *saṃgha*' because of this: *nassa* (referring to *nāsanā*).

17 storing rice for more than 7 days: (Impossible Thing no. 5) contravenes *Nissaggiya Pācittiya* 23, *Pācittiya* 38): *yato te . . . satta sannidhikāraṃ sālīṃ upakkamiṃsu paribhuñjītuṃ, atho kaṇo pi taṇḍulaṃ pariyaṇandhi, thuso pi taṇḍulaṃ pariyaṇandhi . . .*

19 theft: (Impossible Thing no. 2) contravenes *Pārājika* 2: *sakaṃ bhāgaṃ parirakkhanto aññataraṃ bhāgaṃ adinnaṃ ādiyitvā paribhuñji*. Note that the text specifies that he kept his own portion (of rice) while taking another's, which has not been given; this underscores that it counts as an intentional theft, not simple carelessness about ownership.

19 lying: (Impossible Thing no. 4) contravenes *Pācittiya* 1: *musāvādo paññāyati*.

19—20: Impossible Thing no. 1 (cf. *Pācittiya* 61 against killing any living thing, and *Pārājika* 1, against murder) is not described directly as AS, but may be inferred. It is first adumbrated by the violence of the beings in # 19, and then — by implication — by the legitimate

punishment given by the first king in # 20. The text does not specify that capital punishment is involved, but this is assumed by the commentarial tradition: Sv 870 glosses the phrase *khīyitabbam khīyeyya*, inter alia, as *hāretabbam hāreyya*, simply 'remove (whoever) has to be removed'; the sub-commentary, DAT III 59) explains, somewhat gingerly, *sattanikāyato nihāretabbam*, '(whoever) is to be removed from the world of beings'. It has almost always been an accepted part of a king's function throughout Buddhist and Indian history to execute criminals, and this of course makes Buddhist moral ambiguity about them automatic and unavoidable.⁴⁵ In AS, sex and storing rice are called in # 18 *pāpakā akusalā dhammā*, 'bad, unwholesome things'; in # 19 and # 20 theft, lying and violence are called 'bad'; the term *daṇḍādānaṃ*, 'taking up the stick', refers here to the beings' violence in # 19, but *daṇḍa* is also a standard term for royal punishment; in # 22 these three things, and the now apparently legitimate royal activity of *pabbājana*, 'banishing', are called 'bad, unwholesome things', seemingly with the approval of the narrative voice (see # 20.2 on royal punishment for theft, and # 22.1).

IV. The structure of AS, and key-words

Part of the unity and coherence of AS is achieved by the repetition of certain key words, often with deliberate plays on their various senses. The words are *agga*, *aggañña*, *seṭṭha*, the prefix *brahma-*, and *vaṇṇa*. (For the close relationship between the first four of these terms, see # 7.2, 7.3, and # 9.2.) I accept Gombrich's (92a: 169—70) analysis of *aggañña* as an adjective formed by the ending *-ñña* added to *agga* in the sense of 'first'; *aggañña* thus means, in his rendering, 'primeval' or 'original'. I think there is also a deliberate play on words here with *agga* in the sense of 'best', found in # 7 and # 31 (see # 7.2). Fortunately for a translator, the English 'primary' can also have the same two senses: the first two meanings listed in the Oxford English Dictionary are 'of the first order in time or temporal sequence; earliest, primitive, original' and 'of the first or highest rank or importance; that claims the first consideration; principal; chief'. In the title of the *sutta* I render the word 'what is primary', as I see it deliberately catching both senses; the grammatical nature of the phrase *aggaṃ akkhāyati* in # 7

and # 31 suggests the English 'what is primary' there too (see # 7.2), albeit that to refer to a person as 'what is primary' is a little ungainly in English.

The word *settha* means 'best', and is used repeatedly in the text by various people of various things (see below); the prefix *brahma-* can be used with the same meaning in Pali, and this allows puns on the name of the Brahmanical god *Brahmā* (see # 9.2, # 32.1). It is not surprising, in a text proposing an (ascetic) hierarchy, that there should be so many words, so often repeated, for 'best', etc. The most polyvalent term in AS, and the most frequently repeated, is *vanṇa*. On its first appearance it is used by Brahmins to refer to their social class; as Gombrich (92a: 163, cf. 168) points out, it can also mean 'colour', 'complexion', 'good looks'; I have sometimes rendered it 'appearance' (see # 11.3 and 13.1). All these senses are used as the text goes along; but in each case echoes of the other senses are also in play.

I set out here the structure of AS as I see it, showing where and how the key-words occur. I label the first two parts 'Story of the Present' and 'Story of the Past' to evoke the use of the same terms in the structure of Jātaka narratives. I see the organisation of AS as in this sense analogous to that of Jātaka tales, although it is not, of course, presented as such.

1. Story of the Present (# 1–9)

- # 1–7 Conversation with Brahmins about Brahmins
settha = 'best', in # 3, # 4, # 7, used by Brahmins of their class (*vanṇa*); used by the Buddha of the *Dhamma* in # 7
agga = 'best' ('what is primary') used by the Buddha of the Arahant in # 7. (The logic of # 7 proves there to be a close link between *settha* and *agga*: see # 7.3)
Brahmā: used as the name of a god in # 3, # 4, # 7
- # 8 King Pasenadi and the Buddha
settha = 'best' used by the Buddha of the *Dhamma* (twice)
 Note the epithets used for the Buddha and Pasenadi (see # 8.1 and 3)
- # 9 Buddhist ascetics superordinate to kings and Brahmins

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(For continuity with # 8 re: kings, see # 9.1 on *Sakyaputtiya*)
Brahmā: used both as the name of a god and, punningly, as a prefix in the sense of 'best' (see # 9.2)
Dhamma, said to be 'best' in # 7, # 8, replaces god *Brahmā* in the series of epithets used of the Buddha

2. Story of the Past (# 10–26)

- # 10–17 From immaterial celibacy to household life, food-storage and agriculture
aggañña = 'primary' (*agga* = 'first') in # 13, # 15, # 16
vanṇa =₁ 'colour' (of foodstuffs) in # 11, # 12, # 14
 =₂ 'appearance' (by itself and in compounds) in # 12, # 13, # 14, # 15, # 16 (total of 29 times):
 echoes of 'class' as used in # 3, # 4, # 7
- # 18 Recapitulation, and appearance of private property
- # 19–20 From private property to crime and punishment
tadagge = 'from this beginning' (*agga* = 'first')
- # 21–26 Etymologies for the 4 Brahmanical classes, called 'groups' (*maṇḍala*); renouncer-Brahmins, royal cities, the ascetic group
aggañña = 'primary', used 8 times in # 21–25
settha: used of the *Dhamma* in # 21, # 24, # 25, # 26; and (pejoratively) of Brahmins in # 23
- # 27–32 Conclusion
- # 27–30 Morality, Rebirth and Release the same for all social groups (repeats sentiments of # 5–7)
- # 31 The Arahant is what is primary (repeats end of # 7 verbatim)
agga = 'best' (perhaps a hint of the other sense: see # 31.2)
settha = 'best', used of the *Dhamma*
- # 32 *Brahmā* *Sanamkumāra*'s (the Ever-Virgin's: see # 32.1) Verse

settha = 'best', used of ksatriyas vis-à-vis the human world, of 'the person endowed with wisdom and right conduct' vis-à-vis the universe as a whole

Brahmā: used in a characteristically Buddhist sense (see # 32.1)

This outline can show the overall structure of the text, and the continuity of vocabulary; it cannot give a feel for the logic of the narrative as it moves along in a coherent sequence. The story of origins, then, far from being an extraneous and disconnected insertion, as has been alleged, is intimately tied to the focus of the text as a whole. The immediate transition from # 9 to # 10 is effected by the replacement of the Vedas by the *Dhamma* (the Word of the Buddha) and of *Brahmā* by the Buddha, who 'has the best body', and 'is the best' (*brahma-kāyo*, *brahma-bhūto*) (see # 9.2).

I shall not take space here to recapitulate the argument of the Introduction as a whole, nor to set out in detail the correspondences between Gellner's vision of agrarian society and the themes of AS. If they are not obvious already, they will become so on re-reading.

In the translation which follows, as said earlier, I have aimed at accuracy rather than elegance. I have omitted some, but not all repetitions in the text, in deference to modern English prose style. This does of course slightly alter the flavour and pace of the narrative, but this will not matter for my purpose here, which is exegetical.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

I am grateful to various friends and colleagues for helpful comments on an earlier draft: at Chicago, Wendy Doniger, Paul Griffiths and Sheldon Pollock made both minor and major suggestions for revision; Phyllis Granoff provided additional data and suggestions. Roy Norman read it with characteristically generous care, making a number of corrections and useful remarks. I am especially grateful to Patrick Olivelle for forcing me to think much harder about the issue of how to treat the 'satire' in AS than I had done, and for patiently discussing at length with me a number of other questions. Anyone who reads Richard Gombrich's (88) book and (92a) article will see how much I have learned from him, despite differences of emphasis in our readings of AS. I imagine they would all still disagree with some, perhaps much of what I say. Responsibility for the interpretation given here is entirely mine.

Since I present this article as an improvement on the Rhys Davids's translation, I

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should like to dedicate it to the memory of T. W. Rhys Davids, a giant on whose shoulders we stand.

¹ The argument is stated at greatest length in (88), from which page references are given in the text; versions of it appear in a number of Gellner's works: see, e.g., the summary version in (83) Chapter 2, 'Culture in Agrarian Society'.

² In this article I use Sanskrit rather than Pali terms for the four Brahmanical social classes, as they are best known in English in that form; I used the anglicised 'brahmin(s)' except when quoting from others, where I retain their spelling.

³ Gellner's phrase 'conspicuous self-exile' recalls Peter Brown's work on the late antique 'holy man', and the 'rituals of disengagement' which make possible his particular social role(s). See Brown (71) and (78). I have tried before, in Collins (88), to apply this analytical perspective to Buddhist monasticism.

⁴ Erdosi (88: 112).

⁵ Summary accounts can be found in Ghosh (73), Sharma (83) and Erdosi (88); the latter contains a judicious and helpful discussion of the problems of dating both Brahmanical and Buddhist texts, and of relating both to the archeological data currently known.

⁶ See Bechert (91), and other forthcoming volumes on the subject under his editorship.

⁷ Erdosi (88: 16).

⁸ Gombrich (88: 49–59) offers an elegant summary.

⁹ See Olivelle (92), Introduction section 2, and (93) Chapter 2.2–3. Earlier van Buitenen (81: 12) had sketched out a similar idea.

¹⁰ For this political history, see esp. Erdosi (88: 118–50).

¹¹ They are: the majority of the *Digha*, *Majjhima*, *Samyutta* and *Aṅguttara Nikāya*-s, and the *Sutta Nipāta*, with perhaps some other short texts from the *Khuddaka Nikāya*. The *Abhidhamma* has always been accepted to be late; recent evidence is tending to suggest that the version of the *Vinaya* we have is a later redaction, although it too contains no reference to imperial formations.

¹² Where such a figure is mentioned, as in the well-known *Cakkavattisihanāda Sutta*, which was redacted next to AS in the *Digha* collection, and which shares certain narrative motifs with it, there are two interpretive options. Either one decides such passages were redacted after the Mauryan empire; or one follows Gombrich (88: 82), who writes 'the representation of one's own king as a world-ruler of untrammelled power is a commonplace of the ideology informing Vedic ritual. It was an institutionalised fantasy'; therefore, it could have existed before the realisation of large-scale empires. In either case, such passages cannot be read as containing depictions of the pre-Mauryan historical world. This is not the case with AS.

¹³ See Olivelle (93: Chapter 2.2 note 85) who cites Ghosh (73: 19–21) and Erdosi (88: 126).

¹⁴ See Olivelle (91), and other literature cited there.

¹⁵ (78); see also Burghart (85).

¹⁶ See Erdosi (88: 17–8, 118).

¹⁷ Such literature was in large part written by brahmins. Indeed, as Patrick Olivelle reminds me, we should note another ambiguity, or divergence of emphasis within Brahmanism, in addition to that between ascetics and non-ascetics discussed in the text below: that is, between liturgical and other texts which place the brahmin at the

top of the social hierarchy, and other texts — including even the *Manusmṛiti* — which make the king the highest.

¹⁸ (92: 22–3), referring to Heesterman (85).

¹⁹ The first to suggest that the story of origins must have been a separate text was Edmunds (04: 207–9); more recently Schneider (57) and Meising (88) have taken a similar approach.

²⁰ I am here influenced by recent trends in Homeric scholarship; see, e.g., Macleod (82), esp. pp. ix and 37–40, and Griffin (80), esp. pp. 12–5.

²¹ I use this term in the sense proposed by Ramanujan (91).

²² See also Sarkisyanz (65). Much of the heat, and much of the point, can be removed from the debate between Tambiah and Carrithers (77), (87), (93: chapter 7), when one distinguishes what AS and the figure of *mahāsammata* might be in their earliest form, and what the 'myth of origins' and *Mahāsammata* (*sic*, now become a proper name for an individual) became in the later tradition.

²³ Some seem to have taken it as historically factual, pointing to what they thought was the 'natural', pre-political, 'pre-Contract' condition of the newly-discovered American Indian tribes as empirical evidence; others seem to have recognised the allegorical nature of the story, while still according it explanatory and legitimacy value. See Lessnoff (86).

²⁴ He was writing of the poet Andrew Marvell (32: 255). I am grateful to Gananath Obeyesekere for introducing me to this passage (in a talk entirely unconnected with AS), and for kindly tracking down the precise reference.

²⁵ Manuel and Manuel (79: 16, 80, 103, 229, 343).

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 1 on More, and *passim*.

²⁷ I think it would be interesting to study the Brahmanical tradition of *dharmā-śāstra* from this 'o/eu-topian' perspective; but that must await another occasion, and perhaps another scholar.

²⁸ See, e.g. KRN Coll. Pap. II # 43 on the *Sabhiya Sutta*.

²⁹ Kahrs (83) has argued that in Sanskrit, such 'etymologies' are to be understood in relation to the Brahmanical view of it as a language with a special and direct relation to reality: thus, the more meanings perceivable in a word, the more it tells us about the world. RFG cites Kahrs, arguing that the etymologies in AS are deliberately parodying this view. I am not sure that this point is decidable. As I hope to show in a future article, while there is some evidence that early Buddhism did have a view of language as purely conventional, by the commentarial period the form of Middle Indo-Aryan we call Pali (for the texts, the language of Magadha) was seen as having a privileged, epistemologically direct relation to reality, if not the ontological status accorded to Sanskrit in the Brahmanical *Mīmāṃsā* school.

³⁰ See Bronkhorst (83); and for the a-historicism of Sanskrit Deshpande (85).

³¹ Translations from the *Sutta Nipāta*, here and of the *Brāhmaṇadhammika Sutta*, are by Norman (92).

³² For a list of examples of Brahmanical terminology used in a (new) Buddhist sense, see KRN Coll. Pap. IV # 99.

³³ Although novices were not allowed to attend formal-ritual recitations of the *Pāṭimokkha* ('in a seated assembly', *nisinna-parisā*, Vin I 135), as 'co-resident pupils' of a preceptor, they learnt to recite it (Vin I 47: cp. Horner [51: 62 n. 7] and CPD s.v. *uddisāpeti*).

³⁴ The word is *komārabrahmacariya*: see AS # 31.2 and # 31.3.

³⁵ See Collins (forthcoming) on the significance of this in Buddhist monasticism.

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³⁶ The phrase is *manthe ganthervā*; cp. AS # 23 and # 23.1 on *ganthe karonā*.

³⁷ See Winternitz (33: 247) for elements of the former as late as the 4th. century A.D. Lamotte (88: 657) dated the latter to the 4th–5th. centuries A.D.; Gnoli (77: xix–xxi) disagreed, preferring an earlier date, at the time of Kaniska. This, notoriously, is not known exactly, but is usually thought to be 1st.–2nd. century A.D.

³⁸ See KRN Coll. Pap. I: 156. RFG (*ibid.*), acknowledging that '*in nuce* the commentarial tradition goes back to the first generations of Buddhists in northern India', cites Trautmann's work on Dravidian kinship patterns in the commentaries to show the later provenance of at least those sections. But Norman argues (*pers. comm.*) 'since North India was Dravidian and Munda before it became Indo-Aryan, I see no reason to doubt that the Buddha's family were in fact Dravidian, and it could have been that the Sakyans were Dravidian speakers until only shortly before the time of the Buddha. There is, therefore, no need to assume that the commentaries which deal with such things were composed in South India'. Thus, he says, while some parts of the commentaries clearly were composed in South India and/or Sri Lanka, 'I think one has to treat each piece of commentary on its merits, with the possibility that everything is old unless it can be proved otherwise'.

³⁹ On this see, *inter alia*, Collins (90) and the literature cited there.

⁴⁰ Both the *Dīpavamsa* (Chap. 3) and *Mahāvamsa* (Chap. 2), roughly contemporaneous with the final fixing of the commentaries in Pali, make *Mahāsammata* a king at the origin of the Sakyan family; and in the later tradition the figure of the 'first king' *Mahāsammata* occurs in many kinds of text, from legal to ritual, as well as in inscriptions. Tambiah (89) lists some of these later sources; I hope to add more in a future publication.

⁴¹ Sn 406, translation from Norman (92: 44); cp. D I 63 et freq.

⁴² The reference to *vathu-kāma*, 'material objects of desire' here uses a standard division of '(objects of) desire', into material and mental; the latter is *kilesa-kāma*, literally, '(objects of) desire (consisting) in defilement(s)'. Unenlightened monks are as prone to this as householders; given that the description is of an enlightened monk, in whom there can be neither form of desire, the reference must be to such a person's behaviour — that is, he is being said specifically not to store *things* such as food.

⁴³ Sp 710. Kkh 76, Sv 913. The text of A IV 70 in the PTS edition reads *sannidhi-kārake kāme*, but this would seem to be a scribal error, perhaps by someone who did not recognise the gerund and altered the word to agree with *kāme*; there is a v.l. *-kārakam*, which is also the reading in the commentary (Mp IV 169–70), which glosses *sannidhiṃ karvā*.

⁴⁴ For examples, see K. R. Norman (92: 229) ad Sn 773. Norman writes (*pers. comm.*): 'I think that Whitney is correct in seeing that *namuls* are nouns used in the accusative as adverbs, e.g. "eating food in a lump-making sort of way" [referring to *ālumpa-kārakam* in AS # 22].

⁴⁵ There is at least one exception: Aśoka, after the massacre of the Kalingans and his subsequent remorse, if KRN Coll. Pap. I # 26 is right. In the story of Siri Saṃgha Bodhi in Sri Lanka, given in Mhv XXXVI 80ff., although he did not execute criminals, he had dead bodies brought to be burnt publicly in their place; the telling of the story at Att 20 says that he ruled *adaṇḍena asatthēna*, 'without punishment, without weapon(s)'. See also the Mūgapakkha Jātaka, Ja VI 1–30, discussed by Gombrich (88: 70).

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION

In the translation I follow the section divisions made by J. Estlin Carpenter in his edition of the text for the Pali Text Society (11). This is not because I find them especially good — other, perhaps better divisions of the text are possible (see, e.g., #17.1) — but to facilitate comparison between my translation, previous translations, and the text itself. The text was reprinted in Meisig (88), but with an unfortunately complex textual apparatus; see K. R. Noman's (89) review.

There have been previous translations of AS into European languages. The first, to my knowledge, was of sections #10–21 by Edmunds (04); next were two into German by Franke (1913) and Neumann (1918). I have not gone into differences between my rendering and theirs. The most widely-known translation, as mentioned in the Introduction, is that of T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (1921). This was republished in 1981 under the name of Trevor Ling, who claimed that his version was 'a fairly extensive re-translation' (p. xxiv); in fact for the most part it simply modernises RhD's English, and introduces some inaccuracies of its own. Walshe's recent (87) version is better, but it seems clear to me (for example from the extensive use made of RhD in the notes) that like Ling Walshe depends almost entirely on RhD for his understanding of the text. I have made this translation not primarily for the sake of offering another English version but to give structure and coherence to my notes and interpretation.

TRANSLATION

#1. Thus I have heard. At one time the Blessed One was living in the palatial monastery built by Migāra's mother in the Eastern Park outside Sāvatti. At that time Vāsetṭha and Bhāradvāja, aspiring to become monks, were living with the monks there. One evening the Blessed One rose from his solitary meditation, went outside the monastery, and was walking back and forth in its shade, in the open air.

#2. Vāsetṭha saw that the Blessed One . . . was walking back and forth . . . in the open air, and said to Bhāradvāja:

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'Friend Bhāradvāja, here is the Blessed One . . . walking back and forth . . . in the open air. Come, friend, let's go to him: perhaps we may get a chance to hear a Dhamma-talk from the Blessed One himself.'

'Alright, friend', agreed Bhāradvāja; and so Vāsetṭha and Bhāradvāja went up to the Blessed One, greeted him, and walked back and forth together with him.

#3. Then the Blessed One addressed Vāsetṭha (and Bhāradvāja):¹ 'Monks, you were (both) born brahmins, in brahmin families, (but) you have gone forth from home to homelessness, (leaving your) brahmin family. Surely brahmins (must) revile and abuse you.'

'Indeed, sir, brahmins revile and abuse us fully, completely, with the (sort of) abuse one would expect (from them).'

'How do they abuse you . . .?'

'Sir, brahmins say "The brahmin is the best class (*vaṇṇa*), (any) other class is inferior. The brahmin is the fair class, (any) other class is dark."² (Only) brahmins are purified, not non-brahmins. Brahmins are Brahmā's own sons, born from his mouth,³ born of Brahmā, produced from Brahmā, the heirs of Brahmā. You here have left the best class and gone (over) to an inferior class, since you have become wretched shaven-headed (pseudo-)ascetics, members of some sect,⁴ (no better than) offspring of our Kinsman's [i.e. Brahmā's] feet. It is not good, it is unseemly, that you have left the best class . . . [and] have become . . . offspring of our Kinsman's feet." That is how they revile us . . . with the (sort of) abuse one would expect (from them).'

#4. 'Surely, monks, the brahmins are not recalling the past¹ when they say [this]. Brahmin women, (the wives) of brahmins, are seen to menstruate, become pregnant, give birth and give suck; and (so) these brahmins who say: "the brahmin is the best class . . . brahmins are born from Brahmā's mouth . . . heirs of Brahmā", are (in fact) born from vaginas.² They are slandering Brahmā, telling lies, and producing demerit.³

#5. Monks, there are these four classes: kṣatriya (warriors/kings), brahmin (priests), vaiśya (farmers, merchants) and sūdra (servants).¹

- Mohanty, J. N. (1970). *Phenomenology and Ontology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
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DID DIGNĀGA ACCEPT FOUR TYPES OF PERCEPTION?

In a previous paper¹ I argued that Dignāga's doctrine of *pratyakṣābhāsa* was misinterpreted by M. Hattori and A. Wayman, and suggested yet a third interpretation. One of the arguments against Wayman's interpretation challenges his scheme of correspondences between the four types of perception, the four types of error and the four types of *pratyakṣābhāsa* on several grounds, one of which is based on his taking for granted that Dignāga accepted four types of perception. This assumption, I claimed, is highly doubtful, and it is not supported by Dignāga's own words, but only by Dharmakīrti's reshuffle of them.² This claim has been recently criticized, in its turn, by Wayman in his study of "Dharmakīrti and the Yogācāra Theory of bīja"³:

One reader, Eli Franco, . . . alludes to this very verse portion [6ab in Hattori's enumeration] to conclude that Dignāga did not recognize *svasaṃvedana* as a separate *pramāna* (sic.)⁴ to total four such, hence that he recognized only three. Granted that Hattori's presentation of the verse itself — and not reading more widely — might lend itself to such an interpretation as Franco made. Even so, in this case, it seems that Franco did not do enough research, or had poor advice.

My purpose here is not to reopen the controversy on *pratyakṣābhāsa*. If the above point is the only part of my argumentation which is not acceptable to Wayman, the issue is closed indeed. However, since most scholars seem to agree with Wayman that Dignāga accepted four types of perception, a few words of clarification on this subject may not be unwarranted here.

First, a word on the "poor advice," which presumably refers to Professor Schmithausen's counsel. While gladly acknowledging his help and advice, it goes without saying that he bears no responsibility for whatever errors may have occurred in my paper. (Incidentally, the point on the three types of perception was reached by both of us independently.)

Second, concerning my lack of sufficient research. Granted that one

never does enough research (or at least I never do), I am not quite sure what Wayman has in mind. If he refers to the post-Dignāga period, there is no shortage of texts in the Dharmakīrti-tradition, which claim that Dignāga meant exactly what Dharmakīrti says he meant. My whole point, however, was that we have to read Dignāga's text independently of his so-called "Great Commentator." And unfortunately we do not have any other commentarial tradition except that of Dharmakīrti and his followers.⁵ If, on the other hand, Wayman has in mind some pre-Dignāga or even pre-Dharmakīrti text, which sheds a new light on the problem of fourfold perception, I fail to see why he does not share with us the results of his wide reading, or even give us a clue as to the identity of this text.

Or perhaps by 'not doing enough research' Wayman means that I was not familiar with his own, at that time future, interpretation of Dignāga's verse. This interpretation is quite ingenious, and deserves a place of honor in the best tradition of commentarial tricky devices, and it certainly deserves a closer look here.

What Wayman suggests is a slight emendation of Dignāga's verse, to be read: *mānasam cārtha[m] rāgādisvasamvittir akalpikā*.⁶ As far as I can see Wayman's only justification for this emendation is: "Of course, my addition of the *anusvara* (sic.) in brackets can be understood by everyone who has worked with Sanskrit manuscripts — that it is frequently necessary to add this."⁷ He then proceeds to explain how the verse should be read: "Grammatically, it (?) is a series with the term *akalpika* agreeing in gender with the last member of the series, namely *svasamvittir*; and *akalpika* therefore goes with both members of the series."⁸ Grammatically, "it" in the above sentence would have to refer to *anusvāra*, which is nonsense; or by *upacāra* it would refer to *artha[m]*, which is equally wrong, since a word cannot be a series. Working backwards from the translation, one must conclude that what Wayman must have meant is that the sentence contains a series and *akalpikā* although agreeing in gender only with the last member of that series, has to be related to the first member as well.

Wayman's translation runs as follows: "Also the mental (sense) having the object-entity (*artha*), and self-intuition of passion (*rāga*), etc. are without constructive thought." Why Wayman supplements — against both Hattori and Nagatomi — "mental (sense)" rather than

"mental (perception)" remains unexplained, but this does not seem to be relevant to the question whether the emendation of the text should be accepted. Concerning this question, the most obvious problem is that if we take *artha* outside the compound, it cannot mean "having the object-entity" (my emphasis). Furthermore, the reading *mānasam ca-arthaṃ* or *mānasam ca-arthaṃ . . . akalpikā* cannot be construed meaningfully, as *arthaṃ* would have to be a masculine noun in the accusative case without a governing verb. Nevertheless, we could still save Wayman's translation by reading *ca-ārthaṃ*. The advantage of such a translation, if accepted, is that it avoids the somewhat awkward analysis of the compound *artharāgādisvasamvitti* into *arthasamvitti* and *rāgādisvasamvitti*.⁹

However, there is one serious trouble with Wayman's interpretation of the verse: It goes against Dignāga's own commentary on it, the second part of which reads: *rāgadveṣamohasukhādiṣu svasamvedanam indriyānapekṣavān mānasam pratyakṣam*.¹⁰ Thus, no matter whether one follows Hattori or Nagatomi,¹¹ it is clear that Dignāga calls the self-apprehension of desire etc., *mental* perception. Consequently, Wayman's, or for that matter Dharmakīrti's, reading of four types of perception into the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* collapses. Unfortunately, Wayman does not explain how his translation could be made compatible with Dignāga's own commentary. As far as I can see, he could argue in one of two ways. He could claim that the two are incompatible indeed, and that Dignāga had changed his mind in the time between writing the *kārikās* and the *Vṛtti*. This, however, would not solve Wayman's problem, for Dignāga's final position would still take the self-apprehension of desire, etc., as *mental* perception. Had I been in Wayman's place, I would have argued that the *Vṛtti* as reconstructed by Hattori, and as quoted above, should also be emended to conform with the Tibetan translation, that is, the word *mānasam* should be dropped. This modification is indeed supported by both Kanakavarman's and Vasudhararakṣita's translations, none of which has any equivalent to *mānasam*. Hattori's edition of Kanakavarman (p. 181, Db) is indeed misleading, for he replaces *rañ rig pa'i* with *yid kyi* against all Tibetan recensions. By deleting *mānasam*, one may achieve an almost perfect harmony between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. But in this case one would have to adduce some cogent reason to explain

why Prajñākaragupta (*PVBh* 305.17–18) should have interpolated the word *mānasam* into his quotation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Until Wayman comes up with any such reason, his modification of the verse and his new ingenious translation must remain unacceptable; all the more so since we have an alternative and much more probable explanation, namely, that Dignāga's text has been tampered with (probably before the Tibetan translation was undertaken) under Dharmakīrti's influence in order to make it conform to the latter's point of view,¹² just as Wayman did.

It seems, therefore, that in spite of Wayman's efforts to the contrary, one can still make a strong case for reading only three types of perception in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. However, even by arguing for three against four types of perception, we are already caught in Dharmakīrti's web. For by doing so we already presuppose that Dignāga was typologizing different types of perception. A less biased reading of Dignāga does not seem to warrant such a presupposition. Reading the text independently of Dharmakīrti, one should probably maintain that for Dignāga there is only one type of perception, that is, a cognition which is free from conceptual construction. Or better still, that Dignāga was not at all concerned with types of perception. The text yields more easily to the following interpretation: After analyzing the term *pratyakṣa*, claiming that the senses are the special cause of perception (Daa-1 in Hattori's division of the text) and explaining the compatibility of his definition with the Abhidharma (Daa-2 f.), Dignāga proceeds to show that the term applies also to certain, perhaps more controversial cases, in which the cognitions are not produced by the five senses. But there is nothing in the text to indicate that these cases form different types, or different species of one genus. In the introduction to k. 6ab Dignāga says that "Here our distinguishing [various kinds of perception] is in response to the view of others."¹³ I see no reason why we should not take this statement at its face value.

NOTES

¹ Cf. *JIPh* 14, 1986, pp. 79–97.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 81.

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³ In *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological tradition*, ed. E. Steinkellner, Wien 1991, pp. 419–430, at p. 423, n. 17.

⁴ What I claimed, of course, is that it is not a separate *pratyakṣa*.

⁵ Consequently, I used the same method as that followed by scholars like Frauwallner. Hattori (to some extent), Hayes *et al.*, namely, to read Dignāga not in view of his successors, but of his predecessors like Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Bhartṛhari, *et al.* This does not mean, of course, that by following the same method we all reach the same results. For instance, the relationship between Dignāga and Nāgārjuna seems to be non-existing according to Frauwallner, and is interpreted in diametrically opposed ways by Hayes and myself.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Cf. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*. Cambridge 1968, p. 92, n. 1.45.

¹⁰ Cf. the quotation in *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (ed. R. Sāṅkṛityāyana, Patna 1953) p. 315.17–18, Hattori, *op. cit.*, p. 94, Franco, *op. cit.*, p. 95, n. 7.

¹¹ Cf. "Mānasa-pratyakṣa: A Conundrum in the Buddhist Pramāna System," in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies*, ed. M. Nagatomi *et al.* Dordrecht 1979, pp. 243–260, at p. 254.

¹² Cf. Franco, *op. cit.*, n. 7.

¹³ Hattori's translation p. 27; Kanakavarman (p. 181.7): *gṣan gyi ḥdod pa la ltos nas ḥdir khyad par du byas pa yin gyi* . . . Vasudhararakṣita (180.7): *gṣan gyi ḥdod pa la bren nas ḥdir khyad par byas pa ste*.

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HOW INNOVATIVE IS THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA?

*The ālayavijñāna in the context of
canonical and Abhidharma vijñāna theory*

PART I

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INTRODUCTION

The *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* and other *Yogācāra* texts claim orthodoxy for the *ālayavijñāna* on the grounds that it had been taught by the Buddha within accepted scriptural sources, and that it was in fact posited by other Abhidharma schools in the guise of more or less synonymous terms.¹ In an ironic reverse appeal, Walpola Rahula has claimed that "although not developed as in the Mahāyāna, the original idea of *ālayavijñāna* was already there in the Pāli Canon."² On the other hand, Schmithausen (1987: 46) has recently suggested that the

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conception of the *ālayavijñāna* eventually entailed "redrawing the theory of mind."

In this essay I will examine the relationship between the canonical conception of *vijñāna* (Pali: *viññāna*) and the *Yogācāra* concept of the *ālayavijñāna* so as to contextualize these claims. The innovative aspects of the *ālayavijñāna* have so often been emphasized that its vast commonality with its canonical predecessors and Abhidharma contemporaries, the very context in which it most needs to be understood, is all too frequently overlooked.

We shall view the *ālayavijñāna* not simply as a radically new departure, but also as the systematic development of the early concept of *vijñāna* within the more sophisticated context of Abhidharma. From this perspective we shall be able to more fully appreciate both its continuity with the earlier conceptions, as well as the gradual development and elaboration of *vijñāna* theory within Abhidharma and *Yogācāra*, thereby supporting but at the same time qualifying the above-mentioned claims to orthodoxy, origination and innovation.

In the early discourses preserved in the Pāli Canon *vijñāna* was a polyvalent term with diverse epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical dimensions, many of which became marginalized within orthodox Abhidharma discourse. The *ālayavijñāna* is, in crudest outline, this canonical *vijñāna* minus its role within immediate cognitive processes; it encompasses those aspects of *vijñāna* pertaining to the continuity of *samsāric* existence that could not be readily integrated into orthodox Abhidharma discourse, focusing as it does upon the immediacy of transient states of mind. The *ālayavijñāna* system effectively reunited these divergent dimensions in a bifurcated model of the mind which articulated a simultaneous and interactive relationship between the momentary, surface level of sensory cognition and an abiding, subliminal level of sentient existence.

Since the *ālayavijñāna* is presented in terms of the wide range of functions played by the canonical *vijñāna* and the various problematics to which these arrived within Abhidharma, we shall examine these in some detail before we present the gradual systematization of the *ālayavijñāna* itself.

I. THE CANONICAL CONCEPTIONS

'*Vijñāna*' as 'Consciousness', '*vijñāna*' as 'Cognition'

In the early Pāli texts, *vijñāna* was considered equally as 'consciousness', an essential factor of animate existence without which there would be no individual life, and as 'cognition', the ordinary sensory and mental models of perception and knowing.⁴

Vijñāna as 'consciousness' plays a major role in the early Buddhist explanation of the cycle of birth, death and rebirth, known as *samsāra*. Together with 'life' (*āyu*) and 'heat' (*usmā*), *vijñāna* is one of the essential factors necessary for animate existence and without which one would die.⁵ *Vijñāna* enters into the womb at the time of conception,⁶ and exits the body at the time of death.⁷ As a factor of *samsāric* continuity, it is precisely the advent, the 'stationing' or 'persistence' of *vijñāna* in this world that perpetuates *samsāric* existence.⁸

It is this unbroken stream of *vijñāna* that, proceeding from life to life,⁹ is virtually the medium of the accumulated potential effects of past actions, of karma.¹⁰ In this context, *vijñāna*, along with the other four *skandhas*, is said to "attain growth, increase, abundance."¹¹ The total elimination of this accumulated karmic potential along with the eradication of the afflicting passions is closely equated with liberation, *nirvāna*, at which point *vijñāna*, the medium of this accumulation, is also eradicated or at least fundamentally transformed.¹² As we shall see, the *Yogācāra* conception of the *ālayavijñāna* replicates these functions in every one of these respects. This became necessary, I will argue, largely because of the one-sided emphasis Abhidharma put upon *vijñāna*'s second major dimension: the role that *vijñāna*, as simple cognition, plays within ordinary cognitive processes.¹³

As the central element within the perceptual processes, *vijñāna* as 'cognition' occurs in six modes depending upon the type of sensory or mental stimulus and its respective perceptual organ (the five sense organs and the 'mental' organ).¹⁴ In this context, *vijñāna* as cognition occurs upon the contact between the relevant unimpaired sense organ, its respective object and attention.¹⁵

Both of these aspects of *vijñāna*, first as 'consciousness', the essential principle of animate existence and a continuous medium within *samsāra*, and second, as simple, immediate 'cognition', co-existed

within the mass of transmitted teachings, albeit within different contexts of meaning.¹⁶ The earliest traditions evinced little awareness of discordance between the two, since at the deepest metaphysical level¹⁷ they were so inseparably intertwined as to be virtually causes and effects of one another: Karmic actions, within which *vijñāna* as cognition plays a central role, lead to continued existence within *samsāra*, the major medium of which is the unbroken stream of consciousness, of *vijñāna*. And this unbroken stream creates, in turn, the very preconditions for such cognition to occur at all. But to see just how this is, we must examine the relationship between these two aspects of *vijñāna* as they are articulated within the twelve-member formula of the dependent co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*).¹⁸ We should note that the mutual conditionality between these two aspects of *vijñāna* constitutes the central insight of the *ālayavijñāna*-based model of mind.

'Vijñāna' within the 'Pratītya-samutpāda' Series

Vijñāna has two essential places within the *pratītya-samutpāda* series, which correspond roughly to the two aspects described above. First, *vijñāna* conditions the very development of a sentient body by descending into the mother's womb, thereby securing a foothold or support in a new life, wherein it may grow, increase, and multiply,¹⁹ *vijñāna* thus constitutes one of the preconditions for any cognitive activity whatsoever.²⁰ *Vijñāna* at this point is directly conditioned by the *samskāras*, the formative forces of the past.²¹

Second, *vijñāna* is implicitly yet directly involved in the karmic activities that perpetuate *samsāric* life. The terms of the twelve-member *pratītya-samutpāda* series which directly succeed *vijñāna* and name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*) delineate all of the essential elements of the cognitive processes and the affective responses to which they give rise: the six sense-spheres (*ṣaḍāyatana*) and sense-impression (*spṛśa*) are essential preconditions for cognition to take place,²² while the next factor, feeling (*vedanā*), is (along with apperception, *saṃjñā*) said to be its virtually inseparable concomitant.²³ Feeling and apperception, moreover, are themselves karmic activities (*samskāra*) of mind (*citta*) (M I 301: *saññā ca vedanā cittasankhāro*). Thus, as Johansson (1979: 139) notes, every act of cognition is, or perhaps more precisely,

entails *samskāras*, formative karmic activities, and thus leads to further rebirth.²⁴

But the affective dimension outlined within the series of dependent co-arising is just as important: feeling gives rise to craving (*trṣṇā*) and grasping or 'appropriation' (*upādāna*),²⁵ affective attitudes or actions which lead directly toward renewed rebirth in the future.²⁶ These are followed by becoming (*bhava*) and birth (*jāti*), which have long been considered a second process of rebirth within the *pratītya-samutpāda* series by the traditional exegetes. As a link between one life and the next, this juncture will also be cited by the *Yogācārins* to support the existence of a specific type of mind, the same one that is conditioned by the *samskāra* earlier in the series in a parallel relationship, viz., the "ālaya" *vijñāna*.

The *pratītya-samutpāda* series then depicts *vijñāna* as both a principle of animate existence conditioned by the formative forces (*samskāra*) and subsisting throughout one's lifetime, and, implicitly, as intrinsically related within the cognitive processes to the complex of activities that perpetuate *samsāric* existence.²⁷ This is implicit in the very structure and sequence of the series. These two dimensions of *vijñāna*, moreover, may be considered as causes and effects of one another: 'subsisting' *vijñāna*, while itself conditioned by previous karmic activities associated with past perceptual processes, provides the ground or the preconditions for the continued occurrence of those very processes.²⁸ And for as long as the afflicting predispositions (*anuśaya* or *āśrava*) elicit feeling (*vedanā*), craving (*trṣṇā*) and grasping (*upādāna*) in conjunction with those processes, they will in turn continue to perpetuate the cycle of rebirth. This reciprocal cause and effect relationship between the two aspects of *vijñāna* remains implicit and undefined within the early texts;²⁹ the *Yogācārins* will later rearticulate this relationship by differentiating two types of *vijñāna*, the abiding "ālaya" *vijñāna* and the momentary, perceptual *vijñānas* (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), and by explicitly describing their simultaneous and reciprocal conditionality.

The 'Latent Dispositions' ('anuśaya') in Early Buddhist Thought

The relationship between the perceptual processes and the affective

responses they elicit are, we have seen, central to the karmic activities, the formative forces that perpetuate *samsāric* existence. This involves a dispositional substructure which was quite essential to the theory of *samsāric* continuity in early Buddhist thought and subsequently to the developments within *Yogācāra* doctrine under consideration here. Although there are several important notions connected with dispositional tendencies in early Buddhism,³⁰ we will limit ourselves here to the *anusāya*, the latent dispositions or tendencies,³¹ for it was the persistence of these latent tendencies that became the focus of debate during the Abhidharma period and which eventually led *Yogācārins* (for much the same reasons and along the same lines as the *ālayavijñāna*) to postulate a distinct aspect or mode of mind representing them, i.e. the *kliṣṭa manas*.

The latent dispositions are essential to the early Buddhist world view in much the same respects as *vijñāna*: (1) psychologically, they are causally related to the various karmic activities associated with the perceptual processes; and thus, (2) 'psycho-ontologically', they perpetuate further *samsāric* existence; whereas (3) soteriologically, their gradual eradication is closely related to progress upon the path toward liberation.

These dispositions are instrumental in instigating the karmic activities connected with perceptual processes. In the standard formula of dependent co-arising the perceptual processes give rise to feeling or sensation (*vedanā*), followed by craving (*trṣṇā*) and grasping (*upādāna*). This important sequence of affective arousal is usually stated without further elaboration. The close connection between feeling (*vedanā*) and its affective responses, so essential to the perpetuation of *samsāra*, demands explication; this lies within the structure and dynamics of the latent dispositions. According to M III 285:

Visual cognition arises dependent on the eye and visual forms, the coming together of the three is sense-impression; dependent on sense-impression a pleasant, unpleasant or neutral feeling arises. Being stimulated by a pleasant feeling, he will be pleased, welcome it and remain attached to it; his latent disposition to desire (*rāgānusāya*) lies latent (*anuseti*).³²

The same is true for the other sensations: there is a latent disposition to aversion (*paṭigha*) within an unpleasant sensation and to ignorance

(*avijjā*) in a neutral sensation.³³ These dispositions represent the infrastructure, as it were, of the *samskāra*, the karmic complexes that feed and interact with *vijñāna*; thus they help to explicate the dynamics underlying these processes within the series of dependent origination.³⁴

These dispositions also have the same 'psycho-ontological' consequences as *vijñāna*, that is, they help perpetuate *samsāric* existence:

If one does not will, O monks, does not intend, yet [a disposition] lies dormant (*anuseti*), this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be a support of consciousness. Consciousness being supported and growing, renewed existence takes place in the future. Renewed existence in the future taking place, old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair come to pass. Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.³⁵

It is clear then that these affective latent dispositions or tendencies are central to the various karmic activities and thus help perpetuate the long-term results of continued rebirth.

These dispositions are, moreover, fundamental to the basic psychic structure of human beings. In the *Mahāmālunkya-sutta*, the Buddha states that even a small baby has various kinds of *anusāya*:

If, Mālunkyaṅgputta, an ignorant baby boy lying on his back has no [awareness of] self-existence ([of] *dharmas* . . . rules . . . sensual pleasure . . . persons), how could his view of self-existence (. . . doubt regarding *dharmas* . . . attachment to rules and rituals in rules . . . lust toward sensual pleasure . . . aggression toward persons) ever arise?

That disposition (*anusāya*) of his toward a view of self-existence (. . . doubt . . . attachment to rules and rituals . . . desire for sensual pleasure . . . aggression) lies latent (*anuseti*).³⁶

We find here an apparent dichotomy, foreshadowing later developments, between the latent disposition and its actual manifestation: though the unlearned infant possesses only the *disposition* toward a view of self-existence (*sakkāyaditṭhānusāya*), etc., the ordinary individual "lives with his mind possessed by the view of self-existence" (*sakkāyaditṭhi-pariyuṭṭhitena cetasā viharati*), etc.

In contrast to these, the learned monk, well practiced in the Buddha's teachings and well trained in meditation,

does not live with his mind possessed by the view of self-existence [etc.], nor

overcome by the view of self-existence [etc.], and he understands as it really is the deliverance from the view of self-existence [etc.] which has arisen. That view of self-existence of his is eliminated along with the latent disposition.³⁷

These dispositions are present throughout one's lifetime and for as long as one exists within *samsāra*.³⁸ Their gradual destruction reflects stages upon the path toward liberation³⁹ and only upon full liberation are they completely eliminated.⁴⁰

In sum, the *anuśaya* represent a dispositional substructure which, like *vijñāna*, persists throughout the life and lives of individual sentient beings and is central to the karmic activities instrumental in perpetuating *samsāric* existence. The *anuśaya* describe the essential connection between ordinary sensations and feelings (*vedanā*) and the ill-fated reactions elicited by them, and as such are, like *vijñāna*, crucial to the Buddhist explanation of *samsāric* continuity.

II. MOMENTARINESS AND CONTINUITY IN THE ABHIDHARMA

The two doctrinal contexts we have examined above in which *vijñāna*, as well as the latent dispositions, play a central role, viz. in the immediate and discrete processes of cognition and in the very continuity of *samsāric* existence, pertain to arguably distinct temporal dimensions.⁴¹ Although this distinction is seldom explicitly addressed within the *sutta-piṭaka*, it became quite central to the doctrines put forth in the newly emerging Abhidharma literature.

Abhidharma literature preserves doctrinal developments from probably shortly after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha up to and succeeding the early *Yogācāra* texts that first depict the *ālayavijñāna*. It was in the context of these developments that early *Yogācāra* and the concept of the *ālayavijñāna* evolved.⁴² The similarity of their concerns is obvious at even a cursory glance: the Abhidharmic issues debated, the technical vocabulary with which they were expressed, and the general presuppositions underlying them are the same as those used to discuss, describe and defend the concept of the *ālayavijñāna*. The presentation of Abhidharma doctrine in this section⁴³ will thus serve to contextualize the *ālayavijñāna*, and the problems toward which it was addressed, within this overarching Abhidharma milieu,

thereby demonstrating both its continuity with and its development of canonical *vijñāna* theory.

*Abhidharma Analysis of Mind: Its Purpose, Methods and Problematics*⁴⁴

Abhidharma represents the efforts to bring about systematic order and consistency within the variegated body of the discourses of the Buddha for the higher purpose, as its name — 'higher doctrine' — suggests, of leading practitioners toward the ultimate goal of liberation.⁴⁵

In an immensely consequential hermeneutical tack, the *Ābhidharmikas* considered this 'higher doctrine', which was expressed in the precise and technical language of *dharmas*, existential elements discretely distinguishable by their own characteristic,⁴⁶ to be 'ultimately' true. Those aspects of the doctrine, however, which were conveyed in the simpler, almost vernacular language of the early discourses, and thus not readily *transposable* into *dharmaic* terms, were considered merely 'conventional', that is, merely nominal designations⁴⁷ for aggregations of those *dharmas* which exclusively could be said to truly exist. Since the *dharmas*, moreover, are strictly momentary⁴⁸ and wholly constitutive of the animate and inanimate worlds, what appear to be 'individuals' and 'things' are actually only the stream or continuity of these aggregated *dharmas* occurring one after the other in serial fashion. The discernment of these *dharmas* through higher awareness is essential for the Abhidharma's stated purpose of liberation, since, Vasubandhu declares, there is no other way to pacify the afflictions (*kleśa*) than by examining the *dharmas*, which can only be done through the Abhidharma.⁴⁹

Two distinct kinds of problems were created by these developments, belonging roughly to the dimensions of momentariness and continuity we noted above in the canonical contexts of *vijñāna*. Dissecting experience into its discrete and momentary elements, it was essential to understand the internal relationships within and between these momentary processes, for it is the presence or absence of certain factors, especially the afflictions (*kleśa*), that make any particular moment *karmically* wholesome or unwholesome; such an analysis is thus both essential to, and only realizes its significance within, the

soteriological project as a whole.⁵⁰ I shall call this analysis of momentary *dharmic* factors 'synchronic' or 'dharmic' analysis.

The second problematic was entailed by the first: since each mind-moment is strictly momentary, the continuity of certain characteristics of an individual (or rather, of the mental stream, *citta-santāna*) became problematic, both empirically and in regard to the traditional doctrines of *karma*, *kleśa*, rebirth, and gradual progress on the path. In short, the indispensable relationship between causal conditioning and temporal continuity, of how the past continues to effect the present, became problematic within the new context of momentariness. I shall call this traditional reference to aspects of experience that appear to persist for longer periods, 'diachronic' or 'santāna' discourse.

Both the synchronic, *dharmic* analysis and diachronic discourse of the mental stream are of central importance to Abhidharma as a whole. The presence of the afflictions and the type of actions (*karma*) they instigate can be discerned only through the synchronic, momentary *dharmic* analysis, since they alone are ultimately true, while the continuity of individual *samsāric* existence is almost always described in reference to the diachronic level of the mental stream. The exclusive validity that Abhidharma accorded to the analysis of momentary processes of mind threatened to render that very analysis religiously vacuous by negating the legitimacy of its overall soteriological context, that of *samsāric* continuity and its ultimate cessation.⁵¹

We shall briefly examine the developments within the Abhidharma tradition of the synchronic analysis of mind-moments, the diachronic analysis of continuity and the issues elicited by their fateful disjunction. We shall see that here too, as with its multivalence and manifold temporal contexts within the Pāli *suttas*, *vijñāna* is central to both of these discourses.

The 'Synchronic' Analysis of Mind

The synchronic analysis focuses primarily upon *citta*, 'thought', or 'mind' (an important term also used in the early canonical texts to denote the central faculty or process of mind⁵² which can become either contaminated or purified and liberated⁵³) and the mental factors (*caitta* or *cetasika*) which occur with and accompany it.⁵⁴ This analysis

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of *citta* is an analysis of *vijñāna* as well, since *vijñāna* is central to nearly every moment of mind and is, in any case, synonymous with *citta* in the Abhidharma.⁵⁵

Although the basic relationship between the *citta* and *caitta* is reciprocal and simultaneous (*sahabhū*),⁵⁶ the quality of karmic actions depends upon the specific relationships between particular factors. It is the mental factors (*caitta*) which are 'conjoined' or 'associated' with the mind (*citta-samprayukta*)⁵⁷ that make their accompanying actions *karmically* effective.⁵⁸ Conversely, the formative forces which are unassociated with mind (*citta-viprayukta-samskāra*) are less determinative and thus karmically indeterminate (*avyākṛta*).⁵⁹

Since *dharmas* last for only an instant, continuity or change is actually only the incessant arising of succeeding new *dharmas* of a similar or different type.⁶⁰ Abhidharma explains the dynamics of their succession through a system of causes (*hetu*), conditions (*pratyaya*) and results (lit.: fruit, *phala*).⁶¹ It was, generally speaking, the difficulty in accounting for diachronic phenomena within the specifics of this system that brought about the problems towards which both certain Abhidharma notions and the concept of *ālayavijñāna* were addressed. We will discuss only those most pertinent to our concerns,⁶² foremost among which is the resultant cause and effect (*vipāka-hetu/ phala*).

The relationship between the *vipāka-hetu*, the 'resultant, maturational' or 'heterogeneous cause' and its result, the 'ripened' or 'matured fruit' (*vipāka-phala*), is the core of Abhidharma karmic theory since it refers to the functioning of karmic cause and effect over extended periods of time.⁶³ This relationship stands, however, in some tension with the 'homogeneous and immediate condition' (*samantara-pratyaya*),⁶⁴ the conditioning influence that *dharmas* bear upon immediately succeeding *dharmas* of a similar nature.⁶⁵ While the immediate succession of relatively homogeneous *dharmas* is readily explainable, heterogeneous succession is more problematic since it requires that a wholesome factor, for example, succeed an unwholesome factor, or *vice versa*.⁶⁶ But since this succession cannot be the result of homogeneous (by definition) and *immediately* antecedent conditions, it must be conditioned by a causal chain initiated at some earlier time. But how could a cause which is already past, and there-

fore no longer existent, exert a causal influence on the present?⁶⁷ In Abhidharmic terms, what *present dharma* constitutes the link between the *vipāka* cause and result necessary for such long-term karma to operate?⁶⁸ And how or where *exactly* does it factor into the other momentary processes of mind? For if Abhidharma discourse is truly ultimate, and thus implicitly comprehensive, this must be accounted for within the *dharmic* analysis of purely momentary states.

The problems surrounding the maturational cause and effect, then, involve much more than the mere succession of heterogeneous states, since it entails origination from non-homogeneous or non-immediately antecedent conditions, of which the *potential* for karmic results over extended periods of time is crucial. But much the same problems are posed by the long-term persistence of the latent dispositions as well: if the *anuśaya* are present in any effective sense in each moment, how would wholesome actions ever occur? But if they were entirely absent, from where would they arise? (and why would one not already be an *Aryan*?) Though this will be discussed further below, the latent afflictions, in brief, are also problematic within the analysis of strictly momentary states. And last, the attainments and achievements acquired along the path, but not reaching full fruition until perhaps even lifetimes later, could hardly be explainable by reference to purely momentary states of mind.⁶⁹

In sum, if only momentary processes are real and effective, Abhidharma cannot account for factors that must, for exegetic, systemic and empirical reasons, be conceived as subsisting over the long term. But the very purpose of synchronic analysis was, as stated above, to ascertain the underlying motivations, and thus axiomatically the nature of one's actions, so as to diminish the overpowering influence of the afflictions (*kleśa*), cease accumulating karmic potential and thereby gradually progress along the path toward liberation. Thus the diachronic discourse could not be disregarded without undermining the larger soteriological framework within which the synchronic analysis is ultimately made meaningful and intelligible. And it was the continuing validity, indeed the necessity, of just these traditional doctrines alongside the newer analytic that the various Abhidharma schools, each in their own way, felt compelled to address.

'Diachronic' Discourse: Traditional Continuities — Karma, 'Kleśa' and Seeds

The traditional relationship between the dynamics of karma, *kleśa* and *samsāric* continuity are also well preserved in the Abhidharma literature:

It is said [AKBh IV 1] that the world in its variety arises from action (*karma*). It is because of the latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) that actions accumulate (*upacīta*), but without the latent dispositions [they] are not capable of giving rise to a new existence. Thus, the latent dispositions should be known as the root of existence (*mūlaṃ bhava*).⁷⁰

It is this accumulation of actions performed, permeated and influenced by the afflictions (*kleśa*) and their latent counterparts, the *anuśaya*, that increases the mind-stream and so perpetuates the cycle of existence:

In accordance with the projective [cause] (*ākṣepa*-[*hetu*]) the mental stream (*santāna*) increases gradually by the afflictions (*kleśa*) and karma and goes again into the next world . . . Such is the circle of existence without beginning.⁷¹

The close relationship between karma, its accumulation,⁷² and the medium or vehicle of this accumulation is, in contrast to the *Pāli* materials, *explicitly* identified as *vijñāna* in *Sautrāntika*-leaning sections of the *AKBh*:

Mental motivation (*manahsañcetanā*) projects (*ākṣepa*) renewed existence; that [existence] which is projected is, in turn, produced from the seed (*bīja*) of *vijñāna* which is infused (*paribhāvita*) by karma. Thus, these two are predominant in bringing forth the existence which is not yet arisen.⁷³

This much is in substantial agreement with canonical doctrines,⁷⁴ except that, it should be stressed, the *Sautrāntikas* developed the traditional metaphor of seeds to *explicitly* stand for the latent potency of both karma and *kleśa*, as we shall see.

The latent dispositions in the *AKBh* constitute a reservoir of ever-present proclivities predisposed to flare up and possess (*paryavasthāna*) the mind⁷⁵ in response to specific objects⁷⁶ and feelings.⁷⁷ This constitutes the vicious *samsāric* circle: the fruit of karma occurs *primarily* as feeling,⁷⁸ by which the dispositions are expressly pro-

voked (*kāmarāga-paryavasthānīyadharmā*),⁷⁹ whereupon they in turn instigate activities that lead to further karmic result, and so on.

As in the Pāli materials, moreover, these dispositions persist until they are eradicated along the path toward liberation⁸⁰ as an Aryan.⁸¹ But if these dispositions were constantly present and dynamically unwholesome (*akuśala*) factors associated with mind (*citta-samprayukta*), and thus by definition incompatible with wholesome factors,⁸² they would prevent wholesome processes of mind from ever arising.⁸³ But if they were not active and manifest at that very moment,⁸⁴ how could they impart any unwholesome influence at all? And finally, how would a momentarily wholesome mind of an ordinary worldling differ from that of the momentary, mundane wholesome mind of an Arhat, since they would be at that time phenomenologically similar, *dharmically* speaking?

The *kleśa/anuśaya* problem thus poses the same question as that of karmic potential: how can dispositional factors, which are diachronic, *santāna*-related elements *par excellence*, be described in terms of the synchronic, *dharmic* analysis? The *Sautrāntikas* again utilize the metaphor of seed, this time to refer to the dispositions:

The affliction (*kleśa*) which is dormant is called a latent disposition (*anuśaya*), that which is awakened, an outburst (*paryavasthāna*).

And what is that [affliction] which is dormant?

It is the continuity (*anubandha*) in a seed-state (*bīja-bhāva*) [of that affliction] which is not manifest.

What is awakening?

It is being present.

What is called a 'seed-state'?

It is the capacity (*śakti*) of that individual (*ātmabhāva*) for an affliction to arise born from a [previous] affliction, as is the capacity for memory to arise born from experiential knowledge (*anubhava-jñāna*), and the capacity for sprouts, etc., to produce a grain (*phala*) of rice bred from a [previous] grain of rice.⁸⁵

The *Sautrāntikas* here, in agreement with the *sutta* materials examined above and in contrast with the *Sarvāstivādins* and the *Theravādins*,⁸⁶ clearly distinguish between the latent dispositions and their manifest outbursts.⁸⁷ But in so doing they *opt out of the dharma system altogether*: the latent dispositions are neither associated (*citta-samprayukta*) nor disassociated with mind (*citta-viprayukta*)⁸⁸ since they are not *real existents* (*dravya*).⁸⁹

And neither is the *Sautrāntika* concept of seed (*bīja*), representing both the potential for karmic result and the latent dispositions within the mind-stream, since it too is only nominally existent (*prajñaptisat*).⁹⁰ It is related, rather, to solely *diachronic* terms, such as *citta-santāna*, *vijñāna*,⁹¹ *samskāra*, *āśraya*, *nāma-rūpa* (or, as above, the even more nebulous *ātmabhāva*), an explicit admission of its incompatibility with, or rather *untransposability* into, synchronic, *dharmic* discourse:

What is called a 'seed'?

Any psycho-physical organism (*nāma-rūpa*) that is capable of producing a fruit either mediately or immediately through a specific modification of the mental stream (*santātipariṇāma-viśeṣajāt*).

What is called a 'modification'?

It is the mental stream being in a different state.

What is called the 'mental stream'?

It is the motivating complexes (*samskāra*) of the three times existing as cause and effect.⁹²

It is only in reference to the mental stream (*santāna*) that the concept of seed has relevance. But it is just the mass of accumulated karma (*karmopacitam*) and the inertia of the predispositions that constitute individual *samsāric* existence and the habitual energy patterns that perpetuate the whole cycle. This mass and inertia exist, in a sense, at a *subliminal* level wholly independent of the *dharma* system, constantly informing and driving the *supraliminal* functions of mind, which in turn create further karma and stronger affliction-complexes,⁹³ just as a current of water creates and deepens its own stream bed, which then governs its overall course and rate of flow.

Vijñāna then in the *Sautrāntika* parts of the *Abhidharmakośa* in particular, and in *Abhidharma* in general, plays the same dual role as in the early Pāli materials. First, *vijñāna* as cognition plays a central role within the momentary processes of mind which the *citta/caitta dharmic* analysis explicates. Second, the persistence and stationing of *vijñāna* as a principle of animate life is a requisite of *samsāric* existence⁹⁴ and a bodily support throughout life, since it is the common element (*sādhāraṇabhūtāḥ*) from the moment of conception (*pratisandhi-citta*) at rebirth until the time of death,⁹⁵ when it finally

leaves the body altogether.⁹⁶ The stream of mind (*citta-santāna*), corresponding roughly to these latter aspects of *viññāna*, is also explicitly infused by karma and the afflictions, thus perpetuating the cycle of rebirth.

In the Abhidharma, however, these two dimensions or contexts of meaning are radically differentiated and one of them, that of the momentary *dharmic* analysis, is given priority and ultimate status, while the other, the *santāna* discourse explicitly championed by the *Sautrāntikas* in the *AKBh*, is considered merely conventional or nominal; since it remained for all of them, however, the indispensable soteriological framework within which *dharmic* analysis is ultimately made meaningful and, in the end, intelligible,⁹⁷ problems arose.

'Sarvāstivādin' Doctrines

The *Sarvāstivādins*⁹⁸ attempt to reconcile the *dharmic* analysis of mind with the diachronic phenomena of karma, *kleśa*, and their gradual removal along the path presents an interesting contrast to the *Sautrāntika* concept of seeds, since it avoids involving *viññāna* altogether. Rather than resorting to a metaphor denoting the continuous potential of such phenomena, they proposed an ontology in which *dharmas* exist throughout the three times (past, present and future).⁹⁹ This was argued on the grounds that if past causes did not exist, then no longer being present, they could not lead to future results. In one of the *Sarvāstivādin* interpretations, what distinguishes a *dharma* as present is its 'activity' (*karitra*), that is, whether or not it has the capacity to condition the occurrence of another *dharma*.¹⁰⁰

An additional *dharma* called 'possession' (*prāpti*) was also proposed, which would determine when a certain mental factor would occur at a given moment, that is, when it falls into *one's*, or rather *its own mental stream* (*santāna*).¹⁰¹ This 'possession' itself, however, is unassociated with mind (*citta-viprayukta*) and so may co-exist with either a wholesome or unwholesome nature of mind,¹⁰² thereby also allowing for heterogeneous succession.¹⁰³

And since it is the 'possession' of a *dharma* that determines its presence or absence within the mental stream, the need to distinguish between active (*pariyavasthāna*) and latent (*anuśāya*) afflictions is

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obviated. The *Sarvāstivādins* therefore simply conflate the two and assert that they are associated with mind (*citta-samprayukta*),¹⁰⁴ claiming that the latent dispositions mentioned in the *suttas* actually refer to 'possession' by another name.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, what distinguishes an *Aryan* in a mundane moment from an ordinary being (*prthagjana*) is just the 'possession' (*prāpti*) of the appropriate *dharmas*.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the *Sarvāstivādins* as well as the *Sautrāntikas* distinguished abandonment of the afflictions independently of the actual *present* state of mind¹⁰⁷ with the concepts of 'possession' and 'seeds', respectively.

The *dharma* of 'possession', however, was not systematically worked into the complex scheme of cause, condition, and result (*hetu, pratyaya, phala*). As the final mechanism of the nature of karmic actions, the afflictions which instigate them, and the ultimate indicator of progress along the path, *prāpti* itself is remarkably vague and indeterminate, betraying its *ad hoc* nature and inviting Vasubandhu's open disdain.¹⁰⁸

The Medium of Seeds, Body/Mind Relations and Meditative Cessation

The idea that the accumulation of karma and the continuity of the afflicted dispositions were transmitted through the stream of mind raised, however, further questions regarding the two aspects of *viññāna* delineated above: how does this mental series relate, if at all, to the traditional six cognitive modes? Is the series merely one moment of cognition after another? If so, then is there sufficient homogeneity between succeeding moments of the six cognitive modes, with their attendant and divergent mental factors and physiological bases, so as to allow for the transmission of such karmic potential and afflictive potency? And if not, would the stream of mind that transmits such potential refer to a heretofore unspecified kind of mind?

These questions were brought to a head in the context of body/mind issues in which the continuous presence of mind was essential: what kind of *viññāna* (or *citta*)¹⁰⁹ is it that, as in the canonical doctrines, takes up or appropriates (*upatta* or *upādāna*) the body and its sense organs at birth and is thereafter its support or basis (*āśraya*)¹¹⁰ until its departure from the body at death? And what kind of mind keeps the body alive during the absorption of cessation in

which all mental activities come to a halt (*nirodha-samāpatti*)?¹¹¹ Either mind is present, in which case what type of mind would it be without any mental activities whatsoever? Or, if mind were completely absent and its continuity cut, then what would ensure the transmission of karma and afflictive potential,¹¹² and why would the practitioner not simply die? And what would serve as the homogeneous and immediately antecedent condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) for the moment of mind which emerges from this absorption,¹¹³ since its 'mind support' (*manāśrayah*), an immediately antecedent mental cognition,¹¹⁴ would necessarily have been absent?

It is clear that no single one of the six cognitive modes is fully capable of all of the various functions attributed to *vijñāna* in both canonical and Abhidharma sources, since each of them depends upon their respective sense organs and specific sense objects, is intermittent and always accompanied by associated mental factors. The various approaches to these questions evince a similar search for a different type of mind, one subsisting in some fashion independently of the traditional six cognitive modes.

The *Saurāntikas* suggested that the *citta* which emerges from the absorption of cessation arises from seeds continuously preserved in the body, since they held that mind and body are mutual seeds of one another;¹¹⁵ others, however, criticized this for abrogating the condition of homogeneity, that the effect must be similar to the cause.¹¹⁶ The *Sarvāstivādins* held that the emerging *citta* is directly conditioned by the last moment of *citta* preceding the absorption, since for them those past *dharma*s actually exist.¹¹⁷ Others maintained, however, that a subtle form of mind (*sūkṣma-citta*) subsists without apparent functioning during the absorption, since otherwise the complete withdrawal of *vijñāna* would result in death.¹¹⁸ The *Yogācārins* combined these characteristics into a continuous and subtle type of mind that carries the seeds of both body and mind together, *viz.* the *ālaya-vijñāna*.¹¹⁹

Bhavaṅga-citta

The transition from one body to another at rebirth is an interruption in the material series, over which the transmission of accumulated

karma and the ingrained *kleśa* traverses until one has achieved liberation. Most Abhidharma schools considered the mind which reconnects (*pratisandhi-citta*) at rebirth (*upapatti*), and thereupon joins with the fetal materials, to be a moment of mental cognition (*manovijñāna*).¹²⁰ The *Theravādins*, however, amended this position with the new concept of the life-element or life continuum (*bhavaṅga-citta*),¹²¹ which addresses a variety of problems and so bears comparison with the *ālayavijñāna*.

The *bhavaṅga-citta* is a resultant (*vipāka*), and thus *karmically* neutral, mind of homogeneous nature which takes its particular character at rebirth and to which the mind naturally reverts in the absence of cognitive objects.¹²² As a neutral 'buffer-state' between moments of cognition, it serves, along with the object itself and attention, as one of the immediate conditions upon which specific cognitions arise, thus also resolving the problem of heterogeneous succession.¹²³ It is not, however, a continuous stream since it is constantly interrupted by these cognitions, nor is it simultaneous with them.¹²⁴ Neither is the *bhavaṅga-citta* in its classical formulation connected to the acute functions of karma or *kleśa*, since it is concerned primarily with continuity and perception. Karmic continuities in the *Theravāda*, rather, in Collins' words (1982: 248), have no "underlying connecting thread, save the overall force of *karma* which creates them," transmitted through the unbroken succession of either mental moments, some subliminal and some supraliminal, or, during the mindless absorptions, the material life faculty — in sum, a conception not too dissimilar from the *Saurāntikas*' mental stream (*citta-santāna*), where it is the stream of *citta* or *vijñāna per se* that insures the continuity of karma except during the absorption of cessation.

It is with its metaphysical functions, however, that the *bhavaṅga-citta* bears the closest resemblance to the *ālayavijñāna*. Commenting on these Collins (1982: 239) remarks:

It is a condition of existence in two senses: first, in the sense of its mere occurrence as a phenomenon of the samsāric, temporally extended sphere, as a necessary part of any individual name-and-form . . . it is both a causal, 'construct-ive' and a resultant, 'construct-ed' factor . . . Secondly, it is itself a conditioning factor of existence, in the particular sense of being a necessary condition for any *conscious* experience of life. It is only on the basis of *bhavaṅga* that any mental processes can arise.¹²⁵

And it is precisely upon this dual nature of a continuous, constructed aspect of mind necessary for *samsāric* existence and of an active, conditioning aspect serving as a precondition for all cognitive processes that the complex notion of the *ālayavijñāna* was built.¹²⁶

Index of Controverted Issues

We have seen that the Abhidharma tradition laid ultimate validity upon the momentary factors (*dharmas*) wholly constitutive of the individual and whose (mostly) unbroken succession is conventionally designated the mental stream (*citta-santāna*).¹²⁷ The discernment of these factors as they inform, indeed constitute, one's thoughts and actions provided a powerful analytic in service of the higher religious aims of purification of the mind, the cessation of karmic accumulation, and the gradual progress toward these goals. This newer Abhidharmic analytic, however, became increasingly problematic when contextualized within the larger soteriological framework in which it was ultimately meaningful. For when it came time to describe the accepted workings of *karma* and *kleśa*, and their gradual eradication, in terms of the analysis of momentary processes of mind and its concomitant mental factors (*citta-caitta*), the dogmatic, systemic and empirical inadequacies became glaring indeed. And this inability to adequately contextualize the *dharmic* analytic undermines the very purpose of discerning these momentary processes and overcoming their pernicious influences for which it was conceived in the first place.

The totality of the problems created by the Abhidharmic analytic suggests they are of a systemic nature, elicited by the disjunction between the two temporal dimensions of *vijñāna* which we first discerned within the early Pāli materials. The common thread connecting them is that they refer to, rely upon or seem to require aspects of mind which persist in some fashion beyond, or more precisely, *independently* of the momentary cognitive processes.¹²⁸ And while these continuous elements must be, for the most part, *potentially* present, they must also be strictly *neutral* in their karmic influences.¹²⁹ A short summary of these issues, most of them discussed above, bears this out.¹³⁰

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Karma:

- (1) is there a distinct factor of karmic accumulation (*karma-upacaya*)?¹³¹
- (2) is karmic accumulation (*karma-upacaya*) related to mind (*vijñāna*)?¹³²

Kleśa/anuśaya:

- (3) are the outbursts (*pariyavasthāna*) of afflictions (*kleśa*) distinct from their latent dispositions (*anuśaya*)?¹³³
- (4) are the latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) dissociated from the mind (*citta-viprayukta*), and thus karmically neutral?¹³⁴
- (5) are the latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) simultaneous or compatible with wholesome states (*kuśala-citta*)?¹³⁵
- (6) are there innate, but karmically neutral afflictions (*kleśa*)?¹³⁶
- (7) are there seeds (*bija*) that represent the latent dispositions, their 'impressions' (*vāsanā*), the potential for *karmic* result, and/or subtle forms of *vijñāna*?¹³⁷

Attainments:

- (8) do Aryans harbor afflictions or latent dispositions (*anuśaya*)?¹³⁸
- (9) is there a distinct attainment which distinguishes those who are or will be Aryans from the non-liberated?¹³⁹

Continuity of Consciousness:

- (10) are there subtle (*sūkṣma*) and enduring forms of mind?¹⁴⁰
- (11) is a subtle form of mind (*vijñāna*) present during the absorption of cessation or unconscious states?¹⁴¹
- (12) is there a distinct type of *vijñāna* that transists at rebirth?¹⁴²
- (13) is there a neutral type of mind which can mediate between two heterogeneous states?

Simultaneity of Consciousness:

- (14) can ordinary mind (*citta* or *vijñāna*) contain or accept the seeds (*bija*) or 'impressions' (*vāsanā*)?¹⁴³
- (15) is there a type of mind (*citta* or *vijñāna*) underlying the cognitive modes as their basis (*āśraya*) or root (*mūla*)?¹⁴⁴

- (16) do the different cognitive modes (*vijñāna*) function simultaneously?¹⁴⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Collins' (1982: 224) remark on the use of seed imagery in *Theravāda* — "the imagery of seeds and fruit is never regularized to the extent of becoming technical terminology built into the ultimate account of continuity" — can, I believe, be extrapolated to the problem of the individual mind stream within Abhidharma as a whole. Since all *dharmas* are momentary, Abhidharma does not attribute ultimate validity to *any* factor which continues independently of the analyzable, momentary processes of mind. All the doctrines referring to the continuity of *karma* and *kleśa* examined above, however, (with the exception of *vijñāna* in its momentary, cognitive aspect), depend upon their relation to elements (*citta-santāna*, *āśraya*, *nāma-rūpa*, *ātma-bhāva*, *bija*) considered extraneous to *dharmic* discourse.¹⁴⁶ The fact that this juxtaposition of doctrinally technical language with naturalistic metaphors, analogies and conventional usages was necessary in order to give a full account of the continuity of *karma*, *kleśa*, and the acknowledgement of stages in their eradication, demonstrates the limitations of purely *dharmic* discourse, a conclusion supported by all the above-mentioned 'pseudo-permanencies' and 'pseudo-selves' (Conze, 1973: 132, 138). The seeds, for example, were never intended to be part of that discourse since they were not real existents (*dravya*) at all, but simply metaphors for the underlying capacities (*śakti* or *sāmarthyam*),¹⁴⁷ potentials and developments of mind in terms of the life-processes of insemination (*paribhāvita*), growth (*vrddha*) and eventual fructification (*vipāka-phala*; 'ripened fruit').

Central to these tensions lay, again, the concept of *vijñāna*, with its two temporal aspects from canonical times, as momentary 'cognition' and as a continuous, conscious factor essential for life, corresponding, respectively, to the synchronic analysis of mind (*citta/caitta*) and the diachronic discourse of the mental stream (*santāna*) which grows and develops. To the extent that Abhidharma represents the exclusive validity of the synchronic analysis over diachronic discourse, it is so removed from any greater temporal context as to be nearly ahistorical,

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for anything more than the immediate succession of momentary *dharmas* was indescribable, i.e. only nominally or figuratively true (and even this was problematic, as the issues involving heterogeneous succession demonstrate, for these were ultimately inseparable from problems surrounding the fruition of past *karma*, the persistence of latent dispositions, the emergence from the absorption of cessation, etc.¹⁴⁸). The Abhidharma analysis thus undermined its own encompassing soteriological context in which alone it was made meaningful and coherent.

The entire Abhidharma project, in short, of a soteriology based upon a systematic analysis of momentary mental processes in terms of discrete elements or factors, is at stake here. And it is at stake because the Abhidharma, as it stands, cannot accommodate dispositional or conditioning factors outside of, but still very much influencing, those processes most amenable to their probing investigation, in other words, those unmanifest factors clinging to the mental stream, the continuity of individual existence within *samsāra*.

And it was the tension, at least in part, between these two levels of doctrinal analysis and discourse, focused upon the momentary and continuous processes of mind, respectively, that foreshadowed if not stimulated the conceptualization of the *ālayavijñāna*. For it is the series that, if anything, 'carries' the seeds and so insures doctrinal and empirical meaning and coherence. If the Abhidharma project as a whole was to be salvaged, the series and its seeds must be *systematically* worked into *dharmic* discourse, so that it may adequately describe the continuing persistence and influence of the afflicting passions, the accumulation of karmic potential, the presence of bodily vitality, and the marked stages along the path, yet at the same time preserve the developed system of analysis of one's actions in terms of the momentary and discrete psychology worked out over the centuries by generations of scholars and adepts. But for this a wholly new model of mind was called for, one that could articulate the simultaneous existence of both of these temporal dimensions, of momentary, manifest activities and of the persisting influences of the past. Of all the notions proffered, only the *ālayavijñāna* attempted to systematically integrate, or rather reintegrate in the context of the sophisticated

Abhidharma doctrine, these two distinct aspects of mind first found undifferentiated in the early discourses.

NOTES

* I wish to thank Dr. David Patt and Nobuyoshi Yamabe for many helpful suggestions regarding both the form and content of this essay.

¹ For example, *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* ch. VIII.37.1. states that understanding the appropriating consciousness' (*ādāna-vijñāna*) dim cognition of the constant external world (*asamvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti*) is being "skilled in the arising of *citta* (*cittōtpāda-kuśala*) in accordance with the way things truly are (*yathābhūtam*)." (*ji lta na sems kyi skye ba la mkhas pa yin zhe na / sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug shes na sems kyi skye ba la yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mkhas pa yin te / de la sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug ni brtan pa dang snod rnam par rig pa <mi rig pa> 'ni 'di lta ste / len pa'i rnam par shes pa'i o*). See Schmithausen (1987: 385, n. 629) for emendation, (*mi rig pa*) and Sanskrit reconstruction, based upon *TBh kārīkā* 21.11 (*asamviditaka-upādi-sthāna-vijñāptikam ca tat*); *Nivṛti* Portion 6. states that its description of the *ālayavijñāna* is "the correct way (*samyaknyāya*) of establishing *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*." (*de lta na 'di ni sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa rnam par gzhag pa'i tshul yang dag pa yin te /*); *MSg* I.1—4 adduces several *Māhāyāna sūtras*, viz. the *Abhidharma-māhāyāna-sūtra* and the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, that teach the *ālaya-ādāna-vijñāna*, while *MSg* I.11 cites the *āgamas* of contemporary non-*Māhāyāna* schools where the *ālayavijñāna* had purportedly been taught by synonymous terms (*paryāya*).

² Walpola Rahula (1978: 99).

³ By 'canonical' I refer to the authoritative scriptures generally cited under the rubric 'āgama' or 'sūtra' in the Abhidharma and *Yogācāra* texts, as well as the "nikāyas" of the *Theravādins*. (For such citations found within the *AKBh* see Pāsādika, Bhikkhu. 1989 *Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhu*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.) This use implies mainly the first of two senses of 'canon' described by Collins (1990: 90f):

The word 'canon', in relation to textual materials, can usefully be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, as an equivalent to 'scripture' (oral or written). Used in this way, the term does not specify that the collection of texts so designated constitutes a closed list; it merely assigns a certain authority to them, without excluding the possibility that others could be, or may come to be included in the collection. In the second sense, however, the idea of a 'canon' contains precisely such an exclusivist specification that it is *this* closed list of texts, *and no others*, which are the 'foundational documents' . . . When compared with other extant collections of scriptures in Buddhism, I think the Pali Canon is unique in being an exclusive, closed list.

(Emphasis in original).

⁴ The Pali-English Dictionary (PED: 618) entry testifies to the extreme multivalence of the term *viññāna*:

(as a special term in Buddhist metaphysics) a mental quality as a constituent of individuality, the bearer of (individual) life, life-force (as extending also over rebirths), principle of conscious life, general consciousness (as function of mind *and* matter), regenerative force, animation, mind as transmigrant, as transforming (according to individual kamma) one individual life (after death) into the next. In this (fundamental) application it may be characterized as the sensory and perceptive activity commonly expressed by 'mind.' It is difficult to give any one word for v., because there is much difference between the old Buddhist and our modern points of view, and there is a varying use of the term in the Canon itself . . . Ecclesiastical scholastic dogmatic considers v. under the categories of (a) khandha; (b) dhātu; (c) paṭicca-samuppāda; (d) āhāra; (e) kāya.

For this section of this essay, I have benefitted most from the works of Johansson (1965; 1970; 1979), even when disagreeing on points of translation and interpretation. The translations are based upon those of the Pali Text Society, except where noted; they have frequently been altered, however, for the sake of terminological consistency. For the same reason, I will use the more familiar Sanskrit terms *viññāna*, *samskāra*, *nirvāna*, *samsāra*, etc., throughout the text.

⁵ S III 143. "When, then, the three factors of life, heat, and consciousness abandon this body, it lies cast away and forsaken like an inanimate stick of wood." (*yadā kho āvuso imam kāyam tayo dhammā jahanti: āyu usmā ca viññānam, athāyam kāyo ujjhito avakkhito seti, yathā kaṭṭham acetanam*). Cf. M I 296 and *AKBh* II 45a—b. Schmithausen (1987: 285, n. 165).

⁶ D II 62. "I have said that consciousness (*viññāna*) conditions name-and-form. Were, Ananda, consciousness not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form coagulate there?" "No, Lord."

"Were consciousness, having descended into the mother's womb, to depart, would name-and-form come to birth in this life." "No, Lord." (*viññānapaccayā nāmarūpan ti . . . viññānam va hi ānanda mātu kucchim na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpan mātu kucchimim samucchissathāti. no h'etaṃ bhante. viññānam va hi ānanda mātu kucchim okkamitvā vakkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpan iṭṭhatāya abhinibbattisathāti. no h'etaṃ bhante*).

Also S II 101. "When consciousness is established and increases, then name-and-form descends [into the mother's womb]." (*yattha paṭiṭṭhitam viññānam virūḷham aṭṭhi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti*).

⁷ S I 38 specifically states that it is mind (*citta*) that passes over (*vidhāvati*) at the time of death. As Collins (1982: 214) points out, *citta* and *viññāna* here are functionally equivalent.

⁸ S II 65. "Consciousness being established and growing, there comes to be renewed existence in the future." (*tasmim paṭiṭṭhite viññāne virūḷhe āyatim punabbhavābhinibbati hoti*). D II 68, S III 54 also describes the persistence of *viññāna* from life to life; *viññāna* passes over into another body in S I 122 and S III 124 (PED: 618).

⁹ This is not to say that *viññāna*, as a self-subsistent entity, continues unchangingly from life to life. In M I 258 the Buddha specifically denies the thesis of his interlocutor, Sāti: "Even so do I, Lord, understand *dhamma* taught by the Lord: it is this consciousness itself that runs on, fares on, not another . . . it is this [consciousness] that speaks, that feels, that experiences now here, now there, the fruition of deeds that

are lovely and that are deprived," (*evaṃ byā kho 'ham bhante Bhagavatā dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājānāmi yathā tad — ev' idam viññānam sandhāvati samsarati, anaññan — ti . . . yvāyam bhante vado veddyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākam paṭisamvedeṭṭi*). The Buddha responds stating that "apart from conditions there is no origination of consciousness" (*aññatra paccayā natthi viññānassa sambhavo ti*). Rather it is that the *stream* of *viññāna* continues *unbroken*, as in the context of rebirth. (See also S III 58).

Though the term 'stream of consciousness' (*viññānasotaṃ*) belongs more properly to the later literature, it does appear in the Pāli texts in D III 105: "He understands a man's stream of *viññāna* which is uninterrupted at both ends is established in both this world and the next." (*purisassa ca viññānasotaṃ pajānāti ubhayato abbocchinnam idhaloke paṭṭhitaṃ ca paraloke paṭṭhitaṃ ca*). See Johansson (1965: 192) and Jayatillike (1949: 216, as cited in Matthews 1983: 63) for differing interpretations of this passage.

¹⁰ There is no passage in the Pāli Canon to my knowledge which *explicitly* states that *viññāna* receives or maintains impressions of karma. Nevertheless, Johansson calls *viññāna* the "transmitter of *kamma*" (1965: 195f), or the "collector of *kamma* effects" (1979: 61), citing, however, only passages which are fairly ambiguous. This conclusion is, with some qualifications, defensible, I believe, and can be deduced by the passages that do discuss *karma*, while taking into account the overall characteristics of *viññāna* as the only possible medium of *karmic* continuity, particularly across lifetimes. Such a question was not, however, explicitly discussed at length until the Abhidharma period. The supporting texts may be summarized as follows:

First of all karma is accumulated (*upacita*) and passed on: A V 292. "I declare that the intentional actions performed and accumulated will not be destroyed without being experienced;" M I 390: "beings are heirs" to their actions (*kammadāyādā sattā ti vadāmi*); M III 202: *kammassakā sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhu . . . Nāham . . . sañcetanikaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisamvidivā vyantibhāvam vadāmi. yaṃ kammaṃ karonti kalyāṇam vā pāpakam vā tassa dāyādā bhavanti*. Numerous such passages are found throughout the Pāli Canon.

Viññāna itself, moreover, is directly effected by the quality of a karmic action: S II 82. "If an ignorant man undertakes meritorious actions [his] consciousness (*viññānaṃ*) will go to merit, and [if he] undertakes demeritorious actions, [his] consciousness will go to demerit." (*avijjāgato yaṃ . . . purisapuggalo puññaṃ ce sañkhāram abhisankharoti, puññūpagam hoti viññānaṃ. apuññaṃ ce sañkhāram abhisankharoti, apuññūpagam hoti viññānaṃ*). See Johansson (1979: 61; 1965: 195f).

These two characteristics together nearly suffice: *viññāna* takes the quality of *karmic* activity, which itself accumulates until it comes to fruition; and *viññāna* is virtually the only factor which is described as departing at death and re-emerging at the time of conception. For the *karmic* potential to accrue to an individual lifestream and pass along through the series of rebirths, then it must do so, at least at that time, in conjunction with *viññāna*. Thus Johansson (1965: 191) declares, with some license:

The continuity in the material diversity of the series of rebirths must be something that can transmit ethical resultants just as a wave of energy can run through different types of matter and on its way change its form because of the momentary matter and itself cause changes in the matter. This 'wave of energy' is called *viññāna*.

¹¹ S III 53. "By means of the body [feeling, etc.] . . . consciousness would persist, if it is to persist. With body [etc.] for its object, with body [etc.] for its support, seeking a means of enjoyment, it would attain growth, increase, abundance." (*rūpupāyaṃ . . . viññānam tūthamānaṃ tūṭṭheyya rūpārammaṇam rūpapaṭiṭṭam nanadupasevanam virūlham vuddhim veppulam āpajjeyya*). D III 228 is nearly identical. See Johansson (1979: 128).

These exact terms for propagation are also used in an analogy between seeds and consciousness in S III 54. "Now would these five kinds of seeds come to growth, increase and abundance? . . . As the five kinds of seeds, so should consciousness with its sustenance be considered." (*api nu imāni . . . pañcabijjāṭānti vuddhim virūlham veppulam āpajjeyyunti . . . pañcabijjāṭānti evaṃ viññānam sāhāram dattabbam*). Elsewhere consciousness is declared the seed for further *samsāric* existence. (A I 223. *viññānam bijjam . . . hināya dhātuyā viññānam paṭiṭṭham*.)

As we shall see, these vegetative analogies will also be used to describe the *ālayavijñāna*: the "mind possessed of all the seeds matures, congeals, grows, develops and increases" (*Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* (V. 2): **sarvabijakam citam vipacyate sammūrccati vrdhīm virūdhīm vipulatām āpadyate; sa bon thams cad pa'i sems nam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro*) Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987: 356, n. 508).

¹² Passages equating the cessation of *viññāna* with liberation (*vimutta*) are not uncommon in the Pāli Canon. S III 61. "By the disgust, the dispassion, the cessation of *viññāna* [monks] are liberated without grasping — they are truly liberated." (*viññānassa nibbidā virāgā nirodhā anupādā vimuttā e suvimuttā*) Johansson (1965: 200). M II 265. "As he does not delight in that equanimity, welcome or cleave to it, *viññāna* does not depend on it, nor grasp it. A monk without grasping (*anupādāna*), Ananda, attains *nibbāna*." (*tassa taṃ upekkhāṃ anabhinandato anabhivadaṭo anajjhosāyo tūthato na taṃ nissitaṃ hoti viññānaṃ na tad upādānaṃ. anupādāno, ānanda, bhikkhu parinibbāyati*) S III 61. "This eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of consciousness (*viññāna*)." (*ayam . . . aṭṭhangiko maggo viññānanirodha-gāmini paṭipadā*) (Johansson, 1970: 101). D I 223. "When mind and body are completely destroyed, it is destroyed by the cessation of *viññāna*." (*ettha nāmaṃ ca rūpaṃ ca asesam uparujjhati, viññānassa nirodhena eth'etaṃ uparujjhati*).

There are, however, other views found within the same texts, further expressing the rich and complex polysemy of *viññāna* and suggesting that it continues in some form beyond *samsāric* existence. A passage in SN 734 in fact describes the cessation of *viññāna* and its calming in the same breath: "By the cessation of *viññāna*, there will be no origin of suffering; through the calming of *viññāna* a monk is without craving and completely free." (*viññānassa nirodhena n'atthi dukkhassa sambhavo . . . viññānūpasamā bhikkhu nicchāto parinibbuto*.)

The 'survival' of *viññāna* after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* is supported by many textual passages. M I 329: "*Viññāna* is without attribute, endless and radiating all round." (*viññānaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbatopabham*). A *viññāna* without 'support' or 'resting place' neither increases nor performs karmic activities, and is liberated (S III 53. *tad apatiṭṭhitaṃ viññānaṃ avirūlham anabhisankhāraṇca vimuttam*); thus the *viññāna* of a Buddha or Arhat is said to be without a resting place or support (*apatiṭṭhita-viññāna*). (Cf. D III 105; S I 122; S II 66; S III 54.)

It is surely more than coincidental that a nearly equivalent expression is central to the *Yogācāra* conception of liberation, *viz.*, *apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*, in which the impure

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or defiled portions of the *ālayavijñāna* are removed and its support or basis (*āśraya*) within *samsāric* life utterly transformed, leaving the Bodhisattva with no fixed abode (*apratishṭhita*). On various *Yogācāra* treatments of this concept, see Griffiths *et al.* (1989: 244f) for commentaries on *MSg* X.34; Nagao (1990: 23–34); and Sponberg (1979).

These two conflicting conceptions of the fate of a post-*samsāric* *vijñāna*, in whatever form, are central to many of the later controversies concerning *nirvāna* and Buddhahood. The complex and often contradictory passages preserved in these early texts serve to remind us both of the antecedents and origins of the many controverted issues raised within the history of Indian Buddhist thought and of the relevance these texts still hold for the study of virtually every phase of Indian Buddhism.

¹³ M I 292. "It is called 'cognition' because it cognizes." (*vijānāti ti kho tasmā viññānan ti vuccati*)

¹⁴ D III 243. "There are six cognition-groups: visual cognition, auditory cognition, olfactory cognition, gustatory cognition, tactile cognition, mental cognition." (*cha viññāna-kāyā, cakkhu-viññānam, sota-viññānam, ghāna-viññānam, jivhā-viññānam, kāya-viññānam, mano-viññānam.*) There is also the famous simile in M I 259 where the Buddha declares that in just the same way that a fire is named by the type of material which is burning, such as a brush fire, etc., so also each type of cognition is named after its respective conditions, that is, after its perceiving organ.

¹⁵ Similar formulas, for example M I 190, include an unimpaired internal sense-organ of sight, external visible forms entering into the field of vision, and an appropriate act of attention on the part of the mind, at which time a visual mode of cognition manifests. (*ajjhatikam . . . cakkhu aparibhinnaṃ hoti . . . bhāhirā ca rūpā āpātham āgacchanti . . . tājjo ca samannāhāro hoti . . . viññāna-bhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti*) Jayatilleke (1963: 433f).

¹⁶ It is not at all clear that this distinction always applies, or when it does, which 'aspect' predominates. Citing a number of passages, for example M III 260, in which both senses of *vijñāna* may be seen ("I will not grasp after *viññāna* and so will have no *viññāna* dependent on *viññāna*." *na viññānam upādiyissāmi, na ca me viññānanis-sūtam viññānam bhavissati*) Johansson (1965: 198f) vacillates: "there is a form of *viññāna* dependent on cognitive processes, and probably *viññāna* in its rebirth-aspect is intended," while he states at the same time that "rebirth-*viññāna* probably also simply is ordinary consciousness," and that "there is no reason to distinguish between the perceptual and the rebirth-*viññāna*." The point is that these two divergent contexts of meaning form part of a complex, with all its attendant tensions, whose essential unity as well as its differentiation calls for explication — a call answered, in fact, by the majority of subsequent exegetes, traditional and modern.

¹⁷ I am referring here to the widespread view within Indian religion of an ultimate homology between what we would call the psychological and metaphysical realms, what Maryla Falk (1943: 49) considers a "conception of a fundamental identity of the facts and events on both the scales, which are considered as only twin projections of one common complex of facts and events."

¹⁸ The *pratitya-samutpāda* series, delineating patterns or complexes of conditioned co-arising, often occurs with a number of factors different than the traditional twelve. All of them, however, are based upon the following formula: "When this is, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this is not, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases." (*imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti; imass' uppādā*

idaṃ uppajjati. imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti; imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjati.) M II 32, etc.

¹⁹ The *Mahānidāna-sutta* (D II 63) describes the reciprocal conditionality of *vijñāna* and name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), which is itself composed of the five *skandhas*, including *vijñāna*. It states that the descent of *vijñāna* into the mother's womb is a necessary condition for the development of the name-and-form (along with its variegated faculties including *vijñāna*), while the name-and-form is a necessary condition for *vijñāna* to find support in this world, facilitating the arising of birth, old age, death and the mass of suffering. (*viññāna-paccayā nāmarūpan ti iti kho pan' etaṃ vuttam . . . viññānam va hi ānanda mātu kucchim na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāma-rūpaṃ mātu kucchismiṃ samucchissathāti? no h'etaṃ bhante . . . tasmāt ih' ānanda es' eva hetu etaṃ nidānam esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa, yadidaṃ viññānam . . . nāmarūpa-paccayā viññānan ti iti kho pan' etaṃ vuttam . . . viññānam va hi ānanda nāmarūpe patiṭṭham nālabhissatha, api nu kho āyati jāti-jarā-marāṇa-dukka-samudaya sambhavo paññāyethāti? no h'etaṃ bhante. tasmāt ih' ānanda es' eva hetu etaṃ nidānam esa samudayo esa paccayo viññānassa, yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ*.)

The Sheaf of Reeds *sutta* (S II 114) has a similar passage, but the subsequent members of the twelve-fold series follow directly upon name-and-form: "It is just as if, friend, two sheaves of reeds stood leaning against each other, so also, friend, *viññāna* arises conditioned by name-and-form, name-and-form conditioned by *viññāna*, the six sense-spheres conditioned by name-and-form, name-and-form conditioned by the six sense-spheres, and so on; thus is the arising of the entire mass of suffering." (*seyyathāpi āvuso dve nalakalāpiyo aññam aññam nissāya tiṭṭheyyuṃ. evam eva kho āvuso nāmarūpapaccayā viññānam viññānapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. nāmarūpapaccayā salāyatanaṃ salāyatana-paccayā phasso . . . pe . . . evam etassa kevalassa dukkha-handhassa samudayo hoti*.) We shall see that the *MSg* specifically claims that the *ālayavijñāna* is the *vijñāna* which is reciprocally conditioned by *nāma-rūpa*. See n. 13 above.

²⁰ As do the other essential prerequisites to life mentioned above, life and heat (*āyu, usmā*), as well as the five groups of grasping (*pañcupādānakkhandhā*).

²¹ *Samskāra* are closely allied with the intentional activities defined as karma, and inexorably associated with the perpetuation of *samsāric* existence through the medium of *vijñāna*. S II 39,360, III 60, A II 157 define *samskāra* as "intention" (*sañcetanā*). M I 53 relates *samskāra* with *vijñāna*: "From the arising of *sañkhāra*, there is the arising of *viññāna*; from the cessation of *sañkhāra*, there is the cessation of *viññāna*. The way leading to the cessation of *viññāna* is just this noble eight-fold path." (*sañkhārasamudayā viññānasamudayo, sañkhāranirodhā viññānanirodho, ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo viññāna-nirodha gāmini paṭipadā*.)

²² Plus the sense-object, of course. M I 111. "Dependent on the eye and [visual] forms, a visual cognition occurs, the concomitance of the three is sense-impression; conditioned by sense-impression feeling [occurs], what one feels one apperceives, what one apperceives one reflects upon." (*cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvijñānam, tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi*.)

²³ M I 293. "Your reverence, whatever one feels, that one apperceives; whatever one apperceives, that one cognizes; therefore these states (*dharma*) are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to recognize a difference between these states (*dharma*), having analyzed them again and again." (*yaṃ h' āvuso vedeti taṃ sañjānāti,*

yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti, tasmā ime dhammā samsatthā no viṣaṃsatthā, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ.)

²⁴ One *pratīya-samupāda sūtra* in fact begins with the cognitive processes: "Dependent on the eye organ and visual form, visual cognition arises; the concomitance of the three is sense-impression. Depending on sense-impression is feeling, depending on feeling is craving, depending on craving is grasping, depending on grasping is becoming, depending on becoming is birth, depending on birth old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, distress and despair come about. This is the arising of the world." S II 73. *Cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvijñānaṃ; tinnam saṅgati phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā; vedanāpaccayā taṇhā; taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ; upādānapaccayā bhavo; bhavapaccayā jāti; jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsa sambhavanti. ayaṃ lokassa samudayo.* See also Johansson (1979: 80f).

²⁵ I prefer 'appropriation', with its verbal sense of 'seizing, taking', and 'taking as one's own' (*ad-proprius*), as well as the nominal 'that which is taken, seized, appropriated'. This is etymologically closer to 'upādāna', which is comprised of the prefix 'upa', "towards, near, together with," plus the noun 'ādāna', "receiving, taking to oneself" (SED), or even "the material out of which anything is made" (Apte: 471), thus meaning "grasping, attachment, drawing upon, finding one's support by, nourished by, taking up." (PED: 149) It also conveys within the Pāli materials the more concrete meanings of "fuel, supply," and thus "substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going." It is thus formally akin to *samskāra*, in that it may mean both an active process and a passive product, a conditioning and a conditioned state. See Schmithausen (1987: 72).

Upādāna, with its related and suggestive sense of 'fuel', is closely connected with the process of rebirth. One *sutta* states that just as a fire will burn only with fuel (*upādāna*), but not without it, so too will rebirth occur only with appropriation (*upādāna*), but not without it. Here craving (*taṇhā*) becomes the fuel or substratum (*upādāna*) for one who has laid aside the body, but not yet taken up another. (S IV 399. *seyyathāpi vaccha aggi sa-upādāno jalati no anupādāno. evam eva khvāham vaccha sa-upādānassa upapattim paññāpemi no anupādānassa ti . . . yasmim kho . . . samaye imaṃ ca kāyaṃ nikkhipati sato ca aññataraṃ kāyaṃ anuppanno hoti, tam aham tanhupādānaṃ vadāmi. taṇhā hissa . . . tasmim samaye upādānaṃ hoti.*) (See Johansson 1979: 65 and Matthews 1983: 33).

Without such a substratum, however, one becomes liberated. S IV 102. "If a monk is enamored of them [visible forms (*rūpā*)], if he welcomes them, if he persist in clinging to them . . . he will have *viññāna* resting on them, appropriation of them . . . [but] without appropriation . . . the monk will be liberated." (*tañ ca bhikkhu abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati; tassa . . . tannissitam viññānaṃ hoti tadupādānaṃ . . . anupādāno . . . bhikkhu parinibbāyati.*) M III 16. "These five aggregates of appropriation have desire as a root; that which is desire and passion toward these five aggregates of appropriation is the appropriation/fuel of them." (*ime kho . . . pañc' upādānakhandhā chandamūlakā . . . yo kho . . . pañc' upādānakhandhesu chandarāgo, taṃ tattha upādānaṃ*) Johansson (1979: 66, 68). Translation altered. See also M II 265.

²⁶ Passages relating desire, craving, grasping, etc. to rebirth are too numerous to relate. Of particular interest is S II 101 which states that when there is passion, delight, and craving for any of the four sustenances (*āhāra*) of life, edible food,

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sensation, mental impulses or intentions, and *viññāna*, then *viññāna* persists and increases. When *viññāna* persists and increases, then name-and-form descends [into the mother's womb], the *samskāra* increase, and there is renewed existence in the future, and thus old age and death, etc. (*kabalimkāre . . . phasse . . . manosañcetanāya . . . viññāne ce . . . āhāre athi rāgo athi nandī athi taṇha patiṭṭhātaṃ taṭtha viññānaṃ virūlhaṃ. yaṭtha patiṭṭhātaṃ viññānaṃ virūlhaṃ athi taṭtha nāmarūpassa avakkanti. yaṭtha athi nāmarūpassa avakkanti athi taṭtha saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi. yaṭtha athi saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi athi taṭtha āyatim punabbhavābhiniṃbatti athi taṭtha āyatim jātijarāmaraṇaṃ*). Again, the MSg I.37 will claim that the *ālayaviññāna*, as opposed to any of the six momentary cognitions, is just this consciousness-food (*viññānāhāra*).

²⁷ Johansson (1979: 63f) delineates these two distinct functions of mind: "*Viññāna* refers mainly to the stream of conscious processes which characterizes the human mind, but it is also . . . responsible for the continuity both within this life and beyond. . . . Since *viññāna* is used in two different contexts, the *paṭiccasamuppāda* series and the *khandhā*, one may expect different shades of meaning, although they are not clearly kept apart. In the former type of context, it is more of an inner functional unit, inner space, store-room; in the latter, more of concrete, conscious processes which are the inhabitants of this inner room."

²⁸ Johansson (1979: 92f), commenting on a passage where *viññāna* results from feeling rather than the more usual opposite order (M III 260. "*viññāna* rests upon feeling born from visual contact." *cakkhusamphassaṃ vedanānissitam viññānaṃ*), remarks: "Perception is produced through the confrontation of a neural message with memories stored in the nervous system. The information supplied through the senses can be interpreted only by being compared with this stored information; this information can from a Buddhist point of view be envisaged as provided by *viññāna* and therefore present before the stimulus; it is activated only through the contact, *phassa*. *Viññāna* is . . . a precondition of perception . . . The *dimension* of consciousness is the condition of sensation, and the concrete *content* is the result of it." In the same vein, Wijesekera (1964: 254f) suggests that we take the verb '*uppajjati*', usually rendered 'arise', to mean rather that *viññāna* "begins to function" in relation to a specific sense organ, while Thomas (1935: 104) also suggests simply that *viññāna* "manifests itself through the six sense organs."

²⁹ There is the danger, of course, of *anachronistically* reading into the texts distinctions only subsequently made by the later commentators. But, in agreement with the later exegetes, the texts cited here support, indeed call for, just such an analysis. It is not, however, strictly necessary to claim two distinct *aspects* of *viññāna* in these early texts (let alone in the intentions of their author[s]); it is sufficient merely to delineate two consistently distinct *contexts* of meaning. In any case, my primary purpose is to present and examine the materials by which the conclusions of the later writers were supported, and thereby contextualize their claims.

³⁰ The most well-known concept relating to dispositional tendencies is *āsrava* (Pāli: *āsava*) variously translated as 'outflows', 'inflows', even 'cankers'. The Sanskrit root '*sru*' means "to flow, stream, issue, come from, come in" etc. (SED; 1274); the PED (115) records the metaphorical meanings of intoxicating extract or plant secretion, or discharge from a sore; hence the translation favored one hundred years ago: 'canker'.

The *āsrava* are directly connected to the perpetuation of *samsāra* (for example M I 54f: *āsavasamudayaṃ avijjāsamudayo; āsavanirodhā avijjānirodho . . . avijjāsamudayaṃ āsasamudayo; avijjānirodhā āsavanirodho*), and present in all states prior to the

attainment of liberation. We will not examine them more deeply as they are not closely related to the concepts under discussion here in any systematic fashion. See Cox (1992: 66f, 92f) for a summary of the overall role of this concept, particularly as found in the *Sarvāstivādin* Abhidharma literature in Chinese translation.

³¹ The term is composed of the prefix 'anu-', "along, follow behind," and the Sanskrit root 'śī', meaning "to lie down, to sleep, to dwell." The verbal form 'anusēti' (Pāli: *anusēti*), thus means "to lie down with, to dwell upon," but when referring to ideas, the PED (44) defines it as "to fill the mind persistently, to lie dormant and be continually cropping up," while the nominal form, 'anusaya', is glossed as: "bent, bias, proclivity, the persistence of a dormant or latent disposition, predisposition, tendency. Always in bad sense."

Although the *anusaya* merited an entire chapter in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa*, their role within the early Pāli texts was more peripheral. Recent English language scholarship based upon the Pāli materials includes the works of Johansson, Padmasiri de Silva (1972; 1979), and Matthews (1983). Collet Cox (1992: 68f) has also discussed the *anusaya* and its treatment by the *Sarvāstivādins*.

³² M III 285. *cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvīññānam, tinnam saṅgati phasso; phassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitām sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukkham vā. so sukhāya vedanāya phuttho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati; tassa rāgānusaya anuseti.*

³³ M I 303. "A disposition to passion lies latent in pleasant feeling; a disposition to aversion lies latent in unpleasant feeling; a disposition to ignorance lies latent in neutral feeling." (*sukhāya . . . vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, dukkhāya . . . vedanāya paṭighānusayo anuseti, adukkhamasukhāya . . . vedanāya avijjānusayo anuseti*).

These three form the basis of an early classification of the *anusaya* into seven different types, the first three corresponding to the three unwholesome roots of greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*), with the additional dispositions towards speculative views (*dīṭṭhi*), sceptical doubt (*vicikicchā*), pride (*māna*), and craving for existence (*bhavarāga*): S V 60; A IV 9; PED (44) warns, however, that "these lists govern the connotation of the word; but it would be wrong to put that connotation back into the earlier passages." There are several other types of *anusaya* mentioned in the early texts to which we shall return shortly: 'dispositions to a view of personal existence' (*sakkāyadīṭṭhānusaya*), 'attachment to rules and rituals' (*silabbataparāmāsanusaya*), 'desire for sensual pleasure' (*kāmarāgānusaya*), and the 'disposition toward the pride that creates 'I' and 'mine'' (*ahankāra-mamankāra-māna-anusaya*).

³⁴ One *sutta* (S II 66) has the *anusaya* initiate the entire *pratītya-samutpāda* series: "If one does not will, O monks, does not intend, yet [a disposition] lies dormant, this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be a support of consciousness. Consciousness being supported and growing, there come to be the descent of mind-and-body; conditioned by mind-and-body, the six sense-spheres, and so on; such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering." S II 66. (*no ce bhikkhave ceteti no ce pakappeti aha ce anuseti, ārammaṇam etaṃ hoti viññānassa thitīyā; ārammaṇe sati patitthā viññānassa hoti. tasmim patitthiṭṭhe viññāne virūlḥe nāmarūpassa avakkanti hoti. nāmarūpapaccayā salāyatanam; pe. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.*)

³⁵ S II 65. *no ce bhikkhave ceteti no ce pakappeti aha ce anuseti, ārammaṇam etaṃ hoti viññānassa thitīyā; ārammaṇe sati patitthā viññānassa hoti. tasmim patitthiṭṭhe viññāne virūlḥe āyatim punabbhavābhiniṭṭhanti hoti. āyatim punabbhavābhiniṭṭhanti*

sati āyatim jātijārāmarānam sokaparidevadukkha-domanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

³⁶ M I 433. *Daharassa hi malurikyūpūta kumārassa mandassa utāgaseyyakassa sakkāyo (dhammā . . . silā . . . kāmā . . . sattā) ti pi na hoti, kuto pan' assa uppajjissati sakkāyadīṭṭhi (dhammesu vicikicchā . . . silesu silabbataparāmāso . . . kamesu kāmaccchando . . . sattesu byāpādo); anuseti tv'ev' assa sakkāyadīṭṭhānusayo (vicikicchā-nusaya . . . silabbataparāmāsanusayo . . . kāmarāgānusayo . . . byāpādānusayo).*

³⁷ M I 434. *na sakkāyadīṭṭhi-pariyuṭṭhitena cetasā viharati na sakkāyadīṭṭhiparetena, uppānnāya ca sakkāyadīṭṭhiyā nissaraṇam yathābhūtam pajānāti; tassa sā sakkāyadīṭṭhi sānusaya pahiyati.* The interpretation of this last phrase, "eliminated along with the *anusaya*" (*sānusaya pahiyati*) became the source of exegetical disagreements, together with their important doctrinal ramifications, between the various Abhidharmic schools. See note 86, below.

³⁸ An interesting question here is not so much the continuous subsistence of these dispositions, for that seems unquestioned; the real question is whether or not they are in any sense *karmically* effective in their latent state. The texts, however, are ambivalent; for while the *anusaya* are not portrayed as active in every mental process, as the difference between the innocent babe and the beleaguered adult illustrates, they are, nevertheless, held to be generally effective within the wider context of *samsāric* continuity, as in S II 65 above. See Johansson (1979: 109). These will become important issues surrounding the *ālayavijñāna*.

³⁹ An *Aryan* who has destroyed only the five lower fetters (*samyojanani*), for example, may still have a subtle remnant (*anusahagato*) of the pride, desire and disposition toward 'I am'. (S III 131. *evam eva kho āvuso kiñcāpi ariyasāvakkassa pañc' orambhāgiyāni saññojānāni* pahināni bhavanti. aha khvassa hoti yo ca pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato asmūti māno asmūti chando asmūti anusayo asamūhato*). Schmithausen (1987: 437, n. 918) reads "*samyojanāni*" here, based upon a parallel passage on the preceding page, S III 130.

A more advanced *Aryan*, however, is free of these dispositions and so does not react to unpleasant, pleasant and neutral sensations with the habituated responses of aversion, attachment, and ignorance, respectively. (S IV 209. *tam enam dukkhāya vedanāya apatighavantam yo dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo so nānuseti . . . tassa kāmasukhaṃ nābhinandato yo sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo so nānuseti . . . adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo so nānuseti*).

⁴⁰ Liberation (*vimukti*) and the perfect comprehension of pride (*mānābhisamaya*) are closely related to the absence of any disposition (*anusaya*) toward the pride which produces 'I' or 'mine'. A I 133. "Because, indeed Sāriputta, in so far as a monk . . . has no disposition to the pride that produces 'I' or 'mine' regarding this body endowed with consciousness, has no disposition to the pride that produces 'I' or 'mine' regarding all external phenomena (*nimitta*), and who abides accomplishing liberation of the mind and liberation through insight, he abides accomplishing liberation of the mind and liberation through insight without a disposition to the pride that produces 'I' or 'mine' — such a monk, Sāriputta, has cut off craving, has broken the bonds, has through perfect comprehension of pride made an end of suffering." (*yato kho sāriputta bhikkhuno imasmim savīññānake kāye ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti, bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti, yañ ca cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim upasampajja viharato ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti tañ ca cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim upasampajja*

Kathāvatthu XXII.8, for example, only denies that *all* phenomena last merely a single mind-moment; *eka-citta-kkhaṇikā sabbe dhamma*), but they divided this instant into three and four parts of arising, abiding and passing away, and impermanence, respectively. (See also Kalupahana (1992: 206–216), who argues that it was only with Buddhaghosa that the theory of momentariness was introduced into Theravādin Abhidhamma and thereafter at variance with earlier doctrine.)

Though this division of a single instant was elsewhere criticized for not being strictly instantaneous (AKBh *ad* II 46a–b; Shastri: 259; Poussin: 228), this does not directly affect the issues under discussion here; I shall use “momentary” and “momentariness” with these qualifications in mind. The AKBh IV *ad* 2b–3b (Shastri: 568; Poussin: 4), for example defines as momentary (*kṣaṇikāh*) that which is destroyed immediately after it attains its existence (*ko 'yam kṣaṇo nām? ātmalābho 'nantara vināsi, so 'sya asti iti kṣaṇikāh*), while Yaśomitra (*ibid.* in Shastri's edition) glosses '*kṣaṇa*' simply as the limit or boundary of time (*kālaparyantaḥ kṣaṇah*).

⁴⁹ AKBh I.3; Shastri: 14; Poussin: 5. *dharmaṇām pravicyam antareṇa nāsti kleśānām yata upaśāntaye 'bhyupāyāḥ . . . na hi vinā abhidharmopadeśeṇa śīsyāḥ śakto dharmān praviceṣum iti*. See Bareau (1955: 137f, 188, 197) for the doctrines that the *dharma*s are entirely knowable (*jñeya*), perceptible (*vijñeya*) and comprehensible (*abhiññeya*). (citing *Sarvāstivāda* thesis # 3, the later *Mahīśāsaka* thesis # 3, and *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* thesis # 31.)

⁵⁰ For the same reason, the question of at least conventional identity became problematic, since the *dharmic* factors had to be related closely enough to be considered those of an “individual” mind-stream, if not an actual “person,” for otherwise the boundaries between individual minds would blur and karmic cause and effect would diffuse indiscriminately, unattributable to any particular mind-stream.

⁵¹ And skirting the boundaries of incoherence as well. The inconceivability of purely momentary experience devoid of a larger interpretive framework has been pointed out by Thomas Luckmann (1967: 45) in a context not altogether incompatible with basic Buddhist tenets:

Subjective experience considered in isolation is restricted to mere actuality and is void of meaning. Meaning is not an inherent quality of subjective processes but is bestowed on it in interpretive acts. In such acts a subjective process is grasped retrospectively and located in an interpretive scheme . . . The interpretive scheme is necessarily distinct from [and] . . . “transcends” ongoing experience . . .

The meaning of experience is derived from the relation of ongoing processes to the scheme of interpretation [which] . . . rests upon a certain degree of detachment. Such detachment cannot originate in a simple succession of isolated subjective processes . . . a genuinely isolated subjective process is inconceivable.

One may, however, in agreement with its *Mahāyāna* critics, question the Abhidharmikas' claim to ultimate truth and consider Abhidharma as simply another interpretive scheme, preserving ‘inconceivability’ for higher concerns. See Piatigorsky (1984) for the most extensive, and sympathetic, treatment of this approach and Daye (1975). Derrida (1973: esp. 60–69) also discusses the relation between temporality

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and ‘pure experience’ in reference to Husserl's concepts, particularly in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness*.

⁵² The PED (266f) entry for this term indicates, once again, the common indivisibility between the *process* and the *agent* of the process in so many key Buddhist terms; *citta* is “the centre and focus of man's emotional nature as well as that intellectual element which inheres in and accompanies its manifestations: thought. In this wise *citta* denotes both the agent and that which is enacted.” See Guenther (1989: 1f) for similar remarks on the meaning and translation of *citta*.

In the early discourses it was frequently grouped with *vijñāna* and *manas*, cognition and mentation, respectively. S II 95. *yam ca kho etaṃ . . . vuccati cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇa iti pi*. AKBh II 34a–b; Shastri: 28; Poussin: 176f: *cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānam ekārthaṃ*. These terms are distinguished, however, by their characteristic functions and nuances: *citta*, in Vasubandhu's usual double etymology, accumulates (*cinoti*), and refers to a variety (*citraṃ*) of pure and impure elements; *manas* mentates and refers to a previous state of mind inasmuch as it supports the succeeding one; and *vijñāna* discerns objects and arises supported by two conditions, i.e. the organ and object. (*ibid.*: *cinoti iti cittaṃ. manuta iti manah. vijñānāti iti vijñānam. cittaṃ śubhāśubhair dhātubhir iti cittaṃ. tad eva āsrayabhūtaṃ manah. āsrītabhūtaṃ vijñānam iti apare*). The *Yogācārins* will subsequently, and significantly, designate the *ālayavijñāna* as *citta*, while the *manas* will be equated with ‘afflictive mentation’ (*kliṣṭa-manas*), and *vijñāna* with the ‘functioning cognitions’ (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*).

⁵³ A I 8. *pañihūte cittaṇa . . . nibbānam sacchikarissati*. D II 81. “*Citta*, when thoroughly infused with wisdom, is set quite free from the maleficent influences (*āsava*), namely the maleficent influences of sensual pleasure, existence, views and ignorance.” (*paññā-paribhāvītaṃ cittaṃ sammād eva āsavehi vimuccati seyyathidaṃ kāmāsavā bhavāsavā diṭṭhāsavā avijjāsavā*). The verb “*paribhāvīta*” is used with the seeds (*bīja*) in the AKBh, and when used with *citta* will have important implications for *Yogācāra ālayavijñāna* theory. See also Johansson 1965: 176 and 1970: 23.

⁵⁴ Though the general scheme of *dharma*s is common to most Abhidharma schools, the exact list differs from one school to the next. For example the *Yogācārins* considered five *caittas* as ‘omnipresent’ (*sarvatraga*) factors essential for mental functioning at every moment (*sparsā*, sensation; *manaskāra*, attention; *vedanā*, feeling; *saṃjñā*, apperception; and *cetanā*, motivation), in addition to which the *Theravādins* reckoned two, *ekaggatā* (individuality of object) and *jīvitindriya* (life faculty), and the *Sarvāstivādins* five others: *chanda*, desire; *matī*, discernment; *prajñā*, discriminatory awareness; *smṛti*, recollection or mindfulness; *adhimokṣa*, determination; and *saṃādhi*, concentration.

There are further categorizations and distributions of *caittas*, with the exact members differing from school to school, in terms of wholesome mental factors (*kuśala-caitta*) occurring in each wholesome *citta*, unwholesome factors in unwholesome *cittas* associated with universal affliction factors (*kleśa-mahābhūmika*) or simply with the afflictions (*kleśa*) themselves. AKBh *ad* II 24–29; Shastri: 186; Poussin: 153–6, 161–169; Hirakawa (1973: Vol. I. xii–xxiv); Compendium: 94–96; Chaudhuri (1983: 105–108).

⁵⁵ *Vijñāna* (or *vijñāna-skandha*), sometimes together with *mano*, constitutes the category of *citta* in many Abhidharma texts, as, for example, the *Prakaranapāda*

(T.26.627a13, 692b28), as well as throughout the *Yogācāra* corpus. See Hirakawa (1973, Vol. I. xii–xxiv). *Citta*, *viñāna* and *mano* are equated in *AKBh* II 34a–d; see note 52 above.

⁵⁶ *AKBh ad* II 50c–d/51; Shastri: 283–291; Poussin: 248–255. When considered as causal factors, they are called the ‘simultaneous-’ or ‘co-existent causes’ (*sahabhū-hetu*). Although the *Sarvāstivādins* maintained this type of cause, the *Sautrāntikas* rejected it on the grounds that it contradicts the accepted principle that cause and effect necessarily follow one another. As Tanaka (1985) points out, however, this misses the point, since this refers rather to the conditions supporting a phenomenon at any given time, as, for example, a tripod, each of whose legs must be simultaneously present for the others to function. Although this causal factor does not seem particularly emphasized within the Abhidharma, the *Yogācārin*s will thoroughly exploit it in relation to *ālayavijñāna* theory. It corresponds closely to the co-nascent condition (*sahajāta-paccaya*), the sixth condition of the *Paṭṭhāna* of *Theravādin* Abhidhamma.

Yaśomitra seems to agree: since mind (*citta*) and its concomitant mental factors (*caitta*) are the mutual effect of one another they are simultaneous causes. (*AKBh ad* II 53; Poussin: 288; Shastri: 307: *anyonyaphalārthena sahabhūhetuḥ*. Yaśomitra comments: *cittam caittasya phalam, caitto 'pi caittasya iti anyonyaphalam iti tenārthena sahabhūhetuḥ*.) Yaśomitra defends this causal condition by citing the accepted scriptural formula that sensation is the concomitance of feeling, apperception and intention born together (*AKBh ad* II 49; Shastri: 279; Poussin: 245. *taiḥ saha jātā vedanā samjñā cetanā ca iti sahabhūhetuḥ*). *Theravādin* Abhidhamma commentaries hold a similar concept in *MA* II 77: *tam phassaṃ paṭicca sahajātādivasena phassapaccayā vedanā uppajjati*. Quoted in Jayatilike (1963: 435f).

⁵⁷ Mental factors are associated with *citta* when they share five specific commonalities (*samataḥ*): (1) the same physical basis (*āśraya*), i.e. the five sense-faculties and the mental-faculty (*mano-indriya*); (2) the same object (*ālambana*), i.e. the same respective sense-fields (*viśaya*); (3) the same aspect (*ākāra*), i.e. they both conform to the character of the object; (4) the same time of occurrence (*kāla*); and (5) the same number of *dharmas* at a time, i.e. one. (*AKBh* II 34b–d; Shastri: 201f; Poussin: 177f.)

This schema seems to have begun at an early date, for much the same formula is found in *Kathāvatthu* VII.2, where *sampayutta* seems to be defined as having the same physical basis (*ekavattthuka*) and the same object (*ekārammaṇa*), arising and ceasing together (*ekappāda, ekanirodha*), and being concomitant, co-existent and compounded (*sahagata, sahajāta, saṃsaṭṭha*). The Pāli Abhidhamma text, the *Paṭṭhāna*, gives the same three commonalities for the *sampayutta-paccaya*, the nineteenth condition, though the whole system of conditions found in this work is altogether more complex and thoroughgoing than that found in the *Sarvāstivādin* or *Yogācārin* works. See Nyānatiloka (1983: 125).

⁵⁸ *AKBh* IV 1b. (Shastri: 567; Poussin: 1) quoting a *sūtra*, defines *karma* as intention and performing an action having intended. (*kim punas tat karma? iti āha cetanā taṅkṛtam ca tat. sūtra uktam "dve karmaṇi cetanā karma cetayitvā ca" iti*.)

For example, the mental factors of anger or lust being conjoined (*samprayukta*) with mind (*citta*), constitutes or instigates ‘unskillful’ or ‘unwholesome’ (*akuśala*) actions, which eventually produce unpleasant or undesirable results; similarly ‘skillful’

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or ‘wholesome’ (*kuśala*) actions produce pleasant or desirable results. *AKBh* IV 45; Shastri: 652; Poussin: 106; *kṣemākṣemetarat karma kuśalākuśaletarat / . . . kṣemam karma kuśalam, yaḍiṣṭavipākam . . . akṣemakuśalam . . . yasyāniṣṭo vipākah / punyāpunyamariṇam ca sukhavedyādi ca trayam / . . . punaḥ triṇi – sukhavedaniyam karma, duḥkhavedaniyam, aduḥkhāsukhavedaniyam ca*. This last set of terms, “karma leading to happiness or suffering,” etc. (*sukhavedaniyam karma, duḥkhavedaniyam*) are also found in the Pāli texts *A* IV 382, *S* V 211.

⁵⁹ *AKBh ad* II 35–46; Poussin: 178–244; Chaudhuri: 108–109. See also Jaini (1959c).

⁶⁰ Stcherbatsky (1956: 31) describes this brave new *dharmic* world as follows: “Just as they are disconnected, so to say, in breadth, not being linked together by any pervading substance, just so are they disconnected in depth or in duration, since they last only one single moment (*kṣaṇa*). They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be followed the next moment by another momentary existence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (*dharmā*), two moments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point in time-space . . . A cause for the Buddhists was not a real cause but a preceding moment, which likewise arose out of nothing in order to disappear into nothing.”

⁶¹ For the *Sarvāstivādins* the six causes are the main or efficient cause (*kāraṇa-hetu*), the simultaneous cause (*sahabhū-hetu*), the cause by association (*samprayukta-hetu*), the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*), the omnipresent cause (*sarvatraga-hetu*), and last but certainly not least, the maturational cause (*vipāka-hetu*). *AKBh ad* II 49–73; Poussin: 244–331. Verdu (1985: 66–128) and Chaudhuri (1983: 108–115) treat these causes, conditions and results at some length. For corresponding *Yogācārin* views of this system of *hetu*, *pratyaya*, and *phala*, see *ASBh*: 35–43.

⁶² We need not describe each cause, condition and fruit. We have already mentioned the ‘simultaneous or co-existent cause’ (*sahabhū-hetu*), and the ‘associated cause’ (*samprayukta-hetu*) (referring to the relationship between the *citta* and *caittas* mentioned above which share the five commonalities. *AKBh ad* II 51).

The first cause, the *kāraṇa-hetu*, is the ‘efficient cause’, the most essential and general cause, such as when an eye-cognition arises due to a visual form and the unimpaired eye-organ (*AKBh ad* II 49: *Vyākhyā*, Shastri ed.: 279: *caḥṣuḥ pratyaya rūpāṇi ca upadyate caḥṣurviñānam iti kāraṇāhetuḥ*).

Two other major causes which only seldom arise in the debates under consideration here are (1) the ‘homogeneous cause’ (*sabhāga-hetu*), from which *dharmas* follow uniformly and automatically (*niśyanda-phala*), which is to say, their fruit is of the same nature as its cause, wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral (*AKBh* II 54a–b; Shastri: 306; Poussin: 268) and (2) the ‘all-pervading cause’ (*sarvatraga-hetu*), which usually refers to ignorance (*avidyā*) inasmuch as it has not been eradicated and thus influences all actions. *AKBh* II 57c; Shastri: 330–332; Poussin: 291; Sakurabe (1981: 98); Stcherbatsky (1956: 28f); Verdu (1985: 75).

Stcherbatsky (1956: 67) has well illustrated this system of causes, conditions and fruits with the example of the process of visual cognition:

The *Sarvāstivādins* establish several kinds of causal relations between the elements. If, e.g., a moment of the sense of vision produces in the next moment a visual sensation, it is termed *kāraṇa-hetu* and its result

adhipatiphala [predominate result] . . . When the next moment is just the same as the foregoing one, thus evoking in the observer the idea of duration, this relation is termed *sabhāga-hetu* [homogeneous cause] as to a *nisyanda-phala* [uniform fruit]. If this moment appears in a stream (*santāna*) which is defiled by the presence of passions (*kleśa*), this defiling character is inherited by the next moments, if no stopping of it is produced. Such a relation is called *sarvatraga-hetu* as to *nisyanda-phala*. Finally every moment in a stream is under the influence of former deeds (*karma*) and many, in its turn, have an influence on future events. This relation is termed *vipāka-phala*.

⁶³ *Vipāka*, more literally 'maturation', is derived from the root verb 'pac', 'to mature or ripen', or 'to come to perfection', while the prefix 'vi-' carries the weight of English 'dis-', roughly 'difference'. It refers to a ripened or matured fruit different from its cause, in that it is an indeterminate *dharma* (*avyākṛta-dharma*) resulting from a *dharma* which is either unwholesome (*akuśala*) or wholesome with contaminants (*kuśala-sāsrava*) and reaching maturation at a later time neither simultaneously nor immediately afterwards. (AKBh *ad* II 57a–b; Shastri: 330; Poussin: 288. *vipāko 'vyākṛto dharmah anivrtāvākṛto hi dharmah vipākah . . . ya uttarakālam bhavati na yugapad na api antaram sa vipākah*). This contrasts with the 'homogeneous cause' (*sabhāga-hetu*) and 'all-pervading cause' (*sarvatraga-hetu*) and their uniform fruition (*nisyanda-phala*).

Guenther (1959: 19–20) calls *vipāka* an "energetic process" intimately related to *karma*, such that "in its potential stage energy is 'heaped up' (*upacita*), while in its kinetic state it develops (*vipacyate*) toward a certain effect."

⁶⁴ For Vasubandhu, the *adhipati-pratyaya*, the 'predominant condition', and the *hetu-pratyaya*, the 'root condition', comprise the *kāraṇa-hetu* and other *hetus*, respectfully, while the 'object condition' (*ālambana-pratyaya*) refers to the epistemic object. (AKBh *ad* II 61c–64c; Shastri: 381–392; Poussin: 299–311). *Theravādin* doctrine differs here from that found in the *Abhidharmakośa*, for the system preserved in the *Paṭṭhāna* of the *Abhidhamma-pitaka* lists a series of twenty-four conditions (*paccaya*). (Nyanatiloka 1983: 117–127). These are, however, reduced in the *Abhidhammatthasāṅgaha* (VIII.12; p. 197) to four main conditions: object condition (*ārammaṇa-paccaya*), sufficing condition (*upanissaya-paccaya*), the action condition (*kamma-paccaya*) and the presence condition (*atthi-paccaya*).

⁶⁵ AKBh II 62a–b; Shastri: 342; Poussin: 300: *cittacaitā acaramā utpannāḥ samanantarāḥ . . . samāś ca ayam anantaraś ca pratyaya iti samanantarapratyayaḥ*.

⁶⁶ Thus most Abhidharma schools attempted to mitigate the immediately antecedent and homogeneous condition by positing factors that would allow for heterogeneous succession between *dharmas* of different types. As Jaini (1959b: 244) sums up Yaśomitra's (*ad* II 35–6) comments:

Even the Vaibhāṣikas, he says, must resort to some such theory [as the seeds] to explain the phenomena of the succession of two heterogeneous *cittas*. They also believe that an *akuśala* can be succeeded by a *kuśala*. Do the Vaibhāṣikas here agree that the *kuśala* is produced by an *akuśala*? If they do not agree then they deny *samanantara-pratyaya*. If

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they agree then they must explain what kind of power (*śakti*) it is that produces a *kuśala-citta*. If this power is *akuśala* it cannot produce *kuśala*. If it is *kuśala* then it cannot on their terms remain in an *akuśala-citta*.

⁶⁷ AKBh *ad* V 25b; Shastri: 805; Poussin: 51; "If the past would not exist, how would there be the future fruit of pure and impure karma, since at the time the fruit arises the cause of maturation (*vipākahetu*) is not present?" (*yadī ca atītam na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalamāyaryām katham syāt? na hi phalotpattikāle vartamānām vipākahetur asti iti*). See also Poussin (1937a: 77).

⁶⁸ As Piatigorsky (1984: 50) note regarding *karma*, "the only thing it really does is that it connects cause with effect." [Emphasis in original.]

⁶⁹ AKBh *ad* VI 26a; Poussin: 180f. "It is called 'entering into assurance' because it is entering into the assurity of perfection. In the *sūtra* it is called 'the perfection which is *nirvāna*', obtaining which is 'entering', and from whose production one is called an Āryan person. The state of being a worldling is destroyed by the future state." (*saiva ca niyāmāvākrāntir ity ucyate; samyaktvaniyāmāvākramaṇāt. 'samyaktvam nirvānam' ity uktam sūtre . . . tasyābhigamanam avākramaṇam. tasyām cōtpannāyām āryapudgala ucyāte. anāgatayā pṛthagjanatvam vyāvartyate*).

The Appendix of the English translation of the *Kathāvatthu* (383, re: XXI 7, 8) discusses *niyāma* as follows: "*Niyāma* means 'fixity', but *niyāma* is 'that which fixes'. The former is derived from *ni-yam-ati*, to fix; the latter from the causative: *niyāmeti*, to cause to be fixed. When the Path — i.e., a certain direction, course, tendency, profession, progressive system of a person's life — is called *sammatta*, or, contrariwise, *micchatta-niyāma*, both forms are understood in the causal sense. Thus the former 'path' inevitably establishes the state of exemption from *apāyas* (rebirth in misery), and the latter inevitably establishes purgatorial retribution after the next death. *Niyāma*, then, is that by which the *Niyāma* (the fixed, or inevitable order to things) is established, or that by which fixity is brought about, or marked out in the order of things. . . .

"The orthodox view is that, in the whole causal flux of 'happenings' — and these comprise all *dhammas*, all *kammas* — there are only two rigid successions, or orders of specifically fixed kinds of cause-and-effect. These are — (1) The *sammatta-niyāma*; (2) the *micchatta-niyāma*. By or in the latter, certain deeds, such as matricide, result in purgatorial retribution immediately after the doer's next death. By or in the former, the Path-graduate will win eventually the highest 'fruit' and Nibbāna." See also *Kathāvatthu* V, 4; VI, 1; XII, 5; XIII, 4; on *sammatta-niyāma* (Skt.: *samyaktva-niyāma*) see S I 96; S III 225, A I 121f. *Suttanipāta* 55, 371.

Conze (1973: 137f) has succinctly summarized these issues:

Saints are credited with a number of possessions and achievements which are lasting in the sense that they are not lost as soon as the present moment has passed. A Streamwinner need never again be reborn in a state of woe, and thus has won a quality which he will always have. The Arhat, according to some, can never fall away . . . Even while he does not actually realize it, a saint has the power to realize at his will this or that attainment, and thus possesses it potentially. The fact that a

mental state is definitely abandoned or definitely established lies outside the momentary series of states, and so does permanent ownership or potential ownership of a spiritual skill. One speaks of a person being 'destined' (*niyata*) for some future condition, and asserts that he will certainly obtain it. For instance people are said to be 'destined for Nirvana', or 'to be destined' either for salvation (*samyaktva*) or perdition (*mithyātva*).

⁷⁰ AKBh ad V 1a; Shastri: 759; Poussin: 106; *karmajam lokavaicitrayam iti uktam. tāni ca karmāni anuśayavaśād upacayam gacchanti, antarena ca anuśayān bhavābhīr-vartane na samarthāni bhavanti. ato vedūtavayāh mūlam bhavasya anuśayāh*. Yaśomitra (Shastri: 760) explains that existence or becoming (*bhava*) refers here, as with so many of the concepts we are examining, to both resultant (*vipāka*) and active aspects, i.e. the resultant aspect of renewed existence (*punarbhava*) and existence inasmuch as it consists of further life-creating activities (*karma-bhava*). *Theravāda* Abhidhamma similarly divides *bhava* into resultant, renewed becoming (*upapatti-bhava*) and activities that create existence (*kamma-bhava*); *Vibhanga*, 137; *Compendium*, VIII 5: 89f, 262; *Visuddhi-magga* XVII 250f.

⁷¹ AKBh III 19a—d; Shastri: 433f; Poussin: 57—9; *yathā ākṣepam kramād vṛddhaḥ santānaḥ kleśakarmabhiḥ paralokam punar yāti . . . iti anādibhavacakrakam*.

This latter statement means both that *kleśa* and *karma* are due to birth and that birth is due to *kleśa* and *karma*. (AKBh III 19a—d; Shastri: 433f; Poussin: 57—9; *etena prakāreṇa kleśakarmahetukam janma tad hetukāni punaḥ kleśakarmāni tebhyaḥ punar janma iti anādibhavacakrakam vedūvayam*.)

⁷² Accumulation (*upacaya*) of karma is defined as the accumulation until their fruit ripens of intentional actions which necessarily give a result. (AKBh ad IV 120; Shastri: 746f; Poussin: 242f; *sañcetanā . . . vipākāc ca karmopacitam . . . katham sañcetanataḥ? sañcintya kṛtam bhavati . . . katham vipākataḥ? vipākādāne niyatam bhavati*.)

The AKBh differentiates the action (*karma*) which creates such potential from the accumulation (*upacaya*) of that potential itself. (AKBh ad IV 120; Shastri: 746; Poussin: 242f. "What is done and what is accumulated is called karma." *kṛtam ca, upacitam ca karmocyate*.)

This is derived from canonical passages treating karma, as cited previously; A V 292: "I declare that the intentional actions performed and accumulated will not be destroyed without being experienced." It is not, however, universally accepted, as *Kathāvatthu* XV. 11 (*kammūpacayakathā*) demonstrates. This debate concerns the same issues as does the persistence of the dispositions: how can there be a distinct type of karmic accumulation that is not simultaneously related to the mind in a causally effective manner?

The interlocutors, the *Andhakas* and the *Sammatīyas* according to the commentary, suggest that, in contrast to *kamma* itself, its accumulation (*upacaya*, or more suggestively, 'conservation' according to the English translators, p. 300, though in later Abhidhamma *upacaya* typically also means 'growth, development', *Compendium*: 252) is simultaneous (*sahajā*) with otherwise incompatible states, since its nature is not determined by the nature of the actions with which it co-exists; nor is it associated with the same mental factors as the mind; that the accumulation takes no object

(*anārammaṇo*) and, unlike action itself (*kamma*) which is bound to the momentary states of *citta*, the accumulation does not cease with the *citta* with which it is simultaneous. (*kusalena kammēna saha jāto kammūpacayo kusalo ti? na h'evaṃ vattabbe . . . sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena kammēna saha jāto kammūpacayo sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto ti? na h'evaṃ vattabbe . . . kammam cūtena saha jātam, cūtam bhijjamānam, kammam bhijjati? āmantā. kammūpacayo cūtena saha jātam, cūtam bhijjamānam, kammūpacayo bhijjati? na h'evaṃ vattabbe*). The English translators, interestingly, translated '*kamma*' as "karma as conscious process" and '*kammūpacayo*' as "continuation of karmic accumulation as product." The last paragraph of this *kathā* discusses the distinction between *kamma*, its accumulation and its maturation (*vipāka*).

According to the commentary *Kathāvatthu-Atṭhakathā*, 156, the heterodox interlocutors held that the accumulation of *kamma*, like that of the latent dispositions (*Kathāvatthu* IX.4; XI.1), is neutral (*abyākata*), unassociated with mind (*citta-vippayukta*) and without an epistemic object (*anārammaṇa*) Dube (1980: 336).

As with many issues presented in the *Kathāvatthu*, however, the later *Theravāda* position is rather more complex, for the Pāli writer Dhammapāla's commentary the *Paramatthamañjūsā* or *Visuddhimagga-mahāṭikā*, comments on a standard *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi* passage ("it is only when it is past that *kamma* is a condition for *kamma*-originated materiality,"), stating:

If the fruit were to arise from present *kamma*, the fruit would have arisen in the same moment in which the *kamma* was being accumulated; and that is not seen . . . *kamma* has never been shown to give fruit while it is actually being effected; nor is there any text to that effect. — But is it not also the fact that no fruit has ever been shown to come from a vanished cause either? . . . when the fruit arises from *kamma* that is actually past it does so because of *kamma* having been performed and because of storage.

(Pm. 768) as quoted in *Visuddhimagga* (p. 695)

⁷³ AKBh III 41c—d; Shastri: 496; Poussin: 125f; *manaḥsañcetanāya punarbhavasya ākṣepaḥ. ākṣiptasya punaḥ karmaparibhāvitād vijñānabijād abhinirvṛtīr iti anyor anuṭpannasya bhavasya ākarāṇe prādhānyam*.

Here intentions (*manaḥsañcetanā*), that is, mental actions (*manas karma*), correspond to the *samskāra*, which in the series of dependent co-arising directly condition the arising of consciousness (*viññāna*). Interestingly, *Theravādin* commentaries give an Abhidhammic interpretation of passages describing seeds and their relation to consciousness (*viññāna*) as examples of a "construction-consciousness" (*abhisamkhāra-viññāna*) (Collins, 1982: 223; SnA. 257, AA.II. 334), and use a term to convey the consciousness conditioned by such *samskāra*, that is, "construction-consciousness born together with *karma*" (SnA. 505—6: *kammāsahajātibhisamkhāravijñāna*) (Collins: 206). See notes 125, 165.

Also: AKBh III 21a—c; Shastri: 436; Poussin: 62f. *pūrvakleśā daśā vidyā samskārah pūrvakarmānah / sandhiskandhāstu vijñānam*.

⁷⁴ See note 11 above, for passages in the early Pāli texts (S III 54; A I 223) that relate *bija* with *viññāna* in reference to continued *samsāric* existence.

⁷⁵ AKBh ad V 34; Shastri: 829f; Poussin: 72f; "The *kleśa* with complete causes [arises] from non-abandoned latent dispositions (*anuśaya*), from the presence of an object and from incorrect comprehension." (*aprahīṇād anuśayāt viśayāt pratyupasthītāt ayoniśo manaskārāt kleśah . . . , sampūrnākāraṇah.*)

For example, sensual desire arises when a *dharma* which provokes an outburst of sensual desire (*kāmarāgāparyavasthāniya-dharma*) appears in the sense fields and the latent disposition toward it (*rāgānuśaya*) has not been abandoned or correctly understood, while there is incorrect comprehension thereto. (AKBh ad V 34; Shastri: 829; Poussin: 72f; *tat yathā rāgānuśayo 'prahīṇo bhavati aparījñātaḥ kāmarāgāparyavasthāniyās ca dharmā ābhāśagatā bhavanti. tatra ca ayoniśo manaskāra evaṃ kāmarāga upadyate.*) Ignorance is thus the root of them all. (AKBh ad V 36c—d; Shastri: 831; Poussin: 74; *sarveṣāṃ teṣāṃ mūlam avidyā.*)

⁷⁶ AKBh ad V 22; Shastri: 801; Poussin: 48; "The latent disposition of a certain person is disposed toward a certain object; he is bound to it by that [disposition]."

(*yasya pudgalasya yo 'nuśayo yasmin ālambane 'nuśete sa tena tasmīn samprayuktah.*)
⁷⁷ This is true in the *sūta* materials (M I 101, etc.) examined above and as quoted both in the *Kathāvatthu*, XIII.8, and in the *Abhidharmakośa*: "Passion lies latent (*anuśete*) in pleasurable feeling, aversion lies latent in unpleasant feeling, and ignorance lies latent in neutral feelings." (AKBh V 45; ad II 3; Shastri: 843; Poussin: 88; *sukhāyāṃ vedanāyāṃ rāgo 'nuśete, duḥkhāyāṃ pratighaḥ, *aduḥkhāsukhāyāṃ avidyā iti uktam sūtre.* *Emended from "*aduḥkhāduḥkhāyāṃ.*")

⁷⁸ AKBh ad IV 55c—d; Shastri: 664; Poussin: 106. *vipākaḥ punar vedanāpradhānaḥ.*

⁷⁹ See note on AKBh ad V 34, above.

⁸⁰ The AKBh states this clearly and, in agreement with canonical teachings while still hinting at newer, *Saurāntika* concepts, equates the eradication of the afflictions with seeds rendered infertile by fire:

The basis (*āśraya*) of the *Arya* has been transformed due to the force of the Path of Seeing so the destroyed afflictions (*kleśa*) will not be able to sprout again. It is said that the basis is without seeds, having destroyed the afflictions, like [seeds] burned by fire, whereas the seeds are [merely] damaged by the mundane path.

(AKBh ad II 36c—d; Shastri: 215f; Poussin: 183; *āśrayo hi sa āryāṇam darśanabhāva-nāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā paravṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tat prahēyānām kleśānām prarohasamartho bhavati. ato 'gnidagdhavrihivadabijībhūta āśrayaḥ kleśānām prahīnakleśa iti ucyate. upahatabijābhāve vā laukikena mārgaṇa.*)

Pāli *sūtas* mentioning similar doctrines: M I 47; A I 133; S IV 208f. Collins (1982: 222f) cites references in the *Theravādin* Abhidhamma literature depicting those who have progressed along the path as having "rendered consciousness seedless" (Miln. 146; *abijam viññāṇam katam*) and having "destroyed seeds" (Sn. 235; *khīṇabijā*).

⁸¹ The *Kathāvatthu* presents several debates on this issue, demonstrating the antiquity and ubiquity of the distinction between the manifest outbursts and the latent counterparts of the afflictions, to be discussed in more detail below.

In a discussion on the possibility of an *Arhat* falling away (I.2.61, *parihānikathā*) the *Sammatīyas*, *Vajjiputtīyas*, *Sabbatthivādīns*, and some of the *Mahāsāṅghikas*,

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according to the commentary, claim that this occurs due to an outburst of passion (*rāgāparyuṭṭhito*) which arises conditioned by its latent disposition (*anusayam paṭicca uppajjati*); but *arahats* are not said to have these dispositions. Even more to the point is the discussion in III.5 (*aṭṭhamakathā*) concerning whether or not the eradication of the outbursts on the first stage of entering the path also entails the eradication of their latent dispositions. According to the commentary, it is the *Andhakas* and the *Sammatīyas* who hold that it does not; the *Theravādīns* disagree.

Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, XXII.45 correlates the successive eradication of afflictions and their latent tendencies with gradual progress upon the path: the Once-returned eliminates gross fetters, the gross inherent tendencies of greed for sense desires and resentment; the Non-returned, the residual fetters and the residual inherent tendencies of the same; the *Arahat*, greed for existence, conceit, agitation and ignorance, and the inherent tendencies toward conceit, greed for becoming and ignorance. XXII.73 correlates their elimination with the knowledges: "the inherent tendencies to [false] view and to uncertainty are eliminated by the first knowledge. The inherent tendencies to greed for sense desire and to resentment are eliminated by the third knowledge. The inherent tendencies to conceit (pride), to greed for becoming, and to ignorance, are eliminated by the fourth knowledge." XXII.60 explains the term *anusaya*: "For it is owing to their inveteracy that they are called inherent tendencies (*anusaya*) since they inhere (*anusenti*) as cause for the arising of greed for sense desires, etc., again and again."

⁸² The *Kathāvatthu* preserves disputes about this issue as well. IX.4 (*anusayā anārammaṇā ti kathā*) portrays the opponents (the *Andhakas* and some of the *Utarāpathakas*) asking if one who has not fully eradicated the afflictions does not still have their *latent* form even when his mind is otherwise wholesome or indeterminate (*puṭhujjano kusalābyākatē cīte vattamāne "sānusayo ti" vattabbo ti? āmantā*). XI.1 (*tisso pi anusayakathā*) carries the argument the next logical step and asks if therefore wholesome and unwholesome states could not co-exist together, which would entail that the dispositions are karmically neutral, a position that the *Theravādīns* however do not concede to their interlocutors, here the *Sammatīyas* and the *Mahāsāṅghikas*. (*puṭhujjano kusalābyākatē cīte vattamāne "sānusayo ti" vattabbo ti? āmantā. kusalākusalā dhammā sammukhibhāvaṃ āgacchanti? ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe- tena hi anusayā abyākatā ti.*)

⁸³ As Jaini (1959b: 240) succinctly outlines the problem:

even an infant is in possession of *kleśa*, because the latter are present in him in their dormant state (*anuśaya*) and become active when there arise suitable conditions for their operation (*pariyuṭṭhāna*). This implies that when the passions are not operating they always remain in a dormant state. If they are always present in the mind then the latter is always *akuśala*, for a *kuśala* can neither co-exist nor operate simultaneously with an *akuśala*. Consequently, there will be no *kuśala-citta* as long as the latent passions are not removed, and they will not be removed without a *kuśala-citta*.

⁸⁴ There is a further complication here as well, because some of these factors are, in

the AKBh at any rate, considered to be karmically neutral at times. Vasubandhu differentiates between holding to a view of self-existence and extreme views (common to birds and other animals) which are innate and neutral (*sahajā satkāyadr̥ṣṭir avyākṛtā*), and thus not in contradiction with virtuous actions such as giving, and those views which are deliberated (*vikalpiṭa*) and thus unwholesome. (AKBh ad V 19; Shastri: 794; Poussin: 40. *kāmadhātau satkāyāntagrāhadṛṣṭiḥ tat samprayuktā ca avidyā avyākṛtaḥ. kim kāraṇam? dānādibhir aviruddhātvāt. ahaṃ pretya sukhi bhaviṣyāmi iti dānam dadāti śīlam rakṣati . . . sahaṃ satkāyadr̥ṣṭir avyākṛtā. yā mṛgapakṣiṇām api vartate. vikalpiṭā tu akuśala iti pūrvācāryāḥ*). This idea of innate, yet neutral, wrong views will also have larger ramifications within the *Yogācāra* system, as is perhaps hinted by the term 'pūrvācārya', which frequently alludes to *Yogācāra*-like ideas within the AKBh. See note 201 below.

⁸⁵ AKBh ad V 1d—2a; Shastri: 763f; Poussin: 6f; *katham ca sautrāntikānām? . . . prasupto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyate, prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam. ka ca tasya prasuptiḥ? asamukhībhihūtasya bijabhāvānubandhaḥ. kaḥ prabodhaḥ? sammukhībhihūtaḥ. ko 'yam bijabhāvo nāma? āmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ. yathā anubhavañānāajā smṛtyopādanaśaktiḥ, yathā ca ankurādīnām śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktir iti.*

Chapter Nine of the AKBh (Shastri: 1230; Poussin: 295; Stcherbatsky, 1976: 72; Pradhan: 477 or 478) defines the mental stream (*santāna*) as the "continued production of *citta* from earlier action (*karma*)" (*yah karmapūrva uttarottara cittaprasavaḥ sā santatiḥ*) and states that the last moment of the specific modification or transformation (*pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ*) is specially characterized by the "capacity to immediately produce a result." (*sā punaryo 'nantaram phalotpādanasamarthaḥ so 'nyaparināmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ*.)

Another passage states that the conclusion of the result (*phalaparyanta*) of maturation (*pāka*) is engendered by this specific modification (*pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ*) of the mental stream and not by either the simultaneous (*sahabhū-*), associated (*samprayukta-*), or homogeneous causes (*sabhāga-hetu-*). (AKBh ad II 54c—d; Shastri: 312; Poussin: 272. *pāko hi nāma santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajā phalaparyantaḥ. na ca sahabhūsamprayuktahetvoh santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajā phalam asti. na ca api sabhāgahetvādīnām phalaparyanto 'sti.*)

⁸⁶ The AKBh ad V 1d—2a (Shastri: 761; Poussin: 3—4) preserves a debate between the *Sautrāntikas* and the *Sarvāstivādins* over the relationship between the latent dispositions and their manifest counterparts. The text begins by asking if one should interpret the compound 'sensual desire-latent disposition', (*kāmarāga-anuśaya*) as the *anuśaya* which is itself sensual desire (*kāmarāga eva anuśayaḥ*), or as the *anuśaya* of sensual desire (*kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ*). If the two were simply equated, then this would contradict the *sūtra* (*sūtravirodhaḥ*) which states that the outburst of sensual desire is eliminated along with its *anuśaya* (*kāmarāgaparyavasthānam . . . sānuśayaṃ prahīyate*). If, on the other hand, the two were distinguished, this would entail that the *anuśaya* be disjoined (*viprayukta*), which contradicts an *Abhidharma* passage stating the *anuśaya* is associated (*samprayukta*) with the three feelings. (*katham idaṃ jñātavyam — kāmarāga eva anuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśayaḥ, ahoṣvī kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśayaḥ? kim cātaḥ? kāmarāga eva anuśayaś cet sūtravirodhaḥ . . . 'tatkāmarāgaparyavasthānam . . . sānuśayaṃ prahīyate. ' it / kāmarāgasya anuśayaś ced viprayuktānuśayaprasaḅgād abhidharmavirodhaḥ — "kāmarāgānuśayas tribhir indriyair samprayuktaḥ iti. The Vyākhyā glosses indriya as: "sukha-saumanasya-upekṣendriyair samprayuktaḥ iti," upon which our translation of 'indriya' as 'feeling' is based.)*

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The *Sarvāstivādin* position is that they are simply the same, since in the *Abhidharma* the word *anuśaya* means the afflictions due to its characteristic, i.e. it is what makes the mind afflicted, it obstructs wholesome states from occurring and eliminates them once they have occurred; thus the *anuśaya* cannot be dissociated. (AKBh V ad 1d—2a; Shastri: 762; Poussin: 5; *kāmarāga eva anuśaya iti vaibhāṣikāḥ . . . lakṣanikas tu abhidharme kleśa eva anuśayaśabdah / tasmāt samprayuktā eva anuśayaḥ . . . yasmāt anuśayair kliṣṭam cittam bhavaty apūrvam kuśalam na utpadyate, upannac ca parihīyate, tasmāt na viprayuktaḥ*.)

The *Sautrāntika* position is that the latent dispositions are different from their manifest afflictions, but that they are neither associated nor dissociated, since they are not separate entities (AKBh ad V 1d—2a; Shastri: 763f; Poussin: 6f; *katham ca sautrāntikānām? kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśaya iti / na ca anuśayaḥ samprayukto na viprayuktaḥ, tasya adavyantaravāt*. This statement serves to introduce the *Sautrāntika* description of the latent or dormant dispositions as seed-states (*bija-bhāva*).

Jaini (1959b: 242) concurs with Yaśomitra's comments that the *Sautrāntikas*, as their name suggests, rely upon the scriptures (*sūtra*) as authoritative and not upon the scholastic treatises (*śāstra*) (*Vyākhyā*, Shastri ed.: 15: *ye sūtraprāmāṇikāḥ na tu śāstraprāmāṇikāḥ te sautrāntikāḥ*) when he concludes that in contrast with the *Sautrāntikas*, "it is clear from these discussions that the Theravādin as well as the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the term *sānuśaya*, and the subsequent identification of the *anuśayas* with *paryavasthāna*, are contrary to the *sūtra* quoted above [The *Mahā-Māluṅkyā-sutta*, M I 433]. They show a determined effort to uphold the *Abhidharma* in preference to the *sūtra*."

⁸⁷ *Kathāvānthu* XIV.5. Of Latent Bias as Something Apart (*añño anusayo ti kathā*) discusses this point explicitly. The opponent here, the *Andhakas* according to the Commentary, maintain the distinction on the reasoning that an ordinary person whose mind is wholesome or neutral must still have the latent form of the affliction. The Theravādins dissent here, as elsewhere, on the grounds that the dispositions should be treated no differently than other afflictions, such as sensual desire (*rāga*). (*puṭhujjano kusalābyākatte citta vattamāne "sānusayo ti" vattabbo ti? āmanā. "pariyuṭṭhio ti" vattabbo ti? ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi añño anusayo aññaṃ pariyuṭṭhānan ti. puṭhujjano kusalābyākatte citta vattamāne "sārāgo ti" vattabbo ti? amanā. "pariyuṭṭhio ti" vattabbo ti? ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi añño rāgo aññaṃ pariyuṭṭhānan ti.*)

⁸⁸ Again *Kathāvānthu* XI.1 (*tisso pi anusayakathā*) preserves disputes over this topic as well, with the *Sammāṭiyas* and the *Mahāsaṅghikas* asserting that it is because the dispositions are unassociated with *citta* that they are able to co-exist with wholesome or neutral type of *citta*, but the *Theravādin* press them on this, implying that the dispositions are no different from the manifest afflictions and that therefore they too must be unassociated with mind, which is of course unacceptable (*puṭhujjano kusalābyākatte citta vattamāne "sārāgo ti" vattabbo ti? āmanā. rāgo tena cittena sampayuttā ti. ne h'evaṃ vattabbe -pe-tena hi rāgo cittavippayuttā ti*). The Theravādin orthodoxy, however, is not presenting their opponents position in full, for they are misconstruing, or at least conflating, the term 'sārāgo' 'possessed of or having passion', which in the context of the this discussion seems to mean rather 'not having fully eliminated passion', with the simple occurrence or manifestation of that passion itself. In that case, of course, one must say that passion is associated with mind; but if everyone were possessed of such passion until reaching the state of an Arhat, the

problem would still remain as to how any wholesome states could ever occur.

⁸⁹ See note 86, above.

⁹⁰ *AKBh-Vyākhyā ad II 36c—d*; Shastri: 219; *na bijam nāma kiñcid asti; prajñapti-sattvāt*. Nominal entities are established merely by designation, convention, or established usage (*Vyākhyā, ibid.: prajñapti samvṛtyā vyavahāreṇa dharmāḥ prajñaptidharmāḥ*), whereas the analysis into *dharmas* which carry their own characteristics, we shall remember, is that which indicates the ultimate truth in the Abhidharma (*Vyākhyā: 12, ad AKBh I.2b: svalakṣaṇadharaṇatvena niruktaḥ pāramārthikasāmketikābhidharmāḥ*).

The metaphor of seeds was commonly used in “conventional” descriptions. Although the *Theravādins*, for instance, rejected the seed as a real *dharma*, and thus employable within ultimately valid discourse, they readily resorted to its use in conventional speech. The metaphor is prominent in the early discourses, for which the *Theravādin* commentarial tradition regularly glosses with a more *dharmic* term, *abhisañkhāra-viññāna*, “construction-consciousness,” while an *Arhat* is frequently referred to as one who has made his *viññāna* seedless (*abijam viññāṇam kataṃ*) (Collins 1982: 218—224).

⁹¹ Excluding *viññāna*'s role within the immediate cognitive processes, of course. *Viññāna* is at least once said to be merely a figurative term for the mental stream with nothing but itself as its antecedent cause. *AKBh IX*; Shastri: 1219f; Poussin: 281; Stcherbatsky (1979: 57); Pradhan: 473 or 474; *viññānasantānasya viññāne kāraṇa-bhāvāt viññāṇam vijānāti iti vacanān nirdeśam . . . evaṃ viññānam api cittānaṃ santāna upacaryate*.

⁹² *AKBh ad II 36d*; Shastri: 217; Poussin: 185; *kim punar idam bijam nāma? yan nāmarūpaṃ phaloṣpattau samartham sāksāt pāramparyeṇa vā; santatiparināma-viśeṣajāt. ko 'yam parināmo? santater anyathātvam. ke ca iyam santaiḥ? hetuphala-bhūtās trayadhvikāḥ saṃskārāḥ*. The circular nature of this definition borders on tautology: a seed is what produces a result through the mental stream, which is itself just the *saṃskāra* existing as cause and effect.

⁹³ The seed is the capacity (*śakti*) for an affliction to arise born from a [previous] affliction, as is the capacity for memory to arise born from experiential knowledge, etc. (See *AKBh ad V 1d—2a*, cited above.)

⁹⁴ *AKBh III 5—8a* (Poussin: 16—26) discusses the manifold possibilities of the '*viññāna-sthitis*', the 'stations of consciousness'.

⁹⁵ *AKBh I 28c—d*; Shastri: 78; Poussin: 50; *viññānadhātur viññānam sāsravam . . . janmanīśrayāḥ. ete hi janmanah pratisandhicittād yavat cyuticittasādhāranabhūtāḥ*. La Vallée Poussin (49, n. 2) identifies the *sūtra* cited as *Dhātuvibhaṅgasutta*, M III 239.

⁹⁶ *AKBh II 45a—b*; Shastri: 248; Poussin: 215; *āyurūsmātha viññānam yadā kāyam jahatyaṃ. apaviddhas tadā śete yathā kāṣṭhamacetanaḥ*. La Vallée Poussin cites parallels in S III 143; M I 296.

⁹⁷ This necessary reference to and reliance upon conventional terminology on the part of so many commentators seems to belie Abhidharma claims to ultimate discourse, leading Conze (1973: 122—134), for one, to refer the compensatory 'pseudo-selves' (132), i.e. the *citta-santāna*, *saṃskārā*, *āśraya*, *nāma-rūpa*, and *ātmabhāva*, as the subjective referent of the *dharmic* analysis.

⁹⁸ There is, in addition to the *Abhidharmakośa* which frequently presents the *Sarvāstivādin* or *Vaibhāṣika* positions from a polemical perspective, an orthodox

Vaibhāṣika work extant in its original Sanskrit which responds to Vasubandhu's criticisms, the *Abhidharma-dīpa* (edited by P. S. Jaini, 1977); also La Vallée Poussin (1937), *Documents d'Abhidharma*, translates from the Chinese some of the key texts of the *Sarvāstivādins*. See Collet Cox (1992) for a succinct discussion of the *Vaibhāṣika* treatment of many of these issues; also Paul Williams (1981) on *Vaibhāṣika* ontology.

⁹⁹ *AKBh ad V 25b*; Shastri: 805; Poussin: 50f; *yadi ca atūtam na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalam āyatyaṃ katham syat. na hi phalōṣpatikāle varttamānām vipākahetur asti iti. tasmād asti eva atūānāgatam iti vaibhāṣikāḥ*. See also La Vallée Poussin (1937: 77f) on a passage from the *Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra* of Sanghabadra (T.29.1562.629a28f).

¹⁰⁰ Poussin (1937: esp. 93—95); T. 29.631b20f; 409c22f. This is Vasumitra's view, in any case, one of four *Sarvāstivādin* views presented in *AKBh V 24—26*. See Stcherbatsky (1956: 76—91).

¹⁰¹ *AKBh II 36c—d*; Shastri: 211; Poussin: 179; *prāpti-prāpti svasantānapatiānām*. Note the need here again for a non-*dharmic* referent, *santāna*.

¹⁰² *AKBh II 35a—b*; Shastri: 209; Poussin: 178; *viprayuktās tu saṃskārāḥ prāpti-prāpti*. Jaini (1959b: 240, 245).

¹⁰³ *AKBh ad II 36c—d*; Shastri: 214; Poussin: 182; *utpattihetudharmānām prāptir . . . sahajaprāptihetukā*. Jaini (1959b: 245).

¹⁰⁴ See note 86, above.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid. aupacārika vā sūtre 'nuśayaśabdāḥ prāptau*.

¹⁰⁶ *AKBh ad II 36c—d*; Shastri: 214f; Poussin: 183; *vyavasthāhetuḥ prāptiḥ. asatyāṃ hi prāptiāu lokikamānasānām āyaprthagjanānām 'āryā ime', 'prthagjanā ime' iti na syād vyavasthānam. prahīnāprahīnakleśatā viśeṣād etad bhavitum arhati*.

¹⁰⁷ As Conze (1973: 141) warns, “The term *prāpti* obviously sails very near the concept of a ‘person’ or ‘self’. ‘Possession’ is a relation which keeps together the elements of one stream of thought, or which binds a *dharma* to one ‘stream of consciousness’, which is just an evasive term for an underlying ‘person’. . . . ‘Possession’ implies a support which is more than the momentary state from moment to moment, and in fact a kind of lasting personality, i.e. the stream as identical with itself, in a personal identity, which is here interpreted as ‘continuity’.”

¹⁰⁸ At the end of a long exchange, Vasubandhu asked why ‘possession’ is in fact a real entity (*dravyadharmā*) instead of merely a conventional one (*prajñapti-dharma*), as the *Sautrāntikas* charge, to which the *Sarvāstivādins* (the *Vaibhāṣikas*) answer simplistically “because that’s our doctrine” (*AKBh ad II 36c—d*; Shastri: 218; Poussin: 186; *prajñaptidharmā, na tu dravyadharmā . . . dravyam eva tu vaibhāṣikāḥ ubhayam varṇayanti. kim kāraṇam? eva hi naḥ siddhānta iti*).

¹⁰⁹ *AKBh ad II 5—6*; Shastri: 142f; Poussin: 110f; *tatra cūtāśrayaḥ ṣaḍindriyāni. etac ca ṣaḍāyatanaṃ maulam sattvadravayam*.

¹¹⁰ As mind is also its basis; *AKBh ad I 34*; Shastri: 91; Poussin: 63; *upāttam iti ko 'riah? yac cittacaitair adhiṣṭhānabhāveṇa upagrhitam; anugraho 'paghātābhyaṃ anyonyānuvidhānāt*.

¹¹¹ Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Lamotte 1935: 234—247; Pruden 1988: 58—65) most succinctly presents this debate and the positions taken by various schools. *AKBh* treats it in II *ad 42—44*; Poussin: 200—214. On the whole topic of the absorptions and their problematics within Abhidharma doctrine see Griffiths

(1986), in particular pp. 122–128 and Appendix B. Schmithausen (1987: 18ff) considers the absorption of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) the originating context for the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.

¹¹² *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Lamotte 1935: 233; Pruden 1988: 57, para. 21); “If the fruit arises afterwards from the mental stream (*citta-santāna*) which has been infused by the power of karma, then how can the fruit of an earlier action arise afterwards from the interrupted mental stream of those in the two mindless attainments and unconscious existence?” (paraphrase from the Tibetan, P. mDo # 58 sems-tsam Si, 161b3f; D.4062, 139b3f: *gal te las nus kyang des bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyud las tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu 'byung na / sems med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa gnyis dang / 'du shes med pa pa sems kyi rgyud chad pa dag gi las snga ma'i 'bras bu tshe phyi ma la ji ltar 'byung bar 'gyur.*)

¹¹³ *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (Lamotte 1935: 235; Pruden 1988: 58): “But the mind of entry into the absorption has been destroyed (*vināṣṭa*) for a long time. How could it constitute an equal and immediate antecedent?”

¹¹⁴ Since a single moment of mind has in addition a phenomenologically similar and immediately antecedent condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*), a moment of mind or cognition (*vijñāna*) has (at least in the human realm) two types of support: the simultaneous support (*sahaja āśraya*) of its respective sense organ (*indriya*), and the immediately antecedent mental cognition as its ‘mind support’ (*manāśraya*). (AKBh I 44c–d; Shastri: 125f; Poussin: 95f; *caramasyāśrayo 'tūtaḥ pañcānām sahajaś ca taiḥ. manovijñānadhātoḥ samanantaraniṛddham mana āśrayaḥ . . . tatra cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣuḥ sahaja āśrayo yāvat kāyavijñānasya kāyaḥ. atītaḥ punar eṣām āśrayo mano iti api ete pañca vijñānakāyā indriyadvayāśrayaḥ.*)

¹¹⁵ AKBh ad II 44d; Shastri: 246; Poussin: 212; Griffiths (1986: 124); *cittam api asmād eva sendriyāt kāyāt jāyate, na cittāt. anyonyabijakam hi etad ubhayaṃ yad uta cittam ca sendriyaś ca kāya iti pūrvācaryāḥ.* See also *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 23.

¹¹⁶ See Sthiramati's strong criticism of this position in Griffiths (1986: 125).

¹¹⁷ AKBh II ad II 44d; Shastri: 245; Poussin: 211; Griffiths (1986: 123); *katham idānim bahukālam niṛddhāc cittāt punar api cittam jāyate? atītasya api astivād isyate vaibhāṣikāḥ samanantarapratyayatvam.*

¹¹⁸ *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (para. 24) quotes Vasumitra as positing a subtle mind that does not leave the body during the absorption of cessation (Pruden: 59): “But I maintain that this absorption of extinction is endowed with a subtle mind (*sūkṣmacitta*).” An almost identical passage (Muroji 1985: 27) appears in AKBh ad II 44d (Shastri: 245ff; Poussin: 211, 212, n. 2.) and AKBh ad VIII 33b (Poussin: 207f) and is discussed in Griffiths (1986: 125f). This “subtle mind” is considered an “unmanifesting mental-cognition” (*aparispṛṣṭa-manovijñāna*) by the *Vyākhyā* on this passage.

Bureau (1955: 164f, 172) cites the *Dārṣṭānikas* (theses 40, 58) and the *Vibhajyavādins* (theses 5, 6) as also asserting a subtle form of mind during the absorption. He also states (240) that the *Theravādins* (thesis 217) agree with this, citing the *Siddhi* (142, 202–3, 207) as his source. Collins (1982: 245f, 304), however, demonstrates the opposite, citing the orthodox *Theravādin* texts, the *Visuddhimagga* (XXIII.43, 47), which reads “without mind” (*acittako*), and the later *Abhidhammattha-sangaha* (Compendium, IX.9), which states that “mental continuity is suspended” (*cittasantati vocchijjati*); he concludes that “personal continuity spanning a period of cessation, then, is guaranteed by the continued existence of the

body, or rather the material life-faculty, and not by the continued occurrence of *bhavanga*-moments.” This then would accord closely with the *Sautrāntika* position.

Schmithausen (1987: 19f; ns. 149–167) discusses all the passages pertinent to a subtle form of mind.

¹¹⁹ AKBh *Vyākhyā* ad 44c; Shastri: 245; Muroji 1985: 27; *tatra acittakāni eva nirodhāsamjñi-samāpatti-āsamjñikāni iti vaibhāṣikādayaḥ. aparispṛṣṭa-manovijñāna-sacittakāni iti sthavira-vasumitrādayaḥ. ālayavijñāna-sacittakāni iti yogācārāḥ iti siddhānta-bhedah.*

¹²⁰ The canonical doctrines (D II 63, etc.), as we observed above, held that *vijñāna* descended into the mother's womb and coagulated, wherein *nāma-rūpa* developed. The question here is exactly which type of *vijñāna* it is that coagulates.

The *Sarvāstivādin* position (AKBh III 42b–c; Shastri: 500; Poussin: 131; *cyutyupapattayaḥ manovijñāna evaṣṭaḥ*. “Death and birth are considered to be [moments of] mental cognition.”) is that it is a mental cognition which transits at rebirth and coagulates in the womb, with which the *Sautrāntikas* are in substantial agreement (Schmithausen: 301, n. 232 cites VGPV 416b1–4; PSVy 20b7: *mdo sde pas smras pa — yid kyi nam par shes pa ma'i mngal du mtshams sbyor ba.*)

¹²¹ Vibh. 414: *manovijñāna-dhātu* is the only *viññāna* at the time of rebirth (*upapatti*). See also *Mūl.* 299; *Visuddhimagga* XIV 111–114, 124; in *Visuddhimagga* XIV.98 *bhavanga-citta* is classified along with rebirth-mind as a ‘neutral resultant mind-consciousness element’ (*vipākāhetuka-manovijñānadhātu*). See also the *Aṭṭhasālini* III 581–3 (Guenther 1959: 25f). For a more lengthy description of the *bhavanga-citta*, including some comparison with the *ālayavijñāna*, see Collins (1982: 255–261), Mizuno (1978: 853f), also Cousins (1981).

¹²² *Visuddhimagga* XIV 115. “When the rebirth-linking consciousness has ceased, then, following on whatever kind of rebirth-linking it may be, the same kinds, being the result of the same kamma whatever it may be, occur a *life-continuum* consciousness with that same object; and again those same kinds. And as long as there is no other kind of arising of consciousness to interrupt the continuity they also go on occurring endlessly in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a river.”

See also *Abhidhammattha-sangaha*, (Compendium) 1979: 266–7.

¹²³ For example, a mental cognition has a *dhamma* (that is, the usual object of a mental cognition), attention and the *bhavanga-citta* as its conditions. (*Visuddhimagga* XV.39: *bhavangamana-dhamma-manasikāre paṭicca uppajjati manovijñānam.* Cited in Collins (1982: 241).

The translator of the *Compendium* (268) also explains this last function of the *bhavanga-citta*: “The passage from a state of anger to one of joy would be too abrupt without the mediation of a *hedonically indifferent* element, which acts as a sort of buffer between two opposing natures.”

¹²⁴ *Visuddhimagga* XIV.115

With the life-continuum continuously occurring thus, when living beings' faculties have become capable of apprehending an object, then when a visible datum has come into the eye's focus, there is impinging upon the eye-sensitivity due to the visible datum. Thereupon, owing to the impact's influence, there comes to be a disturbance in [the continuity of] the life-continuum. Then, when the life-continuum has ceased, the

functional mind-element arises making that same visible datum its object, as it were, cutting off the life-continuum, and accomplishing the function of *adverting*. So too in the case of the ear door and so on."

¹²⁵ This twofold nature as both 'constructed' and 'constructive' is widely predicated of many key Buddhist terms in the Abhidharma, such as the *samskāra*, *viññāna*, and *upādāna* (appropriation), and is not infrequently described in terms of an active/passive dichotomy, a causal/resultant bifurcation drawn out of terms (frequently participial forms) which were used more simply in the early canon. *Upādāna*, as we have seen, refers both to the *act* of grasping or appropriating and *that which* is so appropriated. Schmithausen (1987: 356, n. 516) describes the same distinctions about *prapañca*: "'Prapañca' is used both in the sense of the *process* of proliferation . . . or even of (emotionally involved) proliferating or diversifying conceptual *activity*, as also in that of what is the *result* of such an activity." (Emphasis in original.)

Collins (1982: 202) has also stressed that *samkhāra* has a similar dual role as constructing and as constructed: "Both the activity which constructs temporal reality, and the temporal reality thus constructed, are *samkhāra*." The *Theravādins* articulate the relationship of *samkhāra* to *viññāna*, with a concept remarkably similar to the *ālayaviññāna*: "When used in the eschatological context, then, the term *abhisamkhāra* denotes a karmically forceful, 'constructive' act, which determines a specific length of *samsāric* continuity . . . The idea of such constructions, such acts, as being conditions for the future occurrence of an appropriate form of consciousness, which is itself the 'dependently originated' condition for psycho-physical individuality . . . and so on, is expressed also by the use of the term 'construction-consciousness' (*abhisamkhāra-viññāna*)" (202). Therefore, "the concept of *abhisamkhāra-viññāna*, then, refers to that consciousness which continues throughout *samsāra*, both constructing future temporal existence, and itself constituting the medium for the temporal reality thus constructed" (208). As such, reiterating the canonical *viññāna* and resonating with the *ālayaviññāna*, the *abhisamkhāra-viññāna* is used to explain the destruction and non-persistence of *viññāna* in the context of *nirvāna* as the "reversal and cessation of *samsāra*" (207). The PED (70), moreover, glosses '*abhisamkhāra*' as 'store, accumulation (of karma, merit or demerit), substratum', etc. and refers to C. Rhys-Davids' translation of '*abhisamkhāra-viññāna*' as a 'constructing, storing intellect' in *Dhammasangani* translation (*A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, p. 262). We noted above (n. 90) that the notion of *abhisamkhāra-viññāna* is regularly used to gloss *bija* in the Abhidhamma commentaries.

¹²⁶ With the important elaboration of the seeds representing the influence of past karma and afflictive mentality (*kliṣṭa-manas*) representing the persistence of an innate yet subliminal craving and self-grasping.

¹²⁷ In addition to the material factors, of course; they are, however, less important for our present discussion.

¹²⁸ As Conze (1973: 138) so well summed it up: "It looks as if not only actualities but also potentialities must be accepted as real. People not only do things but have the 'power' to do or not to do them. A person can call upon such powers, in the same way in which one is said to 'know' French, although no French word may occur in the present moment of consciousness. It is very hard to maintain the view that a person should at any given time be identified with just the one dharma which is in him from

moment to moment . . . the dogmatic assertion of instantaneousness could be made credible only by introducing a number of pseudo-permanencies."

¹²⁹ Otherwise, a strict determinism and an infinite regress would follow. For example, *Kathāvathu* XVII.3 rejects the thesis that everything, even karma itself, is due to karma (*sabbam idaṃ kammato ti kathā*), while VII.10 rejects that idea that *vipāka* itself entails further *vipāka* (*vipāko vipākadhammadhammo ti*). Dube (1980: 334) aptly concludes: "If everything is due to *karman*, everything becomes a *vipāka*. The same thing is *vipāka* with respect to the past and a cause (*hetu*) with respect to the future. In fact taken together these two theses constitute complete determinism where there is only a distinction of relative position of the sequence but hardly of any qualitative difference between *karman* and *vipāka*."

¹³⁰ The diversity of positions taken by the various schools testifies to the universal recognition of these questions, as well as the relative inability to radically address them within the prevailing presuppositions.

Many of these issues appear in rudimentary form in such early texts as the *Kathāvathu* and Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*; the most thorough edition of the latter is that of Teramoto and Hiramatsu (1935), which includes three Chinese and one Tibetan text, Japanese translations of the commentaries by Bhavya and Vinitādeva, and indices and comparative charts. Much of the material from Vasumitra's text is found in Masuda (1925). They reached more developed form by the time of the *Sarvāstivādin* literature and the *AKBh*, roughly contemporaneous with the *Yogācāra* school.

Again, the extreme similarity in terminology used in discussing these issues illustrates the deep commonality between the *Yogācāra* and other schools of the period, justifying our continued reference to, and contextualization within, Abhidharma sources. No one has demonstrated this doctrinal and terminological commonality in *minutiae* between the Abhidharma schools of this early formative period better than Bareau (1955), who has collected and collated references to the doctrinal positions of all the traditional eighteen schools, including their subsects and splinter groups. He draws chiefly upon the *Kathāvathu*, the above-mentioned texts of Vasumitra *et al*, the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* (La Vallée Poussin, 1928) and several Chinese commentaries. Since the materials he has collected, however, differ greatly in time, source, and sectarian viewpoint, and thus historical reliability, we use them with due caution. The sectarian affiliations of the views disputed in the *Kathāvathu*, for example, derive only from the much later commentary. Dube (1980) has also compiled and discussed many of these issues, based upon much the same sources, in a thematic and narrative form. Due to limitations of space we will confine the sectarian positions of each issue to the notes.

¹³¹ *Kathāvathu* XV.11.: *Andhakas* and *Sammātiyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent.

¹³² *Kathāvathu* XV.11.: *Andhakas* and *Sammātiyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent.

¹³³ *Kathāvathu* XIV.5.: *Andhakas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent. Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (70, thesis 63), *Vibhajyavādins* (177, thesis 38) and *Mahīśāsakas* (183, thesis 3) assent; *Theravādins* dissent (230, thesis 139).

¹³⁴ *Kathāvathu* IX.4; XI.1.; XIV.5.: *Mahāsāṃghikas* and *Sammātiyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent. Bareau (1955): *Bahusrūtiyas* reject either alternative (83, thesis 11); *Andhakas* (95, thesis 47), *Sammātiyas* (125, thesis 17), *Vibhajyavādins* (177, thesis 39), *Mahīśāsakas* (183, thesis 4), *Dharmaguptakas* (194, thesis 5: both *anuśāya*

and *klesā* are *viprayukta*), *Uttarāpathakas* (249, thesis 13), and *Vātsīputriyas* assent, but the latter claim that *anuśaya* pertain to the *pudgala* (120, 118, theses 37, 18); *Sarvāstivādins* (142, theses 26, 27) and *Theravādins* (226, 230, theses 108, 140) dissent.

Kathāvattu XIV.6 relates the position of the *Andhakas* that even the outbursts of the afflictions (*pariyuṭṭhāna*) are disjoined from mind (*cittavippayutta*).

¹³⁵ *Kathāvattu* IX 4.; XI.1.: *Andhakas*, *Mahāsāṃghikas* and *Sammattīyas* assent; *Theravādins* dissent.

¹³⁶ Bareau (1955): *Sarvāstivādins* assent (148, thesis 85). See *AKBh ad V 19*, cited above.

¹³⁷ Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (68, thesis 46), *Saurāntikas* (157, thesis 12), *Vibhajyavādins* (177, thesis 38) and a *Mahīsāsaka* subsect (188, thesis 10) assent; *Theravādins* dissent (240, thesis 222).

¹³⁸ *Kathāvattu* I.2.; III.5: *Theravādins* dissent.

¹³⁹ This controversy surrounds the attainment, or predicted future attainment of fruits of the path either in the present or in future lifetimes. It is discussed in various regards in *Kathāvattu* I.5; V.2, 4, 10; IX.7; XII.5; XIX.7. Dube (1980: 180–183). Assurance of entering the path (*sammattaniyāmavakkanti*) is mentioned in S I 196; S III 225; SN 55, 371; A I 121; and *Kathāvattu* V.5, VI.1, XIII.4. *AKBh ad VI 26a*. See note 69, above.

¹⁴⁰ Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (72, thesis 78) posit a root-consciousness (*mūla-vijñāna*) which underlies and supports (*āśraya*) the discrete sensory cognitions; *Mahāsāṃghika* subsect (74, thesis 8) asserts a subtle mental-consciousness (*sūkṣma-manovijñāna*) that pervades the entire body; *Mahīsāsakas* posit an aggregate which lasts as long as *samsāra* (*samsāra-koṭinistha-skandha*) (187, thesis 37); *Theravādins* posit a *bhavaṅga-citta*, a mind (*citta*) which is an element (*anga*) of existence (*bhava*), that is, the cause of existence and the unity of diverse successive existences (240, thesis 219). See note 214, below.

¹⁴¹ Bareau (1955): *Saurāntikas* (158, thesis 29), *Dārśāntikas* (164, thesis 58) and *Vibhajyavādins* (172, theses 5, 6) assent. Bareau states the *Theravādins* (240, thesis 217) assert a subtle mental-consciousness (*sūkṣma-manovijñāna*) present in the attainment of cessation; this is countered by Collins (1982: 245f). See n. 118 above.

¹⁴² The *Theravādins* (Bareau 1955: 240, thesis 218) assert a subtle mental-consciousness that exists at the moment of rebirth. The *Saurāntikas* and *Sarvāstivādins* also consider it to be a mental-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) (*AKBh III 42b–c*).

¹⁴³ Bareau (1955): *Saurāntikas* assent, and claim mind (*citta*) and body (*kāya*) can seed each other (156, thesis 18) and that ordinary *vijñāna* arise from seeds (156, thesis 28); *Mahāsāṃghika* dissent (72, thesis 79).

¹⁴⁴ Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* (72, thesis 78) assent; *Saurāntikas* dissent (159, thesis 30); a *Mahīsāsaka* subsect asserts that *anuśaya* and *bija* reside perpetually in the present from where they exclusively may produce other *dharma*s (188, theses 9, 10).

¹⁴⁵ *Kathāvattu* XVI.4.: *Theravādins* dissent. Bareau (1955): *Mahāsāṃghikas* assent (72, thesis 79).

¹⁴⁶ Silburn's remark (1955: 249), though in a slightly different context, is particularly *apropos*: "ils posent à nouveau le problème du point de vue de l'être plutôt que du point de vue de l'act."

¹⁴⁷ *AKBh ad V 1d–2a*; *ad II 36d*; *Vyākhyā ad II 36c–d*: *śaktiviśeṣa eva bijam*;

AKBh IX: phalotpādana-samarthaḥ. The *Sarvāstivādin* concept of "activity" (*kāritra*) falls into much the same category.

¹⁴⁸ Nyanaponika Thera (1965: 28f), perhaps unwittingly, concurs to a substantial degree with this contention, when, in addition to 'breadth', the simultaneous relations (*sahajāta-paccaya*) between elements, and 'length', the "sequence of observed, consecutive changes stretching forward in time" (*anantara-paccaya*), he speaks of 'depth', the 'third dimension': "The spatial world of qualified analysis is limited to the two dimensions of breadth and length. Bare or qualified analysis dare not admit those conditioning and conditioned phenomena which are bound up with the third dimension, that of depth . . . by 'depth' we understand that subterraneous flow of energies (a wide and intricate net of streams, rivers and rivulets) originating in past actions (*kamma*) and coming to the surface unexpectedly at a time determined by their inherent life rhythm (time required for growth, maturing, etc.) and by the influence of favourable or obstructive circumstances. The analytical method, we said, will admit only such relational energies as are transmitted by immediate impact (the dimension of breadth) or by the linear 'wire' of immediate sequence (the dimension of length). But relational energies may also arise from unknown depths opening under the very feet of the individual or the object; or they may be transmitted, not by that linear 'wire' of immediate sequence in time-space, but by way of 'wireless' communication, travelling vast distances in space and time . . ."

The point here is not whether this 'third dimension' that 'bare analysis dare not admit' is eloquently, or even adequately, expressed in terms of such common metaphors as depth, flow, growth or even energy, but rather if and to what extent they are compatible with the stated aim, and circumscribed range, of Abhidharma discourse, which was roughly defined earlier in the same work by Nyanaponika Thera (5,3) himself as "the systematisation of the . . . Sutta doctrines in strictly philosophical (*paramattha*) or truly realistic (*yathā-bhūta*) language that as far as possible employs terms of a function or process without any of the conventional (*voḥāra*) and unrealistic concepts assuming a personality, an agent (as different from the act), a soul or a substance . . . In the Abhidhamma, this Sutta terminology is turned into correct functional forms of thought, which accord with the true 'impersonal' and everchanging nature of actuality; and in that strict, or highest, sense (*paramattha*) the main tenets of the Dhamma are explained."

If the Abhidhamma is an adequate and truly realistic (*yathā-bhūta*), account of things, then it is asked (by all its contemporary disputants) how such a philosophic language expresses the 'subterraneous flow of energies' from whose 'unknown depths' they arise through 'wireless' transmission? If such conventional metaphors (as opposed to truly real *dharma*s), used in or at least in conjunction with the Abhidharma, as 'flow', 'depth', 'growth' and 'energy', are necessary in order to account for this 'transmission' of karmic energy, as well as the afflicted dispositions, then we must ask if it has successfully fulfilled its stated aims. For either these are necessary elements of reality, in which case they should be truly real, albeit momentary, *dharma*s, or they are unnecessary, in which case they are not actually real and this range of issues is therefore, at the very least, extraneous or superfluous to Abhidharma discourse. Thus, a contemporary commentator like Nyanaponika concurs in every sense and on nearly every point with the criticisms leveled by the *Saurāntikas* and raised by the *Yogācārin*s in terms of the context of the *ālayavijñāna*.

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- AA *Anguttara Nikāya-aṭṭhakathā*.
Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha See Compendium.
Abhidharmadīpa *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (1959). Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977.
- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Shastri, S. D., ed. (1981). Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati Series; de La Vallée Poussin, trans. (1971). *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises. Cited by chapter, verse and page no.
- Apte Apte, V. S. (1986). *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Reprint, Kyoto: Risen Book Co.
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 ASBh *Abhidharmasammucaya-bhāṣyam*. Tatia, N., ed. (1976). Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
- Bh *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya*, Chinese translation of Hsüan Tsang, T. 1597.
- bh *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya*, Tibetan translation. P. # 5551; D. # 4050.
- Compendium *Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha)*. Aung, S. Z., trans. (1910). London: Pali Text Society, 1979.
- D *Dīgha Nikāya* (1890—1911). London: Pali Text Society. Rhys-Davids, T. W. and C. A. F., trans. 1899—1921. *Dialogues of the Buddha*. London: Pali Text Society.
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- M *Majjhima Nikāya* (1948—51). London: Pali Text Society. Horner, I. B., trans. (1954—59). *Middle Length Sayings*; London: Pali Text Society. Cited by page no. in Pāli.
- MSg *Mahāyānasamgraha*, T.1594; P.5549; D.4048. Cited by chapter numbers in MSg-L. Tibetan text in MSg-N referred to.

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- MSg-L Lamotte, É., trans., ed. (1973). *La Somme du Grande Véhicule d'Asanga*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université de Louvain Institut Orientaliste.
- MSg-N Nagao, G. (1982). *Shōdaijōron: Wayaku to Chūkai*. Tokyo: Kodansha.
- Miln. *Milinda's Questions*. Horner, I. B., trans. (1963—64). London: Pali Text Society.
- Nivṛtti* Portion See *Pravṛtti* Portion.
 P. Peking edition of the Tibetan *Tripitaka*.
 PED *Pāli-English Dictionary*, Rhys-Davids, T. W. and Stede, W., ed. (1921). London: Pali Text Society, 1979.
- Poussin See AKBh.
Pravṛtti Portion *Pravṛtti* Portion and the *Nivṛtti* Portion are found within the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. T.30.1579.579c23—582a28 (Hsüan Tsang's trans.); T.30.1584.1019a25—1020c22 (Paramārtha's trans.); P.5539 Zi.4a5—11a8; D.4038 Shi.3b4—9b3. Critical edition and Japanese translation are found in Hakamaya, N. (1979). *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī ni okeru āraya-shiki no kitei. Tōyōbunka kenkyūjo-kiyō* 79: 1—79. Cited by page, line, and outline as found in Hakamaya (1979); Tibetan text edited by Hakamaya.
- Proof Portion A section of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* which immediately precedes the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti* Portions, the Sanskrit equivalent of which is found in ASBh 11, 9—13, 20; T.31.1606.701b4—702a5; P.5554 Si.12a2—13b5; D.4053 Li.9b7—11a5. Japanese translation is found in Hakamaya, N. (1978). *Āraya-shiki sonzai no hachi-ronshō ni kansuru shobunken. Kamazawa Daigaku Bukkyō-gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 16: 1—26; English translation found in Griffiths (1986: 129—138). Cited by page and line, and proof number.
- PSkPBh *Pañcaskandha-prakarana-vibhāṣā*. Sthiramati. P.5567. (D.4066).
 PSVy *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*. Vasubandhu. P.5496 chī.
 S *Samyutta Nikāya* (1894—1904). London: Pali Text Society. Rhys-Davids, C. A. F. and Woodward, F. L., trans. (1917—30). *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*. London: Pali Text Society.
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- SED *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Monier-Williams (1986). Reprint: Tokyo: Meicho Fukyukai.
 See AKBh.
- Shastri *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. La Vallée Poussin trans. (1928). Paris: Libraire Orientaliste.
- SN *Suttanipāta* (1948). London: Pali Text Society.
 SNA *Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā*.
 T *Taishō* edition of the Chinese *Tripitaka*.
 TBh *Trimśikābhāṣya* of Sthiramati, in Levi, ed. (1925). *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. Paris.

- U *Upanibandhana of Asvabhāva*. Chinese translation of Hsüan Tsang, T. 1598.
- u *Upanibandhana of Asvabhāva*. Tibetan translation, P. # 5552; D. # 4051.
- VGPVY * *Vivrtagūdhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*. P.5553; D.4051. Commentary on MSg I.1—49.
- Vibh. *Vibhanga* ed. Rhys Davids (1904). Pali Text Society.
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THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DHARMAKĀYA
CHAPTER OF THE ABHISAMAYĀLAMKĀRA BY
INDIAN COMMENTATORS: THE THREEFOLD AND
THE FOURFOLD BUDDHAKĀYA THEORIES¹

1. INTRODUCTION

It was in 1964 that H. Amano² dealt with the theme of the Buddhakāya theory of Haribhadra in the *Abhisamayālamkāraloka*. Subsequently other scholars, mainly Japanese, have undertaken further studies on this theme, and in 1985 H. Isoda³ published his paper on the threefold and fourfold Buddhakāya theories in the *Abhisamayālamkāra*. Then in 1986, about half a year later than Isoda's paper, I presented a short paper on the same theme entitled 'The Classification of the Commentaries on the Dharmakāya Chapter of the *Abhisamayālamkāra*' at the ICANAS Conference in Hamburg⁴ and also published a study in which I translated the commentary by Go ram pa into Japanese and showed on the basis of the Buddhakāya system that there are two groups of commentators.⁵ Unfortunately these papers have either been written in Japanese or, as in the case of the proceedings of the ICANAS Conference, have not yet been published, and so they have not been able to contribute to studies in America, Europe and elsewhere. In 1989 and 1992, John J. Makransky published papers on this theme in which he presented substantial evidence that *Abhisamayālamkāra* chapter 8 is in fact a 3 kāya text by analyzing its sources and form of its composition.⁶ He also promised a future article which will related his analysis of AA 8 to the disagreements over its meaning in many of its Indian commentaries.⁷ I refer the reader to those articles for detailed argumentation on those matters. At the same time, I would be very glad if this article as well could contribute something for scholars abroad, and so I have ventured to present this paper in English.

2.

In this paper I shall restrict myself to classifying the Indian commentators from the standpoint of their adherence to either the threefold or fourfold Buddhakāya system.⁸

2.1. *The Reason for Excluding Three Commentators from This Study*

There are 15 Indian commentators on the *Abhisamayālamkāra* so far as we can ascertain in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka,⁹ and only these 15 can be the subject of this philological study. Three of these 15, however, namely, Smṛtijñānakīrti, Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Dharmasī, may not have actually written the commentaries ascribed to them in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, because their styles and methods of argumentation are inferior to what we might reasonably expect from such great Paṇḍits. With the help of the later commentaries written by the Tibetan commentators, especially Tsoñ kha pa,¹⁰ it behoves us to first exclude these three persons from consideration in this paper.

The opening section of the *gSer phren* contains the following passage:

«TEXT 1» *gSer phren*

- (1) ḡrel pa ḡdi dag thams cad kyañ da lta rgya gar mar grags mod/ ḡon kyañ kha cheḡi slob dpon *dha rma śris* mdzad par grags paḡi ḡbum ḡrel ḡdi/ rgya gar ma ma yin par mñon te/ . . .
- . . . shes/ rgya gar mkhas paḡi gsuñ la mi ḡbyuñ baḡi bod tshig du ma snañ baḡi phyir ro// des na ḡdi dañ sdud paḡi lde mig grñis *dha rma śris* mdzad par grags kyañ/ lo tstsha baḡam bod gshan shig gis byas sñam mo//¹¹
- (2) yum gsum don brgyad kyis mthun par bstan pa ḡdi yañ nus pa chuñ shiñ/ mdo dañ sbyor tshul la skyon chags pa ḡḡaḡ zuñ ḡdug pas mkhas pa chen po *smri ti dznā na kī riḡi* yin min dpyad dgos so//¹²
- (3) don bsdus sgron me yañ nus pa chuñ shiñ bod tshig du ma snañ bas *jo boḡi* slob ma gcig gis sam gshan bod gcig gis byas par sems so//¹³

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(1) Although all these commentaries are now generally accepted to be Indian texts, this commentary¹⁴ on the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* ascribed to the hand of the Kashmirian Ācārya Dharmasī cannot be an Indian text, because we find many Tibetan expressions in it that have never appeared in the words of an Indian Paṇḍita. Therefore although both this (P.ed.No.5203) and its summary **Kośatāla*¹⁴ are ascribed to Dharmasī, they might have been written by a translator or another Tibetan.

(2) This commentary on three *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, in which (the) three [versions of the] *Prajñāpāramitā* have been harmoniously explained by means of the eight topics,¹⁶ is of little virtue, and there are several mistakes (disadvantages ?) appearing in the manner of combining [the comments and the relevant passages of] the *Sūtra*, and we should examine if it really is by the great Paṇḍita Smṛtijñānakīrti.

(3) The **Piṇḍārthapradīpa*¹⁷ is also of little virtue and we find many Tibetan expressions in it. Therefore we think it may have been written by a certain disciple of Atiśa (jo bo, i.e., jo bo rje dpal ldan a ti śa) or another Tibetan.

The *gSer phren* refers also to the *Samcaya[gāthā]* commentary by Haribhadra. Tsoñ kha pa says that it is uncertain whether it can be ascribed to Haribhadra, but he concludes that it may be by Haribhadra because Abhayākaragupta writes, "in the *Samcaya[gāthā]* commentary of Haribhadra."¹⁸

If we read the commentaries in question, we can readily see that they cannot be ascribed to their alleged authors. The two commentaries ascribed to Dharmasī give us very little information about the threefold or fourfold Buddhakāya systems and so it is impossible to determine which system he advocated. Smṛtijñānakīrti's commentary does indeed mention the fourfold Buddhakāya, namely, *svābhāvikakāya*, *dharma-kāya*, *sāmbhogikakāya* and *nairmāṇikakāya*, but he merely quotes passages from the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* and comments on each *kāya* in an unsuitable manner.¹⁹ Atiśa's commentary simply introduces us to the one *kāya*, two, three, four, five and numerous *kāyas* without any comment.²⁰

Judging from these facts, I consider that the commentaries ascribed to these three authors cannot be by their hand. In the following I shall, therefore, deal with the Indian commentaries other than those ascribed to these three commentators.

2.2. *Tsoñ kha pa's and Go ram pa's Classifications of the Indian Commentators*²¹

Before we examine each commentary, I wish first of all to give a classified table of the remaining 12 Indian commentators in order to facilitate the reader's understanding of my arguments in this paper. Tsoñ kha pa (1357–1419) and Go ram pa (1423–1489) provide us with important information for classifying these 12 commentators.²² I shall, however, ignore other commentators referred to in their commentaries.

I shall first deal with the relevant section in Tsoñ kha pa's commentary *gSer phreñ*, in which a section on "the number of bodies (*skuñi grañs*)" is divided into four subsections on, namely, "two bodies," "three bodies," "five bodies" and "four bodies."²³ In the subsection on "five bodies"²⁴ it is stated that the *Tshig gsal* (P.ed.No.5194) by Dharmamitra and the *gTogs dkar* (P.ed.No.5192) by Dharmakīrtiśrī have the fivefold body system.

The subsection on "four bodies" is further divided into three parts: (1) the advocacy of the fourfold body system; (2) the presentation of the contrary viewpoint; and (3) the examination of the correct side.²⁵ Part (1) cites the large commentary (*rGyan snañ*) and small commentary (*ñGrel pa*) by Haribhadra and the *Tshig gsal* by Dharmamitra and then lists the names "Dharmakīrtiśrī," "Prajñākaramati," "Buddhaśrī-jñāna" and "Kumāraśrībhadrā."²⁶ Part (2) gives as proponents of this view "Ārya Vimuktisena" with his "*Ñi snañ*" (P.ed.No.5185), "Bhadanta Vimuktisena" with his "*rNam hgreñ*" (P.ed.No.5186), "Ratnākaraśānti" with his "*Dag ldan*" (P.ed.No.5199) and "*sÑin mchog*" (P.ed.No.5200), "Abhayākara Gupta" with his "*Zla ñod*" (P.ed.No.5202) and "*Thub dgoris*" (P.ed.No.5299) and "Ratnakīrti" with his "*Graggs cha*" (P.ed.No.5197).²⁷ Part (3) indicates that Tsoñ kha pa advocated the fourfold body system as the correct viewpoint.²⁸

Go ram pa,²⁹ on the other hand, deals with this subject in a section entitled "Determining the intention of this text in particular," and he divides this section into two parts: (1) "indicating the system of classifying the Buddha body into four and checking it by means of proof from sacred texts and logic" and (2) "indicating the system of classifying

the Buddha body into three and establishing it by means of proof from sacred texts and logic."³⁰ Part (1)³¹ lists the names "Ācārya (slob dpon = Haribhadra)," "Dharmakīrtiśrī (*gSer gliñ pa*)," "Dharmamitra (Chos bśes)," "Prajñākaramati (*Ser hbyuñ blo gros*)" and "Buddhaśrī-jñāna (*Bu ddha śrī*)." Part (2)³² lists two persons by the name of "Vimuktisena (*Grol sde rnam gñis*)," the chapter on the transference of merit in the large commentary by Haribhadra (*slob dpon gyi ñgrel chen gyi bśno bañi skabs*), "Abhayākara Gupta (*a bha ya*)," "Ratnākaraśānti (*śa nti pa*)" and "Ratnakīrti (*ra tna kī rti*)." The reason for the appearance of the name "Haribhadra" in both sections seems to be that Haribhadra presents the threefold Buddha body system in his other commentaries on the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*³³ and perhaps that Go ram pa himself respected Haribhadra personally.

Go ram pa also mentions the fivefold Buddha body system in another section, and there we find the name "Dharmamitra."³⁴

2.3. *Haribhadra*

The instability of the position of Haribhadra is now evident if we classify these 12 commentators. This instability results actually from the fact that he describes both systems in his large and small commentaries.³⁵ Before we determine their classification, we should examine the system of both commentaries by Haribhadra.

Haribhadra simply presents the threefold body and fourfold body systems side by side and without making any judgement on them.

«TEXT 2» *Abhisamayālamkāralokā*

- (1) sa ca dharmakāyābhisambodhaḥ svābhāvīkākāyādibhedena caturvidha itī. tatra *prathamō* . . . ity akṛtrimārthena māyo-pamavijñānasarvadharmapratipattya' dhigataḥ *svābhāvīkaḥ kāyaḥ. pariśiṣṭakāyatrayaṃ* tathyaśaṃvṛtyā pratibhāsamānaṃ paramārthato dharmatārūpaṃ yathādhimokṣaprabhāvītaṃ buddhabodhisattvaśrāvakādīgocarātvena vyavasthāpitam itī kathanāya. . . sarve (= bodhipakṣāḥ) cāśrayaparāvṛtyā parāvṛtā bodhipakṣādayo niṣprapañca-jñānātmakā dharmakāyo dvitīyo 'bhīdhīyata itī *kecī*.³⁶

- (2) *anye tu sarvākārām viśuddhīm ye dharmāḥ prāptā nirāśravāḥ/ svābhāviko muneh kāyas teṣām prakṛtilakṣaṇaḥ// iti yathārutatvena lokottarān evānāśravān dharmān abhyupagāmya teṣām yā prakṛtir anutpādātā tallakṣaṇaḥ svābhāvīkāyaḥ. sa eva ca dharmatākāyo dharmakāya iti bhāva-pratīyayalopād vyapadīśyata iti vyākhyāya . . .*³⁷
- (3) *teṣām yogisaṃvṛtyā viśiṣṭārthapratībhāsanānadvārenāśrayaparāvṛtyā parāvṛttā dharmadeśanādyarthakriyākāriṇo 'vaśyam advayās cittacaittāḥ katham abhyupagantavyāḥ/ samgrhītā ity apare. yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā saiva te matā/ iti nyāyād dharmatātmakakāyapratipādanād evādvayajñānāt-mako dharmakāyaḥ pratipādita iti cet. eṣam tarhi nyāyasya tulyatvāt sāmbhogikanairmānikakāyadvayam api pratipāditaṃ iti pṛthagvirdeśo na kartavyaḥ syāt. atha pravacane pathitavāt, yogisaṃvṛtyā tannirdeśa iti matam. amunaiva nyāyēnādvayajñānāt-mako 'pi dharmakāyas tathaiva pṛthagvirdeśyatām iti prāptam.*³⁸
- (4) *kecit kāyacatuṣṭayavyākhyāne svābhāvikaḥ sasāmbhogo nairmāṇiko 'paras tathā dharmakāyaḥ sakāritras caturdhā samudīritā// iti kārikāyām svābhāvikaśabdānantaram dharmakāyasabdasyāpāthāt kāyatrayam eveti.*³⁹
- (5) *anye tūpadarśitaprayojanasāmarthyāt kārikābandhānurodhena jñānasyaiva kāritreṇa sambandhārthaṃ caivam uktam. ato 'viruddham sarvam pradeśāntarābhīhitam kāyacatuṣṭayam bhavatīti.*⁴⁰

I shall now summarize these passages.

(1) This eighth chapter entitled 'The Full Comprehension of Dharmakāya' has four sections: *svābhāvīkākāya* and others. The first is "*svābhāvīkākāya*," and the other three "*kāya* are . . ."

According to this passage, Haribhadra himself seems to advocate the fourfold body system. After (1) he introduces both systems with

'anye tu', 'kecit' and 'apare'. It is at least certain that there must have been some confrontation between both systems in his time.

(2) "*Svābhāvīkākāya*" is at the same time "*dharmatākāya*" which is identical to "*dharmakāya*." The form "*dharmakāya*" simply lacks the suffix "*tā*" in "*dharmatākāya*". (Threefold body system: *svābhāvīkākāya* = *dharmakāya*)

(3) How (= By which body) can the non-dual "*citta*" and "*caitta*" in the sense of *saṃvṛtti* of yogins be accepted? Others answered:

"Origination in dependence — this is precisely what you (= Buddha) understand to be voidness"

According to this maxim *pratīyasamutpāda* (here: = *advayās cittacaittāḥ* = *advayajñāna*) is equal to *śūnyatā* (here: = *dharmatā*), and therefore they (*advayās cittacaittāḥ*) are included in the *dharmakāya* = *svābhāvīkākāya*. Objection: If it is so, the maxim can also in the same way be applied to the other two bodies, so that (iti) they do not need to be divided. Others (apare) try to defend their position: because they (each terms of bodies) are clearly pronounced in the teaching (= *Kārikā*), they should be performed [not] in the sense [of *paramārtha* but] of *saṃvṛtti* of Yogins. The four-bodies advocate replies: by the same principle the *dharmakāya* characterized by *advayajñāna* should be accepted in exactly the same way [as *sāmbhogīkākāya* and *nairmāṇīkākāya*] expounded separately. (Fourfold body system)

(4) In this verse quoted from the first chapter (v. 17)⁴¹ the word "*dharmakāya*" does not immediately follow the word "*svābhāvīkā*;" therefore, it is of the threefold body system. (Threefold body system)

(5) [The reason that the word "*dharmakāya*" does not come in the second position is that] the word "*dharmakāya*" was intended to be connected to activities such as perfect wisdom, etc.; therefore, it is of the fourfold body system. (Fourfold body system)

(1) seems to indicate that Haribhadra intended to advocate the fourfold body system. But we should avoid drawing any hasty conclusions without a detailed examination, partly because, as noted above, Haribhadra presents us with both systems side by side in (2) to (5) and partly because he also gives the threefold body system in his other commentaries. As has already been seen, Tsoṅ kha pa states clearly

and Go ram pa implies that Haribhadra advocated the fourfold body system, and so I tentatively classify him first in the fourfold body system.

2.4. The Classification of the Indian Commentators

Here I present a table of the 12 commentators in accordance with their views to be examined below. As regards the chronological order of these commentators I have adopted the dates as far as they may be determined, but I have been unable to find any information on the dates of Dharmakīrtiśrī, Dharmamitra and Kumāraśrībhadra. Therefore, referring to their order in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka and taking their contents into consideration, I have just tentatively placed these three between Buddhaśrījñāna (= Jñānapāda; the second half of 8th century; disciple of Haribhadra)⁴² and Prajñākaramati (ca. 950–1000). If this chronological order is acceptable, then the fourfold body system except for Buddhaśrījñāna⁴³ comes between the two Vimuktisenas and the other three commentators who advocated the threefold body system.

TABLE I

Threefold body system	Fourfold body system
Ārya Vimuktisena (ca. 6c)	Haribhadra (ca. 800)
Bhadanta Vimuktisena (ca. 6, 7c)	Buddhaśrījñāna (Jñānapāda late 8c)
Ratnakīrti (ca. 11c)	Dharmakīrtiśrī
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 11c)	Dharmamitra
Abhayākaragupta (ca. 1050–1150)	Kumāraśrībhadra
	Prajñākaramati (950–1000)
	Buddhaśrījñāna (ca. 1200)

Since we have already considered Haribhadra's works, we shall now examine the works of the other commentators.⁴⁴

3.

Before examining each commentator, I should mention the manner in which I intend to proceed with my examination of them in this paper.

In sections 3 and 4 I shall examine them one by one, and then in section 5 I shall focus on verse 17 in chapter 1 of the *Abhisamayālamkāra*, since the interpretation of this verse represented the deciding factor in determining which system they chose, and it also enables us to see that the commentators adhering to the threefold body system modified this verse probably to suit their own ends.

3.1 Ārya Vimuktisena

Ārya Vimuktisena

«TEXT 3»⁴⁵

da ni chos kyi sku brjod par bya ba yin te/ de ni *nam pa*
gsum du rig par bya ste/ ño bo ñid kyi sku dañ/ loñs spyod
pañi sku dañ/ sprul pañi skuho//

Now the Dharmakāya is to be explained and this is to be understood as three *kinds*: the Svābhāvikakāya, the Sāmbhogikakāya and the Nairmāṇikakāya.

3.2 Bhadanta Vimuktisena

Bhadanta Vimuktisena

«TEXT 4»⁴⁶

da ni chos kyi sku brjod par bya ste/ de yañ *sku* gsum du
śes par bya ste/ ño bo ñid kyi sku dañ/ loñs spyod rdzogs
pañi sku dañ/ sprul pañi skuho//

Now the Dharmakāya is to be explained and this is to be understood as of three *bodies*: the Svābhāvikakāya, the Sāmbhogikakāya and the Nairmāṇikakāya.

It may be readily seen that «TEXT 4» more or less takes over the content of «TEXT 3» except for minor differences such as that between “*nam pa*” and “*sku*.” It is natural to assume that Bhadanta Vimuktisena wanted to clarify the intention of Ārya Vimuktisena, and it is true that “*sku*” in «TEXT 4» makes the meaning of the passage

«K-1»

svābhāvikaḥ sasāmbhogō nairmāniko 'paras tathā/
dharmakāyaḥ sakāritras caturdhā samudīritah//

«K-2»

svābhāvikaḥ sasāmbhogō nairmānika iti *tridhā*/
dharmakāya sakāritras caturdhā samudīritah//

«K-1»

Maitreya, Ārya Vimuktisena, Haribhadra, Buddhaśrījñāna (Jñānapāda),
Buddhaśrījñāna

«K-2»

Bhadanta Vimuktisena, Ratnakīrti, Ratnākaraśānti, Abhayākaragupta

Who changed this verse «K-1» into the form «K-2» and why? We can answer with some certainty in regard to the first question that it was Bhadanta Vimuktisena who first modified this verse. If the dates of the commentators given in «TABLE 1» are reliable, we can trace the process as follows. Bhadanta Vimuktisena faithfully took over the interpretations of his teacher Ārya Vimuktisena, but in cases where Ārya Vimuktisena was not sufficiently clear or where there was a possibility of misunderstanding, he modified and clarified them. In the present case Ārya Vimuktisena interpreted this verse as representing the threefold body system but Bhadanta Vimuktisena assumed that «K-1» could be misleading, and he wished to eliminate any possibility of another interpretation of this verse and to fix the interpretation of Ārya Vimuktisena. It is also possible that there already existed an interpretation based on the fourfold body system or at least the germs of one.

It is strange that Haribhadra and other proponents of the fourfold body system should never have referred to the form «K-2» in their commentaries and that it is only the three proponents of the threefold body system who do so. According to «TABLE 1» the dates of Haribhadra and others fall between Bhadanta Vimuktisena and these three.

If the proponents of the fourfold body system should have intentionally ignored the existence of «K-2», this tendency at that time would have been quite insufferable for Ratnakīrti, Ratnākaraśānti and

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Abhayākaragupta. As we have already seen, one of the most important authorities for proponents of the fourfold body system in asserting their legitimacy was the assertions of Haribhadra or Haribhadra himself. For these reasons these three desired to dispel any such tendency and to advocate their own legitimacy, and so they criticized Haribhadra so vehemently.

6. CONCLUSION

I shall now summarize the whole process: why did the conflict between the three- and fourfold body systems arise and how did it evolve historically among the different commentators?

The point of divergence between these two systems is how to interpret verse 17 of the first chapter, because there is indeed a lack of clarity and decisiveness to it. Although there was doubtlessly only one interpretation of this verse at first, namely, that of the threefold body system, these terms led to a new interpretation because there already existed a fourfold body system in, for instance, the Vajrayāna. By the time of Haribhadra a new interpretation had arisen and the conflict between the two systems could not be ignored. According to his disciples, Haribhadra probably determined that the fourfold body system was the more reasonable, and mainly on the basis of his commentaries a large number of discussions and disputations between the two systems arose and developed.

Provided the chronology in «TABLE 1» is reliable, we may trace the course of the conflict as follows:

Bhadanta Vimuktisena modified the original form «K-1» to «K-2» for the sake of clarifying the intention of Ārya Vimuktisena, namely, the threefold body system. By the time of Haribhadra a new interpretation had come into existence, and Haribhadra probably considered this new interpretation to be more reasonable but restricted himself to carefully recording both views side by side, and so he did not think it necessary to indicate «K-2» expressly. It is to be easily imagined that the conflict between both systems developed after Haribhadra. Therefore Haribhadra's disciples had to criticize the threefold body system explicitly and ignore «K-2» deliberately. At that time Haribhadra's authority among Buddhists was so great that it prevented proponents

of the threefold body system from attacking him freely (or the commentaries adhering to the former system would not have come down to us). His authority, however, gradually weakened and by the time of Ratnakīrti or Ratnākaraśānti it had become possible to advocate the threefold body system and even attack Haribhadra. In this case Ratnakīrti or Ratnākaraśānti had to express himself very strongly as to why their system was reasonable, and they accordingly reinstated the form «K-2» and rejected the assertions of Haribhadra and even Haribhadra himself. This is why they strongly criticized Haribhadra. It was, moreover, natural that the Tibetan translators, who were more or less influenced by the still considerable authority of Haribhadra in Tibet, though the form «K-1» to be correct and rectified and translated «K-2» automatically with «K-1».

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Abhisamayālamkāra
AAA	Abhisamayālamkāraloka: see n. 35.
AA-ĀV	C. Pensa, <i>L'Abhisamayālamkāravṛtti di Ārya-Vimuktisena, Primo Abhisamaya, testo e note critiche</i> , Serie Orientale Roma, XXXVII, Roma, 1967.
AA-K	Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, <i>Abhisamayālamkāra-prajñā-pāramitā-upadeśa-śāstra, the Work of Bodhisattva Maitreya</i> , edited, explained and translated, Biblio. Buddhica XXIII, Leningrad, 1929.
AA-Sp.	See Amano 1983.
Go ram pa	See n. 29.
Sāratamā	See n. 49.
Tsoñ kha pa	See n. 10.
Biographical dictionaries	
A	M. Saegusa et al., <i>Indo Bukkyō Jinmei Jiten</i> , Kyoto, 1987.
B	A. Saito & H. I. et al., <i>Tōyō Bukkyō Jinmei Jiten</i> , Tokyo, 1989.

NOTES

¹ This paper is based on my two papers in Japanese published in 1992 (Sakuma, 1992a & Sakuma, 1992b). Since then I have exchanged information on this theme with Prof. John J. Makransky and also obtained a copy of his unpublished doctoral dissertation (University Microfilms International). I have learned much from him and shall have to revise my articles. I am grateful to him and also wish to thank my colleague Rolf Giebel for correcting my poor English.

² See Amano, 1964. He studied the Dharmakāya chapter of the AAA and showed how Haribhadra commented the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* in two commentaries on the

basis of the threefold Buddhakāya system but in the AAA and in *Sphuṭārtha* presented both systems in a neutral fashion. Using a wealth of material he concluded that Haribhadra most probably took the standpoint of the fourfold Buddhakāya system.

³ See Isoda, 1985. He demonstrated that there are two types of commentators concerned with the Dharmakāya chapter of the AA and he also showed which commentator described which system and how. He used, for example, the commentary by Bu ston but did not refer to all commentators, nor did he systematize them from this point of view.

⁴ ICANAS: XXXII International Congress for Asian and North African Studies, 25–30 August 1986, Hamburg. The proceedings have not yet been published but at the time I distributed typescript copies of my paper.

⁵ See Sakuma, 1986.

⁶ See Makransky, 1989 and Makransky, 1992.

⁷ See Makransky, 1992, n. 4.

⁸ In this case my contention does not overlap his.

⁹ The catalogues of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka of the Peking and sDe-dge editions give: (1) Ārya Vimuktisena, (2) Bhadanta Vimuktisena, (3) Ratnakīrti, (4) Ratnākaraśānti, (5) Abhayākaragupta, (6) Haribhadra, (7) Dharmakīrtiśrī, (8) Dharmamitra, (9) Kumāraśrībhadra, (10) Buddhaśrījñāna (= Jñānapāda), (11) Buddhaśrījñāna, (12) Prajñākaramati, (13) Smṛtījñānakīrti, (14) Atiśa Dipaṅkaraśrījñāna, (15) Dharmasrī. See Obermiller, 1933, pp. 9–11; (10) & (11): Seyfort-Ruegg, 1981, p. 102 and p. 117.

¹⁰ rJe Tsoñ kha pa blo bzañ grags pa, *Ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin paḥi man niag gi bstan bcos mñon par rtogs paḥi rgrel pa dan bcas paḥi rgya cher bśad paḥi legs bśad gser gyi phren ba* (= *gSer phren*). P.ed. No.6150. I use here the bKra-sis-lhun-po edition: The Collected Works (gSuñ ḥbum) of rJe Tsoñ kha pa blo bzañ grags pa, Reproduced from an example of the old bKra sis lhun po redaction from the library of Klu hkyil Monastery of Ladakh by Ngawang Gelek Demo, Vols. 25–27, New Delhi, 1977.

¹¹ Tsoñ kha pa, Tsa 7a4–7b4.

¹² *Ibid.*, Tsa 7b4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 7b6.

¹⁴ Dharmasrī, sToñ phrag brgya paḥi rnam par bśad pa shes bya ba, P.ed. No.5203.

¹⁵ Dharmasrī, *Ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin paḥi mdzod kyi lde mig ces bya ba*, P.ed. No.5204.

¹⁶ Smṛtījñānakīrti, *Yum ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rgyas par bstan pa ḥbum dan ḥbrin du bstan pa ni khri lia ston dan bsdus te bstan pa khri brgyad ston pa nams mthun par don brgyad kyi bstan pa*, P.ed. No.5187; the passages on this theme appear in P.ed., Kha 270b3ff.

¹⁷ Atiśa Dipaṅkaraśrījñāna, *Ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin paḥi don bsdus sgron ma*, P.ed. No.5201; see P.ed. Tha 261a44.

¹⁸ Tsoñ kha pa, Tsa 7b4–6; the *Samcayagāthā* ascribed to Haribhadra corresponds to P.ed. No.5190. It is already indicated by Obermiller, 1937, p. 5, that the *Samcayagāthā* commentary ascribed to Dharmasrī “is not held in esteem by the Tibetan scholars. Its authorship is dubious and it is characterized by Tsoñ-kha-pa as ‘a feeble work of some unknown Tibetan author’”. At all events this text does not offer any useful information for this paper.

¹⁹ See n. 16.

²⁰ See n. 17.

²¹ Makransky, 1990 (pp. 548—613: Chapter XII: The Controversy Continues in Tibet: Tson kha pa and Go ram pa) deals with Tson kha-pa's and Go-ram-pa's commentaries.

²² I have not used other Tibetan commentaries, such as those by Bu ston rin chen grub (1290—1364), rGyal tshab rje Dar ma rin chen (1364—1432) or Kun mkhyen hJam dbyaṅs bshad pa (1648—1722), because the commentaries by Tson kha pa and Go ram pa provide us with enough information to classify the Indian commentators and I want to avoid any unnecessary complications here.

²³ Tson kha pa, Tsha 238b4f.: *dañ po la gñis/ skuhi grañs/ ño bohi/ dañ po la bshi/ gñis su dañ/ gsum du dañ/ lñar dañ/ bshir dbye paḥo/*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Tsha 239a4ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Tsha 239b3ff.: *bshi pa la gsum/ bshir bshed pa dañ/ de mi bshed paḥi lugs dgod/ hñhad paḥi phyogs brtag paḥo/*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Tsha 239b4ff.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Tsha 240b1ff.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Tsha 242a6ff.

²⁹ Go ram bsod nams seṅ ge, *śeṣ rāb kyi pha rol tu phyin paḥi man ñag gi bstan bcos mñon rtogs rgyan gyi gshuñ sñā phyiñi hbrel dañ dkaḥ gñas la dpyad pa sbas don zab mohi gier gyi kha hbyed*. In: Sa skya paḥi bkah hbum, Vol 13, The Toyo Bunko, Tokyo, 1969, No. 50. The Japanese translation of this passage appears in Sakuma, 1986, pp. 291—319.

³⁰ Go ram pa, Ja 218a2f.: *bye brag tu gshuñ hdihi dgoñs pa ñes bar bya ba; (1) sku bshir phyē baḥi lugs brjod ciñ/ de la luñ rigs kyis dpyad pa bya ba; (2) sku gsum du phyē baḥi lugs brjod ciñ de luñ rigs kyis grub paḥi tshul lo*. See the Japanese translation in Sakuma, 1986.

³¹ Go ram pa, Ja 218a3ff.

³² *Ibid.*, Ja 219a3ff.

³³ *Śeṣ rāb kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ston phrag ñi su lña pa*, P.ed. No.5188 and D.ed. No.3790. The sDe-dge edition ascribes it to Haribhadra. *bCom ldan hñas yon tan rin po che sdud paḥi tshigs su bñad paḥi dkaḥ hgrel shes bya ba (= Samcayagāthā)* P.ed. No.5190. The passages appear in P.ed. No.5188, Ca 258b1—259b8 and P.ed. No.5190, Ja 83a1ff. See Amano, 1964, pp. 28—29.

³⁴ Go ram pa, Ja 216a2ff.

³⁵ The large commentary: *Abhisamayālamkāralokā Prajñāpāramitāvyaḥyā*, *The Work of Haribhadra*, ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932. AAATib: P.ed. No.5189. The small commentary: *Śeṣ rāb kyi pha rol tu phyin paḥi man ñag gi bstan bcos mñon par rtogs paḥi rgyan ces bya baḥi hgrel pa (Sphutārthā)*, P.ed. No.5191; its reconstructed Sanskrit text: H. Amano, *A Study on the Abhisamaya-alamkāra-kārikā-śāstra-vṛtti*, Tokyo, 1975.

³⁶ AAA, pp. 914,9—915,22.

³⁷ AAA, p. 916,6—13.

³⁸ AAA, p. 916,14—22.

³⁹ AAA, p. 916,23—27.

⁴⁰ AAA, p. 916,28—30.

⁴¹ AAA, p. 21,13—14.

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⁴² Seyfort-Ruegg, 1981, p. 102.

⁴³ Seyfort-Ruegg, 1981, p. 117.

⁴⁴ Makransky 1990, pp. 498—547 (chapter XI: Reactions of Some Important Later Indian Scholars to Haribhadra's Four Kāya Theory): his classification of the Indian commentators coincides with mine except for Buddhaśrījñāna (Jñānapāda) (pp. 499—501).

⁴⁵ P.ed.No.5185, Ka 226a6—7; Toh.ed.No.3787, Ka 151b7.

⁴⁶ P.ed.No.5186, Kha 184b1—2; Toh.ed.No.3788, Kha 160b7.

⁴⁷ See Isoda 1991a.

⁴⁸ P.ed.No.5197, Ña 297b3ff.; Toh.ed.No.3799, Ña 250b5ff.

⁴⁹ (1) *Sūddharmatī*: P.ed.No.5199; Toh.ed.No.3801. (2) *Sāratamā: Sāratamā, A Pañjikā on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, ed. by P. S. Jaini, Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series, No. XVIII, Patna, 1979; P.ed.No.5200; Toh.ed.No.3803.

⁵⁰ P.ed. Ta 227b8—228a2; Toh.ed. Ta 193a3—5.

⁵¹ *Sāratamā*, p. 171,24—172,3.

⁵² P.ed. Tha 226a2—3; Toh.ed. Tha 201b5—6.

⁵³ P.ed. Ta 228b6—7; Toh.ed. Ta 193b7—194a1.

⁵⁴ He is said to have been one of the greatest scholars of the Vajrayāna; see biographical dictionaries A and B.

⁵⁵ (1) *Marmakaumudī*: P.ed.No.5202; Toh.ed.No.3805. (2) *Munimatālamkāra*: P.ed.No.5299; Toh.ed.No.3903.

⁵⁶ P.ed. Da 221b4—5; Toh.ed. Da 196a6—7.

⁵⁷ *Sāratamā*, p. 171,24ff.: *aṣṭamo 'bhisamayo dharmakāyah/ tasya catvāri vastūni/ trayāḥ kāyāḥ kārītram ca/ tathāhi pūrvam uddesaḥ kṛtāḥ svābhāvikaḥ saśāmbhogo nairmāṅika itī tridhā/ dharmakāyah sakāritrās caturdhā samudīritāḥ/*

itī/ dharmo mārgah/ sa cēha prakarsagateḥ prakaraṇāc ca saptābhisamayalakṣano grhyate/ dharmalabhyāḥ kāyo dharmakāyah/ kāyah śāriram/ trīṇi śārirāṇi buddhānām trayāḥ kāyāḥ/ uktam hi mahatyor bhagavatyoḥ . . . itī/ uktam ca sūtrālamkāre . . . Marmakaumudī, P.ed. Da 221b3ff.; Toh.ed. Da 197a5ff.: *mñon par rtogs pa brgyad pa ni chos kyi sku ste hdu śes med hdu śes med min gyi chuñ nuḥi mi mthun paḥi phyogs kyi bye brag la/ giēn poḥi bye brag chen poḥi chen po dños gshi dañ rjes kyi ño bohi sems bskyed pa ñi su rtsa gcig pa dañ/ ñi su rtsa gñis paḥi ño bohi kun tu hod ces bsgregs paḥi sañs rgyas kyis der gñas paḥi dños po hi sku gsum dañ mdzad pa dañ bcas pa ni sñon du mdor bstan las/*

ño bo ñid loñs rdzogs bcas dañ/ sprul pa shes dañ rñam gsum dañ/ chos sku mdzad dañ bcas pa ste/ rñam pa bshir ni yañ dag brjod/ ces te/ chos kyi lam ste mñon par rtogs pa bdun gyi ño bohi chos kyis thob par bya baḥi sku ni chos kyi sku la/ sku ni lus de sañs rgyas rñams kyi sku ni rñam pa gsum ste/ bcom ldan hñas ma yum chen mo . . . shes gsuñs pa dañ/ mdo sde rgyan las kyañ/ . . .

⁵⁸ *Kīṅikalā*, P.ed. Ña 228b3ff.; Toh.ed. Ña 193b2ff.: *skad cig "gcig mñon rdzogs byañ chub/ mtshan ñid kyis ni rñam pa bshi" shes pa ni zag pa med paḥi chos thams cad skad cig ma gcig la mñon par byañ chub pa dañ/ dkar poḥi chos thams cad skad cig ma gcig la mñon par byañ chub pa dañ/ mtshan ñid med paḥi chos thams cad skad cig ma gcig la mñon par byañ chub pa dañ/ chos thams cad gñis su med paḥi skad cig*

ma gcig la mñon par byañ chub pa ste/ dños pa bshihī bdag ñid ni skad cig ma gcig la mñon par byañ chub paḥo//

de yañ skad cig gcig mñon rdzogs byañ chub ces pas bstan te/
 ño bo ñid loñs rdzogs bcas dañ// sprul pa shes ni rnam gsum dañ//
 chos sku mdzad par bcas pa ste// rnam pa bshir ni yañ dag brjod
 ces pa la/ ño bo ñid kyi sku dañ/ loñs spyod rdzogs paḥi sku dañ/ sprul paḥi sku
 dañ/ deḥi mdzad pa dañ shes paḥi dños po bshihī bdag ñid chos kyi skuḥo// de yañ
 chos sku shes pas bstan to//

Suddhamatī, P.ed. Ta 91a2ff.; Toh.ed. Ta 79a3ff.: skad cig ma/ "gcig mñon
 rdzogs byañ chub pa// mtshan ñid kyi ni rnam pa bshī" shes bya ba ni chos thams
 cad zag med par skad cig ma gcig gis mñon par rtogs pa dañ/ chos thams cad dge
 baḥi skad cig ma gcig gis mñon par rtogs pa dañ/ chos thams cad dge baḥi skad
 cig ma gcig gis mñon par rtogs pa dañ/ chos thams cad mtshan ñid med par skad cig
 ma gcig gis mñon par rtogs pa dañ/ chos thams cad gñis su med paḥi skad cig ma
 gcig gis mñon par rtogs pa ste/ bshī po de dag ni skad cig ma gcig mñon par rtogs
 paḥo//

ño bo ñid loñs rdzogs bcas dañ// de bshin sprul dañ rnam gsum dag//
 chos sku mdzad par bcas pa ste// rnam pa bshir ni yañ dag brjod//
 ces bya ba ni ño bo ñid kyi sku dañ/ loñs spyod rdzogs paḥi sku dañ/ sprul paḥi sku
 dañ/ deḥi mdzad pa ste/ dños po bshī po de dag ñid chos kyi skuḥo//

⁵⁹ Mimaki, 1984, pp. 218–221, had discussed this relationship between Ratnakīrti
 and Ratnākaraśānti from the viewpoint of Buddhist logic. After examining the views
 presented by various scholars, he concludes that the order Ratnakīrti → Ratnākara-
 śānti, first proposed by Mukerjee, is the correct one. As is evident from the previous
 note, it is not easy to determine whether or not Ratnakīrti added the passages to
 Ratnākaraśānti's work, and so I tentatively follow the order Ratnakīrti → Ratnākara-
 śānti. Mimaki, 1992 reinforces his argumentation with further consideration.

⁶⁰ P.ed. Da 222a7; Toh.ed. Da 197b7–198a1.

⁶¹ P.ed. Ha 285a6–7; Toh.ed. A 217b3–4.

⁶² P.ed. Ha 287a5–6; Toh.ed. A 219a1.

⁶³ *Munimatālamkāra*, P.ed. Ha 291b2ff.; Toh.ed. A 222a3ff.

⁶⁴ See Sakuma, 1987.

⁶⁵ P.ed.No.5196; Toh.ed.No.3798.

⁶⁶ Makransky, 1990, pp. 499–501.

⁶⁷ See biographical dictionaries A, p. 127af, and B, p. 29af.

⁶⁸ P.ed. Ña 221b3ff; Toh.ed. Ña 188a1ff.

⁶⁹ AAA, p. 915.21; p. 918.12–13; p. 916.14–22; see section 2.3 above, «TEXT 2»
 (3).

⁷⁰ P.ed. No.5192; Toh.ed. No.3794.

⁷¹ See Makransky, 1989.

⁷² P.ed. Ja 285a3ff.; Toh.ed. Ja 251b1ff.

⁷³ P.ed. No.5194; Toh.ed. No.3796.

⁷⁴ P.ed. Ña 110a2–5; Toh.ed. Ña 94b5–7.

⁷⁵ We cannot determine to whom "some people" refers, but Amano, 1964, pp. 28–
 29, points out that one of Haribhadra's commentaries gives the threefold body system,
 and there is also Go ram pa 218a3 (see 2.2). Isoda, 1985, p. 373, quotes the passages
 from Roñ ston (1367–1449) of the Sa skya pa school claiming that Haribhadra

advocated the threefold body theory. We also find the phrase "kāyatrayaprāpiṇaḥ" in
 the AAA, p. 994.3 (see 2.2).

⁷⁶ Vairocana is said to be the teacher of Haribhadra. See Isoda, 1985. See AAA, p.
 993.19ff, and Small Commentary, Amano, 1975, p. 301, 23f; the latter says: mkhan
 po yañ dag rnam snañ mdzad// bla ma bzañ la phyag ḥtshal nas// tshig leḥur byas
 paḥi ḥgrel gsal ba// ḥdi ni seṅ ge bzañ pos byas//. The biographical dictionary A,
 p. 212b, informs as that the *Grub mthaḥ chen mo* by ḥJam dbyañs bshad pa clearly
 states that Vairocanabhadra was Śāntarakṣita. Moreover dGe sloñ ye śes rgyal mtshan
 (= Tshe mchog gliñ Yoñs ḥdzin Ye śes rgyal mtshan) (1713–1792)
 Toh.ed.No.5985(A) "Byañ chub lam gyi rim paḥi bla ma brgyad paḥi rnam par thar
 pa rgyal bstan mdzas paḥi rgyan mchog phul byuñ nor buḥi phreñ ba", Ña 99b1–2 (a
 chapter on mkhan chen shi ba ḥtsho [= Śāntarakṣita]) says, "rlabs chen spyod paḥi
 gter gyur rnam snañ mdzad// ces bshags pa/ mkhan po yañ dag rnam snañ mdzad/
 mtshan gshan bo dhi sa tva shes kyañ bya/ legs sbyar gyi skad la śan ta ra ksi ta/ bod
 skad du shi ba ḥtsho shes brjod pa mkhan chen shi ba ḥtsho ni/ . . . ; We can there-
 fore say that Vairocanabhadra is identified with Śāntarakṣita in the Tibetan Buddhist
 tradition down to the present day. I am indebted for this information on the Tibetan
 tradition to my colleague Prof. Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar of Otani University, whom
 I take this opportunity to thank.

⁷⁷ In this respect each commentator interpreted Haribhadra's views to suit his own
 standpoint, and it is to be surmised that the authority of Haribhadra was very high.

⁷⁸ P.ed. No.5195; Toh.ed. No.3797.

⁷⁹ P.ed. Ña 134b8ff.; Toh.ed. Ña 115b4ff.

⁸⁰ P.ed. No.5193; Toh.ed. No. 3795.

⁸¹ Tsoñ kha pa, Tsha 240a6: śer ḥbyuñ.

⁸² Go ram pa, Ja 218a3: śer ḥbyuñ blo gros.

⁸³ *Prajñāpradīpavālī*: P.ed. No-5198; D.ed. No. 3800.

⁸⁴ The name "Buddhaśīñjāna" appearing in Tsoñ kha pa's and Go ram pa's commen-
 taries noted in 2.2 cannot refer to Jñānapāda but doubtless refers to a person who
 flourished ca. 1200. See Seyfort-Ruegg, 1981, p. 117.

⁸⁵ Kendai 1973 edited the text, and according to its colophon it might be the *Prajñā-
 pradīpavālī* by Buddhaśīñjāna. The manuscript seems to correspond to the eighth
 chapter, but it does not coincide with the Tibetan translation. This text does not quote
 this verse itself but comments on it as follows: "tatra dharmakāyābhisamayaś catur-
 vidhah/ tadyathā svābhāvīkākāyāḥ/ dharmakāyāḥ/ sambhogīkākāyāḥ/ nairmānika-
 kāyāḥ sakāritrah/" (pp. 1–2). Although somewhat strange, "sakāritrah" is here
 separated from "dharmakāyāḥ."

⁸⁶ Jaini, 1979, pp. 6–13; Isoda, 1991a, p. 70 refers to this point.

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RICHARD P. HAYES

NĀGĀRJUNA'S APPEAL

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Among the incidental features of Nāgārjuna's philosophy that have captured my attention over the years, there are two in particular that I wish to discuss in this paper.¹ The first observation is that his philosophical writings seem to have fascinated a large number of modern scholars of Buddhism; this hardly requires demonstration. The second observation is that Nāgārjuna's writings had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy. Despite his apparent attempts to discredit some of the most fundamental concepts of abhidharma, abhidharma continued to flourish for centuries, without any appreciable attempt on the part of ābhīdharmikas to defend their methods of analysis against Nāgārjuna's criticisms.² And despite Nāgārjuna's radical critique of the very possibility of having grounded knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the epistemological school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti dominated Indian Buddhist intellectual circles, again without any explicit attempt to answer Nāgārjuna's criticisms of their agenda. Aside from a few commentators on Nāgārjuna's works, who identified themselves as Mādhyamikas, Indian Buddhist intellectual life continued almost as if Nāgārjuna had never existed.

Taken together, these two observations may suggest that the interest that modern scholars of Buddhism have in Nāgārjuna may be out of proportion to the influence that Nāgārjuna had on Buddhist themselves. On first consideration, the observation that Nāgārjuna had little impact on classical Buddhists may seem unrelated to the observation that he has had a good deal of impact on modern Buddhologists. On further reflection, however, it seems that a common reason can be found to explain these two observations; the reason could be simply that Nāgārjuna's arguments, when examined closely, turn out to be fallacious and therefore not very convincing to a logically astute reader. By using faulty argumentation, Nāgārjuna was able to arrive at

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some spectacularly counterintuitive conclusions. The fallaciousness of his arguments would explain why many generations of Indian Buddhists after Nāgārjuna's time ignored much of what he had to say; the Indian Buddhist tradition was for the most part quite insistent on sound argumentation. And the counterintuitive conclusions would help explain why some modern readers have assumed that since Nāgārjuna's conclusions do not follow from his arguments, he was not trying to conform to the canons of standard logic at all but was instead presenting a radical critique of standard logic, or was at least working within the framework of some kind of so-called deviant logic.

The principal object of this paper is to examine some of Nāgārjuna's arguments in order to determine exactly what type of fallacy he most often employs. In order to reach that object, I shall first try to determine the purpose behind Nāgārjuna's argumentation by looking not only at the conclusions he claimed to have reached but also at the reasons why he may have found it important to arrive at those conclusions. The next step will be to examine the actual fallacies upon which his conclusions rest. Once that has been done, the final section of this paper will examine some of the types of interpretation that modern scholars have used in their attempts to make sense of Nāgārjuna's style of argumentation; it will be suggested, but probably not proven definitively, that these interpretive strategies have much more affinity with modern philosophical preoccupations than with anything that would have seemed important to Nāgārjuna.

2. NĀGĀRJUNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL GOAL

Probably more has been written about Nāgārjuna, in English at least, than has been written about any other Buddhist philosopher. As is to be expected, the more scholars investigate and write about Nāgārjuna, the less agreement there is as to what his principal goals were in setting down his ideas in the way he did. Depending on what one reads about Nāgārjuna in secondary sources, one can come away with the impression either that he was a mystic, or a radical critic of the forms of Buddhism that preceded him, or a conservative trying to get back to certain basic principles that had somehow gotten lost in the scholastic developments that took place between the time of the

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historical Buddha and his own time. Of course these different interpretations are not necessarily incompatible, but they do give us somewhat different pictures of the type of world view and the kinds of religious practices one might expect to find associated with a person who expressed himself in the ways that Nāgārjuna did. I cannot hope to solve the problem of which of the competing views of Nāgārjuna is the most accurate, but I think it is possible at least to reject some interpretations of his thought that are not well-supported by a close examination of his writings. Before doing so, however, let me offer a quick recapitulation of what I take to be the most important tenets in his system of ideas.

In speaking of the philosophical goals of Nāgārjuna, discussion will be limited in this paper to one text, the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* (MMK). In this text there is abundant evidence that Nāgārjuna's principal objective is essentially the same as that which is common to all Buddhists of the classical period. Thus it can be said of Nāgārjuna in particular, just as it can be said of Buddhist writings in general, that the texts were written as antidotes to the erroneous thinking that, according to Buddhist theory, functions as the root cause of all distress. More specifically, Nāgārjuna's argumentation is offered as a corrective to two particular views concerning the continuity of the self after the death of the physical body. On the other hand, there is the view that the self is identical with the physical body and the physically generated mental events; when the body dies, so does the mind, and hence so does the self. This first view, known as the view of discontinuity (*ucchedavāda*), is traditionally regarded as one limit (*anta*). The opposite limit, called the view of perpetuity (*śāśvatavāda*), is that the self is not identical with and is separable from the body-mind complex so that the self continues to exist after the decomposition of the body and the mental events based therein. Nāgārjuna's position, and indeed the position of Buddhist doctrine in general, is said to be a position in between these two limits.

In trying to determine Nāgārjuna's principal objective, the natural places to begin looking are the statements he makes at the beginning and at the end of his *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*. That work opens with these well-known lines (MMK 1:1—2):

anīrodham anutpādam aucchedam aśāsvatam|
 anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgaman||
 yaḥ pratīyasamutpādam prapañcopaśamaṃ śīvaṃ|
 deśayāṃ āsa sambuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam||

I pay homage to the finest of speakers, who, being fully awakened, showed happiness to be dependent origination, the quelling of vain thinking, which is without any coming to an end, without any coming into being, without discontinuity, without perpetuity, without singularity, without plurality, without any approach and without any retreat.

And at the end of this same work, Nāgārjuna again pays respects to the Buddha in these words (MMK 27:30):

sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat|
 anukampāṃ upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam||

I prostrate before Gautama, who, after experiencing compassion, taught true virtue in order to dispel all opinions.

Embedded in these seemingly simple verses are a number of rather difficult problems of interpretation, which I have tried to avoid in my translation by using ordinary language as much as possible so as not to employ technical terms that would favour one philosophical interpretation over any other. Having avoided these problems by a neutral translation, let me now face them head on.

Look first of all at the opening verse that was cited above. In it we are told that the Buddha taught that true happiness (*śīva*) consists in quelling vain thinking (*prapañcopaśama*). And the last verse of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* asserts that the purpose of the Buddha's teachings was to dispel all opinions (*dṛṣṭi*). What is crucial to an understanding of Nāgārjuna's thought is some appreciation of what is meant by the words "prapañca" and "dṛṣṭi."

Before we go any further in this line of inquiry, it should be pointed out that both of these words are virtually devoid of any constant precise meaning. Rather, they are variables that are capable of being

given a more or less precise meaning by the Buddhist who uses them. Every Buddhist uses these words to connote wrongful uses of the mind. So, whenever we encounter the terms in a given text, all we can know for sure is that they refer to mental habits that have to be got rid of if we are to attain the greatest good. For some Buddhist thinkers, wrongful mental habits might consist in holding certain specified views that are contrary to the principal dogmas of institutionalized Buddhism. For others, a wrongful use of the intellect might consist in any sort of analytical thinking. For yet others, it might consist in naive, uncritical thinking. But in the usage of any given thinker, we can never be sure without further investigation just exactly what kinds of mental habits are seen as being impediments to our highest well-being. So in Nāgārjuna's verses all we can know for sure is that the terms have undesirable overtones.

Fortunately, it is not too difficult to discover what Nāgārjuna means by the term "opinion (*dṛṣṭi*)," since the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* contains an entire chapter on exactly that subject. In fact, it is the final chapter in his work and serves as a summary of all that he has been trying to achieve from the very outset of his treatise. In this summary chapter, Nāgārjuna gives several examples of the kinds of opinion he feels are counterproductive. He says at the outset of the chapter:

dṛṣṭayo 'bhūvaṃ nābhūvaṃ kiṃ nv atīte 'dhvanīti ca|
 yās tāḥ śāsvatalokādyāḥ pūrvāntaṃ samupāśritāḥ||
 dṛṣṭayo na bhaviṣyāmi kim anyo 'nāgate 'dhvani|
 bhaviṣyāmīti cāntādyā aparāntaṃ samupāśritāḥ||

There are opinions concerning such things as an eternal world that depend upon a beginning point in time. Examples of such opinions are "I existed in the past," or "I did not exist in the past."

There are opinions concerning such things as termination that depend upon an ending point in time. Examples are "I will not exist in the future," or "I will be someone else [than who I am now]."

On reading these two verses it becomes clear that the opinions that require elimination are just those that presuppose that one has some definite personal identity. Opinions that presuppose that there is a definite personal identity that one carries around throughout one's life are, according to Nāgārjuna, ungrounded opinions. If one presupposes that there is a definite identity, that is, something essential in oneself that remains the same while peripheral things undergo change, then it is quite natural to wonder about such questions as the starting point of one's existence, such as whether one began at conception or at birth. And it is also natural to wonder whether one existed in some sense prior to the present existence, and to wonder whether at some point in the future one's self will cease to exist.

But if there is no warrant for the presupposition that there is something stable and unchanging, then all such opinions about the past (before the present life) and future (after the present life) become groundless. At the very best, dwelling on beliefs that are groundless is a waste of time that could be devoted to more constructive thoughts. And at the worst, groundless beliefs always carry the risk of not conforming to reality, and whenever one's beliefs do not conform to reality, there is a possibility of the unpleasant experience of being taken by surprise by unexpected realities. Therefore, groundless opinions are among the encumbrances to be discarded in order for one to achieve happiness.

There is one other key verse in Nāgārjuna's *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* that sheds light on the opening two stanzas. It is verse MMK 24:18, which reads:

yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe |
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā ||

We claim that dependent origination is emptiness. To be empty is to be a derivative idea. That alone is the middle path.

If all these verses that have been considered so far are taken together, it is fairly clear that Nāgārjuna is arguing that the intuitive notions we have of our own personal identities are complex notions or derivative

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ideas (*upādāya prajñaptih*). If these complex ideas can be analysed into their simpler parts, then one can dispense with them. In particular, one can dispense with the idea of a self, which is the ultimate root of all unhappiness. Accordingly, nearly all the remainder of Nāgārjuna's work sets about the task of showing that the concept of a permanent self cannot possibly correspond to anything in the real world, because the very notion is riddled with internal contradictions. It is, in other words, Nāgārjuna's aim to show that the notion of a self is in the final analysis an unintelligible notion.

During the course of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*, Nāgārjuna provides arguments for a number of theorems that bear on the general conclusion that nothing has a self. Two of these subsidiary theorems that will come up for discussion in the course of this paper are the following:

Theorem 1. *No beings at all exist anywhere.* (na jātu kecana bhāvāḥ kvacana vidyante)

Theorem 2. *Nothing can undergo the process of change.* (kasya anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati)

The reasoning that Nāgārjuna presents in support of these theorems will be examined below in section 3; in the present section the principal task is simply to understand what these theorems mean, and what they imply.

In order to understand the standard interpretation of Theorem 1, it may be helpful to bear in mind that it is made in the context of an examination of the basic postulates of Buddhist ābhidharmika scholasticism. According to the scholastics, a being is that which has an identity (*svabhāva*), that is, a characteristic by which it can be distinguished from beings that have different identities. One can make a theoretical distinction between two types of being. Simple beings are those that cannot be broken up or analysed into small components, while complex beings are organized aggregations of simple beings. The ontological position taken within most schools of classical Buddhist abhidharma is that complex beings do not exist as beings above and beyond the simple beings of which they are composed. Insofar as a

complex being has any identity, its identity is derivative, being a product of the identities of its elementary parts; as was shown above, a being whose identity is derivative is said to be empty (*sūnya*). Simple beings, on the other hand, do have distinct identities, according to the scholastics, and can therefore be said to exist in their own right. Simple beings are basic properties (*dharmā*). They may be physical properties, such as resistance, cohesion, and motility; or basic psychological properties such as attraction, aversion, indifference, joy, sadness, equanimity, understanding, misunderstanding and so forth. When it is said that a person has no self (*ātman*), what is meant is that a person is a complex being whose identity is a product of all the many physical and mental properties that are organized into a single system. Now in stating Theorem 1, Nāgārjuna is making the claim that not only do complex beings lack an identity and therefore an ultimate reality, but so do simple beings. In the final analysis, then, there are no beings of either kind that exist anywhere.

Theorem 2 is also related to scholastic ways of thinking. According to the metaphysical principles followed by the ābhīdharmikas, complex beings are prone to undergo change, because anything that is composite is liable eventually to undergo total decomposition. And before decomposing altogether, a complex being is prone to losing some of its parts and acquiring new parts to replace those that have been lost. A person, for example, may lose the psychological property of attraction for a particular object and replace it with the property of indifference towards that object. The process of losing and substituting their elementary parts is the mechanism by which complex beings undergo change, and eventually death or destruction. Since such change is inevitable, people who become fond of complex beings are bound to feel the unpleasant psychological properties of sadness and so forth that attend the experience of a change or loss of an object of affection. According to classical Buddhist theory, the best strategy for breaking the habit of becoming fond of complex objects is to focus the attention on the simple properties of which they are composed, and to recognize that even these simple properties are transient.

Credit must be given to the ābhīdharmikas for providing a cogent theory of change and for recognizing that all complex beings are liable to undergo change. The ābhīdharmikas also deserve credit for realizing

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that the notion of change in a complex being is, like the notion of such a being's identity, a derivative idea. In the same way that a complex being's identity is the product of the identities of the parts of which it is made, a complex being's change of state is a product of the relative locations of its elementary parts. Thus, in the technical language of Buddhist ābhīdharmā, the change the complex beings are said to undergo is also empty. The main shortcoming of the ābhīdharmikas' account of change is that it fails to provide any account for how simple beings can undergo change. Complex beings lose their existence by losing their integrity; that is, their components, become scattered to such an extent that the parts no longer hang together as a single aggregation. But how does a simple being lost its existence? It could be said that a simple being has only one part and therefore loses its existence by losing its one part, but the question still remains: how does a simple being lose its only part? Since the being is identical to its sole component, the being cannot be separated from its single property; the part of a simple being cannot be scattered in the same way as the parts of a complex being. The only way a simple being can go out of existence is if its single part goes out of existence, but there is no account for how its single part loses its existence.

Recognizing that a simple being can neither lost its integrity, nor can it go out of existence, Nāgārjuna observed that a being that has an identity (*prakṛti, svabhāva*) cannot undergo change. Add this to the ābhīdharmika conclusion that the change of complex beings is a derivative idea rather than a primitive fact of the world, and one arrives at Theorem 2: nothing can undergo the process of change.

As we saw above, Nāgārjuna's view of the Buddha's teaching was that it served to help people achieve happiness by dispelling all opinions (*sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇa*). Presumably, Nāgārjuna saw his own task as helping his readers achieve the same goal by the same means. Since most opinions are in some way or another about beings and the changes they undergo, Nāgārjuna's strategy seems to be to dispel opinions by showing that in the final analysis opinions have no subject matters. Showing the insubstantiality of the subject matters of opinions is, in other words, a way of trying to starve opinions out. According to Buddhist theory, the sensual appetites can be starved by withdrawing the attention from sensible objects; recognizing the

intrinsic unattractiveness of sensible objects helps one to be willing to withdraw that attention. Similarly, curiosity and the other intellectual appetites can be starved by withdrawing the attention from intellectible objects, namely, the properties (*dharma*) cognized by the intellectual faculty (*manovijñāna*). Realizing that all properties are insubstantial helps one to be willing to withdraw attention from them. Nāgārjuna's *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*, I suggest, is a method of helping one attain that realization. What remains to be investigated now is the soundness of the argumentation by which Nāgārjuna tries to prompt that realization.

3. NĀGĀRJUNA'S APPEAL TO REASON: EXAMINING HIS ARGUMENTATION

The form of argument that Nāgārjuna uses throughout his *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* is exemplified by the ones adduced in his discussion of causal relations, which is the topic of the first chapter of the work. The strategy of argumentation in the first chapter of that work is one that he uses repeatedly, without significant variation, throughout his philosophical writing. Therefore, it is worth examining Nāgārjuna's arguments on the topic of causal relations in some detail.

3.1. Arguments in MMK 1: *pratyāya-parikṣā*

It is no accident that Nāgārjuna begins his *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* with an examination of causal relations. There is probably no concept more central to formal Buddhist doctrine than that of causality. The notion of cause and effect is the very backbone of the four Noble Truths, which are in turn regarded as the very essence of the Buddha's teaching. Taken as a whole, the Four Noble Truths state that discontent has an identifiable cause, and if this cause can be eliminated, then so can its effect. In other words, the very goal of Buddhist theory and practice is to achieve lasting contentment, which is said to be possible only through the elimination of the ultimate causes of discontent. Without a concept of causality, therefore, there could be no Four Noble Truths, and without these truths there would be no teaching identifiable as Buddhism.

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Nāgārjuna's close examination (*parikṣā*) of the notion of causality begins with this assertion in MMK 1:3:

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ|
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvā kvacana kecana||

There are absolutely no beings anywhere that have arisen from themselves, nor are there any that have arisen from something other than themselves, nor are there any that have arisen from both, nor are there any that have arisen from no cause at all.

The reasoning behind these assertions could be summarized as follows:³

- (1) It cannot be thought that a being comes into being from itself. If a being comes into being at one moment out of itself at a previous moment, then there is no change in that being from one moment to another. If there is no change, then it is not appropriate to say that anything new has "come into being." Rather, it would be appropriate to say that something has remained static. And even if one is talking about the same moment, there is a fundamental contradiction involved in saying that two things are identical: if there is identity, there is only one thing. Therefore, we cannot say, for example, that a single self comes into being from the plurality of properties belonging to the five groups (*skandhas*) and that the self is identical with those properties.
- (2) It also cannot be said that a being comes into being from something other than itself. If a being is said to be capable of coming into being from what is absolutely different from itself, then it should be possible to say that anything can arise from anything else without restraint, and there should be no constraints on what can be regarded as a cause of a particular effect. It should be possible to say, for example, that a pumpkin seed causes an oak tree to grow. But this is not what people mean when they talk of causes, and especially this is not what the Buddha meant in articulating the Four Noble Truths. He did not say that dissatisfaction comes into being owing to just anything chosen at random, but rather he specified that it comes into being owing to particular kinds of desire and certain specific misconceptions.

(3) Given that one cannot say that a thing comes into being from what is absolutely identical, and one cannot say that it comes into being from what is absolutely distinct, perhaps one can say that a being comes into being from that which is in some respects the same and in some other respects different from itself. Although this suggestion appears to make sense, Nāgārjuna argues that one cannot in fact say that a being comes into being from something that is both the same as itself and other than itself. The only way that something can be in some ways identical and in some ways different from a second thing is if both things are complex beings, that is, beings that are composed of many aspects. But this is not the sort of being that the Buddha was talking about when he discussed causality; he was talking about dharmas, which are not composite beings made up of more simple parts. Since dharmas are simple, there can be no question of two dharmas being in some respects the same and in some respects different. It cannot, therefore, he said that one dharma arises from another dharma that is partially the same and partially different.

(4) Finally, it cannot be said that beings arise from no causes whatsoever. There is, of course, no internal contradiction in this statement, but it is incompatible with the basic assumption of the Four Noble Truths. So, while one can hold to this view as a possible view, one cannot pass this view off as a possible interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha.

What is characteristic of his strategy is that Nāgārjuna first sets out all the logically possible relationships between the two items under examination, and then he tries to show that none of the apparently possible relationships is actually possible. This leads him to conclude that, since there is no possible relationship between the two would-be relata, the relata themselves do not really exist. Hence the heart of the first chapter of *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* is the conclusion stated in MMK 1:3: "No beings at all exist anywhere." This is the content of Theorem 1 discussed in section 2 above.

Now before this conclusion can be reached, it must be firmly established that none of the apparently possible relationships between a being and what preceded it is in fact possible. Of these four apparently possible relations between a cause and its effect, three are fairly

obviously impossible. Given the reasons stated above, one is not likely to want to argue that an effect arises out of a cause that is identical to the effect itself, nor that an effect arises out of a simple cause from which it is in some respects identical and in some respects different, nor that an effect arises out of no cause at all. It may be the case that a simple being cannot come into being out of another simple being, for the reasons stated above. It is, however, by no means obvious that a complex being does not come into being from another complex being or from a collocation of simple beings. In fact, this is precisely the relationship between cause and effect that intuitively seems most correct: the cause is a different thing from its effect. Even if one would want to add the qualification that an effect arises from a cause that is the same *kind* of thing as the effect itself, one would intuitively want to say that the cause is one thing and the effect another. So Nāgārjuna's reasons for dismissing this possibility require a closer examination.

It is important to note that the position that Nāgārjuna examines is the common Buddhist view based upon the notion that each simple property (*dharma*) is distinguished from every other simple property in virtue of possessing its own distinct nature, called its *svabhāva* or its own nature, which is a nature that no other simple property has. Each property's own nature is in effect its identity, in the sense of that by which it is differentiated from others. In his criticism of this view, Nāgārjuna plays on an ambiguity in "svabhāva," the word for own nature. The word "sva-bhāva" means a nature (*bhāva*) that belongs to the thing itself (*svasya*); it refers, in other words, to a thing's identity. But Nāgārjuna takes advantage of the fact that the word "svabhāva" could also be interpreted to mean the fact that a thing comes into being (*bhavati*) from itself (*svataḥ*) or by itself (*svena*); on this interpretation, the term would refer to a thing's independence. Assuming this latter analysis of the word, rather than the one that most Buddhists actually held, Nāgārjuna then points out that whatever comes into being from conditions is not coming into being from itself; and if a thing does not come into being from itself, then it has no *svabhāva*. But if a thing has no *svabhāva*, he says, it also has no *parabhāva*. Here, too, Nāgārjuna takes advantage of an ambiguity in the key word he is examining. The word "para-bhāva" can be analysed to mean either (1) that which has the nature (*bhāva*) of another thing (*parasya*), that

is, a difference, or (2) the fact of coming into being (*bhavati*) from another thing (*paratah*), that is a dependence.

When one reads Nāgārjuna's argument in Sanskrit, it is not immediately obvious that the argument has taken advantage of an ambiguity in the key term. But when one tries to translate his argument into some other language, such as English or Tibetan, one finds that it is almost impossible to translate his argument in a way that makes sense in translation. This is because the terms in the language of translation do not have precisely the same range of ambiguities as the words in the original Sanskrit. In English, we are forced to disambiguate, and in disambiguating, we end up spoiling the apparent integrity of the argument.

Let's look at the phrasing of Nāgārjuna's argument in the original Sanskrit and see why it looks plausible. The original argument as stated in MMK 1:5 reads:

na hi svabhāvo bhāvānām pratyayādiṣu vidyate |
avidyamāne svabhāva parabhāvo na vidyate ||

Surely beings have no *svabhāva* when they have causal conditions. And if there is no *svabhāva*, there is no *parabhāva*.

As we have seen above, the word "svabhāva" can be interpreted in two different ways. It can be rendered either as **identity** (which I shall call *svabhāva*₁) or as **causal independence** (*svabhāva*₂).⁴ Similarly, the word "parabhāva" can be interpreted in two ways. It can be rendered as **difference** (*parabhāva*₁), or as **dependence** (*parabhāva*₂).

Now the sentence in MMK 1:5ab makes perfectly good sense if it is understood as employing *svabhāva*₂.

Statement 1. *Surely beings have no causal independence when they have causal conditions. (na hi svabhāvaḥ bhāvānām pratyayādiṣu vidyate |)*

Statement 1 makes sense at face value, because it is obviously true that if something is dependent upon causal conditions, it is not independent of causal conditions. The sentence in MMK 1:5cd, on the

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other hand, makes better sense if it is understood as employing *svabhāva*₁ and *parabhāva*₁.

Statement 2. *And if there is no identity, then there is no difference. (avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvaḥ na vidyate |)*

Statement 2 also makes sense at face value, because a thing's identity is understood as a feature that distinguishes the thing from things other than itself; if a thing has no such features, then it has no identity and is therefore not distinguishable or different from other things.

It would be much more difficult to get a true statement out of the sentence in MMK 1:5cd if it were understood as employing *svabhāva*₂ and *parabhāva*₂.

Statement 3. *And if [beings have] no independence, then they have no dependence. (avidyamāna svabhāva parabhāvaḥ na vidyate |)*

Indeed statement 3 seems to be quite false at face value. So if one gives Nāgārjuna the benefit of the doubt by assuming that he was trying to write sentences that were true (or at least appeared to be true at face value), one is likely to reject statement 3 as the correct interpretation of MMK 1:5cd and to adopt statement 2.

The problem that now arises is this: no matter how much sense statement 2 may make as an independent statement, it does not at all follow from statement 1. It only appears to follow in the original Sanskrit because of the ambiguity of the expressions involved. A careful logician would not be deceived by Nāgārjuna's argument, but it is phrased in such a way that it might very well take the unwary reader off guard.

Sprung, in order to make MMK 1:5 even appear convincing in English translation, has to coin a new English expression. He comes up with this (Sprung, 1979, p. 66):

If there are conditions, things are not self-existent; if there is no self-existence there is no other-existence.

Sprung's translation has the obvious advantage of preserving the prima facie plausibility of the original Sanskrit, but it has the equally obvious

disadvantage of using a neologism that does not readily convey any meaning to a speaker of the English language. Whereas the word "self-existence" occurs as a standard English word with the meaning of independence, "other-existence" is merely a calque that avoids the task of offering a real translation. Inada's translation also employs calques rather than real interpretations (Inada, 1970, p. 40):

In these relational conditions the self-nature of the entities cannot exist. From the non-existence of self-nature, other-nature too cannot exist.

Kalupahana's translation of this verse makes use of the same calques as Inada's (Kalupahana, 1986, p. 107):

The self-nature of existents is not evident in the conditions, etc. In the absence of self-nature, other-nature too is not evident.

Experiencing difficulty in making sense of Nāgārjuna is not confined to those who tried to translate him from Sanskrit into other languages. Even his own Sanskrit commentators showed signs of having trouble making Nāgārjuna's arguments appear sensible. Candrakīrti, for example, like Sprung and Kalupahana, has his work cut out for him. Note what he says (Vaidya, 1960, p. 26, lines 17 ff.):

avidyamāne ca svabhāve nāsti parabhāvaḥ | bhāvānām bhāva
utpādaḥ | parebhya utpādaḥ parabhāvaḥ | sa na vidyate |
tasmād ayuktam etat parabhūtebhyo bhāvānām utpattir iti |

And if there is no *svabhāva* there is no *parabhāva*. The word "bhāva" means the act of coming into being, or the act of arising. The act of arising from others is what is meant by "parabhāva." But that [act of arising from others] does not exist. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that there is coming into being or arising from others.

It is very difficult to see why "it is incorrect to say that there is coming into being or arising from others." Candrakīrti is left without a strong argument for why this is incorrect, and so all he can do is to assert it strongly and hope that no one will question him too forcefully.

Nāgārjuna's second critique of the notion of causal relations is

independent of his first argument. the second argument is based on the interdependence of the ideas of cause and effect. The argument goes something like this:

- (1) A condition can only be called a condition when something arises from it. In other words, when no effect is arising from a condition, the condition is not a condition.
- (2) It can be said in general that to exist is to be identical to oneself. Conversely, if a thing is not identical to itself, it does not exist.
- (3) A condition is not a condition.
- (4) Therefore, a condition does not exist.
- (5) If a condition does not exist, then it cannot give rise to an effect.

Like Nāgārjuna's earlier attempt, this argument also takes advantage of an ambiguity. But when the ambiguity is removed, the argument ceases to carry any persuasive power. There is an important distinction to be made between saying that a thing exists at all and saying that it exists under a given description. This can be illustrated by considering the following sentences:

Statement 4. *An acorn exists.*

Statement 5. *An acorn exists as the cause of an oak tree.*

Statement 5 is true only if an oak tree arises from the acorn, but statement 4 may be true whether or not an oak arises from the acorn. Now if we look at two of the premises of Nāgārjuna's argument, it can be seen that he is talking about existence in two different ways, and these two ways are counterparts to the distinction illustrated in statements 4 and 5.

In saying "A condition is not a condition," Nāgārjuna is saying something very much like "The condition (for example, an acorn) does not exist as a condition (that is, as the cause of the oak.)" In saying "therefore, a condition does not exist," however, Nāgārjuna would like us to believe that he means that the condition does not exist at all. But this conclusion does not at all follow from anything he has said leading up to it. It is only by playing on the ambiguity of such terms as "existence" that Nāgārjuna can create the illusion of a valid argument.

3.2. Arguments in MMK 15:1-11

Nāgārjuna's use of equivocation is nowhere more evident than in the arguments in which the term "svabhāva" occurs. The ways in which Nāgārjuna glides from one meaning of that term to another merits a closer examination. It was suggested above that the word "svabhāva" is capable of being interpreted either as identity (svabhāva₁) or independence (svabhāva₂), and that "parabhāva" can be interpreted either as difference (parabhāva₁) or dependence (parabhāva₂). In fact, the form of these words naturally allows for a richer interpretation than that. The word "bhāva" is a verbal noun formed by adding the primary suffix (*kr̥tpratyaya*) known in the Pāṇinīyan system as GHaÑ to the root √BHŪ. According to Pāṇini the suffix GHaÑ forms verbal nouns that have one of three senses: (1) the simple name of the action named by the verbal root itself,⁵ (2) the instrument by which an action is carried out or through which a state of affairs arises, or (3) the location in which an action is performed.⁶ These three senses that a verbal noun (VN) formed with GHaÑ can have will be symbolized in the discussions that follow as VN_(P), VN_(I) and VN_(L) respectively. Given the possibility of verbal nouns of this form to express more than one factor in a situation, the family of words used in MMK 15 that have "bhāva" as the principal feature can be analysed as having the following range of meanings.

bhāva _(P)	The performance of the act of coming into being; the performance of being present; existence.
bhāva _(L)	That in which the performance of the act of coming into being occurs; a being, that which is present; an existent.
abhāva _(P)	The performance of the act or fact of not being present; absence. The performance of the act of ceasing to be present; becoming absent.
abhāva _(L)	That in which the performance of the act of not being present occurs; an absentee.

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svabhāva ₁ (P)	The fact of being identical.
svabhāva ₁ (I)	An identifying characteristic; an identity; an essence.
svabhāva ₁ (L)	That in which the fact of being identical occurs; that which has an identity; an identifiable thing.
svabhāva ₂ (P)	The fact of being causally independent; independence.
svabhāva ₂ (L)	That which is independent.
parabhāva ₁ (P)	The fact of being other or different; otherness, difference.
parabhāva ₁ (I)	A differentiating characteristic; a differentia.
parabhāva ₁ (L)	That which is different; another.
parabhāva ₂ (P)	The fact of being dependent; dependence.
parabhāva ₂ (L)	That which is dependent.
anyathābhāva _(P)	The process of changing, altering.
anyathābhāva _(L)	An alteration, a change.

The effect that Nāgārjuna achieves by switching from one sense of these key terms to another can be illustrated by examining the argument of the fifteenth chapter of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*, in which all but one of the eleven verses in the chapter contains at least one of the terms listed above.⁷ The chapter opens with this verse (MMK 15:1):

na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ|
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet||

Birth of an independent thing from causes and conditions is not reasonable. An independent thing born from causes and conditions would be a fabrication.

This statement is indisputably true, because it follows from the definition of the notion of independence; it would be a logical impossibility for a thing that is causally independent to be dependent on causes. For this first statement to be indisputably true, then, the term "svabhāva" must be understood as **svabhāva**_{2 (L)}. The use of "svabhāva" in the sense of **svabhāva**_{2 (L)} continues into the next verse (MMK 15:2):

svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham|
akṛtimah svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca||

But how could an independent thing be called a fabrication, given that an independent thing is not a fabrication and is independent of anything else?

It is in the next verse (MMK 15:3) that one can find a shift from one sense of "svabhāva" to another as well as from one sense of "parabhāva" to another.

kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati|
svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate||

How, in the absence of an identifiable thing, could there be a difference, given that the identity of a different thing is called a differentia?

The first sentence of this verse makes perfectly good sense when considered in isolation. Difference occurs in relation to a point of reference, and if there is no point of reference, then difference is unintelligible. But this statement does not follow from anything that has been said in the first two verses. This statement only appears to follow from the previous ones because of the use of the term "svabhāva" in this verse and in the two that precede it; the term is not used, however, in the same sense in the three verses:

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- (1) The birth of a **svabhāva**_{2 (L)} from causes and conditions is not reasonable. A **svabhāva**_{2 (L)} born from causes and conditions would be a fabrication.
- (2) But how could a **svabhāva**_{2 (L)} be called a fabrication, given that a **svabhāva**_{2 (L)} is not a fabrication and is independent of anything else?
- (3) How, in the absence of a **svabhāva**_{1 (L)}, could there be **parabhāva**_{1 (P)}, given that the **svabhāva**_{1 (L)} of a **parabhāva**_{1 (L)} is called a **parabhāva**_{1 (P)}?

The next two verses (MMK 15:4—5) also make use of equivocation. In verse 4 the term "svabhāva" appears again in the sense of **svabhāva**_{2 (L)}, and "bhāva" also occurs in two different senses.

svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām r̥te bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ|
svabhāve parabhāve vā satī bhāvo hi sidhyati||
bhāvasya ced aprasiddhir abhāvo naiva sidhyati|
bhāvasya hy anyathābhāvam abhāvaṃ bruvate janāḥ||

How can there be existence (**bhāva**_(P)) without either independence (**svabhāva**_{2 (P)}) or dependence (**parabhāva**_{2 (P)}), given that existence (**bhāva**_(P)) is established when there is either independence or dependence?

If an existent (**bhāva**_(L)) is not established, an absence (**abhāva**_(P)) is certainly not established, given that people call the change of state (*anyathābhāva*) of an existent (**bhāva**_(L)) its ceasing to be present (**abhāva**_(P)).

Verse 4 makes the claim that everything that exists must be either causally independent like ether (*ākāśa*) or dependent on causes and conditions, so there is no existent that is neither independent nor dependent. This claim is not one that anyone is likely to dispute. Making this claim does not, however, really serve the purpose that Nāgārjuna appears to wish for it to serve. His argument in MMK 15:3 was that neither a *svabhāva* nor a *parabhāva* can be established; his

claim in MMK 15:4 is that there is no existent unless there is either *svabhāva* or *parabhāva*; and from these two premises the conclusion is supposed to follow in MMK 15:5 that there is no *bhāva*, and if there is no *bhāva* then neither is there *abhāva*.⁸ Owing, however, to the fact that the key terms “*svabhāva*” and “*parabhāva*” are used in different senses in MMK 15:3 and MMK 15:4, the conclusion that Nāgārjuna asserts does not follow from the premises that he offers as grounds for that conclusion.

It is impossible to determine in which of the possible senses the terms under consideration are used in MMK 15:6–7:

svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvaṃ eva ca |
ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāśane ||
kātyāyanāvavāde cāstiti nāstiti cobhayaṃ |
praṭiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā || 7 |

They who perceive *svabhāva*, *parabhāva*, *bhāva* and *abhāva* do not perceive the truth in the Buddha's instruction.

In the *Kātyāyanāvavāda* the Lord, who clearly saw *bhāva* and *abhāva* denied both the view that one exists and the view that one does not exist.

As Kalupahana (1986, p. 7) has observed, the *Kātyāyanāvavāda* is the only Buddhist text that Nāgārjuna cites by name or even alludes to in the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*.⁹ In this text, which was reportedly accepted as canonical by every school of Buddhism,¹⁰ the Buddha is portrayed as explaining to Kātyāyana that the middle path consists in avoiding the two extremes of believing that all things exist (*sarvaṃ asti*) and believing that nothing exists (*sarvaṃ nāsti*).¹¹ The middle path that avoids these two extremes is the recognition that everything that is experienced comes into being through conditions and fails to come into being when its conditions are absent. It is, according to the sūtra, this correct view (*samyagdrṣṭi*) of conditional arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) that is supposed to replace the incorrect perceptions of existence (*astitva*, *bhāva*) and non-existence (*nāstitva*, *abhāva*) and above all the incorrect perception of a self (*ātman*).

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In MMK 15:8, the word “*prakṛti*” is introduced and appears to be used as a synonym of “*svabhāva*”; the term “*prakṛti*” is evidently being used in the sense of nature or natural disposition:

yady astitvaṃ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate ||

If a thing were to exist by nature, then it could not fail to exist, for the change of state of a nature is certainly not possible.

Saying that it is in the very nature (*prakṛti*) of a thing to be a particular way is equivalent to saying that the thing in question cannot be any other way. Therefore, if it is in the nature of a thing to exist, then it cannot be any other way than existent. In this context, then, “*prakṛti*” is being used in the sense of unalterability, uniformity and identity; it refers to precisely that characteristic or set of characteristics in a thing that are not subject to change (*anyathābhāva*, *vikāra*).¹² In contexts in which “*prakṛti*” means essence in contrast to accident (*vikṛti*), it overlaps in meaning with “*svabhāva*” in the sense of identity, that is, *svabhāva*₁ (1). This sense of the term “*prakṛti*” is carried into the next verse, MMK 15:10, which reads:

prakṛtau kasya cāsatyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati |
prakṛtau kasya ca satyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati ||

And in the absence of a nature, what can undergo the process of change? On the other hand, if a nature is present, what can undergo the process of change?

The only possible conclusion of this pair of statements is that there is no change. And so to Theorem 1 we can now add the following as one of the claims that Nāgārjuna is unambiguously making: “Nothing can undergo the process of change.” This is the content of Theorem 2 discussed in section 2.

The last two verses of the chapter related the conclusions arrived at here to the overall themes of the entire *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*,

namely, that a clever person rejects both the view that the self is perpetual and the view that the self is discontinued after the death of the physical body. MMK 15:10—11 read as follows:

astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīti ucchedadarśanam|
tasmād astitvanāstīve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ||
asti yaddhi svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śāśvatam|
nāstīdānīm abhūt pūrvam ity ucchedaḥ prasajyate||

The notion of perpetuity is that one exists; the notion of destruction is that one fails to exist. Therefore, a wise person should not experience existence or non-existence.

Perpetuity follows from believing that that which exists independently (*svabhāvena*) does not fail to exist; destruction follows from believing that that which existed before no longer exists.

The ways in which authors of previous studies of the fifteenth chapter of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* have translated these eleven verses appears in Appendix A below. An analysis of the differences in the translations appears in Appendix B.

3.3. Summary of Nāgārjuna's fallacies

Just how well Nāgārjuna used logic has long been a matter of interest to modern scholars. Most of these studies have focussed on his use of the tetralemma (*catuskoṭi*) and have sought to discover whether or not this way of framing questions betrays either an ignorance of the law of contradiction or a deliberate use of some kind of non-standard or deviant logic.¹³ Studying the tetralemma alone is not likely to shed much light on Nāgārjuna's knowledge of logic, since the tetralemma was a fairly primitive framework for posing questions that was in use before the time of the Buddha. The Buddha's use of this framework may have inclined Nāgārjuna to treat it with some respect, even if his own command of logic had advanced beyond the level of sophistication that the tetralemma represents. Given that the conceptual tools at the disposal of intellectuals in India had improved considerably during

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the half-millennium that separated Nāgārjuna from the Buddha, one can expect that Nāgārjuna's presentation of certain ideas would be somewhat more clear and precise than the Buddha's presentation had been.¹⁴ In any event, one must look at much more than his use of the tetralemma to ascertain Nāgārjuna's command of logical principles, and indeed his whole attitude towards the limits of rational discourse. One scholar who set out to do a more comprehensive study of Nāgārjuna's argumentation was Richard Robinson. Thirty-five years ago Robinson (1957) provided evidence that Nāgārjuna explicitly knew about and referred to the law of contradiction. To quote just one of the five citations that Robinson gave, Nāgārjuna wrote in MMK 8:7cd

parpasparaviruddhaḥ hi sac cāsac caikataḥ kutaḥ|

For how can presence and absence, which are mutually exclusive, occur in the same thing?

Robinson (1957), p. 295) also provided textual evidence of three passages in which Nāgārjuna explicitly stated the law of excluded middle. Since adherence to these two laws is the criterion that people usually use in distinguishing between standard and deviant systems of logic, it is unquestionable that Nāgārjuna's logic was quite standard. This does not mean, however, that he was always correct in his use of logic by modern canons of validity. Robinson found, for example, three passages in which Nāgārjuna clearly committed the formal fallacy of denying the antecedent (p. 297); this is an argument of the form:

$$\begin{array}{l} p \rightarrow q \\ \neg p \\ \hline \neg q \end{array}$$

This use of a formally invalid structure may have been quite innocent, says Robinson, since Nāgārjuna's use of argumentation was in general at about the same level as Plato's; both seem to have had a good intuitive grasp of basic logical principles, but both also used forms of argumentation that later logicians would come to recognize as

fallacious. Denying the antecedent was not recognized as a fallacy in Europe until Aristotle discovered it; there is no clear evidence that it was recognized in India before Nāgārjuna's time. Given that the state of knowledge of formal logic was much more crude in Nāgārjuna's time than in later generations, says Robinson, it is not at all surprising that his contemporaries used lines of reasoning that later Indian Buddhists, not to mention people in the twentieth century, would know to avoid. "It's not that they [*viz.*, Nāgārjuna's contemporaries] were worse thinkers than the moderns, but simply that they were earlier. It is in this milieu that Nāgārjuna's reasoning should be appraised" (Robinson, 1957, p. 307).

In another penetrating study of Nāgārjuna's methods of argumentation, Robinson (1972a) compares Nāgārjuna's presentation to a *trompe-l'œil* or sleight-of-hand trick.

Its elements are few and its operations are simple, though performed at lightning speed and with great dexterity. And the very fact that he cannot quite follow each move reinforces the observer's conviction that there is a trick somewhere. The objective of this article is to identify the trick and to determine on some points whether or not it is legitimate.

The "trick" that Robinson discovered lay in Nāgārjuna's definition of the term "svabhāva" in such a way that it was self-contradictory. If the *svabhāva* as defined by Nāgārjuna exists, says Robinson, "it must belong to an existent entity, that is, it must be conditioned, dependent on other entities and possessed of causes. But by definition it is free from conditions, nondependent on others, and not caused. Therefore, it is absurd to maintain that a *svabhāva* exists" (Robinson, 1972a, p. 326). Exposing the absurdity of the notion of *svabhāva* as defined by Nāgārjuna only does damage, of course, to those who actually used the term as defined by him. In the remainder of his article, Robinson shows that in fact none of Nāgārjuna's philosophical rivals did use the term "svabhāva" as he had redefined it, and therefore no one was really refuted by him. In his concluding remark, Robinson says:

The nature of the Mādhyamika trick is now quite clear. It consists of (a) reading into the opponent's views a few terms which one defines for him in a self-contradictory way, and (b) insisting on a small set of axioms which are at variance with common sense and not accepted in their entirety by any known philosophy. It needs no insistence to emphasize that the application of such a critique does not demonstrate

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the inadequacy of reason and experience to provide intelligible answers to the usual philosophical questions.

To the various fallacies and tricks brought to light by Robinson in his articles, we can now add the informal fallacy of equivocation as outlined above. That is, not only did Nāgārjuna use the term "svabhāva" in ways that none of his opponents did, but he himself used it in several different senses at key points in his argument.

4. NĀGĀRJUNA'S APPEAL TO MODERNS: EXAMINING HIS INTERPRETERS

In the previous section I have tried to show that if one analyses the arguments of Nāgārjuna carefully, then it is possible to reveal their weaknesses. In particular, it was argued that many of Nāgārjuna's arguments are undermined by the informal fallacy of equivocation, that is, using a key term in different senses. What is achieved by revealing the fallacious nature in Nāgārjuna's argumentation is simply the freedom to reject the conclusions that he claims to have reached; since the arguments are not sound, one is not compelled to accept their conclusions. In showing that the arguments are not sound, I have merely shown that the ways of thinking that Nāgārjuna was apparently trying to discredit remain more or less unscathed by his criticisms. This helps explain why generations of Buddhist philosophers coming after Nāgārjuna — and most Indian Buddhist philosophy did develop several centuries after his time — could reasonably continue, without embarrassment or apology, to use the concepts and technical terms that he had apparently tried to show were groundless: concepts such as identity, difference, cause, effect, potential and so forth.¹⁵

It is less obvious, perhaps, that the fallaciousness of Nāgārjuna's thinking may also account for his popularity among people in the second half of the twentieth century. My central thesis in this section of the paper is that since Nāgārjuna employed faulty reasoning, he was able to arrive at conclusions that seem contrary to both reason and common sense experience, such as the conclusions that there are no beings and that nothing undergoes change; and, since there is a robust willingness on the part of many twentieth century intellectuals to

entertain philosophical perspectives that challenge the very foundations of most classical thought and of common sense, there is a predisposition to be attracted to anyone as apparently extraordinary as Nāgārjuna.

Defending such a thesis will require both mustering some evidence and indulging in some speculation without the benefit of compelling evidence. The principal evidence to be examined will be drawn from the writings of scholars and thinkers that I take to be representative of three related but different schools of modern thought. What all these schools have in common is (1) some kind or another of negative view of classical metaphysics and classical ethics, and (2) an assumption that Nāgārjuna's principal agenda was also to criticize metaphysics and to avoid the perceived pitfalls thereof. Again for the sake of ease of presentation, I have called these schools by names that their adherents themselves have used, or at least would probably readily accept: Absolutism, Logical Positivism, and Deconstructionism. Having discussed and criticized each of these schools, I shall conclude by referring to twentieth century interpreters of Nāgārjuna who have attempted to place him firmly in his own classical context, disregarding his relevance, or lack thereof, to modern times. Before looking at any of the particular modern schools of Nāgārjuna, however, let me venture a few observations about modernity in general.

Modern people evidently have a great affinity for Nāgārjuna's philosophy. Of all the thinkers of Indian Buddhism, he has attracted by far the most attention. This vast amount of attention that is paid to him is not merely due to the fact that Nāgārjuna is regarded to have been important in his own time. Much of it is due, I think, to the fact that people find him somehow important for our times. To understand why it is that people of the modern age think they like Nāgārjuna, it will be necessary to say a little about some of the shared assumptions of some of the prominent intellectual trends of the late twentieth century.¹⁶

Two noteworthy trends of the thought of this period that have had a bearing on people's search for philosophers in antiquity who might have anticipated these modern trends are (1) a skepticism about moral issues, or at least a sense that ethical questions are essentially subjective in nature, and (2) a critical attitude towards the enterprise of

metaphysics. Usually ethical reasoning is systematically related to metaphysical and epistemological standpoints. What has most preoccupied modern interpreters of Nāgārjuna has been his attitude towards metaphysics. But before examining some of the modern ways of interpreting Nāgārjuna's stance on metaphysics, let me make some brief observations on how his doctrines might appeal to people influenced by the ethical skepticism of modern thought.

4.1. *Nāgārjuna and ethical relativism*

The twentieth century has been an era of almost constant warfare, or at least an incessant preparedness for war, in nearly every region of the planet. Many people in these circumstances have grown weary of the categorical messages in the ideological propaganda designed to make populations think of themselves as morally upright people who must be ever ready for combat against those who have been designated as the sinister enemies. People who find such propaganda tedious are usually predisposed to seek out alternatives to the uncompromising rhetoric of the warriors. Looking for more irenic ways of thinking and talking, many such people have been attracted by the apparently open-minded spirit of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness; indeed, one of the many possible interpretations of the doctrine that all dharmas are empty is that this doctrine implies that no teachings or doctrines or ideologies of any kind are absolutely and irrefutably true, for "teaching" is one of the many meanings that the word "dharma" can have.¹⁷

Not only are no teachings indisputably true, according to this peaceable interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness, but even the very concepts of "true" (*sat*) and "false" (*asat*), "competence" (*kuśala*) and "incompetence" (*akuśala*), "good" (*puṇya*) and "evil" (*pāpa*), and "virtue" (*dharma*) and "vice" (*adharmā*) are arbitrary and groundless. Interpreting the doctrine of emptiness in this way is congruent with a set of conclusions about ethics that have been commonly accepted in twentieth century thought, quite often by people who are only dimly aware of the reasoning that one might offer in support of the conclusions. Those conclusions are (1) that moral propositions are neither true nor false, (2) that moral statements are based on judgements of value rather than grounded in the ascertainment of facts, (3) that

moral stances are therefore essentially subjective and indefensible by any rational means, and (4) that since there is no logical or rational defense of moral statements, the only defense of morality is on purely aesthetic grounds.

The kind of moral relativism found in the twentieth century is closely related to views on metaphysics and epistemology that have evolved in Europe since the eighteenth century. The evolution of modern ethical thinking has been described convincingly by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, pp. 36—78); while MacIntyre's principal interest was the history of European thought, most of what he says about classical Greece could also be said, with only slight modifications, of ancient India.

In ancient Greek philosophy, observes MacIntyre, the propositions of ethics were regarded as statements of fact. This could be so, because the Greeks saw morality as a method designed to convey people from their present state of discontent to their potential state of contentment. Ethics was, in other words, a method of attaining a goal. In much the same way, the teachings of classical Indian Buddhism are presented as a praiseworthy path (*ārya-mārga*) leading from discontent (*duḥkha*) to contentment (*sukha*).¹⁸ In classical Greek thought, as in classical Buddhism, any statement about whether or not a given mode of behaviour would get one to a state of contentment was as accessible to rational and empirical investigation as a statement about whether a given road leads to Athens. This type of thinking prevailed in European thought until the eighteenth century, during which time the thinkers ushered in a new way of thinking that they called the Enlightenment, thereby suggesting that most of the thinking that had preceded that century had been dark and obscure. The intellectuals of the Enlightenment had grown very suspicious of the perceived abuses of claims of divine authority and they began to seek out methods of attaining knowledge that were not in any way dependent upon such claims. As this tendency increased, empiricism and scientific rationalism came to dominate people's ways of thinking. People came to believe that the only things that are objectively real are those things that are revealed to the senses. Among the many things that are not revealed to the senses are potentials, the presently invisible seeds of future events. And among the many kinds of insensible potentials are goals

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(*telos*) and purposes. Now ethics, as seen in classical times, is a goal-oriented activity. Post-Enlightenment thinkers, on the other hand, tried to dispense with the concept of ethics as goal-seeking activity. But in so doing, they deprived ethical propositions of the only claims they had on being either true or false. If one removes the concept of a destination, the question of whether or not any given road is the right one becomes meaningless. In the absence of a criterion by which ethical statements can be decided as true or false, all ethical propositions come to be seen as mere assertions of will. Conflicting ethical statements come to be seen as little more than slogans around which different individuals and groups of people rally in their bid for power. In classical thinking, the individual had meaning only in the context of the goal of contentment. In modern thinking, in the absence of a goal, the individual becomes absolute, something to be considered without reference to any other outside factors. As the individual becomes absolute, the old language of virtue gives way to the new language of individual rights and freedoms. And the classical study of morality is replaced by the study of how people use statements of right and wrong to secure their own self-interests, or worse, how some individuals and groups curtail the inalienable rights and freedoms of others.

While Nāgārjuna's discussions of emptiness may lend themselves to being viewed as being congruent in some respects with the ethical relativism of the twentieth century, it should be borne in mind that the kind of ethical relativism that has evolved in European and American circles is the product of a way of thinking that is quite different from those that prevailed in classical Greece or in classical India. It is possible, of course, that Nāgārjuna anticipated these modern ways of thinking, but it cannot simply be assumed that he did so. Until evidence can be produced that indicates clearly that Nāgārjuna's intention was to challenge the views on morality that prevailed in his times, the safer assumption is that he accepted the standard ethical views of his time without suspicion.

4.2. *The Absolutist interpretation*

The term "Absolute" entered European philosophical vocabulary in 1800 in a work entitled *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775—1854), who ushered

in an era of Absolutist philosophers, the most celebrated of whom were Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762—1814) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770—1831). In the writings of these thinkers, the Absolute is described as the complete and perfect unity underlying the diversity of appearances; it is that which contains and at the same time supersedes all finite realities. Absolutism is a development of Immanuel Kant's (1724—1804) Critical philosophy, which questions the dogmatism in both empiricism and rationalism. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, which was first published in 1781, Kant described his new "critical" philosophy as achieving within the sphere of metaphysics what Copernicus had earlier achieved within the sphere of astronomy. Before Copernicus, said Kant, the assumption had been made that the earth was fixed in space and that all the heavenly bodies, including the planets, moved around it. As a result of making this assumption, astronomers had to make elaborate theories of planetary motion to account for all the apparent reversals in the directions of planetary motion. Copernicus had argued that a much more elegant account of planetary motion could be achieved by acknowledging that the Earth, along with the other planets, was in fact in motion around the Sun. This radical shift in perspective from a geocentric to a heliocentric model of the planetary system enabled astronomers to arrive at a theory of planetary motion that was both more simple and more accurate. Similarly, before Kant, metaphysicians had operated on the assumption that the basic categories of metaphysics — such as time, space, potentiality, necessity, causality, and free will — corresponded to features of the real world, and that human beings discover these realities by means of reason. What Kant argued was that these metaphysical categories are part of the rational human mind itself and are imposed upon the world. The radical shift in perspective that Kant claimed to achieve is the realization that metaphysics is not a study of the world of nature, but rather a study in human thinking.

Following the lead of Kant's Critical philosophy, Absolutism is contrasted with Dogmatism, a derogatory name given to the belief that knowledge of the world can be attained empirically or rationally or through a combination of both. Typically it is said that the Absolute cannot be known either through the senses (empirically) or through the intellect (rationally). Knowledge of it therefore requires a special

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kind of Intuition, which is experienced as a sense of complete unity of the knower with the object of knowledge.

4.2.1. *Stcherbatsky's neo-Kantian Mādhyamika*

Fedor Ippolitovich Stcherbatskoi (1866—1942), known to English readers as Theodore Stcherbatsky, was one of the first European historians of Buddhist philosophy to publish a neo-Kantian interpretation of Nāgārjuna, which appeared in his 1927 study of the first and twenty-fifth chapters of Candrakīrti's commentary to *Mūla-mādhyamaka-kārikā*. Stcherbatsky (1927, p. 17) declares that Nāgārjuna had concluded that for the Buddha

... Reality was transcendent to thought. He [*viz.*, Nāgārjuna] systematized the four alternatives (*antās or kotis*), mercilessly exposed the disconcerting implications of each alternative, brought the antinomies of Reason luminously to the fore by hunting them out from every cover, and demonstrated the impossibility of erecting a sound Metaphysic on the basis of dogmatism or rationalism. This was his dialectic. The four alternatives were already formulated by the Buddha. His originality consisted in drawing out by the application of rigorous logic the implications of each alternative, driving Reason in a *cul de sac* and thus preparing the mind for talking a right-about-turn (*parāvṛtti*) towards *prajñā*.

The Absolute Reality that escapes both empirical investigation and the methods of reason, says Stcherbatsky was called Nirvāṇa by Buddhists (Stcherbatsky, 1927, 'The conception of Buddhist Nirvana' section, p. 3). It could be achieved only by a special "faculty of appreciative analysis" (*prajñā*) (p. 3) that came about through the practice of "mystic trance" or "mystic intuition (*Yogi-Pratyakṣa*)" in which "the mystic sees in a moment the construction of both the gross and the mystic worlds as vividly as if they were an experience of direct sense-perception" (p. 4). In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the preparation for this "intuition of the transcendental truth" was provided by "the course of negative dialectic" (p. 4). For Stcherbatsky, then, the arguments of Nāgārjuna were a preliminary clearing of the mind of concepts that impeded the direct experience of the Absolute through the practice of yogic trance.¹⁹

Stcherbatsky's Absolutist interpretation of Nāgārjuna was criticized within a few years by Stanisław Schayer. Schayer (1931, pp. xxix—xxxiii) rejected the comparison with Kant and post-Kantian Europeans

in favour of comparisons between Nāgārjuna and such exemplars of what he called "mystischen Skepsis" as Pyrrho, Plotinus and al-Ghazālī, but he still regarded the Mādhyamikas as seekers of an Absolute that could not be achieved through the mundane methods of empirical investigation and reason; indeed, the principal difference between the Mādhyamikas and Kant, said Schayer, was that the Mahāyāna mystics believed that the Absolute could be experienced directly, whereas Kant did not.

Both Stcherbatsky and Schayer were criticized two decades later by Jan W. de Jong (1950). Schayer's mistake, said de Jong, had consisted in trying to isolate four separate meanings of the term "svabhāva" and failing to realize that these four meanings are so interconnected that they really reduced to just two. De Jong (p. 323) recapitulates Schayer's four distinct senses of "svabhāva" (see note 4 above) and goes on to say (pp. 323–24) "Mais, en fait, on ne peut tenir compte de cette distinction, car, pour Nāgārjuna, les quatre concepts indiqués par Schayer s'enchaînent étroitement les uns aux autres et peuvent se ramener à deux." The two senses to which the term "svabhāva" can be reduced according to de Jong are (1) that of an identifying nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) of things taken individually and (2) the immutable nature (*prakṛti*) of all things taken together as a single unity. The Mādhyamikas, says de Jong, equally denied both of these fundamental senses of "svabhāva". While critical of Schayer on this point, de Jong Nevertheless gives him credit for having realized that mystic intuition provided the epistemological foundation of the Mādhyamaka school's view of an absolute reality that can neither be described in words nor comprehended through the methods of dichotomous thinking.

What Stcherbatsky had failed to realize in his attempt to show the parallelism between Mādhyamika philosophy and various European forms of Absolutism, says de Jong (p. 326), was that analogies between European and Buddhist thinking only serve to distort the latter; moreover, they are not grounded on the evidence of the original texts. The Buddhist form of absolutism, claims de Jong, is quite uniquely "Oriental" and has no exact parallels in any kind of Western thought. He concludes by saying:

Nous espérons avoir réussi à démontrer qu'il est impossible de considérer l'absolu des Mādhyamikas soit comme la totalité de l'être, soit comme le néant. Une telle alter-

native ne peut être posée que dans le cadre des habitudes de la pensée occidentale. L'absolu a, pour les Mādhyamikas, une signification tout à fait différente. Sur le plan philosophique, ils s'abstiennent de tout jugement, mais l'expérience mystique les fait accéder par la délivrance à l'absolu.

4.2.2. *Murti's nondualist (advaita) Mahāyāna*

Notwithstanding de Jong's warning against describing Buddhist thought in terms of modern European philosophical categories, T. R. V. Murti continued along the road of Absolutist interpretation that Stcherbatsky had trod a generation earlier. In his *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, first published in 1955 and revised in 1960, Murti claims that Nāgārjuna achieved a revolution in Indian Buddhist thought that was as significant as the revolution in astronomy achieved by Copernicus and the revolution in metaphysics made by Kant. Kant made his discovery, says Murti, owing to the insoluble philosophical problems that arose when the Empirical tradition, which consisted of mostly English and Scottish philosophers, confronted the Rationalist tradition, which consisted primarily of German and French philosophers. Nāgārjuna's breakthrough, says Murti, came about as a result of similarly insoluble philosophical problems that arose when the *ātman* tradition of brahmanical philosophy confronted the *anātman* tradition of early Buddhist philosophy. It was obvious to everyone that the debate over whether or not there is an imperceptible self that remains constant while all sensible properties undergo change could never be solved by purely empirical means, because the evidence of the senses cannot settle questions about topics that are said to lie in principle beyond the senses. And so people assumed — wrongly, according to Murti — that the question could be solved by intellectual methods, that is, by reason alone (or what Kant would call pure reason). Both Kant and Nāgārjuna, says Murti, saw the role of philosophy as being to reveal the "pretensions of reason". In doing so, the result was not simply one further philosophical system, but a radical critique of all philosophical systems, a critique that showed that there cannot be such a thing as a philosophical system that gives a satisfactory account of the real world (Murti, 1960, p. 294).

Where both Kant and Nāgārjuna fell short, according to Murti, was in their failure to realize the full implication of their own discoveries, namely, that "Mind (Thought or Reason) is the only Real, and all

activity is the activity of reason or consciousness" (Murti, 1960, 297). In Europe it took Hegel to bring this fully to light, and in India it required the Vijñānavāda Buddhists and the Advaita Vedāntin school of Hinduism. A key difference between Kant and Nāgārjuna, according to Murti, is that Kant denied that it was ever possible to get beyond the limits of the human mind; even realizing that the mind presents us with illusions is not sufficient to remove those illusions. Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, never deviated from the Buddhist view that it is possible to attain the Absolute by removing illusion (*avidyā*).

Murti argues in several places in his book that Dialectic is a key feature of early Buddhism and of Nāgārjuna's thinking. What Murti means by Dialectic may be clarified somewhat by the following passage (Murti, 1960, p. 124):

Dialectic is a self-conscious spiritual movement; it is necessarily a critique of Reason. This is not possible without the consciousness of the opposition of the thesis and the antithesis. There must be at least two view-points or patterns of interpretation diametrically opposed to each other. A dilemma is not a dialectic, for that is a temporary predicament having reference to a particular situation. The Dialectic is a universal conflict affecting every sphere of things.

It was Murti's contention that the Buddha himself was the first philosopher in India to discover the Dialectic. His evidence for this was that the Buddha refused to answer certain questions, such as whether or not the world has a beginning or an end in time, and whether or not someone exists after death. Murti argues that the Buddha did not answer these questions because he recognized that they could not be answered at all. The Buddha's silence was his expression of his radical critique of Reason, which trades always in opposites. Thus the Buddha's silence was the first Buddhist use of Dialectic, which trades in the unification of such opposites. Similarly, Nāgārjuna's dialectic is portrayed by Murti as "a movement from the relativity of *buddhi* [intellect] which is phenomenal to the non-dual Intuition of the absolute, from *dr̥ṣṭi* [dogmatism] to *prajñā* [intuitive knowledge of the absolute]" (Murti, 1960, p. 301). But, while there may be certain similarities between the Buddhist use of dialectic and Hegel's use thereof, Nāgārjuna's dialectic differs from Hegel's in several important ways, says Murti. First, Hegel's dialectic is one in which a higher

synthesis reconciles the opposites of lower levels of truth, whereas Nāgārjuna's dialectic removes all opposites imposed by the intellect. Second, Reason for Hegel constitutes "the very fabric of the real", while for Nāgārjuna reason (*buddhi*) is the fundamental source of all ignorance, for it is reason that veils and obscures the underlying unity of the Absolute. It is Reason (*buddhi*) that impedes Intuition (*prajñā* = *advayaṃ jñānam*) (Murti, 1960, p. 304). Finally, the Absolute for Hegel is Thought, while for Nāgārjuna it is Non-dual Intuition (*Pranīpāramitā*).

Murti's fondness for using the term "Absolute" leads to the awkward situation of his having an embarrassment of Absolutes that must somehow be distinguished from one another, since not all the things he has labeled as Absolutes are equivalent. He therefore devotes an entire chapter to the task of distinguishing among the various systems of Indian philosophy that are, according to him, Absolutist. Murti (1960, pp. 311–328) offers a useful summary of the criticisms that the various schools of Indian philosophy — Advaita Vedānta, Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika — made against one another. And he also attempts to show how these forms of classical Indian absolutism differed from the Absolutist philosophies of nineteenth century Europe. In almost every case, incidentally, Murti's account of the differences between classical Indian and modern European philosophies implies a deficiency in the latter. European philosophers are consistently portrayed as coming close, but ultimately failing, to achieve the brilliant insights of their Indian predecessors.

The dialectic of Hegel is a brilliant superfluity; it has no spiritual value (Murti, 1960, p. 305).

It is unfortunate that Kant missed the startling discovery that he had made. Prejudiced in favour of faith, Kant makes only a negative and trivial use of criticism. He should have taken criticism itself as philosophy, the true metaphysics as a science. The Mādhyamika, however, most consistently develops this. His absolute is the critical Reflection itself (Murti, 1960, p. 328).

In that same chapter, Murti also offers a summary of the points that he feels all the systems that he labels as Absolutist have in common. In all systems, he says,

(1) The Absolute is transcendent, that is, it is "totally devoid of empirical determinations (*nir-dharmaka, śūnya*). In other words, the ultimate reality cannot be an

object of any of the senses, including the intellect. And from this it follows that "the absolute is realised only in a non-empirical intuition. . . . The nature of this experience is that it is non-discursive, immediate and unitary cognition; here essence and existence coincide" (Murti, 1960, p. 321).

(2) The Absolute is immanent, that is, it is the reality underlying all appearances. The Absolute is a single undivided reality, being without duality (*advaya*) and without characteristics or features (*nirdharmaka*).

(3) Since the nature of the Absolute is that it is single and undivided, knowledge of it cannot be communicated through language, since language is based upon the making of distinctions.

(4) Absolutism makes it necessary to distinguish between Reality and Appearances. It also makes it necessary to distinguish between scriptures that are discussing Reality and those that discuss only Appearances. Thus in every Absolutism a distinction is made between two levels of truth or two levels of language.

(5) In all forms of Absolutism, the ultimate goal of religious practice is "complete Identity with the Absolute", that is, losing the individual self in the greater singleness of Being. So for the Mādhyamika, Nirvāna should be understood as loss of individual identity and consequent absorption into the oneness of the Absolute.

By the end of his study of the Mādhyamika system, Murti makes it very clear that he considers the philosophy as he has described it to be a solution to many of the ills of twentieth century life. Indeed, Murti ends his assessment of the Mādhyamika system with an almost passionate utopian vision of a world free from the conflicts among individuals and nations that are rooted in insupportable dogmas. This peaceful world, he argues, in which internal and external conflicts have all disappeared

is possible in the advaita or advaya, where all our faculties and interests are unified as Brahman or Prajñāpāramitā. It is possible *only* in advaita, for that alone abolishes private standpoints and interests, which make for the ego-centric outlook. In the last analysis, the ego is the root of the unspiritual; the universal is the spiritual. Śūnyatā, as the negation of all particular views and standpoints, is the universal *par excellence* (Murti, 1960, p. 333).

Murti's version of Mādhyamika ends up being rather like a modern version of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta. The philosophical standpoint of Advaita is preserved in Murti's Mādhyamika, but the dogmatic insistence on the authority of revealed scripture — so central to classical Vedānta — has been removed, and the entire institutional structure of both Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism has also been removed.

Denominational religions with their dogmas and organisational sanctions deservedly

stand discredited. There is something inherently secular and unspiritual in any organisation. It tends to create vested interests and to breed corruption. In stifling freedom of expression and setting up a norm of dogmas to which the votaries are required to conform, organised religion (the church) succeeds only in antagonising other religious groups and creating schisms and heresies within its own fold. What we need is the realisation of the spiritual which is the bed-rock of all our endeavour. Only mystical religion, which eminently combines the unity of Ultimate Being with the freedom of different paths, for realising it, can hope to unite the world (Murti, 1960, 241).

4.2.3. Criticisms of the Absolutist interpretation

Various shortcomings of the Absolutist interpretations of Nāgārjuna have already been articulated by several scholars. As we saw above, Schayer (1931) found it more profitable to compare Nāgārjuna with the Greek skeptics and with certain neo-Platonic thinkers than with the neo-Kantians. Robinson (1957, p. 292) also expressed the view that "The most usual comparisons, those with Kant and Hegel, are not apposite, because Kant's and Hegel's structures differ too radically from any of the Indian systems in question." Moreover, added Robinson, this attempt to compare Nāgārjuna with modern philosophers has the even deeper weakness of seeking "to answer our questions, rather than to identify Nāgārjuna's questions." Since Nāgārjuna and his contemporaries were "infinitely less sophisticated" than Kant and his contemporaries, argued Robinson, the modern historian of philosophy had better assess the accomplishments of Nāgārjuna in the historical milieu in which they were produced (Robinson, 1957, p. 307). And when one examines Nāgārjuna's doctrines in the context of his contemporary setting, it becomes clear that:

There is no evidence that Nāgārjuna 'uses logic to destroy logic.' He makes mistakes in logic, but does not deny any principles of logic. He asserts that a certain set of propositions — the Buddhist doctrine — is true under a certain condition, that of emptiness, and false under another condition, that of own-beingness (Robinson, 1957, p. 307).

Sentiments similar to Robinson's were expressed two decades later by Ruegg, who wrote that "A problematic has thus tended to be imposed on Buddhist thought in a form that does not in fact seem essential to the questions with which the Buddhist thinkers were actually concerned" (Ruegg, 1977, p. 52). Owing partly to criticisms such as these coming from scholars of the stature of Robinson and

Ruegg, and owing partly to the fact that Kantian and Hegelian philosophy have in general become somewhat *demodé* in recent decades and therefore no longer the standard of comparison against which other philosophical achievements are measured, few scholars of Buddhism educated after the Second World War have pursued the line of interpretation set forth by Stcherbatsky and Murti.

4.3. *The Positivist interpretation*

In European philosophy, Absolutism was but one child of Kant's Critical philosophy; another was the set of ideas known as Positivism, which shared the post-Kantian disdain for metaphysics. The term "positivism" was made a part of European philosophical vocabulary through the writings of Auguste Comte (1798—1857). There are many varieties of positivism, but typically the various types have in common that they hold the position that methodical empiricism, also known as the scientific method, is the only means of acquiring testable knowledge.

The particular name "Logical Positivism" was first applied to a set of ideas put forth by members of the Vienna circle, a group of mathematicians, physicists and philosophers of science that included among others the physicists Ernst Mach and Moritz Schlick and the philosopher Rudolf Carnap, whose training had also been in physics and mathematics. The doctrines of this school evolved over the span of two decades, from approximately 1920 until 1940. Many of the doctrines of this school were adopted by various philosophers and scholars in Great Britain and in English-speaking parts of North America. One of the key ideas of the Logical Positivists was the notion that a proposition whose truth or falsity cannot be determined through methodical and controlled testing procedures is simply meaningless. Such a proposition may appear to convey some meaning, say the Logical Positivists, but in fact it says nothing at all and is therefore neither true nor false. One branch of traditional philosophy that had been made up almost entirely of assertions that could not possibly be either confirmed or falsified by experience was metaphysics, the branch of philosophy dealing with such problems as the nature of being and non-being (presence and absence), causality, and potentiality and actuality. Therefore "metaphysics" came to be used by Logical Posi-

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 tivists as a derogatory name given to philosophical systems, and indeed to some forms of classical physics and mathematics and logic, that were based on propositions that cannot be verified or falsified by the scientific method.

Two prominent historians of Buddhist philosophy whose ideas reflect positivist influences are A. K. Warder and David J. Kalupahana. Warder and Kalupahana share a conviction — which many other scholars of Buddhism would now dismiss as an unwarranted assumption — that the Sutta-piṭaka of the Pāli canon represents the true spirit, although not the actual words, of the historical Buddha's teachings. Moreover, both scholars appear to accept the principle that the truest forms of Buddhism are those that remain closest to the teachings of Gautama the Buddha as recorded in the Pāli Sutta literature. Both Warder and Kalupahana find the spirit of this canonical Buddhism paradigmatically articulated in the Kesaputta Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, where the Buddha is portrayed as saying to the Kālāma people that one should not arrive at conclusions

owing to hearsay, owing to tradition, owing to rumour, owing to distinction in canonical works, on account of speculation, on account of methodical reasoning, owing to a study of appearances, after contemplation and acquiescing to an opinion, because of plausibility nor by thinking "the ascetic is our revered teacher."²⁰

This passage, as interpreted by Warder and Kalupahana, leaves the empirical method of acquiring knowledge, along with legitimate inferences grounded in one's own personal experience, as the sole methods of ascertaining the truth. Their Buddha, in other words, was an empiricist.

4.3.1. Warder's empiricist Buddhism

Warder does not explicitly liken the Buddha's teachings to those of the Logical Positivists, but he does claim that the Buddha regarded some metaphysical questions as "meaningless instead of being beyond our knowledge" (Warder, 1970, p. 194). He clearly recognizes the tension between what he sees as the anti-authoritarian empiricist stance of the passage of the Aṅguttaranikāya quoted above and the tendency of Buddhists to try to establish an authentic record of what the Buddha had said. Buddhists, says Warder (1970, p. 443),

found themselves in an apparent dilemma: they were to rely ultimately on experience, yet they attributed complete authority to the statements of the Buddha as handed down to them in the *Tripitaka*. . . . Of course there ought to be no discrepancy between these two [viz., experience and authority]: the Buddha's words proceeded from experience and the laws of nature (he held) do not change, therefore anyone else's experience must lead to the same conclusions.

What follows from this view of the Buddha as a pure empiricist, of course, is that any of his followers who tried to arrive at a systematic, theoretically sound, intellectually satisfactory account of the master's teachings were — at least to the extent that they introduced metaphysical notions — deviating from the spirit of the Buddha's teachings, and therefore from true Buddhism. As ābhīdharmikas and other scholastics set out to explain Buddhist principles, they naturally began to introduce notions that aided the theoretical understanding of Buddhist doctrine. And in introducing such theoretical constructs, argues Warder, they began to wander from the true nature of the Buddha's doctrine. At this point in history, it became necessary for someone to re-discover and reaffirm the purely empirical spirit of genuine Buddhism.

Warder claims that the work of Nāgārjuna was a continuation of the Buddha's original resistance to the notions of "existence" and "non-existence". About the charge that Nāgārjuna was a nihilist, he writes "In fact his rejection of 'non-existence' is as emphatic as his rejection of 'existence', and must lead us to the conclusion that what he is attacking is these notions as metaphysical concepts imposed on the real universe" (Warder, 1970, p. 382). The "real universe" for Warder is clearly the world discovered through the experience of the senses. The Buddha's doctrine, says Warder (1970, p. 377),

is not speculative but empirical: the Buddha emphatically rejected all speculative opinions (*drsti*) and propounded no such opinion himself, only an empirical account of conditioned origination and the way to end unhappiness. The basic concepts of philosophy, even 'time', 'space', 'motion', 'causality', and so on, are themselves speculative, and Nāgārjuna shows by rigorous analysis that it is inconceivable how, for example, a 'motion' as understood in philosophy could ever take place.

Thus Warder's Nāgārjuna is a far cry from Murti's non-dualist Mādhyamika. Warder's Buddha and Nāgārjuna are firmly grounded in ordinary, common sense experience, while Murti's Buddha and Nāgārjuna

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eschewed common sense experience along with reason and grounded themselves in a special kind of unifying experience called Intuition.

4.3.2. *Kalupahana's Positivist Buddhism*

While Warder's Buddha and Nāgārjuna were probably rather more like empiricists in the tradition of David Hume, Kalupahana's Buddha and Nāgārjuna were definitely akin to the Logical Positivists. Indeed Kalupahana (1976, p. 158) writes that the Buddha's rejection of metaphysical questions as utterly meaningless was unmistakably congruent with the teachings of the Logical Positivists. So eager is Kalupahana to maintain this congruence that, faced with having to give an account for the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth (which is not among the doctrines traditionally associated with the Vienna circle), he goes so far as to cite A. J. Ayer, "the chief exponent of Logical Positivism today"; in order to show that even for someone like Ayer "the theory of rebirth as presented in the early Buddhist texts could be considered a *logical possibility*"; he also cites a passage from a work by C. D. Broad to show that the question of whether or not one survives after death is an intelligible question and not a meaningless one (Kalupahana, 1976, pp. 52–53). By invoking the testimony of these stalwart members of the Logical Positivist community, Kalupahana manages to clear the Buddha's name of the unpleasant accusation of having traded in meaningless metaphysical questions.

In his study of *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*, Kalupahana (1986) follows Warder's lead in portraying Nāgārjuna as a champion of the pristine empiricism of original Buddhism and a slayer of the metaphysical dragons that had a way of endangering the pure doctrine. Kalupahana's Nāgārjuna was, like the Buddha, "an empiricist *par excellence*" (Kalupahana, 1986, p. 81). A principal target of Nāgārjuna's philosophical darts, according to Kalupahana, were the Sarvāstivādins, who "presented a theory of 'self-nature' or 'substance' (*svabhāva*)", a theory that was "contrary to the fundamental philosophical tenet of the Buddha" (Kalupahana, 1986, pp. 1–2). While clearly siding with Robinson in his criticisms of the excesses of Stcherbatsky and Murti, Kalupahana as clearly rejects Robinson's suggestion that modern philosophers are more sophisticated than the Buddha and the Buddhists

of classical India. In a stinging indictment apparently (on the evidence of a footnote) directed at Mark Siderits's (1980) review of Kalupahana (1975), Kalupahana (1986, p. 5) writes:

Some writers on Buddhism, intoxicated by this conception of the evolution of thought, have shown reluctance to recognize the sophistication with which philosophical ideas were presented by the Buddha 2500 years ago. Having failed miserably to perceive the philosophical ingenuity of the Buddha as reflected in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, as well as the subsequent degeneration of that system in the later commentarial tradition, followed by a revival of the earlier system by philosophers like Moggaliputtatissa and Nāgārjuna, these writers are insisting upon a gradual sophistication in Buddhist thought comparable to what one can find in the Western philosophical tradition.

As the above passage clearly shows, Kalupahana tends to consider deviations from the Buddha's message as recorded in the Pāli Nikāyas, to be "degenerations". In particular, the degenerate tendencies of the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas led them to adopt substantialist and essentialist views that were based entirely on speculative reasoning and not in the least on empirical investigations. In short, the Buddhist scholastics became metaphysicians, "blinded" by such concepts as "identity and difference, substance and quality, self-nature and other-nature, permanence and annihilation" (Kalupahana, 1986, p. 81). Nāgārjuna's contribution to Buddhist philosophy, according to Kalupahana, was to heal his colleagues of their metaphysically induced blindness so that they could once again see clearly what the Buddha had taught.

4.3.3. *Criticisms of the Positivist interpretation*

The positivist interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and indeed of the Buddha, may be appealing to many people in the twentieth century, but it is not without its shortcomings. To begin with, it should be fairly obvious to anyone who goes through Nāgārjuna's arguments carefully that he rarely appeals to empirical observations. His view is not that nothing exists unless we can observe it through the senses, but rather that nothing corresponding to a given concept exists unless the concept is free of contradictions. His principal concern is to try to determine what exists and what does not exist, and this question is the paradigmatic question of the branch of philosophy that is traditionally called

metaphysics. If empiricism is the view that only sense-experience is a source of knowledge, and if rationalism is the view that reason takes precedence over experience, appeals to authority, and claimed revelation, then there can be no doubt that Nāgārjuna was more a rationalist than an empiricist. For him the highest good was the form of happiness that comes from seeing the world as it really is rather than through a fog of intuitions accepted uncritically. The means of reaching that highest good was through the careful application of reason to our intuitions towards the aim of eliminating those intuitions that could not stand up to close logical scrutiny. This work is all conceptual in nature with not even a hint of the kind of systematic, methodical, controlled scientific investigation so strongly endorsed by members of the Vienna circle.

Moreover, empiricists are rarely observed drawing such conclusions as Nāgārjuna's "No beings at all exist anywhere" and "Nothing can undergo the process of change." Furthermore, as was pointed out above, the doctrine of causality lies at the very heart of the doctrine declared by the Buddha. The Buddha's doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya samutpāda*) — and therefore also Nāgārjuna's doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), which is defined as dependent origination — becomes utter nonsense if it is not construed as a doctrine of causes and their effects. The Four Noble Truths state that discontent (*duḥkha*) has a cause, namely misapprehension (*avidyā*), and that when the cause is removed, the effect no longer arises. The supreme happiness is described as the absence not only of actual discontent but of the very possibility of discontent. These notions of causality, potentiality and actuality were among the metaphysical ideas that came to be rejected by the earlier empiricists such as Hume as well as by the later Logical Positivists.

In an unpolished draft of a work in progress that was published after his death, Robinson (1972b, pp. 322—323) stated with reference to what he called the "pragmatist" interpretation of the Buddha's rejection of theory (*dr̥ṣṭi*) that this interpretation

makes several complex and unwarranted assumptions: (a) that an opposition between theory and practice was formulated by Gautama; (b) that the *dr̥ṣṭi* are 'metaphysical'; (c) that Gautama's teaching (four truths, twelve *nidānas*) is not metaphysical. None of this is so.

A more simple interpretation of the available textual data, suggests Robinson, is that the Buddha rejected all theories that did not agree with his own theory. While not directed specifically at those who advocate an empiricist interpretation of the Buddha's teachings (and of his silence on some issues), Robinson's comments are apt criticism of the kind of view advanced by Warder and Kalupahana. Given Nāgārjuna's obvious preoccupation with the paradigmatic questions of metaphysics, and given the absence of any explicit preference for investigations that would qualify in any way as empirical, I am inclined to disagree with Kalupahana's assessment of Nāgārjuna as an "empiricist *par excellence*." Quite on the contrary, if given a choice between classifying Nāgārjuna as a rationalist, an empiricist or an anti-metaphysical Critical philosopher, I would have to say that Nāgārjuna in the *Mūla-mādhyamaka-kārikā* strikes me very much as a rationalist *par excellence* and — dare I say it? — a metaphysician *par excellence*.

4.4. *The Deconstructionist interpretation*

Deconstruction is a term associated with Jacques Derrida and those influenced by him. Like absolutism and Positivism, the Deconstruction movement is motivated in part by a general suspicion of metaphysics that can be traced more or less directly back to Kant. To a somewhat greater degree than Absolutists and Positivists, the Deconstructionists have developed a technical vocabulary and a rather stylized manner of deliberately unorthodox presentation, influenced no doubt by *l'esprit de jeu* that characterizes the writings of Derrida. Owing to the self-consciously playful forms in which representatives of this school present their work (and disguise their ideas), it is more challenging to offer a concise summary of what this movement has tried to achieve.²¹ The following, therefore, is no more than an essay — one with which many would probably find exception — at sketching out features of the Deconstructionist movement that have played a role in how some scholars have interpreted the thought of Nāgārjuna.

In trying to understand Deconstructionist criticism, it may be helpful to bear in mind that this movement evolved as a reaction to various features of the Structuralist school of thought that dominated intellectual circles in France in the 1950's. Structuralism, which was itself strongly influenced by the linguistic theories of Ferdinand de

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Saussure, was typically grounded in the notion that literary works, like all other cultural phenomena, are products of socially mediated systems of interrelated elements which have no meaning in themselves but derive their significance only through their relationships with and opposition to other elements in the system. All such elements are arranged into hierarchical levels of which the users of the system, such as the speakers of a given language or the performers of a particular ritual, are only partially aware. The task that Structuralist critics set for themselves is to make explicit these structures of which the users of a system are not fully conscious but which they nevertheless correctly employ.

Complex structures require organizing principles around which their elements are ordered. And insofar as the elements of a structure acquire their significance in the context of the overall system of which they are a part, the organizing principle (such as the purpose for which a system came into being) assumes a dominant or central role, and the simple elements that are organized assume a dominated or marginal role. It is difficult to imagine organized systems in which such hierarchical arrangement is not a feature. When one is speaking in particular of social systems, then, the elements of which such systems are made include, among other things, people and groups of people. Much of the Structuralist analysis of society and of cultural phenomena, therefore, is a study of which groups of people are in dominant central positions and which groups of people are in marginalized positions. Thus while the task of a Structuralist critic in general is to make explicit the infrastructures of a system, the task of a social scientist using Structuralist methods might be to show, for example, the effects that domination has on both the central and the marginalized groups within a social system. Many social scientists, as they became aware of the deleterious effects that marginalization has had on some groups, even tried to suggest ways of modifying the structures so that some groups were less marginalized. In highly industrialized nations with a recent history of colonizing less industrialized peoples, social critics often used the concepts of structuralism to try to make their fellow citizens aware of how colonization had put the colonized people at a disadvantage. Many Structuralists became interested in trying to arrive at social structures that were less hierarchical in nature.

Deconstruction can be seen as partly a continuation of the reformist spirit of some structuralism, and partly a criticism of the central concepts of structuralism. As a continuation of reformist sentiments, many Deconstructionists take delight in inverting hierarchical expectations and focusing on the marginal rather than on the central elements in a system. Derrida, for example, has observed that in Saussure's system of linguistics, spoken language was seen as a system of symbols that signified an idea or concept or proposition, while written language was seen as a system of symbols that represented the sounds of the spoken language. Thus written language, being symbols of symbols, was always marginalized in favour of a study of spoken language, and spoken language itself was seen as being dominated by the ideas communicated through it. Derrida uses the term "logocentrism" to refer to hierarchical structures in which ideas play the dominant role, and in order to invert the expectations of this hierarchy he has deliberately drawn attention to writing as an independent act that may be appreciated without any reference at all to the putative ideas of the writer. Deconstructive textual interpretation, then, becomes not an act of trying to infer the ideas of the original author, but an act of playing with the written symbols in deliberate disregard of what the author's intention may have been in first inscribing them.

Deconstruction is also a criticism of structuralism that evolved from, among other things, a recognition that the very idea of a decentralized structure or non-hierarchical system is absurd. The whole history of the concept of structure, says Derrida (1988, pp. 109–110)

must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix . . . is the determination of Being as *presence* in all senses of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence — *eidōs, archē, telos, energeia, ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject) *alētheia*, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.

The radical critique of metaphysics initiated by Kant eventually had, among its many consequences, that of questioning the very idea of centrality. Empiricists challenged the central notion of purpose (*telos*) in one manner, phenomenologists in another, existentialists in yet

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another. Structuralists, on the other hand, adopted the dubious strategy of holding on to the notion of structure, in which purpose is central, while decrying the undesired effects of the marginalization that invariably results from something being regarded as central. Thus about the science of ethnology Derrida has observed that it "could have been born as a science only at the moment when a decentering had come about: at the moment when European culture — and in consequence, the history of metaphysics and of its concepts — had been *dislocated*, driven from its locus, and forced to stop considering itself as the culture of reference" (Derrida, 1988, p. 112). But the fact that any science develops within a cultural framework means that the results of its research must be communicated through a system of symbols and concepts that have come to be accepted by that culture. Therefore, the very critique of European ethnocentrism really made sense only in Europe, or in societies in which European ways of thinking had come to be central and other ways of thinking marginalized. Ethnology, in other words,

is primarily a European science employing traditional concepts, however much it may struggle against them. Consequently, whether he wants to or not — and this does not depend on a decision on his part — the ethnologist accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment when he denounces them. This necessity is irreducible; it is not a historical contingency (Derrida, 1988, p. 112).

Generalizing on this observation about the dilemma of Structuralist reformers, who were unable to criticize the presuppositions of their culture without adopting the very presuppositions they wanted to attack, Derrida suggests that one can never escape metaphysics through critiques thereof, for these critiques themselves are based on metaphysical presuppositions. Thus every attempt to decentralize some concept succeeds only in marginalizing the decentralized one and putting some other concept at the center. The run around metaphysics, if it can be achieved at all, can be achieved only through play (*le jeu*), that is, by the refusal to treat anything at all as central.

Thus there are two interpretations of interpretation. . . . The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who . . . has dreamed of

full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play (Derrida, 1988, pp. 121–122).

In practice, this play is typically carried out by deliberately teasing as many “meanings” as possible out of a set of symbols, even to the extent of showing that every text can be shown to hold directly contradictory meanings within itself. This practice is held to be justified by the observation that symbols always have a rich multiplicity of significations, or *polysemy*. Every text thus ultimately refutes itself. The task of the deconstructionist is simply to make apparent the self-refuting nature of every text and every system; the critic does not deconstruct a text but merely shows how the text deconstructs itself.

4.4.1. Magliola on Nāgārjuna as deconstructive bodhisattva

Robert Magliola has argued that Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamika has much in common with the philosophy of Derrida. The affinity is so close, he claims, that “without Derrida it is difficult for a ‘moderner’ to understand Nagarjuna!” (Magliola, 1984, p. 93). But, just as Murti’s Nāgārjuna anticipated more than the best that later European Absolutists could offer, Magliola’s Nāgārjuna anticipated more than the best that Derrida has been able to offer. Nāgārjuna, argues Magliola (1984, p. 87),

tracks the Derridean trace, and goes ‘beyond’ Derrida in that it frequents the ‘unheard-of thought,’ and also ‘with one and the same stroke,’ allows the reinstatement of the logocentric too. (As we shall see, we can ‘have it both ways,’ and the two ways are a non-paradoxical, ever altering and wayward ways; as we shall see, ‘*samsāra* is *nirvāna*’.)

Magliola, who does not claim Buddhist studies as his academic discipline, draws upon the work of numerous specialists in Indian philosophy and in Buddhist philosophy in order to present a picture of Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist who clearly saw the pitfalls of logocentrism and tried to rescue the Buddha’s teachings from the dominant logocentric tendencies of scholastics and systematizers of his day, such as the ābhīdharmikas. Logocentrism, says Magliola, “is any *identity* at all that one conceives, or even ‘feels,’ and then ‘labels’ or perhaps ‘behaves towards’ as if it were an ‘idea’. And the structure of an identity, for Derrida, is necessarily a binary unit — factor and expres-

sion, signifier and signified” (Magliola, 1984, p. 89). And Nāgārjuna’s *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* is best seen as an effort — a successful one at that — to avoid the binary nature of logocentric thinking altogether. Nāgārjuna does not, argues Magliola, simply achieve a mystical unity of opposites under an all-embracing Absolute, for Absolutism is logocentrism *par excellence*, since all opposites and particularities are simply marginalized while the Absolute is seen as the central element in terms of which all particulars derive their significance. Rather, Nāgārjuna shows a way of thinking and speaking that avoids binary oppositions and is thus a thinking that is beyond thinking and a speaking that is beyond speaking (Magliola, 1984, p. 94).

Offering a full sketch of Magliola’s argument is not necessary to the purposes of this paper. Suffice it to say that his principal strategy is to quote at length from the anecdotal literature of the Chan and Zen schools of Buddhism,²² and to indulge in a bit of deconstructive play with the Chinese characters used to convey key Mādhyamika terms.

4.4.2. Other postmodern interpretations

Other scholars have followed Magliola’s lead in presenting Nāgārjuna as a thinker who anticipated Heidegger and the Deconstructionists who followed in his wake. One scholar who has included a few references to Deconstructive strategies in his sensitive attempt to interpret Mādhyamika philosophy in the light of such modern thinkers as Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida and Rorty is C. W. Huntington (1989).²³

Another scholar who has been influenced by Magliola’s Deconstructive interpretation of Buddhism is David Dilworth in his introductory essay on Kitarō Nishida (Nishida, 1987, 1–45). According to Dilworth, Kitarō Nishida held the view that some East Asian Buddhists based their whole thinking upon a system of logic that denies the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. Nishida, a Zen Buddhist who taught philosophy at University of Kyōto and was a founding father of the celebrated Kyōto school of philosophy, was of the opinion that Eastern peoples think in a radically different way than Western peoples. Whereas Westerners, according to Nishida, rely upon a logic in which something either is the case or is not the case, which leads to all manner of confrontations between people who hold competing

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views, Eastern logic can easily accommodate contradictions. In fact, says Nishida, the foundation of Eastern logic is not the law of contradiction but the law that says "A if and only if not A." It is the opinion of Dilworth that this Eastern logic is not unique to the Zen tradition but can be located in such Indian philosophers as Nāgārjuna. The evidence that Dilworth cites is the opening stanza of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*, which we have already looked at. This stanza says of something that it is neither one nor many, that it neither endures nor comes to an end. What Dilworth takes all this to mean is that the subject to which these predicates apply is neither exclusively one nor exclusively many but rather is one precisely because it is many and many precisely because it is one; both unity and plurality apply to it at the same time and in the same respect.

4.4.3. *Criticisms of the Deconstructionist interpretation*

A key supposition in the case that Magliola (and, following him, Dilworth) makes is that Nāgārjuna makes use of a variety of what we have been calling deviant logic. Thus the success of his argument hinges on whether one concludes (1) that Nāgārjuna was deliberately using a form of logic not based on the laws of contradiction and excluded middle or (2) that he was using a standard logic but made mistakes in using it. As I have already indicated, the evidence is strongly in favour of the latter conclusion. Moreover, there is no need to assume that Nāgārjuna is dealing in a deviant logic, since it is quite possible to give a good account of what he was trying to achieve while remaining well within the bounds of the standard logic that, so far as I am aware, every classical Indian philosopher favoured. It is quite legitimate in standard logic to predicate contradictory predicates of a given subject, provided that the subject does not name something that exists. And that, I think, is exactly what Nāgārjuna tried to show over and over again in his work, namely, that there are certain subjects to which contradictory predicates can seemingly be applied, and therefore we can only conclude that the subjects themselves do not really exist. Far from deviating from the law of contradiction, Nāgārjuna relies constantly upon being able to derive contradictions from certain presuppositions; without the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, his whole enterprise becomes entirely ineffective.

In summary, while the Deconstructive approach to Nāgārjuna, like any kind of playfulness, may provide good amusement (perhaps especially for the author who writes it, since it is often more fun to play than to watch others playing), this approach probably offers rather little insight into Nāgārjuna's argumentation. Indeed, the Deconstructive interpretation of Mādhyamika helps to preserve the demonstrably false conclusion that Nāgārjuna used logic to destroy logic.

4.5. *Kamaleswar Bhattacharya*

Several of the interpreters examined up to this point have had in common a somewhat anachronistic tendency to search for anticipations of modern philosophical problems in the writings of a classical thinker. But as we have already seen, not all modern interpreters of Nāgārjuna have taken that approach; some have preferred to look for parallels only in the classical traditions of European philosophy rather than in modern thought. We have already noted that Schayer, Robinson and Ruegg all expressed misgivings about the attempt to find modern counterparts of early Buddhist thinkers, and that Schayer was interested in drawing parallels between Nāgārjuna and certain Greek skeptics. Another attempt to compare the thought of Nāgārjuna with his contemporaries in the Hellenistic world appears in Hayes (1988, pp. 50–62), where it is pointed out that some features of Nāgārjuna's thought are remarkably similar to characteristics in the work of Pyrrho of Elis, who reportedly accompanied Alexander the Great to India and who is given credit for founding the skeptic school. In particular, an attempt was made to show some similarities between some trends in Buddhism and the Pyrrhonian values of non-assertion (*aphasia*), which was understood as the state of having no opinions, and inner calm (*ataraxia*), understood as the peace of mind that results from eliminating the emotional attachments that result from having beliefs.

Siderits and O'Brien (1976) also followed Schayer's lead in an article that pointed out the similarity between Nāgārjuna's arguments against motion and the arguments against motion presented by the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (born 490 b.c.e.) The similarity in the arguments themselves and in the conclusions reached raises the question of whether the two philosophers had a similar purpose in arguing

as they did. Unfortunately, the textual evidence is too scanty to enable one to arrive at any firm conclusions. The thought of Zeno of Elea has been preserved only in fragmentary form, that is, in quotations of his arguments by other philosophers, especially Aristotle. On the basis of what has been preserved, it seems fairly clear that what Zeno was trying to prove was the impossibility of plurality and the impossibility of motion. Being a follower of Parmenides, Zeno was apparently committed to the view that there is a fundamental and indivisible unity underlying all apparent diversity, and that all diversity is, therefore, in the final analysis illusory. Zeno's views are sometimes compared to those of some schools of *advaita* that arose in India at various times. If one takes the parallelism seriously, then it might well be concluded that the underlying motive of Nāgārjuna's method of argument was to establish that beneath the transitory and painful diversity of the world of experience there is a stable and peaceful unity, which can be discovered only through the application of metaphysical reasoning.

Other modern historians of classical Indian thought have preferred to avoid finding parallels between Nāgārjuna and his European contemporaries and instead to explain the Mādhyamika system solely in terms of philosophical currents present in the India of his day. One important scholar who has taken this approach is Kamaleswar Bhattacharya.

Like many other historians of philosophy, Bhattacharya (1984; 1985) is among those who have expressed some misgivings about the conclusions of those who have seen a remarkable parallelism between the Mādhyamikas and trends in modern thought. Those who see anticipations of modern and even post-modern tendencies in the early Mādhyamaka, warns Bhattacharya, have often seen these similarities by neglecting what the classical texts themselves explicitly say, and by failing to appreciate the texts in their own historical milieu. Bhattacharya (1984, p. 189) cites approvingly the Buddhist historian David Seyfort Ruegg, who criticizes some modern scholars for imposing their own prejudices and problematics onto the Mādhyamaka texts. The result, says Ruegg (1977, p. 52), is a kind of ethnocentrism in which we assume that what we modern Westerners find of greatest importance and value must also be what the classical Indian Buddhists found of greatest importance and value.

Bhattacharya's misgivings about comparisons of Nāgārjuna with

Europeans is not confined to his wish to avoid anachronisms. He is equally skeptical about the attempts to compare Nāgārjuna to the ancient Greek thinker Zeno. Bhattacharya (1985, p. 13) cites Daniel H. H. Ingalls (1954), who writes that it is important to recognize that the paradigm of rationality for Zeno and most other Greek thinkers was mathematics and especially geometry, while the paradigm for rationality for Nāgārjuna and most Indian thinkers was *vyākāraṇa*, the methodical study of natural language. Zeno begins with the geometer's axioms about lines, points and planes, while Nāgārjuna begins with Pāṇini and Patañjali's definitions of action, agent, patient and instrument. The worlds of conceptual analysis may be so far apart that we can attach no significance to the apparent likeness in the conclusions reached by Zeno and Nāgārjuna, especially in the conclusion that there is no motion. Agreeing with Ingalls, Bhattacharya expresses the view that very nearly every modern interpreter of Mādhyamaka has failed to pay sufficient attention to Nāgārjuna's indebtedness to the worldview of the classical Indian grammatical tradition, and especially to the genius of Patañjali.²⁴ Bhattacharya finds it significant that hardly a single argument used by Nāgārjuna was unknown to the grammatical tradition. It is his indebtedness to the grammarians that distinguished Nāgārjuna from those Buddhists that preceded him and from the Greeks and such modern European thinkers as Kant, for whom mathematics was the supreme tool of analysis.

What one might conclude from Bhattacharya's work — Bhattacharya himself does not explicitly draw this conclusion — is that Nāgārjuna's contribution to Buddhism was the return of Buddhist thinking to the heartland of brahmanical intellectualism and hermeneutical methodology. Indeed, for all its apparently radical criticisms of commonly accepted ideas, Nāgārjuna's work is among the first pieces of Buddhist literature to bear all the earmarks of classical brahmanical ways of thinking. Not only can Nāgārjuna be given much of the credit for bringing Buddhism to the intelligentsia, but he can also be given much of the credit for bringing a certain kind of systematic argumentation into Buddhism.

4.6. *Nāgārjuna's philosophical goal: a reprise*

Taking up the hints provided by Bhattacharya, one might describe the philosophical importance of Nāgārjuna's work in something like the

following way. First, one of the most fundamental insights of the Sanskrit grammarians was that language does not directly relate to things as they really are in the world; rather, language is purely the result of a speaker's desire to depict a given situation in a given way. It is the speaker who decides which factors in a complex situation to mention and which to ignore; it is the speaker who decides which factors will be emphasized among those that are mentioned at all. There is nothing in the world that compels anyone to speak in any way. There is nothing that demands to be said at all, and there is especially nothing in the situation of the world that demands that things be said in a particular way. Speaking is willful activity that must be preceded by a desire to have others know one's thoughts. To this basic insight of the grammarians, one can add certain Buddhist doctrines about desire, arriving then at the following conclusions. One who is free of all desire has nothing to say. But the desire to speak is perhaps the last of the desires to be abandoned. What Nāgārjuna's analysis of the categories of speech may be intended to do, therefore, is to reinforce this insight of the grammarians, and simultaneously to reinforce the message of Buddhism. By seeing thoroughly into the intrinsic willfulness of speaking, and by seeing also that speaking is an action that can only create confusion in the final analysis, one may eventually abandon the desire to speak. And if one can abandon the desire to speak, one can easily abandon the desire to know.

The importance of abandoning the desires to speak and to know may become more clear by turning once again to a verse that has already been examined briefly. In the discussion of Nāgārjuna's philosophical goal (see Section 2 above), mention was made of verse MMK 24:18:

yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe|
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā||

We claim that dependent origination is emptiness. To be empty is to be a derivative idea. That alone is the middle path.

In the light of the insights provided by Bhattacharya, let us examine

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the implications of this verse once again. First, it should be borne in mind that the expression "pratīya-samutpāda" literally means: "coming into being (*samutpāda*) after acquiring (*pratīya* = *prāpya*) something." What it means to say that something comes into being after acquiring something is explained by Nāgārjuna through the gloss that he himself provides to the term "pratīya samutpāda." He tells us that "coming into being" means "becoming apparent" or "becoming an object of knowledge." This interpretation is suggested by the gloss that Nāgārjuna gives to the term "samutpāda," namely, "prajñapti." This latter word literally means "the act of making someone aware of something" or "the act of bringing something to one's attention." Therefore we can say that for Nāgārjuna "to come into being" is equivalent in meaning to "to become an object of attention". Now it is said that the act of coming into being, or becoming an object of awareness is subsequent to another act, namely, the act of acquiring (*prati*). The name for this action is glossed by Nāgārjuna by the verb "upādā." This verb has special significance in Buddhism. It names the action of clinging or being attached.²⁵ What this means, then, is that as a result of one's attachments, one creates the objects of one's own experience.

The stock list of attachments in Buddhism comprises four items: (1) attachment to pleasures (*kāma*), (2) attachment to views (*drṣṭi*), (3) attachment to habitual modes of behaviour (*śīla-vrata*), and (4) attachment to belief in a self (*ātmavāda*). Each of these attachments influences the kinds of things of which one becomes aware. Thus, attachment to pleasures brings about the fact that we tend to experience either what we wish to experience and take pleasure in experiencing or what we wish to avoid and find pain in experiencing; that which evokes neither pleasure nor pain tends not to be noticed. Attachment to views brings about the fact that we tend to experience what we believe we will experience; that is, we tend to notice mostly what reinforces our beliefs and opinions and easily overlook what challenges our most firmly held beliefs. Attachment to habitual patterns of behaviour brings about the fact that we tend to experience what we are accustomed to experiencing; that is, we notice what we have conditioned ourselves to notice. And attachment to belief in a self brings about the fact that we tend to place ourselves at the centre of all experience; that is, we see ourselves as perceiving subjects and the

rest of the world as objects either to be drawn into or eliminated from the horizons of our awareness. This world of experience as conditioned through various kinds of attachment is, however, said to be empty. Realizing the emptiness of all things is realizing that we would have no experiences at all without desire and craving. One who has no desire, according to this view, has no perceptions — that is, no interpretations of sensations. One who has no desires has only pure, uninterpreted sensations that are unmediated by language, unexpressed in language, unaccompanied by thought, and unaffected by attraction or aversion. One who has no desires also has no sense of self, no identity.

The general pronouncement that attachments are the immediate cause of things coming into being comes, of course, straight from classical Buddhism. The special insight that desire is also at the root of language, and also of the kinds of thinking that one does about experience, can be seen to stem from the grammatical tradition. Nāgārjuna's insight that attachments are the immediate cause of perception, in the sense of interpreting what is brought to the senses, can be described as a combination of the Buddhist view with the insight of the classical grammatical tradition, with which Nāgārjuna was clearly quite familiar.

5. THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF SILENCE

In Section 4 several interpretations of Nāgārjuna's presentation of Buddhism were compared and criticized. In the present section an attempt will be made to show the implications of three of these different interpretations by examining how each deals with the question of the Buddha's refusal to answer certain questions.

As is well known and often repeated, the Canonical tradition of Buddhism records that the Buddha refused to answer fourteen questions. These questions are called the undetermined or unexplained issues (*avyākataṅga*, *avyākṛtavastūni*). According to the texts, the Buddha said "I have not determined whether (1) The world is eternal (*sassato loko*), (2) the world is non-eternal (*asassato loko*), (3) the world has boundaries (*antavā loko*), (4) the world is unbounded (*anantavā loko*), (5) life is the physical body (*taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ*), (6) life is one thing and the physical body is another (*aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ*), (7) one who knows the truth exists after death (*hoti*

tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā), (8) one who knows the truth does not exist after death (*na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā*), (9) one who knows the truth both exists and does not exist after death (*hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā*), (10) one who knows the truth neither exists nor does not exist after death (*neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā*), (11) discontent is caused by oneself (*sayam kataṃ dukkham*), (12) discontent is caused by another (*paraṃ kataṃ dukkham*), (13) discontent is caused by both oneself and another (*sayam katañ ca paraṃ katañ ca hoti*), or (14) discontent, being caused neither by oneself nor by another, arises spontaneously (*asayaṃkāraṃ aparaṃkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ dukkham*).” Different scholars have offered different explanations for why the Buddha chose not to indicate whether he agreed or disagreed with those fourteen statements.

5.1. T. R. V. Murti's explanation

According to Murti, the Buddha's refusal to answer these questions was grounded in his realization that the categories of Reason, which deal with polar opposites such as identity versus difference, and existence versus nonexistence, are incapable of capturing the nature of the Absolute. Thus he says

The formulation of the problems in the thesis-antithesis form is itself evidence of the awareness of the conflict in Reason. That the conflict is not on the empirical level and so not capable of being settled by appeal to facts is realised by the Buddha when he declares them insoluble. Reason involves itself in deep and interminable conflict when it tries to go beyond phenomena to seek their ultimate ground. Speculative metaphysics provokes not only difference but also opposition; if one theorist says 'yes' to a question, the other says 'no' to the same. . . . [The Buddha] is conscious of the interminable nature of the conflict, and resolves it by rising to the higher standpoint of criticism. Dialectic was born. To Buddha, then, belongs the honour of having discovered the Dialectic long before anything approximating to it was formulated in the West. . . . Criticism is deliverance of the human mind from all entanglements and passions (Murti, 1960, pp. 40—41).

The questions are about the Unconditioned. Buddha is alive, unlike other philosophers, to the insuperable difficulties (*ādinavaṃ sampassamāno*) in conceiving the Transcendent in terms of the empirical. . . . [The Tathāgato] is deep and unfathomable like the ocean. To say with regard to the ocean that it begins here or that it does not, etc., would be a piece of irrelevance. Likewise, the Tathāgata, as the totality of things, is beyond predication.

5.2. David Kalupahana's explanation

David Kalupahana argues that the Buddha remained silent on these issues because he accepted only what could be experienced through the senses, whereas these fourteen propositions dealt with matters that could not be decided by sensual experience.

Since no answer based on experience is possible, the Buddha remained silent when pressed for an answer and maintained that the questions as to whether the *tathāgata* exists (*hoti*) or arises (*uppajjati*), does not exist or does not arise, both or neither, do not fit the case (*na upeti*) (Kalupahana, 1976, p. 157).

Kalupahana rejects Murti's notion that the Buddha's silence stemmed from his unwillingness to attribute categories to the Absolute. There is no textual justification in the Pāli Canon for Murti's contention that the Buddha was concerned with questions of the Absolute or with anything Transcendental. Rather, says Kalupahana, the Buddha realized that our only source of knowledge is our own perfectly ordinary experience of the everyday world, and we have no means of going beyond the limitations of that experience. Kalupahana then goes on to outline three objections that the Buddha has to what Kalupahana calls "metaphysical" knowledge. These three objections are: (1) Metaphysical theories have no basis in our ordinary experience, and they cannot be verified by empirical investigation. (2) Metaphysicians attempt to determine in advance what must be true and ignore what their senses tell them is true. (3) Metaphysical propositions are strings of words that may appear meaningful because they conform to rules of grammar, but turn out to be meaningless when examined more closely.

This is the Logical Positivist criticism of metaphysics and is found in the early Buddhist texts. . . . As the Logical Positivists themselves maintain, these metaphysical statements are meaningless because they are not verified in experience (Kalupahana, 1976, p. 158).

Kalupahana's proof text for this Positivist anti-metaphysical stance is the Sabba-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya:

Monks, I will teach you 'everything'. Listen to it. What, monks, is 'everything'? Eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and odor, tongue and taste, body and tangible objects, mind and mental objects. These are called 'everything'. Monks, he who would

say: "I will reject this *everything* and proclaim another *everything*," he may certainly have a theory. But when questioned, he would not be able to answer and would, moreover, be subject to vexation. Why? Because it would not be within the range of experience (*avisaya*) (Kalupahana, 1976, p. 158).

5.3. The Buddha's explanation

Both Murti and Kalupahana can be seen to have gratuitously offered an anachronistic interpretation of the Buddha's silence. One need not, however, find exotic modern interpretations of the Buddha's silence, since the very texts in which his refusal to answer questions is reported also report his own explanation of why he chose to remain silent on certain issues. The Buddha's own explanation for why he had not determined the answers to these fourteen questions is given, among other places, in the Poṭṭhapādasutta of the Dīghanikāya:

"Why, venerable sir, has the Lord not determined?"

"Because, Poṭṭhapāda, this is not connected to a purpose, nor is it connected to virtue, nor is it connected with the life of purity, nor does it lead to humility, nor to dispassion, nor to cessation, nor to tranquility, nor to superior understanding, nor to supreme awakening, nor to nirvana. Therefore, I have not determined."

"What has the Lord determined, Venerable sir?"

"I have determined that this is discontent, this is the cause of discontent, this is the cessation of discontent, and this is the path leading to the cessation of discontent."²⁶

The Buddha then concludes that he has taught the Four Noble Truths because these truths are connected to a purpose, are connected to virtue, are connected with the life of purity, do lead to humility, and dispassion, and cessation, and tranquility, and superior understanding, and supreme awakening, and nirvana.

In the Cuḷa-Māluṅkyasutta of the Majjhimanikāya the Buddha gives an answer very much like the one he gave to Poṭṭhapāda. But in this sutta he adds:

Living the life of purity does not depend on the view that the world is eternal, nor does it depend on the view that the world is not eternal. Whether or not the world is eternal or not eternal, there definitely is birth, growing old, dying, grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair. And I have explained how to bring those things to an end here and now.

He then applies exactly this same formula to the other thirteen questions. The evidence of these two passages supports the conclusion that

the Buddha did not answer these questions for the simple reason that they are not relevant to the cultivation of good character and the quest for an end to discontent. But this does not indicate a commitment either to Murti's Absolutism or to Kalupahana's Logical Positivism.

A somewhat more elaborate answer can be found in the *Samyuttanikāya* 4.391. There the Buddha also says he has no answers to these fourteen questions. When asked why he does not determine the answer, he replies:

Let me ask you what is the reason why the wandering ascetics with other views try to answer these questions, whereas Gotama the recluse does not try to answer them. The reason is that other wandering ascetics think that the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind either belong to them or are their selves or are part of their selves. But the Tathāgata, being a fully awakened Arahant, does not think of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body or mind as belonging to him, nor does he think of them "These are my self." The Tathāgata, unlike other wandering ascetics, also does not regard feelings, perception, mentality or awareness as things that belong to him or as being himself or as being part of himself. There is nothing about which the Tathāgata says "This is mine. This is I. This is my self."

The argument of this latter passage could be summarized as follows: Someone who thinks of the living body or the mind as the self or as belonging to the self recognizes that the body and mind are both impermanent. Those who think in this way then become filled with fear that they will cease to exist. Because they are filled with a desire to live (*jīvitumkāma*) and a desire not to die (*amaritukāma*), they believe what they want to believe: there is life after death. Some people, on the other hand, are attached to pleasures and wish to pursue pleasures without regard to how their actions will affect other living beings. These people, who choose not to be responsible in their actions, believe what they want to believe: there is no life after death. The Tathāgata, on the other hand, realizes that all discontent arises from ignorance, which takes the form of identifying the body and the mind as the self. When this identification comes to an end, so does all discontent. One can then face all changes and all kinds of experience with calm and dignity.

The *Samyuttanikāya* passage would suggest that the Buddha's reason for avoiding giving answers to the celebrated fourteen questions was not because the questions presupposed the existence of polar opposites that could be subsumed under an all-embracing Absolute,

nor because he was a pure empiricist who disdained metaphysics, but rather because he recognized that all possible answers to these questions presuppose the existence of an enduring self. But if the existence of such a self is denied, then no predicates can truly be predicated of it. If no unicorns exist, then it is as false to say "The unicorn is white" as it is to say "The unicorn is not white." In other words, refusing to give answers to the fourteen questions was the Buddha's way of denying the existence of an enduring self.

When it is recalled that denying the existence of an enduring self was also very much the principal task of both the *ābhidharmikas* and Nāgārjuna, it turns out that (1) the *ābhidharmikas* need not be seen as in any way spoiling or misconstruing the basic teachings of the Buddha, and (2) Nāgārjuna need not be seen as taking any kind of radical turn either from the Buddha or from the *ābhidharmikas*. On the contrary, the Buddha, the *ābhidharmikas* and Nāgārjuna appear to be following almost exactly the same philosophical trajectory.

6. CONCLUSION

In the preface of his study of Western interpretations of Nāgārjuna, Andrew P. Tuck (1990, p. v) makes the claim that it is a "common-place of contemporary scholarship" that the interpretations that scholars give of texts are "isogetical: they reveal far more about the views of scholars and their scholarly eras than exegesis is said to do." It should be noted that the primary purpose of Tuck's study is not to offer a history of scholarship on Nāgārjuna, but rather to use some recent studies of Nāgārjuna as illustrations of the process of isogesis at work. Isogesis is, according to Tuck (p. 10), a largely unconscious process whereby an interpreter unwittingly reads a set of biases and unexamined presuppositions into a text; these prejudices are said to stem from such sources as the interpreter's basic temperament as well as from all kinds of social conditioning and indoctrination. This being the focal interest of his work, Tuck naturally (and presumably deliberately) gives far more attention to Stcherbatsky and Murti, whose work serves better to illustrate his thesis, than to scholars such as Schayer, in whose work the phenomenon of isogesis is somewhat less in evidence. Tuck gives no mention at all to the important contributions of

Ruegg, Lindtner and Bhattacharya, who appear to come very close to the ideal of detached and scientific objectivity in scholarship that Tuck suggests is little more than an ideological remnant of nineteenth century mythology promoted by such thinkers as Schleiermacher and Dilthey.

In light of what was seen above in Section 4, it may be tempting to agree with Tuck's claim that twentieth century scholarship on Nāgārjuna reveals much more about the preoccupations of twentieth century intellectuals than about Nāgārjuna and his contemporaries, for it certainly does appear to be the case that the interpretations of Nāgārjuna's thought presented by Stcherbatsky, Murti, Warder, Kalupahana, Magliola, Dilworth and Huntington all reflect trends in nineteenth and twentieth century European thinking far more than they reflect trends in classical Indian thought. That notwithstanding, we have seen plenty of counter-evidence to Tuck's thesis as well; the works of Schayer, Robinson, Bhattacharya, Ruegg and Williams all seem far more exegetical than isogetical, and, except for the fact that they all refer to and find fault with post-Kantian interpretations, they bear few characteristics that would identify them as works of the twentieth century.²⁷

On looking at trends in twentieth century scholarship on Nāgārjuna, one can discern two fairly distinct styles, which seem to correspond to the traditional approaches known as exegesis and hermeneutics. Roughly speaking, the former attempts to discover what a text meant in the time it was written, while the latter attempts to find the meaning of a text for the time in which the interpreter lives. Exegesis tends to be confined mostly to the accumulation and ordering of philological, historical and textual data, while hermeneutics attempts to make those data not only intelligible but also relevant to the concerns of people in the present. These two traditional approaches begin with somewhat different questions and therefore yield somewhat different results. As long as scholars are clear in their own minds about which of these approaches they are taking and which approach other scholars are taking, there is no reason for those who take one approach to decry the work done by those who take the other. It is as pointless to accuse the historian of being a bad philosopher as to accuse the philosopher or the preacher of being a bad historian.

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What I have attempted to do in the present study, however, is not to adjudicate in the disputes that have occasionally erupted between historical-minded exegetes and philosophically engaged interpreters. Rather, what I have tried to do is simply to show that a close look at Nāgārjuna's work in the context in which it was written reveals that Nāgārjuna put forth a number of fallacious arguments. In particular, I have tried to show that he made frequent use of the fallacy of equivocation. Owing to his use of this and other fallacies, the conclusions he puts forth do not necessarily follow from the evidence he adduces for them. An attempt has been made to show that this fallaciousness in Nāgārjuna's writing has been seen by some modern interpreters not as a vice but as a rather interesting virtue; for it has been seen by some as a clue that Nāgārjuna deliberately rejected standard logic in favour of a deviant logic by which one might simultaneously hold two contradictory views with impunity. While such an hypothesis, if true, might give modern proponents of deviant logic, or to outright opponents of logic of any kind, the sort of comfort that attends finding famous and highly respected antecedents to one's own position, I contend that the hypothesis is in fact unlikely to be true. On the contrary, it appears to me on examining the textual evidence that Nāgārjuna had a set of definitely stated doctrines for which he was trying to produce a systematically arranged set of rational arguments. That he failed in this task does not diminish his importance within the history of Buddhist philosophy. It merely shows him to have been a thinker who displayed about the same degree of fallibility as most other human beings. But being an imperfect philosopher need not at all reduce Nāgārjuna's appeal, either to historians of philosophy or to philosophers themselves.

APPENDIX

A. TRANSLATIONS OF NĀGĀRJUNA'S
MŪLA-MADHYAMAKA-KĀRIKĀ CHAPTER 15

In order to illustrate the different strategies that different modern translators have taken in handling Nāgārjuna's mercurial use of the term "svabhāva," the verses of chapter 15 are given below, along with

the translations found in Streng (1967), Inada (1970), Sprung (1979) and Kalupahana (1986), as well as my translation. Schayer's (1931, pp. 55–80) rendering does not appear here, because he chose to avoid altogether translating the key terms, preferring simply to import the Sanskrit terms "bhāva", "svabhāva", "abhāva", "parabhāva" and "prakṛti" into his German translation; his title for the fifteenth chapter of the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*, however, is 'Kritik der Lehre von dem absoluten Sein,' suggesting that he took the most important sense of "svabhāva" under consideration to be that of unconditioned being.

na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet || 1 |

- Streng:* The production of a self-existent thing by a conditioning cause is not possible, [for,] being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent thing would be "something which is produced."
- Inada:* The rise of self-nature by relational and causal conditions is not justifiable. For, such a self-nature will have a character of being made or manipulated.
- Sprung:* The genesis of a self-existent nature from causes and conditions is not intelligible. A self-existent nature which arises from causes and conditions would be something created.
- Kalupahana:* The occurrence of self-nature through causes and conditions is not proper. Self-nature that has occurred as a result of causes and conditions would be something that is made.
- Hayes:* Birth of an independent thing from causes and conditions is not reasonable. An independent thing born from causes and conditions would be a fabrication.

svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham
akṛtimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca || 2 ||

- Streng:* How, indeed, will a self-existent thing *become* "something which is produced"? Certainly, a self-existent thing

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[by definition] is "not produced" and is independent of anything else.

- Inada:* How is it possible for the self-nature to take on the character of being made? For, indeed, the self-nature refers to something which cannot be made and has no mutual correspondence with something else.
- Sprung:* How can a self-existent nature be something created? Self-existent nature is not created nor is it dependent on anything other than itself.
- Kalupahana:* Again, how could there be a self-nature that is made? Indeed, an unmade self-nature is also non-contingent upon another.
- Hayes:* But how could an independent thing be called a fabrication, given that an independent thing is not a fabrication and is independent of anything else?

kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati
svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate || 3 ||

- Streng:* If there is an absence of a self-existent thing, how will an other-existent thing come into being? Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing is called "other-existence."
- Inada:* Where self-nature is non-existent, how could there be an extended nature? For, indeed, a self-nature which has the nature of being extended will be called an extended nature.
- Sprung:* If there is no self-existence, how can there be existence of otherness? For it is the self-existence of the existence of otherness which is called 'existence of otherness'.
- Kalupahana:* In the absence of self-nature, whence can there be other-nature? For, self-nature of other-nature is called other-nature.
- Hayes:* How, in the absence of an identifiable thing, could there be a difference, given that the identity of a different thing is called a differentia?

svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām rte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ
svabhāva parabhāve vā sati bhāvo hi sidhyati || 4 ||

- Streng:* Further, how can a thing [exist] without either self-existence or other-existence? If either self-existence or other-existence exist, then an existing thing, indeed, would be proved.
- Inada:* Again, separated from self-nature and extended nature, how could existence be? For, indeed, existence establishes itself in virtue of either self-nature or extended nature.
- Sprung:* How can there be an entity apart from self-existence and other-existence? If there is either self-existence or other-existence entities are already established.
- Kalupahana:* Without self-nature and other-nature, whence can there be an existent? For, the existent is established only when there is self-nature or other-nature.
- Hayes:* How can there be existence without either independence or dependence, given that existence is established when there is either independence or dependence?

bhāvasya ced aprasiddhir abhāvo naiva sidhyati
bhāvasya hy anyathābhāvam abhāvaṃ bruvate janāḥ || 5 ||

- Streng:* If there is no proof of an existent thing, then a non-existent thing cannot be proved. Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a “non-existent” thing.
- Inada:* If existence does not come to be (i.e., does not establish itself), then certainly non-existence does not also. For, indeed, people speak of existence in its varying nature as non-existence.
- Sprung:* If existence is not accepted, non-existence cannot be established. Because people say that non-existence is being other than existence.
- Kalupahana:* When the existent is not established, the non-existent is also not established. It is, indeed, the change of the existent that people generally call the non-existent.
- Hayes:* If an existent is not established, an absence is certainly

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not established, given that people call the change of state of an existent its ceasing to be present.

svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvaṃ eva ca
ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane || 6 ||

- Streng:* Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent thing and a non-existent thing, do not perceive the true nature of the Buddha's teaching.
- Inada:* Those who see (i.e., try to understand) the concepts of self-nature, extended nature, existence, or non-existence do not perceive the real truth in the Buddha's teaching.
- Sprung:* Those who think in terms of self-existence, other-existence, existence and non-existence do not grasp the truth of the Buddha's teaching.
- Kalupahana:* Those who perceive self-nature as well as other-nature, existence as well as non-existence, they do not perceive the truth embodied in the Buddha's message.
- Hayes:* They who perceive identity, difference, presence and absence do not perceive the truth in the Buddha's instruction.

kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayaṃ
pratiśiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā || 7 ||

- Streng:* In “The Instruction to Kātyāyana” both “it is” and “it is not” are opposed by the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning of “existent” and “non-existent.”
- Inada:* According to the Instructions to Kātyāyana, the two views of the world in terms of being and non-being were criticized by the Buddha for similarly admitting the bifurcation of entities into existence and non-existence.
- Sprung:* In the *Kātyāyanāvavāda Sūtra*, the illustrious one, who comprehends existence and non-existence, repudiated both thoughts: that something is that something is not.
- Kalupahana:* In the admonition to Kātyāyana, the two theories [implying] ‘exists’ and ‘does not exist’ have been refuted

by the Blessed One who is adept in existence as well as in non-existence.

Hayes: In the *Kātyāyanāvāda* the Lord, who clearly saw presence and absence, denied both the view that one exists and the view that one does not exist.

yady astitvaṃ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstītā
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jatūpapadyate || 8 ||

Streng: If there would be an existent thing by its own nature, there could not be "non-existence" of that [thing]. Certainly an existent thing different from its own nature would never obtain.

Inada: If existence is in virtue of primal nature, then its non-existence does not follow. For, indeed, a varying character of a primal nature is not possible at all.

Sprung: If it is the nature of something to exist, it cannot cease to exist. Real change of the nature of something is not logically possible.

Kalupahana: If existence were to be in terms of primal nature, then there would not be its non-existence. A change of primal nature is certainly not appropriate.

Hayes: If a thing were to exist by nature, then it could not fail to exist, for the change of state of a nature is certainly not possible.

prakṛtau kasya cāsatyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati
prakṛtau kasya satyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati || 9 ||

Streng: [An opponent asks:] If there is no basic self-nature, of what will there be "otherness"? [Nāgārjuna answers:] If there is basic self-nature, of what will there be "otherness"?

Inada: If primal nature does not exist, what will possess the varying character? If, on the other hand, primal nature does exist, what then will possess the varying character?

Sprung: If things have no inherent nature what is it that will

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change? If things have an inherent nature what is it that will change?

Kalupahana: When primal nature is not-existent, whose change would there be? When primal nature is existent, whose change would there be?

Hayes: And in the absence of a nature, what can undergo the process of change? On the other hand, if a nature is present, what can undergo the process of change?

astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīti ucchedadarśanam
tasmād astitvanāstīti nāstīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ || 10 ||

Streng: "It is" is a notion of eternity. "It is not" is a nihilistic view. Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse to "being" or "non-being".

Inada: Existing is the grasping of permanency (i.e., permanent characteristics) and non-existence the perception of disruption. (As these functions are not strictly possible), the wise should not rely upon (the concepts of) existence and non-existence.

Sprung: To say 'things are in being' is the eternalist view; to say 'Things are not in being' is the naturalist view. Therefore thinking man should not resort to the twin beliefs in existence and non-existence.

Kalupahana: "Exists" implies grasping after eternalism. 'Does not exist' implies the philosophy of annihilation. Therefore, a discerning person should not rely upon either existence or non-existence.

Hayes: The notion of perpetuity is that one exists; the notion of destruction is that one fails to exist. Therefore, a wise person should not experience existence or non-existence.

asti yad dhi svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śāśvatam
nāstīdānīm abhūt pūrvam ity ucchedaḥ prasajyate || 11 ||

Streng: That which exists by its own nature is eternal since "it does not not-exist." If it is maintained: "That which existed

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GOING OR KNOWING? THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF LIVING LIBERATION IN THE UPANIṢADS

The idea of liberation while living or *jīvanmukti* has been much discussed in Advaita Vedānta and other schools of Indian thought. The notion of *jīvanmukti* found in Advaita was developed and elaborated over many centuries, and did not become a formal doctrine until after the time of Śaṅkara, Advaita's founder.¹ Still, the basic elements of the Advaitin conception of *jīvanmukti* can be traced back to the earliest Upaniṣads. There we find both the idea that one (or one's essential being) gains immortality (eternal life) in a heavenly realm only after leaving the body and the rudiments of a conception of liberation (and immortality) while living by knowing *ātman*/brahman identity.² This liberation (*mukti*, *mokṣa*) by nondual knowledge takes one beyond both the life-and-death cycle of *samsāra* and any "physical" or material heavenly realm.³

Many scholars have noted that early Indian religious texts describe liberation not as knowing the self but as reaching a heavenly realm (*brahma* or *svarga loka*), i.e. "going somewhere" in time and space. In some early Upaniṣads, one is said to gain these realms by following the path (*yāna*) of the gods (*deva*) or the fathers (*pitṛ*); these paths required the performance of sacrificial acts, faith (*śraddhā*) and/or asceticism.⁴ From this view, liberation and immortality are tied to a place, albeit a heavenly and blissful place, which lacks the sorrow and frustration of our human realm. This view also implies that one gains liberation and immortality only after death, since only then does one reach heavenly realms. The notion that one goes to another realm by the path of the gods is called by later Advaitins "liberation by stages" (*krama-mukti*), in contrast to immediate (*sadyo*) or living (*jīvan*) liberation.⁵

As the ideas of karma and rebirth take hold, however, it becomes apparent that for most beings even a heaven is temporary, and one must eventually (and repeatedly) return to this realm of suffering and